

THE UNIVERSITY OF HULL

***The United Malays National Organization (UMNO)***  
***1981-1991:***  
***A Study of the Mechanics of a changing Political***  
***Culture.***

being a Thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

in the Centre for South East Asian Studies,  
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by

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## Preface

This study is the result of a life interest in the Malays and their remarkable impact on Malaysian political history. I was involved in youth politics in the 1970's, and in UMNO, from being an ordinary member in the late 1960's, to an UMNO activist after 1976 when I became involved in an urban-based UMNO Division in the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur. Later on I was active in my home town, in a rural UMNO Division. When the UMNO Baru was formed in 1988, I was elected Permanent Chairman of this UMNO Division. I have observed UMNO meetings at Branch, and Divisional levels. At the same time I have observed UMNO General Assemblies as one of the Divisional representatives. I am translating all these experiences and observations that I have gathered historically, into an ethnographic study carried out as a participant observer.

I felt certain, as was evidenced in the literature and journals between 1981 and 1991, that there was indeed, a growing political interest among the Malays which had been the result of their socio-economic modernization. I consider the period 1981-1991 as a critical era in Malay politics, because of the many major occurrences of dynamic development in Malaysian politics. Education and socio-economic development have mobilized the Malays and shaped Malay political culture.

I have used Malay written sources as much as possible because they have had a strong influence on the developing Malay political culture. Many of these writings have had a tremendous impact on politics. My task is to clarify the Malay view on their political beliefs and orientations. I therefore hope that from this historical context, the study will give a better understanding of Malay political thinking.

It is important to note that I have been fortunate to meet many activists from UMNO, PAS and Semangat 46, and eminent and grassroots people who were willing to discuss and to be interviewed for this study, even though most of them refused to have their names mentioned.

I found the guidance of Dr Clive.J.Christie of the Centre for South East Asian Studies at the University of Hull, greatly enriched my knowledge. I am also indebted to Melanie Brailford and Derek Tillott who gave great assistance in editing the draft of this thesis.

My sincere gratitude goes to the Arkib Negara Malaysia, the Librarians of the University of Hull, Universiti Utara Malaysia, University of Malaya, Universiti Sains Malaysia and Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia.

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I am particularly indebted to Universiti Utara Malaysia and the Malaysian Public Service Department for granting me study leave and financial assistance under the Bumiputera Academic Training Scheme (SLAB), without which this research could not have been done.

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## *Table of Contents*

1. <i>Preface</i>	i
2. <i>Table of Contents</i>	iii
3. <i>Illustrations</i>	iv
4. <i>Abbreviations</i>	vi
5. <i>Glossary</i>	ix
5. <i>Introduction</i>	xi-xxxi
 <b>5. <i>Part One: Structure and Development.</i></b>	
<i>Chapter I.</i> Malay Political Culture: Tradition and Change	1-46
<i>Chapter II.</i> The UMNO 1945-1981: Organizational Development.	47-93
 <b>7. <i>Part Two: Factors Affecting Malay Political Culture.</i></b>	
<i>Chapter III.</i> Modernity and Tradition: The Conflict of Interest	94-138
<i>Chapter IV.</i> Islamic Fundamentalism and Malay Nationalism: The Conflict of Ideology.	139-183
<i>Chapter V.</i> Mahathirism and The Challengers: The Conflict of Leadership.	184-227
 <b>8. <i>Part Three: The Changes in Malay Political Culture.</i></b>	
<i>Chapter VI.</i> The Grand Finale: From Faction to Fraction	228-272
<i>Chapter VII.</i> The General Election in 1990: Malay Political Warfare.	273-323
<i>Chapter VIII.</i> Malay Political Culture in UMNO: Present and Future.	324-370
9. <i>Conclusion</i>	371-392
10. <i>Appendix</i>	393-401
A. The chronology of the formation of UMNO Baru and Semangat 46.	
B. The UMNO Supreme Council 1984-1987.	
11. <i>Bibliography</i>	402-424



## *Illustrations.*

### *Figure*

1.The Map of Parliamentary Constituencies and UMNO Divisions 1984-1991.	xb.
2.The structure of UMNO based on the 1955 Constitution.	53b
3.The structure of UMNO based on the 1960 Constiution.	57b.
4.The Committee and Bureaux of the Central UMNO 1984-1987.	58b.
5.The Barisan Nasional Supreme Committee 1986.	75b.
6.The organizational structure of state Barisan Nasional's Election Committee.	76b
7. UMNO's Corporate Investment: the Fleet Holding's Group Corporate Structure.	105b.
8.The organizational Structure of UMNO 1990-1993	354b.

### *Tables.*

I.UMNO Divisions and State Electoral Voters for The Malay Peninsula in 1984.	61
II.The number of students at the University of Malaya by race within each faculty for the year 1967-1968.	98.
III.The salary scheme of Malaysian politicians 1980-1992.	115b.
IV.Percentage of nomination for three top post in the UMNO Election 1987.	236b.
V.The list of delegates in the 1987 General Assembly perceived by Team A and B.	237b.
VI.Margin of victory for three top posts in the 1987 UMNO Election.	255b.
VII.The result of the 1987 election of the UMNO Supreme Council members.	256b.
VIII.The distribution of UMNO leaders in the cabinet reshuffle in May 1987.	260.
IX.UMNO Malaysia Protem Committee on February 8, 1988.	264
X.UMNO Baru Protem Supreme Council members on February 21, 1988.	267-268

XI.The result of the first election of Semangat 46 Supreme Council members on October 11, 1989.	275b.
XII.State of parties on October 22, 1990 (Parliamentary seats).	297b.
XIII.State of parties on October 22, 1990 (States Assemblies seats).	302-303.
XIV.Semangat 46 battle ground in the 1990 General election.	313.
XV. Total votes at the 1990 General Election for Malay political parties in the Malay Peninsula. 317.	
XVI.Political parties in the Dewan Rakyat in 1986 and 1990. 320.	
XVII. The result of the 1990 Election for parliamentary seats in Kelantan.	322.
XVIII. UMNO members until November 1991.	342.
XIX. The nomination from Divisions and total votes secured by the candidates for Vice Presidency in the 1990 UMNO Election.	354
XX. The nominations and results of the 1990 Election of UMNO Supreme Council members.	360-361

### *Abbreviations*

ABIM	Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (The Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement).
APU	Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah (The Muslim Unity Front).
ATMA	Angkatan Tindakan Mahasiswa [Students Action Front]
Belia 4B	Gerakan Belia 4B Malaysia (The 4B Youth Movement of Malaysia).
BTN	Biro Tata Negara (the National Civic Bureau).
DAP	Democratic Action Party.
DEB	Dasar Ekonomi Baru (the New Economic Policy- NEP)
EAEG	East Asian Economic Group [Caucus]
GPMS	Gabungan Pelajar Melayu Semenanjung (The Federation of Malay Student Union).
IRC	Islamic Representative Council (presently known as Majlis Sura Muslimun , MSM).
ISEAS	Institute of the Southeast Asian Studies.
JMBRAS	Journal of the Malaysian Branch Royal Asiatic Society.
JSEAH	Journal of the South East Asian History.
JSEAS	Journal of the South East Asian Studies.
KMUK	Kesatuan Melayu United Kingdom (the United Kingdom Malay Union).
MAYC	Malaysian Association of Youth Clubs (Persatuan Kelab-kelab Belia Malaysia).
MCKK	Malay College Kuala Kangsar, Perak.

MKT	Majlis Kerja Tertinggi (the UMNO Supreme Executive Council).
MISG	Malaysian Islamic Study Group
NBI	National Bureau of Investigation (Biro Siasatan Negara -BSN, formerly known as Anti Corruption Bureau)
NST	New Straits Times
PAS	Parti Islam SeMalaysia (the Pan-Malaysia Islamic Party- PMIP).
PBS	Parti Bersatu Sabah (the Sabah United Party).
PLUS	Projek Lebuh-roya Utara Selatan (the North South Highway Project).
PRM	Parti Rakyat Malaya (the People Party of Malaya).
PTD	Perkhidmatan Tadbir dan Diplomatik (the Administrative and Diplomatic Service, formerly known as the Malayan Civil Service- MCS).
RIMA	Review of Indonesian and Malayan Affairs
RTM	Radio dan Television Malaysia (The government Broadcasting Agency).
SANYA	Sabah National Youth Association (Persatuan Kebangsaan Belia Sabah).
Semangat 46	Parti Semangat 46 ( the Spirit of 1946 Party).
Semarak	Setia Bersama Rakyat (Loyalty with the People).
SITC	Sultan Idris Teacher Training College.
TSB	Tindakan Siswa Bersatu (the United Student Front).
TV3	a private television station.
UKM	Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (the National University of Malaysia).
UMNO	The United Malays National Organization (Pertubuhan Kebangsaan Melayu Bersatu).

UMSU	The University of Malaya Students Union.
USNO	The United Sabah National Organization.

## *Glossary*

***Barisan Nasional*** a coalition of political parties led by UMNO. In fact, it was an extension of a *Perikatan* (alliance) of UMNO, MCA and MIC that was formed in 1953. After May 13, 1969, Tun Razak formed a coalition government in Pulau Pinang with Gerakan (GRM) and in Perak with Gerakan and PPP. PAS and UMNO agreed to cooperate in 1972. Barisan Nasional was officially formed on June 1, 1974

***Fitnah*** Slander in the form of gossip, distribution of surat layang (flying letters) and the publication of books containing character assassination of political leaders.

***Gagasan Rakyat*** The Peoples Front, a multi-racial opposition party that united the DAP, PBS, PRM, AIMPF and Semangat 46. The Semangat 46 coordinated the Gagasan and APU as a united opposition front in the 1990 General Election.

***Mesyuarat Agung Cawangan*** Branch Annual Meeting to discuss party matters, to elect representatives to the Divisional Conference, and to elect Branch Committee members.

***Pengkhianat*** Treachery (derhaka) and betrayals (khianat), are almost the same, both of which were considered by the ruling elite as disloyalty. Sang Rajuna Tapa, Kitul and Raja Mandeliar are among the palace chiefs who have been associated with subversive elements in Malay history, which contributed to the fall of Malay kingdoms in Temasik and Melaka respectively. They were considered penderhaka (traitors) to the *Raja* and pengkhianat (betrayers) of the *bangsa* (nation).

***Perhimpunan Agung UMNO*** UMNO General Assembly is a meeting of UMNO Divisional delegates throughout the country and is annually held in Kuala Lumpur to discuss matters of interest to the party, and the Triennial election of the Supreme Council.

***Pergerakan Pemuda UMNO*** The UMNO Youth Movement, when it was formed in 1949, was known as *Perikatan Pemuda* (the Youth League), the leader of Pemuda UMNO is called the *Ketua Pemuda UMNO* (Head of UMNO Youth).

***Pergerakan Wanita UMNO*** When it was introduced in 1947 this UMNO female wing, was known as the *Pergerakan Kaum Ibu UMNO* (UMNO Women's Movement). It was legally formed in the 1949 Constitution. In 1971 its name was changed to *Pergerakan Wanita UMNO* and its leader is entitled *Ketua Wanita UMNO* (Head of UMNO Women).

***Persidangan Perwakilan Bahagian*** Divisional Representatives Conference, a meeting of representatives from UMNO Branches, to elect 10 Divisional delegates to the General Assembly and to elect members of the Divisional Committee every two years in the old UMNO Constitution and every three years in the new one.

**Revolusi Mental** An awareness campaign by the Pemuda UMNO in 1968 in order to change Malay attitudes to be congruent with political and socio-economic developments.

**Surat Layang** It means an anonymous flying letter or poison-pen letter. 'Surat layang' usually aims at character assassination. Politically, UMNO members were introduced to this culture in 1969. It became rampant in UMNO General Assemblies and reached a climax in the 1987 UMNO election. It seems to have become a tradition now. Even the Malays nowadays have become more daring in publishing books that promote and demolish political leaders.


**Team A** A faction in UMNO that was formed before the party election of 1987. The team has been led by Dr Mahathir, Ghaffar Baba and the majority of the UMNO Cabinet Ministers and Supreme Council members. Team A had its own supporters at State, Divisional and Branch level. Team A defended Dr Mahathir to continue leading UMNO and the government. When UMNO was defunct, Team A formed the so-called UMNO Baru in 1988.

**Team B** A faction opposing the Team A's leadership. It was led by Tengku Razaleigh to challenge Dr Mahathir's policies and leadership. This team managed to open the minds of UMNO members on the need to change its leadership. However this failed to be translated into votes, and Team B was defeated in the 1987 UMNO election. The Team dragged the battle of UMNO into the Courts which ended up with the demise of UMNO. They tried to revive the old UMNO through the registration a new party called *UMNO Malaysia*, but unsuccessfully. They also failed to deter the formation of UMNO Baru, but finally succeeded in forming *the Semangat 46* party.

**UMNO Baru** The present UMNO that was legally formed in 1988 and named the *Pertubuhan Kebangsaan Melayu Bersatu (Baru)* but constitutionally it was translated as UMNO. The mass media introduced it as UMNO Baru or New UMNO. However Dr Mahathir later corrected the press and wanted them to call it *UMNO*, not New UMNO or UMNO Baru.

Fig.1

The Map of Parliamentary Constituencies and UMNO Divisions 1984-1991.





## INTRODUCTION

The study of politics is the study of changing relationships in a dynamic society. Thus it involves an appreciation of history. The leadership of UMNO has been in the past a significant factor in influencing Malaysian politics. UMNO represents the Malays, the largest community in a multi-racial country. From 1955, UMNO led the *Perikatan* (Alliance) government, which subsequently grew into a coalition of *Barisan Nasional*<sup>1</sup> (the National Front) from 1974. Because the Malaysian government is a party government, it is, in many ways, more important to analyse and interpret developments in UMNO rather than the Barisan Nasional. To some extent, it appears that real power lies in the hands of the Cabinet and UMNO.<sup>2</sup>

Between 1981 and 1991, UMNO faced a series of crises that revealed changes in Malay political culture and created party conflict. This can be traced back to 1969, education and economic mobility having changed Malay thinking and attitudes. However, this change was disorganized and lacking in direction. Dr Mahathir was one who subscribed to this point of view and when he took political power, he took this opportunity to mould and guide such changes. His theses, *The Malay Dilemma* (1970),<sup>3</sup> and *The Challenge* (1976)<sup>4</sup> acquaint us with the basic ideas of Mahathirism and his vision for the country.<sup>5</sup>

Leadership and conflict are closely related to tradition, and in the system both make up the culture of an organization or society. Therefore, a political culture is the

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<sup>1</sup> Diane K. Mauzy, *The Barisan Nasional: Coalition Government of Malaysia*. (Kuala Lumpur: Marican, 1982).

<sup>2</sup> *Aliran Monthly*, 11 (11), 1991, p.7.

<sup>3</sup> Mahathir Bin Mohamad, *The Malay Dilemma* (Kuala Lumpur: Federal Publications, 1982), the first edition published by Donald Moore, Singapore. This book was banned by the Malaysian Government from 1970 until 1981.

<sup>4</sup> Mahathir Mohamad, *The Challenge* (Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk Publications, 1986), the Malay edition was published in 1976 by Pustaka Antara.

<sup>5</sup> See V. Kanapathy et al (eds.), *The Mahathir Era: Contribution to National Economic Development* (Petaling Jaya: International Investment Consultant, 1989); K.S. Jomo, *Malaysia's New Economic Policies: Evaluations of the Mid-Term Review of the Fourth Malaysia Plan* (Kuala Lumpur: Persatuan Ekonomi Malaysia, 1985); and Chung Kek Yoong, *Mahathir Administration: Leadership and Change in a Multi-racial Society* (Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk Publications, 1987).

product of the collective history of a political system and the life history of the individuals who concurrently make up the system.<sup>6</sup> Traditions, leadership, religion and ethnicity that oriented the attitudes, beliefs and sentiments towards the political process shaped the Malay political culture. To a certain extent, both the Malays and UMNO are equated with Islam. Therefore, to 'destroy' UMNO and the Malays would be seen as the destruction of Islam in Malaysia.<sup>7</sup> Therefore, the strength of Islam relies on the strength of Malay politics.<sup>8</sup> From the mid 1970's, the Islamic revivalists led by PAS and ABIM, exploited the Islamic resurgence to enhance their own political interests, in a politics of 'Holier than thou,'(lebih Islam) and an attempt to form an Islamic state as an alternative to UMNO's 'secular' government. They challenged the UMNO ideology of *Semangat Kebangsaan Melayu* (Malay Nationalism). By the early 1980's UMNO lost its unity of purpose when materialism and personal interest threatened its organizational goals. Therefore, as a result, few UMNO leaders came forward to defend UMNO ideology, especially when PAS and ABIM defined that ideology as un-Islamic. Dr Mahathir operated a strategy of containment that aimed to divert PAS and ABIM influences, and guide UMNO members in supporting a new approach to Islam. That strategy forced Anwar Ibrahim, formerly a strong supporter of PAS, to send his couriers to enquire whether he could join UMNO. Anwar Ibrahim then began to criticize the PAS leadership which had claimed that theirs was the only party able to spread the word of Islam. Anwar Ibrahim convinced the public that the Barisan Nasional government had also been promoting Islam.<sup>9</sup> Nevertheless, Dr Mahathir's strategy of coopting Anwar created conflict within the party.

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<sup>6</sup> Lucian W.Pye and Sidney Verba (eds), *Political Culture and Political Development* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965), p.8.

<sup>7</sup> A statement of former PAS leader who deserted the party to join UMNO, *Berita Harian*, June 7, 1989.

<sup>8</sup> *Utusan Melayu*, July 2, 1989.

<sup>9</sup> *Rekod dan Perkembangan: Pertubuhan Kebangsaan Melayu Bersatu*, 3/90, (Kuala Lumpur: The UMNO Research Dept., 1990), p. 11

The root of the party's problems was developed long before Dr Mahathir took over UMNO's leadership.<sup>10</sup> A 'circulation of the elite'<sup>11</sup> became obvious in UMNO after 1969 under the pretext of '*order baru*' (the new order), and Dr Mahathir observed changes in Malay orientations towards political and socio-economic structures. The Malay intelligentsia and intellectuals in 1969 supported Dr Mahathir's idea of changing the party leadership, but once he got into power, he had to face a similar challenge to the established leadership. The party became unstable when the 1981 leadership conflict developed, which eventually led to the deregistration of UMNO.

Political leadership in UMNO is an interesting area of study. Culturally, UMNO preserved Malay traditional elements which were enhanced by the patron-client relationship and loyalty to the ruling elite, *budi bahasa* (tactful courtesy and consideration), *sopan santun* (respectful manners), *adil dan pemurah* (justice and generosity), *lemah lembut* (gentleness), *pandai mengambil hati* (compassion), charm and grace in speech and also morality were thus among the traditions of the Malay way of politics and also factors in allegiance. Therefore, loyalty, patronage, support of colleagues, influence over the mass media, and the right to choose the date of election and candidates were key strengths for UMNO's President. This was a new form of *daulat*- a personal mystical force of sovereignty. Musa Hitam's resignation from the party's leadership marked the starting point of the challenge to this leadership strength, which reached a climax in the 1987 party election crisis. It was Dr Mahathir who shaped the changes in UMNO, by applying various political tactics such as co-optation, confrontation, containment and negotiation in his 'rules of the game' to ensure his attainment of impregnable power. In the context of Malaysian

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<sup>10</sup> See Dato'Senu Abdul Rahman, *Keselamatan Sudah Tidak Terjamin* (Kuala Lumpur: Pustaka Antara, 1976).

<sup>11</sup> V.Pareto, *Mind and Society*, Vol. III, (London: 1935) edited by A.Livingstone, p.2052. Pareto's term for the endless cycle of renewal and replacement of elites in which political elites of one type are replaced by another, see also David Jary and Julia Jary, *Dictionary of Sociology* (Glasgow: Harper-Collins Publisher, 1991), p.170 ; Maurice Duverger, *The Study of Politics* (London: Nelson, 1972), p.116; and T.B.Bottomore, *Elites and Society* (Middlesex, Penguin Books, rep.1974), pp.12-13.

politics, Dr Mahathir was an unusual top political leader; being a commoner and not an aristocrat, he was brought up in local educational institutions instead of England. He succeeded in becoming a medical doctor rather than a lawyer, and he applied a direct and abrasive style of leadership. More significantly, he was a thinker<sup>12</sup> and visionary leader.<sup>13</sup> These traits are in contrast to his predecessors; Tunku Abdul Rahman, Tun Abdul Razak and Tun Hussein Onn. His style of leadership<sup>14</sup> - assertive, contentious, confrontational, and abusive - were his strength in confronting his political opponents.

The period from 1981 to 1991 was a significant era in the history of UMNO. The myth of Malay unity is an obsession for the Malays. However, this period was considered historic because of the occurrence of turbulent conflict within UMNO that led to a split in the party. UMNO members then experienced a dilemma of choice in that they could choose to join either UMNO Baru or Semangat 46. These parties claimed to be the body and soul of the original UMNO in an attempt to gain political legitimacy. Therefore, this research describes the management of political conflict in UMNO during this period. Four events highlighted divisions among the Malays: the constitutional crisis of 1983; the rapid development of the dakwah movement in 1978-1982; the leadership crisis in UMNO 1981-1987; and the General Election of 1990.

Conflict in UMNO led to changes in the patterns of campaigning in the 1990 General Election. There was an attempt to develop a two-party system. National Development, ethnicity and regionalism were among the main features of the campaign. As in the past, the Barisan Nasional relied on UMNO to be the backbone

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<sup>12</sup> A statement of Dato Rais Yatim, Deputy President of Semangat 46, former Federal Minister and former member of UMNO Supreme Council, in an interview with him in London, June 21, 1992.

<sup>13</sup> John Funston 1988. 'Challenge and Response in Malaysia: The UMNO Crisis and the Mahathir Style.' *The Pacific Review*, Vol.1. No.4., p.363.

<sup>14</sup> William Case, 'Comparative Malaysian Leadership: Tunku Abdul Rahman and Mahathir Mohamad', *Asian Survey*, XXXI, No.5, (May 1991), pp.456-473.

in the electoral campaign. However, the election of 1990, cast some doubts as to whether UMNO Baru could mobilize Malay support, or whether Semangat 46 would be able to compete in their claim for political legitimacy. As a result, the electorates arrived at a cross-roads where they had to decide whether to continue or to change the government.

In the 1980's and early 1990's, UMNO leaders dragged their members through another dilemma, regarding the Malay Sultans. The issue started in 1983 when Dr Mahathir proposed a Constitutional amendment on the 'role' and 'power' of the King (*Yang DiPertuan Agong*). Ultimately, this developed into a confrontational situation between Dr Mahathir and the Sultan of Kelantan in particular. In the 1991 Assembly, the Sultan of Selangor became the main focus of criticism. Therefore, the Malay Rulers crisis began with criticism of individual rulers, then ended with the traditional institution being treated with what was tantamount to cynicism.<sup>15</sup> Until the end of 1991, the problem between these two ruling elites remained unresolved. UMNO leaders had been trying to educate the monarchy to behave in what UMNO defined as an 'actual' constitutional monarchy<sup>16</sup> while the Malays wrestled with the question of the future of the monarchy, a symbolic leadership that has become one of the established traditions in Malay political culture.

### *Clarification of Definitions and Terms.*

According to Andrew Kakabadse (1984) individuals are a mixture of values, attitudes, behaviour and particular skills. Each individual is likely to exhibit more than one style of behaviour. The combination of predominantly shared values and the dominant attitudes of most people, form the acceptable and unacceptable norms of

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<sup>15</sup> A.C.Milner, "Rethinking Islamic Fundamentalism in Malaysia," *RIMA*, 20, 2 (Summer 1986), pp.48-75.

<sup>16</sup> Aliran, an interest group took the view that UMNO leaders orchestrated the issue of monarchy to divert the attention of the entire nation from real issues such as inflation, urban poverty, national unity, and environmental deterioration (see an article entitled "The UMNO General Assembly: Rulers vs the Sultans," *Aliran Monthly*, 11 (11), 1991, pp.2-6.

behaviour in any organisation. Over time, such norms become tradition and the result creates a developed culture and the total climate of an organization.<sup>17</sup> Therefore, in an organization like UMNO, it is the leader who shapes the political culture. He directs, changes and alters the culture according to his vision. In his attempt to reshape the party's tradition, the leader has to face challenge and conflict within the organization. Thus, political leadership needs the skill to manage such a conflict, while appreciating the changing environment within the party and the society as a whole. Dr Mahathir's era is a very colourful one in terms of Malay political history. The implementation of the National Education Policy and the New Economic Policy made an impact during Mahathir's era. His policies managed to provide a means of social mobility for the Malays and modernize their way of life to an extent that affected their political behaviour.

### *Modernity and Tradition.*

History demonstrates changes in political development, from traditional society to a modern one. This involves a process of 'modernization'.<sup>18</sup> Rudolf and Rudolf,<sup>19</sup> and Salamon<sup>20</sup> define modernization as a process of transition, from traditional to modern society.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> Andrew Kakabadse, *The Political Management* (Aldershot: Gower, 1984), p.3.

<sup>18</sup> Radcliffe-Brown suggested that 'modernization' is a process of evolution emphasizing diversification, while Lewis Morgan argued that it was concerned with progress. This later influenced the development of the Parsonian model, which in turn provided the basis of the emergence of Marion Levy's and David Apter's model of modernization. As the basis of understanding the concepts, models and theories of modernization see T. Parson, "Social System," in *The Sociology of Organization*, eds., O.Grusky and G.A.Miller (New York: 1970), A.G.Frank, *Sociology of Development and Underdevelopment* (London: Pluto Press, 1971), H.Bernstein, "Modernization Theory and the Sociological study of Development," *The Journal of Development Studies* 7, 2 (January 1971), W.F. Ogborn, *Social Change* (New York, 1922) and "The Hypothesis of Cultural Lag," in A.Etzioni and E.Etzioni, *Social Change* (New York, 1964), pp 459-462, W.W.Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth* (Cambridge, 1971), Marion Levy Jr, *Modernization and the Structure of Societies*, vol.1, (Princeton, 1966), and David Apter, *The Politics of Modernization* (London, 1969).

<sup>19</sup> L.Rudolf and S.H.Rudolf, *The Modernity of Tradition: Political Development in India* (Chicago and London: Chicago University Press, 1967), p.9.

<sup>20</sup> L.M.Salamon, "Comparative History and The Theory of Modernization," *World Politics*, XXIII (October 1970), pp.83-103.

<sup>21</sup> Indexes of modernity are as follows: the intensive application of modern technology; participant life-style; open systems and qualification orientation; orientations towards the nuclear family; and secular ideology. This model implicitly assumed that in modernizing traditional society, contacts between the two societies should have occurred or been planned. Through these contacts, modernity indexes are diffused into the traditional society, either through assimilation, adaptation or acculturation process. For a critique of modernization theory see Mohd Dahlan.Aman, "Theories and Policies of Modernization: An

However, modernization in some spheres of life may occur without resulting in 'modernity'.<sup>22</sup> Bendix suggests industrialization,<sup>23</sup> modernization, and development<sup>24</sup> as the main variables of social change. Modernization, which is also known as social and political development, refers to all those social and political changes that accompany industrialization. Among them are urbanization, changes in occupational structure, social mobility, and the development of education, as well as political changes.<sup>25</sup> There are three basic categories that reflect political development: traditional, transitional, and modern. For James S. Coleman, this process of change is known as 'the development syndrome'.<sup>26</sup>

Generally, traditions are often advanced as the main source of legitimacy,<sup>27</sup> while attachment to tradition is transformed into 'traditionalism'. 'Traditionalism' defines itself as the self-conscious, deliberate affirmation of traditional norms. Revivalism is a basic engine of traditionalism. It is always dogmatic and doctrinaire and insists on uniformity.<sup>28</sup>

Connections between tradition and modernity are rarely simple. Rudolph and Rudolph viewed tradition and modernity as a continuum.<sup>29</sup>

The political party is considered to be a modernizing instrument and secondary agent of socialization. The entire socio-political framework of

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Application of A.G.Frank's Critique With Particular Reference to Malaysia (West Malaysia) (Unpublished M.A. thesis, Department of Anthropology and Sociology, Monash University, Australia, 1973)..

<sup>22</sup> Reinhard Bendix, "Tradition and Modernity Reconsidered". in *Comparative Studies in Society and History: An International Quarterly*. IX ( 1966-1967), p.329.

<sup>23</sup> He refers to *industrialization* as economic changes brought about by a technology based on inanimate sources of power as well as the continuous development of applied scientific research. see Reinhard Bendix. *Nation-Building and Citizenship: Studies of our Changing Social Order* (New York: John Wiley, 1964). p.5.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.* The term development is used where reference is made to relate the technical-economic and the socio-political changes.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>26</sup> See James S.Coleman. "The Development Syndrome: Differentiation-Equality-Capacity." in Leonard Binder, et al. (eds). *Crises and Sequences in Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press,1971), pp 73-100.

<sup>27</sup> See M. Weber. *From Max Weber: Essay in Sociology*, trans. by H.H.Gerth & C.W. Mills (London: Kegan Paul, 1947),p.296.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>29</sup> L.I. Rudolph and S.H.Rudolph 1967,s. *The modernity of Tradition*, pp 2-4.

the society will ultimately determine the party's form.<sup>30</sup> Therefore, in modernization, political parties play a critical role by building a system around themselves, or by becoming a modernizing device that can be manipulated by political entrepreneurs.

### *Political Culture.*

Definitions of political culture are many and varied. They depend upon the level at which we want to study political life. There are two ways of defining Political Culture: firstly, by using its psychological focus with its emphasis on the individual; secondly, it can refer to the collective orientation of people, towards the basic elements in their political system.<sup>31</sup>

Glenda M. Patrick (1984) classifies the authoritative definition of political culture into four distinct conceptualizations<sup>32</sup> Parsonian or 'objective' (Easton); 'psychological' (Almond, Powell and Verba); 'heuristic' (Pye); and 'comprehensive' (Fagen and Tucker). The latter has challenged the other three definitions for their too psychological formulations.<sup>33</sup>

Gabriel Almond was the first to introduce the term political culture in 1956. Every political system is embedded in a particular pattern of orientation to political action, and this is referred to as political culture.<sup>34</sup> Later, Almond includes 'public opinion' as part of a political culture, while the term 'orientation' and 'attitudes' were used in a number of instances.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> Ibid., p.81.

<sup>31</sup> Walter A. Rosenbaum, *Political Culture* (London: Thomas Nelson, 1975) p.4.

<sup>32</sup> Glenda M. Patrick, 'Political Culture' in Giovanni Sartori (ed.), *Social Science Concepts: A Systematic Analysis* (California: SAGE, 1984), p.271.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., p.270.

<sup>34</sup> Gabriel A. Almond, 'Comparative political system', *Journal of Politics*, XVIII, 1956, pp.391-409 which is reproduced in Roy C. Macridis and Bernard E. Brown (eds), *Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings* (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1972), pp.355-40.

<sup>35</sup> See Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *Civic Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963) and Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell Jr., *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966).



In his earlier writing, Almond freely employed factors such as 'ideologies,' interest groups, 'rules of the game', as well as the expectations and attitudes of various groups in the society. Orientations are considered to be predispositions to political action and are determined by such factors as: tradition, historical memories, motives, emotions and symbols. Therefore, in the latest definition by comparative politics, political culture would consist of ideology, belief and value systems.<sup>36</sup>

Verba (1965) assumed that political culture was an integral part of a more general culture, in which the basic beliefs and value patterns of such a culture play a major role in structuring the political culture.<sup>37</sup>

Almond suggests that political socialization is a process of induction into political culture, its end-product is a set of attitudes-cognitions [knowledge and awareness of the political system], value standards [judgements about the system], and feelings [emotional disposition to the system] -toward the political system, its various roles, and the system's incumbents. It also includes knowledge of values, affection and feelings toward the 'input' of demands and claims into the system, and the system's reciprocal 'outputs'.

Beer<sup>38</sup> (1958) viewed political culture as the way government ought to be conducted and which objectives it should aim to achieve through its main components such as values, beliefs, and emotional attitudes. According to him, it is political culture that affects, shapes or conditions the patterns of power and interest.

Alternatively Macridis (1961)<sup>39</sup> suggests that political culture is in effect, commonly shared goals and commonly accepted rules for individual and group interaction, through which authoritative decisions and choices are made by all 'actors' within that political system.

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<sup>36</sup> Almond and Powell, *Comparative Politics*, pp. 1,8 and 23.

<sup>37</sup> Sidney Verba, 'Comparative Political Culture,' in Lucian W.Pye and Sidney Verba (eds), *Political Culture and Political Development*. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965), p.521.

<sup>38</sup> S.M.Beer and Adam Ulam, *Patterns of Government* (New York: 1958), p.32.

<sup>39</sup> Roy Macridis, 'Interest groups in comparative analysis', *Journal of Politics*, XXIII (1961), p.40.

Later, Almond and Verba (1963) developed a typology of ideal political culture<sup>40</sup> that may be characterized as either '*participant*', '*subject*' or '*parochial*', which clearly drew on the cognitive, affective and evaluative dimensions of attitudes to political institutions<sup>41</sup> (such parts of a political system as the executive, legislative, judiciary, political parties and pressure groups). The British, the American and Scandinavian political systems have been described as '*participant*' political cultures, where orientations are positive to all these institutions. In systems, such as those found in Eastern Europe and other new socialist states, where the citizens assume a passive or obedient relationship with the system, viewing themselves as ineffective in influencing the system, though being affected by it, Almond and Verba regarded this political culture as a '*subject*' one. The political culture in traditional societies is '*parochial*', where the individual does not consciously relate himself to the political system but has only invisible awareness and knowledge of it. Kavanagh, however, disputed this typology. He assumed that only a quarter of British adults met the criteria for the above pure type.<sup>42</sup>

Rosenbaum (1972) offered the view that scholars themselves never reached a consensus on the real components of political culture.<sup>43</sup> He supported Pye's (1965) suggestion that political culture should be limited to the attitudes, beliefs, and sentiments that give order and meaning to political processes and thus provide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern behaviour.<sup>44</sup> Therefore a political culture consists only of those critical but widely shared beliefs and sentiments that form a '*particular pattern of orientation*'.<sup>45</sup> He further proposed three essential

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<sup>40</sup> Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1963), pp. 11-29.

<sup>41</sup> Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966), p. 50.

<sup>42</sup> Dennis Kavanagh, *Political Culture* (London and Basingstoke, 1972), p. 11.

<sup>43</sup> Walter A. Rosenbaum, *Political Culture* (London: Nelson, 1975), p. 5.

<sup>44</sup> L. W. Pye, *Aspects of Political Development* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co. 1966), pp. 104-5.

<sup>45</sup> Pye and Verba 1965, *Political Culture and Political Development*, p. 8.

elements of political order, known as 'core components' of political culture, these being:<sup>46</sup> i) orientation towards governmental structures; ii) orientation towards others in the political system; and iii) orientation towards one's own political activity. To discuss political culture, there are four themes that relate political culture to development, namely: trust and distrust towards political institutions; hierarchy and equality in relations of power; liberty and coercion in the building of a strong nation; and levels of loyalty and commitment.<sup>47</sup>

There are four enduring issues that lead to major political disorder or disintegration in a political culture, these are: i) elite-mass culture cleavages; ii) political subcultures; iii) disruptive socialization; and iv) political change. These are dynamic forces that are always active within political systems, creating tension that needs to be managed, such as the defiance of a political leader's skill, and the testing of the elasticity of the political culture. Baker (1987) pays more attention to political conflict in his study of political culture of a society heading for revolution. He defines political culture as the set of discourses and practices characterizing activity in any given community.<sup>48</sup>

Either political culture or organizational culture depends on leaders to embed and transmit the culture. The five most powerful primary mechanisms used in stabilizing and reinforcing culture are as follows: i) measure and control of what is being set up by those in power; ii) leadership reactions to critical incidents and organizational crises; iii) deliberate role modelling, teaching and coaching by leaders; iv) the criteria for the allocation of rewards and status; v) the criteria for recruitment, selection, promotion, and retirement.<sup>49</sup> Since organizational cultures are created by leaders, it seems that culture and leadership are two sides of the same coin.

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<sup>46</sup> Rosenbaum 1975, *Political Culture*, pp.6-7.

<sup>47</sup> Pye and Verba 1965, *Political Culture and Political Development*, pp. 22-23.

<sup>48</sup> K.M.Baker (ed), *The French Revolution and the Creation of Modern Political Culture, vol.i., The Political Culture of the Old Regime* (Oxford: Pergamon, 1987), p. xii

The different functions are served by culture at different organizational stages, and the issues are therefore different at each stage.<sup>50</sup> In the formative stage of an organization, culture tends to be a positive force, which needs to be elaborated, developed and articulated. In organizational mid-life, culture becomes diverse. The task of deciding which elements need to be changed or preserved becomes one of the tougher strategic issues faced by the leader at that time. In maturity and decline, culture may become dysfunctional and must change in some areas, thus creating more drastic problems for leaders.

Albert Widjaja suggested six variables in studying political culture. They are, orientation of values, levels of militancy, attitudes towards tradition and change, patterns of leadership, attitudes towards mobility, and priorities of policies.<sup>51</sup>

To summarize, political culture is the pattern of individual attitudes, beliefs, emotions and values of a society toward politics. This pattern involves several orientations towards a political system:<sup>52</sup> i) *cognitive orientations* (knowledge, accurate or otherwise, of political objects and beliefs); ii) *affective orientations* (feelings of attachment, involvement, rejection, and the like, concerning political objects); and iii) *evaluative orientations* (judgement and opinions about political objects). Most political cultures are heterogeneous. A political culture, whether diverse or homogeneous, is a product of many interrelated factors, such as: historical developments, geography, ethnic differences, and the socio-economic structure. There are two fundamental groups of components in a political culture: attitudes toward the political institutions of the state; and the degrees to which citizens feel they can influence and participate in the decision making process. These political attitudes and values are symbolized by many things, such as the monarchical system,

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<sup>49</sup> E.H.Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1985), p.2.. See also Schein's work 'Coming to a new awareness of organizational culture' *Sloan Management Review*, XXV, pt.2, (1984), pp.3-16.

<sup>50</sup> E.H.Schein 1985, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, pp.270-292.

<sup>51</sup> Albert Widjaja, *Budaya Politik dan Pembangunan Ekonomi* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1982).pp.128-159.

<sup>52</sup> Almond and Powell 1966, *Comparative Politics*, p.50.

or symbols expressing the idealized elements of political institution. Myths play an important role in a political culture and provide a foundation for national identity. The emotional intensity that may embrace these symbols is a means of identifying the political values and attitudes within a political system.

For the purpose of this study, Rosenbaum's operational definition<sup>53</sup> of political culture is being used as a guide for the analysis of Malay political culture. Political culture itself is a historical creation. For this reason, it resembles nothing more closely than a kind of living archaeological site.<sup>54</sup>

This study also accepts the fact that in any political system there are fundamental differences between the culture of the elite and of the masses.<sup>55</sup> In the case of rural Malay society, most of the latter are followers who have no strong cohesion unless they are organised. Traditionally, the Malay masses or the *rakyat* are apolitical, and political decisions have been made by the ruling elite and not by consensus. Indeed, this study focuses on the elite political culture and its impact on the rakyat.

#### *Studies related to Malay Political Culture and UMNO.*

Shahnon Ahmad's novels that were written between 1965 and 1978<sup>56</sup> reflect the attitude of rural Malay society towards Islam and political change in a detailed and realistic view of Malay village life. He highlighted the problems of poverty in *Ranjau Sepanjang Jalan* (1966), and develops the theme of Islam as the overwhelmingly predominant force in Malay society in his novels of *Srengenge* (1975) and *Seluang Menodak Baung* (1978). Village politics were discussed in

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<sup>53</sup> Walter A. Rosenbaum 1975, *Political Culture*, p.9.

<sup>54</sup> Baker 1987, *The French Revolution*, p.xii, see also Eckhart Hellmuth (ed), *The Transformation of Political Culture: England and Germany in the late Eighteen Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p.9.

<sup>55</sup> Lucian Pye 1965, "Introduction: " in Pye and Verba (eds), *Political Culture and Political Development*, p.15.

<sup>56</sup> See David J.Bank, 'Islam and political change in rural Malay society: Shahnon Ahmad's novels as data,' in Sharon A.Carstens (ed.), *Cultural Identity in Northern Peninsular Malaysia*. (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1986), pp.13-28.

*Rentong* (1970). His novels were based on the life of one of Malaysia's poorest villages, Sik in Kedah, and did not differ much from the picture given by Conner Bailey<sup>57</sup> who analysed Sik's political leadership patterns and their basis in 'pengaruh'(personal influence). Among his latest writings is *Sutan Baginda* (1989),<sup>58</sup> which describes the life of a political leader willing to do anything to promote his political interest for the sake of glory and power. Sutan Baginda, the main character, does not take politics as a responsibility and trust on behalf of the people, and deviates from the rules of *Allah* (Almighty God). As a result, Sutan Baginda became a psychotic at the end of his life. This was a punishment for his insincerity, dishonesty and the lack of purity of his faith in Allah. Therefore, the novel *Sutan Baginda* represents the perceptions and criticisms of some Malay intelligentsia towards the ruling political elite. Although it is a piece of creative work, it is to a certain extent, a novel that reflects the problems of present Malay political culture.

On the history and early developments of UMNO, studies have been done by a few scholars such as A.J.Stockwell,<sup>59</sup> Moore,<sup>60</sup> and Roff.<sup>61</sup> Ramlah Adam<sup>62</sup> focuses on the structure and activity of UMNO between 1945-1951, while studies by Moore concentrate more on UMNO in relation to the 1959 General Election, and Funston examines the development of UMNO from 1945 to 1969.<sup>63</sup> In 1987,

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<sup>57</sup> Conner Bailey, *Broker, Mediator, Patron and Kinsman: an historical Anylisis of Key Leadership Roles in a Rural Malaysian District*, paper in *Intcmational Studies, southeast Asia series no.38*. (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1976).

<sup>58</sup> Shahnnon Ahmad, *Sutan Baginda* (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1989).

<sup>59</sup> A.J.Stockwell, 'The formation and first years of the United Malays National Organization. *Modern Asian Studies*, XI, (1977), pp.481-514; and *British Policy and Malay Politics During the Malayan Union Experiment 1942-1948* (Kuala Lumpur: MIBRAS, Monograph No.8, 1979).

<sup>60</sup> D.E.Moore, 'United Malays National Organisation and the 1959 Malayan Election', (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of California, 1960).

<sup>61</sup> M.Roff, 'UMNO-the first twenty five years,' *Australian Outlook*, XX, 3, (December 1969), pp. 258-78.

<sup>62</sup> Ramlah Adam, *UMNO: Organisasi dan Kegiatan Politik*. (Kota Bharu, Kelantan: Mohd.Nawi Book Store, 1978).

<sup>63</sup> N.J.Funston, *Malay Politics in Malaysia: A Study of the United Malays National Organization and Party Islam* (Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann, 1980).

Shafruddin<sup>64</sup> studied the relationship of the power structure in UMNO and the state's bureaucratic system.

Zainah Anwar<sup>65</sup> has shown the prominence and power of 'dakwah' in the campuses, both socially and politically, which created division and acrimony between religious and secular factions among the Malays. She concludes that the final consequence of the Islamic revival in Malaysia has been the revitalization of PAS, and that policy accommodations and religious compromises have been thrust upon the technocratic UMNO government. Nagata's work (1984)<sup>66</sup> gave a comprehensive view on the emergence of three urban dakwah groups:-ABIM, Arqam and Tabligh that claim the need to reassert Malay identity and emphasize the universalism of Islam. On the other hand, Chandra Muzaffar (1987) analyses from a sociological perspective the Islamic resurgence in Malaysia and its effect on Malaysian Politics.<sup>67</sup>

Malay political culture and its change was discussed by Dr Mahathir in *The Malay Dilemma* (1970) which stressed heredity, the role of the ruling elite and Malay value systems as causes for Malay backwardness. This was followed by a book called *Revolusi Mental* (1971)<sup>68</sup>, which considers the attitudes of the Malays and negative cultural traits that are not compatible with economic development. However both works were refuted by Dr.Syed Hussein Alatas<sup>69</sup>. Alatas blamed the traditional ruling elite for retarding the growth of the 'spirit of capitalism' among the Malays. This point was earlier made by Tan Chee Khoo in 1968. He felt this was all due to the exploitation of the Malays by absentee landlords, many of whom were in the

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<sup>64</sup> B.H.Shafruddin, *The Federal Factors in the Government and Politics in the Peninsular Malaysia* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1987).


<sup>65</sup> Zainah Anwar, *Islamic Revivalism in Malaysia: Dakwah among the students*. (PetalingJaya, Selangor: Pelanduk Publications, 1987).

<sup>66</sup> Judith Nagata, *The Reflowering of Malaysian Islam: Modern Religious Radical and Their Roots* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1984).

<sup>67</sup> Chandra Muzaffar, *Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia* (Petaling Jaya: Fajar Bakti, 1987).

<sup>68</sup> Senu Abdul Rahman et. al (eds.), *Revolusi Mental* (Kuala Lumpur: Penerbitan Utusan Melayu, 1971).

<sup>69</sup> See Dr Syed Hussein Alatas, *Siapa Yang Salah: Sekitar Revolusi Mental dan Peribadi Melayu* (Singapore: Pustaka Nasional, 1974) and *Islam dan Sosiatisma* (Pulau Pinang: Seruan Masa, 1976), pp.60-71.



bureaucratic and political elite.<sup>70</sup> Therefore, this literature has given us an explanation of how a conflict of values would become inevitable when the Malays transformed themselves into a modern society.

Malay ways of conflict management have declined since Malay 'gentleness' (lemah lembut) and deference (menghormati) towards their leaders have faded. Diane K. Mauzy has argued that 'aggressive politics,' 'winner-take-all' and 'zero-sum' attitudes are all inevitable but contrary to the traditional 'Malay way'.<sup>71</sup>

In discussing traditional political culture, A.C. Milner (1982)<sup>72</sup> made a new appreciation of the unique qualities of Malay political culture in the nineteenth century. He emphasised the role of the Raja as 'the only institution' in Malay feudal government in which wealth has become the main source of power, and the Malay concept of *nama baik* (good name) and the thirst for titles. Few changes were made in the pre-Second World War Malay system of administration as a study by Shahril Talib has shown. He illustrated how the ruling elite made use of the political system in order to control resources.<sup>73</sup> *Tuhfat al-Nafis*<sup>74</sup>, a Malay historical source, provides an enlightening description of Malay politics in the last Malay empire of Johor and Riau-Lingga, while the *Sejarah Melayu* is the only Malay source that describes the world of the Malay court in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, in which a social contract between the ruler and his subjects was based on the concepts of *daulat* (sovereignty) and *derhaka* (treachery).<sup>75</sup> Gullick studied the feudal Malay political

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<sup>70</sup> Tan Chee Koon, 'Some observations on communal relation in the socio-economic structure of Malaysia,' in *Intisari*, Vol. III, 2, (1968), p.38.

<sup>71</sup> Diane K. Mauzy, 'Malaysia in 1987: decline of "the Malay way"', *Asian Survey*, XXVIII, 2, (February 1988), pp.213-222.

<sup>72</sup> A.C. Milner, *Kerajaan: Malay Political Culture on the Eve of Colonial Rule*. (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1982).

<sup>73</sup> Shahril Talib, *After its Own Image: The Trengganu Experience 1881-1941*. (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1984).

<sup>74</sup> Raja Ali Haji Ibn Ahmad, *The Precious Gift (Tuhfat al-Nafis)*. Annotated translation by Virginia Matheson and Barbara Watson Andaya. (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1982).

<sup>75</sup> See *Sejarah Melayu 'Malay Annals'*, Translated by C.C. Brown with a new introduction by R. Roelink. (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1983, -originally published in JMBRAS in 1953).



and socio-economic structure,<sup>76</sup> then he examined the social changes that took place in Malay communities. Besides his concern with the position of the rulers, the aristocratic elite, and the situation of the rakyat (the peasant class), he also noted how Malay political culture adapted itself to changes.<sup>77</sup> Abdul Latif Sahan's<sup>78</sup> graduation exercise has shed light on the political attitudes of the Malays after the Second World War. Syed Husin Ali<sup>79</sup> in 1981 concluded that the Malays were at an important crossroads in which they may lose their sense of direction and thereby lose sight of their objectives. However, the Malay elites then were enjoying much political and economic privilege. By 1987, Wan Mohd Mahyiddin admitted that the new generation of Malays were facing a serious crisis of values and identity.<sup>80</sup>

Modern Malay political culture studied by Shamsul A.B. (1986), analysed the impact of politico-economic processes at a local level and in village politics.<sup>81</sup> Previously, Roger<sup>82</sup> examined political mobilization, electoral organization and the patterns of change in a rural area that came out in his research on political involvement in a rural Malay community. A macro study of political culture and political leadership was undertaken by Means. It enabled him to categorise the period from 1970 as the era of the 'second generation'.<sup>83</sup> Ahmad Kamar's work (1984) discussed the development of Malay political leadership according to a structural-functional approach. He compared the leadership in UMNO and PAS and highlighted

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<sup>76</sup> J.M.Gullick, *Indigenous Political System of Western Malaya* (London: University of London, 1958).

<sup>77</sup> J.M.Gullick, *Malay Society in the late Nineteenth Century: The Beginnings of Change*. (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1987).

<sup>78</sup> Abdul Latif Sahan, 'Political Attitude of the Malays', (unpublished B.A. Graduation Exercise, University of Malaya, Singapore, 1959).

<sup>79</sup> S.Husin Ali, *The Malays: Their Problems and Future* (Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann Asia, 1981).

<sup>80</sup> Wan Mohd. Muhyiddin, *Politik UMNO dan Isu Barisan Nasional: Satu Perbincangan* (Subang Jaya: Pustaka Cipta, 1987).

<sup>81</sup> Shamsul A.B, *From British to Bumiputera Rule: Local Politics and Rural Development in Peninsula Malaysia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1986).

<sup>82</sup> See Marvin L. Roger, 'Electoral organization and political mobilization in rural Malaysia' in *Manusia dan Masyarakat* (siri baru), 4, 1983.; 'Pattern of change in a rural Malay society: Sungai Raya revisited', *Asian Survey*, 22 (1982), and his PhD thesis 'Political Involvement in a Malay Rural Community' (PhD dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1968).

<sup>83</sup> Gordon P.Means, *Malaysian Politics: The Second Generation* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1991).

the emergence of Malay entrepreneurs who were to monopolize the UMNO leadership.<sup>84</sup>

Ozay Mehmet<sup>85</sup> viewed the DEB (the National Economic Policy) as the originator of a system of economic trusteeship, where the ruling elites assumed the role of trustee, having emerged as a cartel seeking rewards through collusion, transaction costs and other forms of non-competitive bargains. They therefore enriched themselves while paying lip-service to poverty eradication. Through this he was able to show the relationship between 'distributional coalitions' and economic benefits.

Edmund Terence Gomez<sup>86</sup> argued that the DEB only benefited a particular class of Malays. The upper class or 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' emerged on the basis of state capital and political patronage. Gomez's work is an important contribution to the understanding of the Malay political elite's involvement in business and politics. Another interesting study has been done by Mohamad Abdad Zain<sup>87</sup> on capitalist expansionism, class fractionalization and intra-bourgeoisie party factionalism.

Malaysian Scholars have focused primarily on rural leadership, for example such writers as Syed Husin Ali,<sup>88</sup> S.Ahmad Hussein (1975)<sup>89</sup> and Wan Abdul Rahman (1982).<sup>90</sup> They have studied the patterns of Malay leadership and change in relation to the impact of bureaucracy.

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<sup>84</sup> Ahmad Kamar, *Malay and Indonesian Leadership in Perspective* (Petaling Jaya, Selangor: Ahmad Kamar, 1984).

<sup>85</sup> Ozay Mehmet, *Development in Malaysia: Poverty, Wealth and Trusteeship* (Kuala Lumpur:INSAN, 1988-original publication- London and Dover, NH: Croom Helm, 1986).

<sup>86</sup> Edmund Terence Gomez, *Politics in Business: UMNO's Corporate Investments* (Kuala Lumpur: FORUM, 1990).

<sup>87</sup> Mohamad Abdad Mohamad Zain, "Mahathir's Corporatism vs Razaleigh's Liberalism: capitalist expansionism, class fractionalization and intra-bourgeoisie party factionalism," *Kajian Malaysia*, VI, 2 (december 1988), pp.22-41.

<sup>88</sup> See S.Husin Ali, 'Pattern of Rural Leadership in Malaya' in *JMBRAS*, XLI, 1, pp.95-45, and *Malay Peasant Society and Leadership* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1975).

<sup>89</sup> Syed Ahmad Hussein, 'Struktur kepimpinan di dalam pembangunan Luar Bandar,' *Dewan Masyarakat*, 13 (July 1975), pp.48-53.

<sup>90</sup> Wan A.Rahman, 'Changing perception of leadership among rural Malays in Kelantan', *Malaysia in History*, XXV, pp.81-87.

The leadership conflict in UMNO in the 1980's has encouraged the publication of more literature on political leadership, conflict and the political behaviour of UMNO leaders and members. These reflect the changes in Malay political culture. Political issues have become the centre of attraction for people, and so, consequently, the press, including *Berita Harian*, the *New Straits Times*, *Utusan Malaysia*, and *Utusan Melayu*, which have played an important role in ensuring UMNO's influence over the public. The *Star* and *Watan* on the other hand have tried to provide alternative arguments on the issues of political parties and government. The *Harakah* (an organ of PAS), *The Rocket* (an organ of DAP), the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, *Asia Week*, the *Asian Wall Street Journal* and also *Aliran* publications have always been critical towards UMNO.<sup>91</sup> These are important media for studying the political culture of the elite in Malaysia, since the printed media has become one of the main communication channels in influencing the masses.

Subky Latif and Harun Hassan pioneered the publication of 'investigative political books' in the market, which have speculated on potential successors in the UMNO leadership.<sup>92</sup> Later, Harun Hassan concentrated his focus on political leadership through his monthly journal '*Sarina*', and this was followed by Syed Hussein Alattas, who, whilst claiming to be 'a free lance writer', published more than 10 titles in relation to the UMNO leadership.<sup>93</sup> His interpretations were very subjective but provided an insight into the facts. Other

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<sup>91</sup> On *Aliran* views towards the ruling party and government see for example, *Issues of the Mahathir Years*. (Bayan Lepas, P.Pinang: *Aliran*, 1989), Most of its critical views toward UMNO and political leaders could be followed from its organ *Aliran Monthly*.

<sup>92</sup> Rosnah Majid, *Koleksi Temuramah Khas Tokoh-Tokoh* (Kuala Lumpur: Utusan Publication, 1985).

<sup>93</sup> For example *Challenger: Siapa Lawan Siapa* (Kuala Lumpur: Alnujum, 1987), *Talqin Untuk UMNO* (Kuala Lumpur: 1988), *Politik Serpihan* (Kuala Lumpur: 1989), *Revolusi Istana Dan Rakyat* (Kuala Lumpur, 1989), *Musa Derhaka* (Kuala Lumpur, 1986), *Perdana Menteri Yang Kelima* (Kuala Lumpur:1983), and *Siapa Selepas Musa?* (Kuala Lumpur, 1981).

similar work has been done by journalists such as Suhaimi Mokhtar,<sup>94</sup> Rosnah Majid,<sup>95</sup> Yusof Harun,<sup>96</sup> and Daud Ibrahim.<sup>97</sup>

There are other writers such as Alias Muhamad,<sup>98</sup> Chamil Wariya,<sup>99</sup> Aziz Zariza Ahmad,<sup>100</sup> Kamaruzaman Yacob,<sup>101</sup> and Yahya Ismail.<sup>102</sup> While the former three tried to give a fair treatment of the facts, the latter two were more inclined to be biased against UMNO.

There are a few biographical works on the leadership of UMNO contributing to this research. Among the most famous biographers is Victor Morais,<sup>103</sup> who has written on Hussein Onn and Anwar Ibrahim. Other writers are William Shaw<sup>104</sup> on Tun Razak, Harry Miller<sup>105</sup> on Tengku Abdul Rahman, Ranjit Singh<sup>106</sup> on Tengku Razaleigh, Bruce Gale<sup>107</sup> on Musa Hitam, and Zakry Abadi<sup>108</sup> on Sanusi Junid.

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<sup>94</sup> Yusof Harun, *Dailog dengan Pemimpin* (Kuala Lumpur: Penerbitan Pena, 1986).

<sup>95</sup> Harun Hassan and Subky Latif, *Siapa Selepas Tun Razak* (Kuala Lumpur: Amir Enterprise, 1975).

<sup>96</sup> Suhaimi Mokhtar, *Warisan Pimpinan UMNO* (Kuala Lumpur: Penerbitan Pena, 1981).

<sup>97</sup> Daud Ibrahim, *UMNO, PAS, Realiti & Maruah Wartawan Politik* (Kuala Lumpur: Daud Ibrahim, 1991).

<sup>98</sup> Alias Mohamed, *Kepimpinan Demokrasi & Tradisi* (Kuala Lumpur: AMW Communication, 1984), and *UMNO 38 Tahun: Zaman Gemilang* (Kuala Lumpur: AMW Communicatio, 1984).

<sup>99</sup> See Chamil Wariya, *Siapa Kuasai UMNO* (Petaling Jaya: Media Intelek, 1985); *UMNO Era Mahathir* (Petaling Jaya: Fajar Bakti, 1988); *UMNO Baru: Kelahiran dan Perkembangan Awalnya* (Kuala Lumpur: K Publishing, 1988); and *Pandangan Politik Era Mahathir* (Petaling Jaya: Fajar Bakti, 1990).

<sup>100</sup> Aziz Zariza Ahmad, *Fasa Kedua: Dr Mahathir Mohamad* (Kuala Lumpur: Firma Malaysia Publishing, 1988).

<sup>101</sup> Kamaruzaman Yacob, *Rumusan: Politik Malaysia* Kuala Lumpur: Media Jaya, 1988).

<sup>102</sup> At least he has published three titles relating to the leadership crisis in UMNO such as *Politik UMNO Melayu Tergugat* (Aug.1987), *Siapa Presiden UMNO Mahathir-Tengku Razaleigh*, and *Mengapa Mahathir Dicabar*. In my interview with him, Yahya Ismail denied he was a supporter of Semangat 46, he reaffirmed that he only supported the truth. His controversial short story was 'Maharaja Beruk' [The Emperor of the Monkeys] which expressed his opinion on the UMNO leadership. See his anthology entitled *Maharaja Beruk dan Beruk-beruk Lainnya* (Kuala Lumpur: Dinamika Kreatif, 1988).

<sup>103</sup> Victor Morais, *Hussein Onn: A Trust with Destiny* (Singapore: Times Books International, 1981); *Mahathir: Profile in Courage* (Singapore: Eastern Univedrsities Press, 1982); and *Anwar Ibrahim: Resolute in Leadership* (Petaling Jaya: Arenabuku, 1983).

<sup>104</sup> William Shaw, *Tun Razak: Life and Times* (Kuala Lumpur: Longman, 1976).

<sup>105</sup> Harry Miller, *Prince and Premeir: A Biography of Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra, Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya* (London: George Harrap & Co. 1959).

<sup>106</sup> Ranjit Gill, *Razaleigh: An Unending Quest* (Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk Publiction, 1986).

<sup>107</sup> Bruce Gale, *Musa Hitam: A Political Biography* (Petaling Jaya: Eastern Universities Press, 1982).

There is no shortage of literature on the life of Dr Mahathir and his premiership, but the same cannot be said for Ghafar Baba or Abdullah Badawi. Finally, there is a short comparative study on the UMNO leadership by William Case who tried to compare the leadership of Tunku Abdul Rahman and Dr Mahathir in relation to democratic stability.<sup>109</sup>

At the time of the deregistration of UMNO, many more political books flooded the market. Most of them criticized the UMNO leadership. Some were very emotional and subjective in interpretation. Indeed this group of writers, such as Ahmad Mokhtar Mohamad,<sup>110</sup> Rizal Rahman,<sup>111</sup> Kamarazaman Yacob,<sup>112</sup> Marina Yusof,<sup>113</sup> and Mohd.Sayuti Omar<sup>114</sup> were very critical of UMNO and its leaders. However, A.Ghani Ismail,<sup>115</sup> a feature writer, tried to analyse events fairly. Other authors wrote scandalous tales about political leaders at that time, writing under *nom-de-plumes*<sup>116</sup>, not daring to use their own names. Such stories, were often founded on hard facts well known to the public, but were blown out of proportion by these irresponsible writers.

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<sup>108</sup> Zakry Abadi, Sanusi Junid: *Pencetus Idea Pemikir Bangsa* (Kuala Lumpur: MYZ, 1991) and see also his latest work *Kualiti Kepimpinan Selepas Dr Mahathir dan Ghafar Baba: Suatu Perspektif Dalam Ketokohan* (Kuala Lumpur: Sarjana Enterprise, 1991).

<sup>109</sup> William Case May 1991, "Comparative Malaysian leadership." pp.456-473.

<sup>110</sup> Ahmad Mokhtar Haji Mohammad, *People Power: From the People to the People*. (Petaling Jaya: Penerbit Dinamik, 1990).

<sup>111</sup> Rizal Rahman, *Perebutan Kuasa dan Kesombongan UMNO* (Kuala Lumpur: Variasi, 1985).

<sup>112</sup> Kamarazaman Yacob, *Mahathir Menuju Diktator?* (Kuala Lumpur: Media Jaya, 1988); and *Rumusan: Politik Malaysia* (Kuala Lumpur: Media Jaya, 1989).

<sup>113</sup> Marina Yusoff, *Masa Untuk Perubahan*. (Kuala Lumpur: The Champ Sdn Bhd, 1990?).

<sup>114</sup> Mohd Sayuti Omar, *Merdeka Kedua*. (Kuala Lumpur: Tinta Merah, Feb.1990), and Anwar Ibrahim: *Mimpi dan Realiti*. (Kuala Lumpur: Tinta Merah, Nov.1990).

<sup>115</sup> A.Ghani Ismail, *Razaleigh Lawan Musa Pusingan Kedua 1984*. (Taiping, Perak: IJS Communication, 1983).

<sup>116</sup> See for example *Black Maria, Skandal Orang Politik*. (Kuala Lumpur: Intercity Enterprise, April 1990); Ibnu Khalid, *Skandal Mat Taib MB Selangor*. (Kuala Lumpur: Dinamika Kreatif, 1989). These two books were widely distributed, a few circulated at the UMNO General Assembly such as by Kelana Jaya's, *Dilema Politik Selangor: Satu Pendedahan Secara Terbuka* (n.p.:1984) but there were some which secretly circulated such as a 19 page booklet by A.Maideen, *Najib..Perampas Isteri Orang! Tokoh Pemimpin Pemuda UMNO Baru?* (n.p: n.d), A.Maideen, *Anwar Oh Anwar...Aku Rindu PadaMu*, (n.p: n.d). and Adnan Iman, 'Mahadar Kutty' (Kuala Lumpur: Adnan Abu Bakar, n.d.).

*Framework, Objective and Methodology of Study.*

There is no specific theoretical framework adopted in this study, except for an operational definition which is used as a guide to analyse political culture. The focus of this study is the political culture of UMNO, with an emphasis on leadership, conflict and its implications for the party and Malay politics, in order to examine how political leadership shaped changes in Malay political culture and to try to describe a general pattern of political culture among UMNO's members and its leaders. As has been mentioned earlier on, this study concentrates on the period from 1981 to 1991 for various reasons: historically, this was the end of the line for the UMNO formed in 1946; politically, it was a period of rapid changes in political development; psychologically, the Malays reached a turning point in their political thinking in this new materialist era; and finally, it is also possible to evaluate change in the Malay way of politics, and to describe the processes of reconstruction of the entire political system in the Mahathir era.

*The study Approach:* This thesis is divided into three main parts that consist of: Structure and Development in order to understand the background of modern political developments and Malay political culture; The main factors contributing to changes in political culture in UMNO; and the final part which concerns aftermath of the conflict and an analysis of the general patterns of Malay political culture. With the adoption of a plurality of approaches and supported by other social science disciplines, it is hoped that this study can use facts and generalizations to aid the understanding of Malay political culture in the last decade of this century.

## Chapter One

### Malay Political Culture : Tradition and Changes

This Chapter discusses the background and development of Malay politics. Traditional Malay political culture is the basis of the Malay social structure, which shapes their value systems. The traditional socio-economic and political systems were based on feudalism,<sup>1</sup> although they have since undergone some degree of transformation. However, feudalistic elements still prevail in the contemporary Malay way of life. Traditional Malay attitudes were moulded by absolute monarchy: the intact and central position of Malay kingship, authoritarian elements, and the King's authority not only in administration of the state but also in the social sphere of life of his subjects or *rakyat*. These factors had formed the basic pattern of Malay thinking and their political cultures; the culture of the ruling elite and the culture of the masses (*rakyat*). Change in these cultures was shaped by exogenous and endogenous factors that fomented political change.

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<sup>1</sup> Feudalism has always been associated with the structure of a traditional society. Feudalism is generally considered to describe the period before the introduction of Capitalism. The basic difference between feudalism and capitalism lies in the mode of production. In defining the feudal mode of production, it is necessary to understand five structural characteristics: 1).the existence of unfree labour; 2).a fusion of economic and political power.; 3). economic coercion; 4). a self-sufficient or subsistence economy of the village; and 5) the condition of simple production .However, Sullivan has suggested that traditional Malay social organization has changed from being kin-based to class-based. Gullick remains sceptical about this owing to the fact that a capitalist mode of production can hardly exist without a capitalist class to organise and exploit it. Malay Rajas were motivated not by avarice but by a desire to acquire and retain subjects, and so this can hardly be applied to Malay society. See S.H.Alatas "Feudalism in Malaysian society: a study of historical continuity", in *Modernization and Social Change* (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1972), pp.100-111; Chandra Muzafar, *Protector ? : An Analysis of the Concept and Practice of Loyalty in Leadership relationship within Malay Society* (Pulau Pinang: Aliran, 1979); Shahrudin Maaruf *Malay Ideas on Development: From Feudal Lord to Capitalism* (Singapore: Times Book, 1988) pp.1-23.and Wan Hashim *Peasants Under Peripheral Capitalist* (Bangi:Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 1988), pp.34-38, the latter quoted Hamza Alavi's ideas in his article, "India: transition from feudalism to capitalism", *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, vol.10, no.4, (1980), pp. 363-64 which is considered 'a more satisfactory approach'. See also Patrick Sullivan , *Social Relation of Defence in a Malay State: Nineteenth Century Perak*, Monograph No.10, (Kuala Lumpur: MBRAS, 1982), p.71, and J.M.Gullick 1958, *The Indigenous Political System*, p.xx.

## Traditional Malay political culture.

### 1. *The Characteristics of the Malay Polity.*

Milner<sup>2</sup> has identified several characteristics of traditional Malay politics.<sup>3</sup> First, there was no all-encompassing Malay empire or state; although leaders arose and tried to dominate all or most of the smaller individual kingdoms. Secondly, there were many kingdoms which remained independent of the central power, and which did not develop into large-scale empires themselves. Thirdly, Malays never acknowledged a single sovereign, and indeed no such figure existed in the Malay lands which shared a common genealogy. Fourthly, Malays expressed no sense of 'nationhood', nor do they consider themselves members of a race which owes its origins to a single ancestor or homeland, but rather they identify themselves as 'rakyat' (subjects) of their Raja or Sultan. Fifthly, the similarities in the Malay world were identified by style of life, language, literature, and the fact that all land belongs to the Raja, and the consequent absence of any concept of permanent ownership. Sixthly, there was fragmentation and fluidity in political conditions, as unsettled as the demography. These characteristics permeate the structure of Malay political culture.

### 2. *Regime Orientation.*

*Taat Setia (Loyalty) and Psychological Feudalism.* Taat setia was an archaic Malay political value, a notion of obligation essential to the principle of loyalty itself, which was mobilised to assure political survival.<sup>4</sup> This tradition is symbolised by the legend of the agreement between Sang Sapurba and Demang

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<sup>2</sup> A.C.Milner, *Kerajaan: Malay Political Culture on the Eve of Colonial Rule*, (Tucson, Arizona: The University of Arizona Press, 1982), p.1.

<sup>3</sup> *ibid*

<sup>4</sup> Clive Kessler 1989, "Some continuities in Malay political culture," (a working paper presented at the Second International Conference of Malay Civilization, Kuala Lumpur.) p.32.



Lebar Daun at Bukit Seguntang<sup>5</sup>. This agreement symbolized a type of feudalism<sup>6</sup> in Malay society, which had a profound psychological impact:<sup>7</sup>

*"In the context of psychological feudalism, the relationship between those in power and those dependant on them is characterized by personal attachment to the leader or man in authority rather than to the principles he stand for."*

*Sejarah Melayu* is the classic text on the life of Malay feudalistic society.<sup>8</sup> This work was written as a record of the stories and ethics of the Malay rulers, and their protocol, and the book was intentionally written as a 'guide' for the Malays.

Malay feudal psychological values were obsessed with power. *Sejarah Melayu* mentioned '*daulat*', a personal mystical force,<sup>9</sup> which was a salient feature of the institution of the Malay Raja. The Bukit Seguntang accord, that ideally laid down the basis of the relationship between Malay rulers and their subjects, was based on the notion of '*daulat*' and denies the subject any rights. These tendencies permitted the exercise of blind loyalty. Sang Sapurba, in agreeing to patronise Demang Lebar Daun and his people, demanded unquestioning loyalty from him and his descendants.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> C.C.Brown (trans.) 1970, *Sejarah Melayu*, (Singapore: Oxford University Press), p.16

<sup>6</sup> See S.H.Alatas 1972, "Feudalism in Malaysian society: a study of historical continuity", in *Modernization and Social Change*, (Sydney: Angus and Robertson), pp.100-11. He defines the term feudalism as a method of government characterized by the following traits: 1.the presence of a large gulf between the poor (usually peasants) and the rich (usually noblemen and chiefs) in the economic, social, political and judicial fields; 2.the political order was dominated by one hereditary group having at their disposal large estates; 3.the prevalence of the manorial system of economy wherein a large, self sufficient estate was cultivated by the peasants for the master, often a royal personage who rewarded them with strips of land, the fruits of which were in the main part retainable; 4. a feudal lord, the head of the manorial hierarchy, immune from the supervision of higher authority, yet pressing for judicial, economic, fiscal and administrative rights; 5.the relation between the lord and his dependents being one of enforcement, the lord having rights to unpaid labour and the services of his dependents; 6.grants of land for cultivation were not to be withdrawn at will by the lord; 7.the warrior class dominated the feudal order, and 8. the feudal order lacked functional divisions and favours decentralization of both power and administration.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., p.101.

<sup>8</sup> *Sejarah Melayu* or The Malay Chronicle is considered as an authentic source in the study of Malay political culture in the pre-colonial era. Malay literary epic works such as *Hikayat Hang Tuah*, *Hikayat Merong Mahawangsa*, *Hikayat Johor*, *Hikayat Pahang*, *Misa Melayu*, *Hikayat Deli* and *Tuhfat al-Nafis* are among the Malay sources that are consulted in an attempt to draw a clearer picture of traditional Malay political culture. The *Hikayat Pahang* and *Hikayat Deli* were heavily utilised by Milner.

<sup>9</sup> As illustrated in *Sejarah Melayu*, Sang Sapurba changes sea water in a container into fresh water by putting his feet into it. The power of '*daulat*' of the Sultan of Melaka is illustrated when a Chinese ruler is cured of a rash affecting the whole of his body by drinking and washing his face with the '*air basuh kaki*' (the water with which the ruler of Melaka washes his feet) of the Melaka ruler.

<sup>10</sup> see Shaharuddin Maaruf 1988, *Malay Ideas*, pp.1-23. In 1946 the situation changed when the Sultans were accused of treason (menderhaka) by their rakyat when they signed the Malayan Union Treaty. Dato' Onn Jaafar, the UMNO leader, then led

*"...that your descendants shall never to the end of time be disloyal to my descendants, even if they are cruel and evil."*

This is the concept of divine kingship,<sup>11</sup> as practised in the Hindu era that had produced *daulat* or sovereignty in traditional Malay society, not only in legal terms but also in cultural and religious aspects. Besides commanding unquestioned loyalty from the subjects, the ruling class had rights, privileges and, to a certain extent, supernatural power over the 'rakyat'. These rights and privileges, indeed, solidified the dominance of parochial loyalty in the Malay political system.

#### *Indefinite National Border.*

The demographic character of the Malay states was subject to frequent and dramatic change, for example through migrations. Hence there were no clearly demarcated territories. Normally the myriad of separate villages transformed into a state system, after the establishment of royal courts, and the growth of an urban setting to support the courts.<sup>12</sup>

#### *Monarchy as the Symbol of Unity.*

The Sultan enjoyed a position of great dignity, but in most cases he exercised little of his power. Nevertheless, the authority of the Sultan was neither demarcated nor circumscribed. The ruler was the apex of the Malay political system, the symbol of unity, and the titular source of rank and authority. The ruler's imperative role in Malay society, as mentioned in *Sejarah Melayu*, was that he was responsible only to Allah (Almighty God) which legitimised blind loyalty:

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the Malays to force all the Malay rulers to accede to the people's wishes and behave themselves. In 1983, Dr Mahathir in facing the 'unique behavior' of the prospective King (Yang Di Pertuan Agung) who was considered to be unpredictable, proposed a constitutional amendment which led to a prolonged constitutional crisis lasting until 1991, see chapter V and VIII..

<sup>11</sup> See Robert Heine-Geldern 1942, "The conception of state and kingship in Southeast Asia." *Far Eastern Quarterly*, vol.2, p.22.

<sup>12</sup> R.S.Milne and Diane K.Mauzy, *Malaysia: Tradition, Modernity and Islam* (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1986), pp.10-11.

*No matter how unjust and cruel a ruler may be, the loyal Malay subject is admonished to be loyal since only the hand of God would be able to render appropriate justice to the ruler.*<sup>13</sup>

However, it was soon realised that 'real power' resided not with the Raja but with the Orang Besar, who were responsible for government, including the spheres of local administration, justice, defence, revenue collection, and general leadership<sup>14</sup>.

It seems that in the Malay traditional political system, Orang Besar was the key institution, but we should also note that the Malays considered themselves to be living not in states or under governments, but in a *kerajaan*, in the "condition of having a Raja."<sup>15</sup> In short, the Raja was the only institution in the traditional political system or "what might be called in the Malay model, a working system of leadership."<sup>16</sup>

## ***2. Political Trust.***

### ***Rakyat Trust in Government.***

The rakyat not only felt the need for the maintenance of the 'kerajaan' but also attributed to it the 'symbol of the ownership' of the sovereignty of the Malays. They in fact strengthened it by expressing loyalty. They became the rakyat of the Sultan by virtue of their subjugation to the latter, who was believed to be impregnated with 'daulat' and was thus transformed into a divine being upon his installation. To demonstrate his divinity and supernatural power, the Sultan used such symbols as 'Royal Regalia' (*alat kebesaran diraja*), royal musical instruments (*Nobat*), royal protocols and so on, through which the rakyat acknowledged their submission and recognised the sultan's divinity. The rakyat also believed that their Sultan inherited

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<sup>13</sup> Leonard Y. Andaya, "The Structure of Power in Seventeenth Century Johor," in Anthony Reid and Lance Castles (ed.) *Pre-Colonial State Systems in South East Asia* (Kuala Lumpur: MBRAS, Monograph no.6, 1975), p.3

<sup>14</sup> Gullick 1988, *Indigenous*, pp.21-95.

<sup>15</sup> Milner 1982, *Kerajaan*, p.114.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p.71.

the extraordinary power called *Daulat*. Therefore, those who encroached on the Sultan would suffer attack by a supernatural power which had been protecting the Sultan since his installation.

Significantly, this process convinced the rakyat that the kerajaan existed solely for the Sultan and his Orang Besar (Chiefs). It is obvious that formality and ritual rate very high in the Malay hierarchy of values<sup>17</sup>. Indeed, the notion of unquestioning loyalty to the Sultan has been generally accepted by the Malays, though it would come into conflict with Islamic values; when for example, carrying out the royal command violated the moral values of Islam<sup>18</sup>.

Power and position, of course, caused much injustice in Malay feudalism. One's power and position depended mainly on winning the approval of one's superior; exploitation of power and positions of influence dominated social life. The *Misa Melayu*<sup>19</sup> and *Tuhfat al Nafis* have mentioned how bloody and cruel power struggles among the ruling class were, and how they weakened the Malay states.

#### *Decision-making Processes: The example of Perak.*

In 18th century Perak, there was an Assembly of the ruling class which comprised all 'anak raja' (princes), the Orang Besar and the hulubalang. The concept of collective government was practised in the Assembly<sup>20</sup>, which normally held public meetings in the Balairong Seri (audience hall), where differing views could be put forward'.<sup>21</sup> Moreover, it was rare that the Sultan went against the collective decision of the Orang Besar.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> Mahathir Mohammed 1982, *The Malay Dilemma*, p.157.

<sup>18</sup> Chandra Muzafar 1979, *Protector*, p.31.

<sup>19</sup> See Ahmad Fawzi Mohd.Basri, *Misa Melayu* (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1992).

<sup>20</sup> B.W.Andaya, *Perak, The Abode of Grace: A Study of an Eighteenth Century Malay State*, ( Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1979), p.30. Her research was based on the Misa Melayu and Dutch records.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p.29.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*

Beside the Assembly, there was an executive Council of State comprising the Raja Muda, the Orang Besar Empat, who were the senior ministers, and a few selected Orang Besar. This council was responsible for advising on royal decisions.<sup>23</sup>

In order to make his decisions and orders effective, in Perak, the Sultan normally practiced the tradition of 'political marriage, which ensured loyalty to him. Linkage between Raja and rakyat was provided by the Orang Besar, who were responsible for the enforcement of royal commands and convincing the rakyat:

*"A determining factor in the preservation of this chain of command was the ruler's ability to maintain the loyalty and co-operation of the men beneath him. He could seek to ensure this co-operation by making judicious marriages into families of orang Besar or by taking the daughters of influential lineage groupings as gundik (secondary wife)."*<sup>24</sup>

Among the Orang Besar, the same practices occurred in order to strengthen their position and widen their support. For example, there existed marriage bonds between the families of Orang Kaya Menteri, Orang Kaya Panglima Bukit Gantang, and Orang Kaya Panglima Kinta.<sup>25</sup>

Power was too vital to be willingly surrendered. There were cases when an influential Orang Besar, who actually governed the state, could undermine royal authority by supporting a rival contender for the throne.<sup>26</sup> Such an event could produce fragility of loyalty, and endanger the political system.<sup>27</sup>

The *Raja Muda* (Crown Prince) always occupied a crucial position in traditional Malay political culture. As an immediate heir to the throne, a Raja Muda needed the support and acceptance of the Orang Besar, prior to his appointment as

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<sup>23</sup> Ibid, p.30. It could be the forerunner of the present Dewan Negara of Perak which is chaired by the Sultan, waris negeri (heir to the throne), selected Orang Besar, the Menteri Besar and a representative of the non-Malays.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., p.28.

<sup>25</sup> See M.A.Fawzi Basri, *Cempaka Sari, Sejarah Kesultanan Negeri Perak*, (Ipoh: Yayasan Perak, 1986), p.140 and 148.

<sup>26</sup> Andaya 1979, *Perak*, p.31.

<sup>27</sup> See chapter V-VII to compare this with the modern Malay political culture.

Sultan. At the same time, the rest of the heirs to the throne<sup>28</sup> would compete for the favour of the Raja Muda for their future position as favourite of the designated Sultan. "It had been noted that in the disputes between 1800 and 1871 almost every case involved the Raja Muda and the Sultan in opposing camps."<sup>29</sup>

*Black Magic and supernatural power.*

Malay feudalism was also given continuity and endurance by another institution called the 'Pawang' or 'Bomoh' (traditional medical practitioner), who were prominent personalities in traditional Malay society. Their supernatural power was needed at the installation of the sultan, the service of the Pawang being a prerequisite to perform the ritual of '*Tabal Jin*', '*memulih alat kebesaran* (restoring to health of the regalia and 'nobat', the royal musical instruments). The Pawang also functioned as a 'doctor' in those days<sup>30</sup>.

Most of the Malay states had their own officials called Pawang or Bomoh Diraja, the royal shamans<sup>31</sup>. The Pawang or the Bomoh Diraja had to be skilful in magical art (*ilmu pawang*) and prescribed traditional medicine, and also had special responsibility to 'memulih' (revive) the state regalia. He also had to possess the power to invoke the guardian spirit of the country.<sup>32</sup> During those days, it was said that the Pawang had the skill of predicting 'langkah' (the right moment) to launch a military

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<sup>28</sup> In the 18th century, Perak used a complex system to appoint the heir to the throne (*waris negeri*). Beside Raja Muda, there were eight princes who vied for power. There was Raja Di Hilir (the Prince in charge of Downstream), Raja Di Hulu (The Prince in charge of Upperstream), Raja Di Darat (The Prince in charge of Interior land), Raja Di Baruh (the Prince in charge of Coastal land), Raja Kecil Besar (The Prince of the Senior), Raja Kecil Sulung (the Prince of the Elder), Raja Kecil Tengah (The Prince of the Junior), Raja Kecil Muda (The Prince of the Youngest). From tensions within the royal lineage arose difficulties for the sultan in maintaining the support and allegiance of his relatives. "Conflict between royals and personal interests remained an enduring problem, mainly apparent when a ruler sought to maintain his control over the tin trade." (Andaya 1979, Perak, p.34).

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., see Chapter 5 and 6 to compare the open rivalry, between the UMNO President and his Deputy, in political power struggles.

<sup>30</sup> See Gullick 1987, *Malay Society*, pp.316-325.

<sup>31</sup> See for example the function of Kelantan state Shaman in Roland Werner, *Bomoh/Dukun: The Practices and Philosophies of the Traditional Malay Healer*, (Beme, Switzerland: University of Beme, 1986).

<sup>32</sup> Andaya 1979, Perak, p.34.

attack, or to begin state ceremonies. Normally, the status of the post of state shaman was 'ascribed'.

At the village level, the bomoh, or Pawang, who in some places was known as the Dukun, existed side by side with the Imam. Sometimes, a person who had religious knowledge could also be a medical practitioner by using '*doa*' (reciting of a verse in Quran). Normally, those Dukun who practised black magic and the invoking of spirits, derived their skill from a mixture of pre Islamic knowledge and the misuse of verses from the Quran. However, according to the *Undang Sembilan Puluh Sembilan Perak* (The Law of Ninety Nine of Perak) during the 18th century, every village had to have a mosque official, a magician (pawang) and a midwife (bidan). The Pawang was king 'in the house of the sick, in the rice field and in the mine.'<sup>33</sup>

"Magical belief and practices constituted, beside religion, another facet of the composite belief system of the Malays."<sup>34</sup> Magic facilitated the relationship between the human world and the invisible and symbolic world of the spirit-beings, with its cosmological hierarchies. Malay magical practitioners may be generally classified as mediators, keepers, manipulators and activators of spirit-beings apart from being folk-healers, or 'dukun'. Magical practitioners were also involved in 'offensive' black magic sorcery, and employed charms, spells and incantations.<sup>35</sup> The role of the 'dukun' was another instrument which contributed to social factions and divisions on the basis of rumour and slander.

In fact, the total belief system of Malay culture has involved an interaction between Islamic ideals, inherited traditional beliefs, and, later, empirical knowledge.

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<sup>33</sup> R.O.Winstedt, "More Notes on Malay Magic." *JMBRAS*, vol. V (2), 1927,p.346. Revival of bomoh practices was obvious in Malay society in the late 1970's when the bomoh offered their services for the rehabilitation of drug addicts. Then the media exposed the practice of using bomoh as a means gaining political power among the politicians, see chapter III.

<sup>34</sup> Zainal Kling, 'Magical Practices in a Rural Malay Community in Sarawak,' in H.M.Dahlan (ed.), *The Nascent Malaysian Society*, 2nd edn., (Bangi: Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 1986), pp.83-112.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, p.187. sorcery is the employment of formulae, charms and spells by Malays for evil ends. A sorcerer may be hired, for instance, to cast a spell upon a person for vengeance after being disgraced.

Indeed, the interaction between Islamic ideals and local traditional beliefs is a constant feature of Muslim communities.<sup>36</sup>

### 3. Rules of the Game.

#### *Status and Power.*

In Malaysia, the pre-colonial era is considered as 'feudalism' or the traditional phase. In that period, Malay society consisted of two basic social classes; golongan *bangsawan* (aristocrats or ruling class<sup>37</sup>), and golongan *rakyat* (subject class), of which the majority were Malay peasants. *Taraf* or *kedudukan* (status) and *kuasa* (power) were the basic structures of the traditional Malay polity. The personality of the Sultan or Ruler was a deciding factor in a strong or weak central government. The Malay polity easily tended toward a highly decentralised form of government.

Adat istiadat (customs), peraturan (formal rules) and protocols have been salient features in Malay political culture. These were correlated with the function of *taraf* (status) in the Malay community. It has been shown that ceremonials generated great popular enthusiasm in Malay culture, and have inspired political action on the part of the subjects. In fact, the belief in 'adat' was one of the key sources of the legitimization of leadership, whose norms and sanctions strengthened harmony in the community.

#### *Ruling Elite.*

The ruling class consisted of the ruler and his family (known as ' *kerabat diraja*'), and the commoners' chiefs or '*Orang Besar*'. The prestige held by Malay aristocrats was derived from the relationship between aristocrat and ruler. Aristocrats owed service and obedience to the ruler; however, it was the economy which underlay any departure from the norm in the relationship between ruler and his chiefs. The

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<sup>36</sup> Mohd. Taib Osman, "Patterns of Supernatural Premise Underlying the Institution of the Bomoh in Malay Culture", *Bunga Rampai: Aspects of Malay Culture*, (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1984), p.164.

<sup>37</sup> See Gaetano Mosca, *The Ruling Class*, translated by Hannah D.Kahn, (New York: McGraw Hill, 1939), pp.50-53.



ruler was 'the organising principle of the system, but, the role of the ruler was more ceremonial than actual; and thus his symbolic role was passive rather than active. Therefore, it was the chiefs who actually controlled the government (Kerajaan) in the state (Negeri).<sup>38</sup>

It was the Orang Besar who controlled the districts and pursued an active administrative role. These aristocrats, who performed their duties at *the Istana* (palace) or district level, were the executives who managed the government in the name of the Raja. Their formal submission to the Raja and their actual *de facto* autonomy in their district<sup>39</sup> or territory<sup>40</sup> caused them a dilemma. However, this situation "expressed a tradition of unified government, centred on the court, which hardly recognised the existence of district chiefs."<sup>41</sup> The preponderance of the Rajas was shown in Malay royal custom and traditions, which included language and etiquette for the royal family<sup>42</sup>.

Obviously, the district chief's office was interposed between the ruler and the mass of the rakyat in the outlying villages. *Misa Melayu* has illustrated the chain of command in a traditional Malay polity; at the village level, the *Penghulu* (Village Head) functioned as the main agent of the ruling class.

To differentiate themselves from the *rakyat* (subjects), the ruling class used honorific prefixes to their names. The Royal family and royal aristocrats normally bore the title of Raja, Tunku or Tengku, Ungku or Wan. If they were appointed to certain posts, they were normally known by such titles as, Raja Muda, Yang Di

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<sup>38</sup> The concept of 'kerajaan' and 'negeri' (state) has been discussed by Milner (1982) and Virginia Matheson (1975). It is preferable to define 'kerajaan' as 'government,' and 'negeri' as 'state'. At present, the Sultan is Head of state, a symbolic leader, while the Menteri Besar (Chief Minister) is the Head of government who actually controls the state administration. However it has been accepted that before 1874, Malay Rulers were absolute monarchs, and almost all activities of the state were implemented in the name of the Sultan, his authority being necessary to legitimate the subject classes' obedience to their orders.

<sup>39</sup> Gullick 1958, *Indigenous*, pp.ix-xi.

<sup>40</sup> Up until now, some Malay states still use the title of 'Sultan dan Yang Di Pertuan Negeri .....Darul.....serta Jajahan Takluknya, meaning Sultan and the Ruler of the state.of.....Darul.....and its territory.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, p.xi.

<sup>42</sup> Syed Alwi Alhady, *Malay Customs and Traditions*, (Singapore: Eastern University Press, 1962), pp.61-126.

Pertuan Muda, Raja Bendahara, Tengku Temenggung, Tengku Laksamana, Tengku Panglima Perang, Tengku Muda Serting, Ungku Muda and so on. Other 'Orang Besar' who were of non-royal blood, generally bore the title of 'Datuk' or 'Orang Kaya-kaya', for example, Orang Kaya-kaya Indera Maharaja Perba Jelai, Orang Kaya-kaya Shahbandar, Orang Kaya-kaya Indera Segara, Orang Kaya-kaya Datuk Seri Agar Di raja, Orang Kaya-kaya Datuk Panglima Kinta, Datuk Setia Pahlawan, Datuk Setia Raja, and Datuk Setia Perkasa and so on. In most of the Malay States, the 'Orang Besar' were divided into four categories<sup>43</sup>: Orang Besar Empat (the Four Great Chiefs); Orang Besar Lapan (the Eight Great Chiefs); Orang Besar Enam Belas (the Sixteenth Great Chiefs) ; and Orang Besar Tiga Puluh Dua (the Thirty Two Great Chiefs).

*The Rakyat: Retainers and Followers.*

A chief had his own aristocratic supporters who operated in various positions in ensuring control of the district. They were known as 'kawan' or 'pengikut' (retainers), or sometime as 'orang kita' (our men). From his retainers, a chief derived his income. In some Malay states, there had been a special class called '*Orang Keistimewaan*'- privileged commoners who held positions in the royal household or the government. In Kedah, Orang Keistimewaan could be indentified from a list of people who were exempted from corvee labour which included those who held social status such as *ulama*, Syed (descendant of the prophet), *anak orang baik-baik* (men of good birth), Haji (a believer who had performed Hajj to Mecca), Lebai, state officials, Penghulu, Mosque officials, and servants of the Istana (Sultan's household).<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> Gullick 1988, *Indigenous*, pp.90-91. In Perak state the Four Chiefs are known as Bendahara, Temenggung, Orang Kaya Besar and Orang Kaya Menteri. While the Eight Chiefs are Maharajalela [then changed to Mahakumia Indera Diraja], Laksamana, Sri Adika Raja, Shahbandar, Sri Agar Diraja [then changed to Setia Bijaya Diraja], Panglima Kinta , Panglima Bukit Gantang, and Imam Paduka Tuan, see also Fawzi Basri 1986, *Cempaka Sari*, pp.150 and 255-256

<sup>44</sup> See The Annual Report, Kedah, 1909, p.1.

The others formed the unprivileged subject class or 'Rakyat' which can be categorised into at least three main groups<sup>45</sup>: *Orang Merdeheka* (free man) ; *orang berhutang* (debt-slaves); and *hamba abdi* (slaves). The slaves suffered various types or degrees of slavery, such as *hamba tawanan* (war captive slaves), *hamba diranggak* (slaves captured by force), *hamba Habsyi* (Negro slaves), *hamba hulur* (criminal convicts), and *hamba serah* (voluntarily slaves). These types of rakyat were the major source of man-power in the state.

Demand for the transfer of surplus labour to the territorial chiefs and the Sultan by means of forced labour, toll or other taxes was based on political, legal and military coercion, and traditional feudal bonds and duties.<sup>46</sup> In fact, in the absolute monarchy system, there was an absence of absolute private property. All lands were '*Tanah Raja*' (the king's land), and all business was monopolized by the ruling elite. Abdullah Munsyi, who observed the Malays in the early nineteenth century, described the oppressive attitude of the ruling class toward commoner Malays.<sup>47</sup>

In the case of Perak, for example, Long Jaafar, the territorial chief of Larut, brought in Chinese labour to his tin mining operations.<sup>48</sup> In Johor, Temenggong Ibrahim monopolised all natural resources which then provided his regular income.<sup>49</sup> Later he and his senior ministers formed joint ventures with Chinese merchants to help build up the pepper and gambier plantations in the interior of the state. While the Malay ruling class focused their political role on safeguarding productive fields from competing native predators, the Chinese merchants, through their secret societies (*kongsi gelap*), supplied and organised immigrant indentured labour as direct

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<sup>45</sup> For a detailed discussion see Aminuddin Baki 1966, "The institution of debt slavery in Perak", *Peninjau Sejarah*, Vol.1., No.1., p.1.

<sup>46</sup> Fatimah Halim, 'Transformation of the Malaysian State,' *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, vol.XX (1), 1990, p.67.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., The author quoted from the writing of Abdullah Munsyi (1838), *The Voyage of Abdullah*. translated by A.E.Coope.

<sup>48</sup> Fawzi Basri 1986, *Cempaka Sari*, pp.58-72.

<sup>49</sup> See Ahmad Fawzi Basri, *Johor 1855-1917: Pentadbiran dan Perkembangannya* (Petaling Jaya: Fajar Bakti, 1988), pp.13-22 and *Sistem Kangcu Dalam Sejarah Johor: 1844-1917*, (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Historical Society, 1984).

producers. At a later stage, British capitalists, on the other hand, provided the necessary credit and controlled the international market of these products.<sup>50</sup>

### *Kepatuhan (Allegiance).*

Another concept related to traditional Malay political culture is allegiance or *patuh*. The Malay sought wealth not for its own sake, but as a means of gaining political influence in the form of developing a sizeable personal following. The Rajas, or ruling class, enhanced their fortunes by preventing their Malay subjects from accumulating any wealth. The ruling class constantly fought "against potential competitors for the allegiance of their subjects."<sup>51</sup>

In strengthening public allegiance, however, the Raja or the ruling class, had to periodically demonstrate humanitarian characteristics such as *adil* and *pemurah* (justice and generosity). Theoretically, the ruler's behaviour should be *lemah lembut* (gentle), being charming and graceful in his speech, and *pandai mengambil hati* (compassionate ) toward his officers and rakyat. The ruler or Raja might lose the allegiance of the Orang Besar and rakyat if he was arrogant, self-centred, or showed lustful behaviour and tyranny.<sup>52</sup>

### *Power and Morality.*

Another point concerned the religious life of the ruling class which was rather superficial and ritualistic, using double standards. Through such a dualistic approach the ruling class was able to prevent religion from genuinely influencing the everyday character of society. However, the ruling class respected religious personalities, whom they believed possessed supernatural power or were protected by God.

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<sup>50</sup> Fatimah Halim 1990, 'Transformation', p.67.

<sup>51</sup> Milner 1982, *Kerajaan*, p.27.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, p.40.

For that reason the religious personalities enjoyed special treatment from the ruling class<sup>53</sup>.

*Derhaka (Treason).*

Related to the concept of loyalty and allegiance was the concept of *Derhaka*. In Malay culture, as elsewhere, rebellion or committing treason was the ultimate political sin. The inner order of social relations among the Malays was to a large degree shaped by Islamic and Malay ethics, which prescribed the rules for the relationship between parent and child, teacher and pupil, master and servant, and ruler and subject. However, this relationship between the parties concerned eventually deteriorated into domination on the part of the party in power, which shaped the hierarchical pattern of the relationship. The parental ego in Malay society was strong, but the concepts of '*Kurang ajar*' (lack of manners), and *derhaka* (treason) suggested a degree of rebellion in Malay culture.

There were cases in Malay history, when some rebels managed to surface. The court chronicles, such as *Hikayat Johor Serta Pahang*,<sup>54</sup> *Tuhfat al-Nafis*,<sup>55</sup> described the assassination of Sultan Mahmud II of Johor as rebellion. However, the chronicles gave a justification, as the Sultan was extremely cruel, exercising tyranny and carrying out random murders, including the killing of the pregnant wife of a minor chief. In fact, it was the latter and the Bendahara who then took over the government after planning the assassination.<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> For example, Maulana Yusuf refused to accept the coming of Sultan Mahmud and his official entourage to study Islamic religion at Maulana Yusuf's house. The Sultan, however, was not offended, returning without protocol, introducing himself as 'fakir Mahmud'. The Sultan agreed to all this because of his dualistic morality: "he could humble himself before God without humbling himself before man. He could acknowledge the equality of man before God without believing in the equality of men among men" (Milner 1982: 21).

<sup>54</sup> M.A.Fawzi Basri, 'Hikayat Johor serta Pahang', in *Warisan Sejarah Johor*, (Kuala Lumpur: The Malaysian Historical Society, 1983,) p.39.

<sup>55</sup> Virginia Matheson and Barbara Watson Andaya (eds and trans.) of *Tuhfat-al-Nafis* (the Precious Gift) by Raja Ali Haji, (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1981).

<sup>56</sup> Fawzi Basri, *Warisan Sejarah Johor*, p.14.

Incidents of protest by Malay chiefs toward their Sultan are documented in *Sejarah Melayu*.<sup>57</sup> Hypocritically, the chiefs spoke of loyalty but actually committed treason.<sup>58</sup> However, in the case of the rakyat they were frightened and worried about suffering *ditimpa daulat*, a supernatural sanction of 'his majesty' in form of a thunderbolt,<sup>59</sup> if they committed treason. The belief in 'daulat' among the rakyat was beginning to fade in the early 20th century with the outbreak of the To Janggut Rebellion in Kelantan in 1915,<sup>60</sup> and the Trengganu Uprising in May 1928, both in the east coast Malay states.

#### 4. Political Competence and Efficacy.

##### *Kekayaan (wealth).*

"Kekayaan" (wealth) was the main concern of the Malay rulers as reflected in Malay writings. "The way in which wealth was obtained, be it by force, 'legitimate trade', monopoly, or even gambling or magic, was relatively an unimportant matter."<sup>61</sup> The ruling class were the greatest merchants in their states.

The absence of Malay private merchants was another salient feature in the Malay world. Even during the supremacy of the Malay Kingdom of Melaka, trade was principally in the hands of Indians and Arabs, and later, in the nineteenth century, in the hands of Chinese traders. Milner has implied that the attitude of the Malay rajas was the main cause for the lack of Malay traders:<sup>62</sup>

*"Yet it need not be assumed that Malays were unable to compete in commerce. On the contrary, they had established a reputation in many non-Malay countries as able traders....[but] Their absence in Malay states was due, at least in part, to the attitude of the Malay rajas"*

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<sup>57</sup> See C.C.Brown 1976, *Sejarah Melayu*, p.16.

<sup>58</sup> S.H.Alatas 1972, *Modernization and Social Change*, p.102.

<sup>59</sup> J.M.Gullick 1958, *Indigenous*, p.44.

<sup>60</sup> J.de V.Allen, 'The Kelantan Rising of 1915: Some thoughts on the concept of resistance in British Malayan History', in *JSEAH*, IX (2), September 1968, pp 244.

<sup>61</sup> Milner 1982, *Kerajaan*, p.20.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, p.21.

Andaya has identified no less than 22 places which produced tin in the Malay state of Perak during the 18th century.<sup>63</sup> Certainly the traditional tin mining was controlled by the ruling class with the rakyat as their followers constituting the labourers. The aristocrats, in their pursuit of wealth, appeared merely as a consuming, rather than a genuine entrepreneurial class.

*The Passive Masses.*

Thus, Malay feudalism had imposed a situation where the rakyat were politically and economically passive. It was not in the way of things to encourage participation in the ruling of the state, since administration was the monopoly of the Sultan and his officers. It was the duty of the rakyat to obey rules and orders from the top. British officials observed that in traditional society, individual Malays had no initiative whatsoever<sup>64</sup>, no political institutions<sup>65</sup>, no government, and they lived under absolute and cynical autocracies<sup>66</sup>. The Malays then were a society which always heavily relied on the ruling elite.

The Malay states, as other traditional states in South East Asia,<sup>67</sup> had their traditional political values which were based on and supported the absolute monarchy, and other authoritarian elements in the socio-political sphere. These political values generated the pattern of Malay thought which underpinned attitudes and structures such as: the Malay government was a highly personalised hierarchical system; the government official was privileged; government was outside the sphere of peoples' business; and the lack of a notion of opposition.<sup>68</sup>

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<sup>63</sup> See Andaya's map, Perak, p.xv.

<sup>64</sup> H.Clifford, *Further Side of Silence*, (New York, 1927), p.xi

<sup>65</sup> F.Sweetenham, *The Real Malay* (London, 1901),p.7.

<sup>66</sup> Clifford (1927), *Further Side*, p.xi. However, the portrayal given by British officers could be because the Malays were in transition and was not a representative picture of Malay civilization which required a just administration, as mentioned in the Malay Annals and other Malay works.

<sup>67</sup> See Maung Maung Gyi, *Burmese Political Values: The Socio-Political Roots of Authoritarianism* (New York: Praeger, 1983), pp.36-48.

<sup>68</sup> In traditional Burmese society there were 11 main attitudes relating to their thought patterns, namely: i) In Buddhist terms the government was intrinsically an evil, ii) oppression and misrule were natural, iii) it was futile to stand up against the

However, 19th century British imperialism and capitalism, in the Malay Peninsula, brought changes in this polity and its political value systems.

### *Malay Politics in the Imperialist era.*

In the midst of western imperialism's encroachment, the Malay states continued to be divided. The last Malay empire of Johor Riau-Lingga, only controlled or influenced certain parts of the Straits of Melaka and the South China Sea. Internal conflict and civil war, caused by frequent power struggles, greatly reduced the strength and dynamism of the Malay states. At that time, Malay leaders failed to recognise the dangers of western imperialism to the Malay world.

### *Monarchy and Indirect Rule.*

The signing of the Pangkor treaty in 1874 marked the crucial turning point in Malay politics. The colonial power adopted an administration of indirect rule, nine Malay states being controlled by the British under a system of indirect rule called *The protected Malay States*. Under this system, "the monarchical system was strengthened in appearance and form giving it unrivalled popular legitimacy and symbolic potency."<sup>69</sup> . At the same time, The British imperialists introduced the modern administrative system and capitalism, and the fusion of feudal government and colonial power resulted in a 'parallel system'<sup>70</sup> in the Malay states' political structure.

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government even on legitimate grounds, iv) the government was not the concern of people, v) the government will take care of everything, vi) to become an officer was the summum bonum of life, vii) "no matter how wealthy he be, anyone who holds no office is a 'poor' man at the mercy of the asoya (government)," viii) security in office depends on the pleasure of the superior, and not so much on the intrinsic quality of the work, and one's duty was to please one's superior, ix) there could be no opposition to government, even as a matter of different opinion, and much trouble could be in store for anyone who dared to oppose it, x) whatever the government does, its policies, activities, style, and techniques of administration must be viewed as fair, just, beneficial and proper, and xi) government was omnipotent, omnipresent, and omniscient, Maung Gyi 1983, *Burmese Political Values*, pp.37-38.

<sup>69</sup> Fatimah Halim 1990, 'Transformation', p 67.

<sup>70</sup> R. Emerson, *Malaysia: A Study in Direct and Indirect Rule*, (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1969). pp.135-268. In that system the sultan was akin to a constitutional monarchy, whereby all governmental administration was in the hands of British Residents or Advisors along with colonial officials. For the implementation of the system in Johor, see M.A.Fawzi Basri 1988, *Johor 1855-1917*. pp.93-133.



However, changes under British indirect rule did not occur without conflict and differences.

The enforcement of western law and forms of administration, along imperialist lines, led to the erosion of the political power of the ruling class. Their power became more symbolic, and real power rested with British officials. The Malay aristocrats continued their titular offices, but their functions were reduced to ceremonial ones; for example, attending state functions, especially state ceremonies such as funerals and the installation of a sultan, and royal marriages. They also functioned as guests in the ceremony which marked the bestowing of state awards and medals. In some states, such as Johor in the 1920's, salaried Malay officers also performed a ceremonial role in the Istana. They were appointed to certain roles and carried a titular traditional title for the purpose of a particular ceremony.<sup>71</sup>

The State Councils, a 'window-dressing' kind of democratic government, were formed. However, in reality, the British Residents effectively controlled the councils.<sup>72</sup> The Resident, whose advice had to be sought and acted upon in all matters other than those touching Malay religion and custom, had made the Sultanate a mere 'rubber stamp' institution in an indirect rule system.

### *The Masses Revolt.*

The concept of *Daulat* and *Derhaka* which related to the power of a Sultan were to be openly challenged by the rakyat in the early 20th century. Tok Janggut led the Kelantan Malays against the government in the incident which the British called The Rebellion of Tok Janggut in 1915, while the religious leader, Haji Abdul Rahman Limbong, spearheaded the people of Trengganu in the uprising of 1928. Although

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<sup>71</sup> M.A.Fawzi Basri, "Sistem Gelaran dan Taraf dalam Kerajaan Dinasti Temenggung di Johor 1850-1930," *Purba* (the Journal of Malaysia Museum Society), vol.1, 1982, pp.68-85.

<sup>72</sup> E.Sadka, "The State Council in Perak and Selangor, 1877-1895," in K.G.Tregonning (ed), *Papers on Malayan History*, (Singapore: Dept of History, University of Malaya, 1962), pp.120-134.

both challenges failed, the incidents demonstrated a change in Malay perceptions toward both their traditional institutions and the British intervention.

Kelantan and Trengganu with Johor, Kedah and Perlis were exceptional Malay states, in which large number of Malays participated in the running of the state. Because the British responded to abundant Malay talent by bringing them into government service, the Malays, especially in Kelantan and Trengganu, played important roles in modernising the states 'administrations'.<sup>73</sup> These two Malay states, although less efficiently run, retained 'independence' from western capitalism and cultural encroachment. In order to avoid Malay uprisings in other Malay States, British officials were more cautious, and they were more flexible in their attitude to Johor and Kedah.<sup>74</sup> These latter states developed their own modern administrative and education system, which contributed to the emergence of a new Malay leadership after the Second World War.

#### *Changes in Administration.*

For the Malay ruling class, their notion of religion and custom was a whole world-view of an integrated way of life. Given the traditional nature of Malay society, this represented Malay feudalism and its corresponding culture and social order.<sup>75</sup> The Pangkor treaty of 1874 accorded to the Sultan power only in connection to the religion and customs of the Malays. In other matters, power would be executed on the advice of the British Resident. From then on, this became the tradition in the Malaysian political system.<sup>76</sup>

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<sup>73</sup> Rupert Emerson 1963, *Malaysia*, p.249.

<sup>74</sup> Ingelise Lamont Lanman 1988, 'The Fabric of Malay Nationalism on the Malay Peninsula', (Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles.), p.108. See reference to the political attitude of Kelantan and Trengganu Malays, and the Malay political leadership from Kedah and Johor in chapters VII and VIII.

<sup>75</sup> Shahrudin Maaruf 1988, *Malay Idea*, p.48.

<sup>76</sup> The Federal Constitution since 1948 endorsed the matter. The Sultan became head of State religion. A council or Department of Religious Affairs was formed to advise him. After 1970, the Federal government began to centralise power by coordinating the issues and problems of religion from each state through the formation of a *Majlis Fatwa*, and The Federal Council of Islamic Affairs. Presently, the Federal Government has Pusat Islam as the nerve centre to monitor problems regarding religion, and has the Islamic Missionary Foundation for propagating Islam. A religious scholar has been given

Some of the Orang Besar, in The Federated Malay States such as Perak and Selangor, were appointed as *Orang Besar Jajahan* (The Territorial Chief), to represent the Sultan, and became a symbolic patron of local Malays. They had no real power but were given fixed allowances from the state treasury. In such Unfederated Malay States as Johor and Trengganu, the modern Malay bureaucrats called *Pesuruhjaya Kerajaan*<sup>77</sup> or District Officers were retained in their office, though their power over land, judicial and some administrative functions was taken over by the British Assistant Adviser. The Malays in the Unfederated Malay States were more fortunate in the context of participation in their state machinery. However, the parallel system at district level was not without tensions. There were cases of hostility and friction between the Assistant Adviser and the *Pesuruhjaya Kerajaan*.

The Penghulu was another traditional leader whose position changed in the colonial era, from ascribed to achieved status -from hereditary to elected leader. The Penghulu was absorbed into the district administrative apparatus, and moved from being responsible to the Malay ruling class, to being responsible to the district administrator.<sup>78</sup> The status of the Penghulu was defined and streamlined as a administrator of a Mukim - a group of villages. Under the Land Enactment, the Mukim formed a new socio-political unit of administration and become

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the position of Federal Deputy Minister in the Prime Minister's Department, also looking after Religious Affairs and the supervision of Pusat Islam.

<sup>77</sup> see Fawzi Basri 1988, *Johor*, pp. 41-43, 74-82, 108-114,

<sup>78</sup> see K.O.L. Burridge, 'Rural administration in Johore,' *Journal of African Administration*, vol.IX (1), 1957, and 'Managerial Influence in a Johor Village' *JMBRAS*, vol.XXV (1), 1957, pp.93-114; R.E.Downs, 'A Rural Community in Kelantan, Malaya,' in *Studies on Asia*, ed. Robert K.Sakai, (University of Nebraska Press, 1960), pp.51-62; S.Hussin Ali, *Social Stratification in Kampung Bagan*, Monograph of the MBRAS, 1964; M.G.Swift, *Malay Peasant Society in Jekebu*, (London: Athlone Press, 1965). In 1965-1966 the Department of Malay Studies of the University of Malaya carried out research on Penghulu, and Malay leadership for the graduation exercise of its final year students. Among them were Abdul Maulud Yusof, 'Leadership Dalam Kampong Baru,' (1965); Abdul Razak Abdullah, 'Penghulu Di Mukim Ayer Baloi,' (1966); Hashim Mydin, 'Sistem Penghulu Di Kedah,' (1966); Ismail Yusof, 'Sistem Penghulu Di Hulu Perak,' (1966); Johari Hassan, 'Struktur Pimpinan Luar Bandar,' (1965); Khadijah Muhammad, 'Sistem Penghulu Di Daerah Kelang,' (1966); Mahfor Baba, 'Pentadbiran Tradisional di Peringkat Mukim,' (1965); Nahariah Hussein, 'Pentadbiran dan Pimpinan di Daerah Ulu Langat,' (1966); Siti Maznah Saad, 'Struktur Pimpinan di Peringkat Kampong,' (1966); Sulaiman Jaafar, 'Sistem Penghulu di Daerah Kuala Lumpur,' (1966); Wan Zahid Nordin, 'Susunan dan Organisasi Pentadbiran dan Politik di Mukim Kerdau,' (1965); and Zainal Keling, 'Sistem Penghulu di Alor Gajah,' (1966).

the lowest administrative unit<sup>79</sup>. Until an increasing number of the Malays graduated from tertiary education to join the civil service or the private sector, the modernisation of the Penghulu institution<sup>80</sup> did not diminish the status, image and role of Penghulu in the eyes of the Rakyat<sup>81</sup>.

The Penghulu maintained their dignity as '*Orang Kerajaan*' (Government official), or '*Orang Raja*' (King's servant) during the traditional period.<sup>82</sup> After its absorption into the administrative machinery, the Penghulu received a salary, and his appointment was based on qualifications. Moreover, transferable posts undermined the intimate relationship between the Penghulu, previously of local origin, and his *anak buah* (the villagers). The Penghulu was put in charge of a *Mukim* -a group of villages- and then supervised the individual villages indirectly through village heads.<sup>83</sup>

The "Kampung" (village) as a basic socio-political unit also encountered change. The village headman held various titles such as Ketua Kampung, To Sidang, Tok Empat, Panglima, Batin, Menteri and Jenang-jenang. Originally the Penghulu was responsible for appointing the Ketua Kampung. However, before independence the Penghulu was given the task of organizing the election of the Ketua Kampung. Thus the Penghulu of a Mukim held the responsibility of proposing a list of potential candidates for the post of Ketua Kampung. They presented a '*sijil Ketua Kampung*'- a letter of authority legitimizing their leadership of the village, and thus

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<sup>79</sup> See Masuo Kuchiba, Yoshiro Tsubouchi and Narifumi Maeda (eds), *Three Malay Villages: A Sociology of Paddy Growers in West Malaysia*, translated by Peter and Stephanie Hawkes, (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1979), pp.208-210.

<sup>80</sup> See Conner Bailey, *Broker, Mediator, Patron, and Kinsman: An Historical Analysis of Key Leadership Roles in a Rural Malaysia District* (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1976), pp.40-69.

<sup>81</sup> See S. Husin Ali, *Malay Peasant Society and Leadership* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp 116-131.

<sup>82</sup> By 1970, with an increasing number of Malay graduates holding higher posts in the government and the private sector, and College-trained teachers involved with UMNO, the Penghulu no longer dominated UMNO leadership at the UMNO Divisions or Branches.

<sup>83</sup> See Fawzi Basri 1988, *Johor*, pp. 114-120.

from a hereditary leadership the system changed to elected leadership.<sup>84</sup>

Urbanization and capitalism coloured the thinking and ethics of the Malay elite. Capitalism had an influence on religion and nationalism. Abdullah Munsyi started the discussion of the 'laziness' of the Malays and the attitudes of the ruling elite. By the end of 19th century, a weekly, *Bintang Timor*, published an article entitled 'Mengapa Melayu Layu' (Why do the Malays decline?).<sup>85</sup> However, it was the Malay elite itself and the British who deliberately formulated and implemented a policy of maintaining sacrosanct the traditional world of the rural Malay.

#### *Political change and The Modern Malays.*

Gullick (1987) has argued that the period between 1900 and 1920 was a watershed in Malay society, in which the modern Malay began to emerge<sup>86</sup>:

*"At first sight, Malay society in the nineteenth and then the twentieth century presents a sharp contrast. The nineteenth century appears to have been the last age of unchanging stability and the twentieth century marks the beginning of accelerating process of social change which continues down to modern times...[By 1920] the Malay community had set aside its initial doubts about the lay education of its sons (and its daughters)- so much so that the Malays were demanding that the network of vernacular schools, a powerful instrument of change, should be extended throughout the Malay states.*

However, in rural areas, Malays were kept ignorant, backward and encapsulated in the subsistence sector by British administrators, who claimed to be their protectors. The regulations and laws enforced by the 'protector' brought a great deal of hardship and confusion to the Malay peasant. They no longer enjoyed certain

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<sup>84</sup> By 1962, the post of Ketua Kampung had been institutionalised as a political appointment. Candidates were selected for that post by the District Office administrators who assessed their suitability on such factors as political considerations. Normally the Ketua Kampung is given the task of chairman of "the Jawatankuasa Kemajuan dan Keselamatan Kampung" (The Village Development and Security Committee) better known as *JKK*, see Hassan Mohamad Ali 1984, "Leadership factors associated with effective functioning of the Malaysian grass-roots development machinery (Village Development and Security Committee) in Peninsular Malaysia" (Unpublished PhD dissertation, Wisconsin, USA); Marvin L. Roger May 1975, "Patterns of Leadership in a Rural Malay Community." *Asian Survey*, Vol. XV, No. 5, pp.407-420; and Harun Abdul Karim 1971. "Village Development Committee- A Study of Its Origin, Organization and Performance". (B.A. Graduation Exercise, Faculty of Economics, University of Malaya).

<sup>85</sup> W.R. Roff, *The Origin of Malay Nationalism* (Kuala Lumpur: Penerbit Universiti Malaya, 1975), pp.54-57.

<sup>86</sup> J.M. Gullick 1987, *Malay Society*, p.3.

liberties concerning the acquisition of natural resources for their daily life. The Malay Mail in 1901 mentioned how the Malays lost business in the transportation of tin along Kelang River, in Kuala Lumpur, when the British introduced the railway in late 19th century. As a result, the Malays were left out of modern economic activities.<sup>87</sup> The press also expressed its concern over the socio-economic problems of the Malays. It was proposed that the British administration should give more attention to the Malays who were loyal and deferential.<sup>88</sup> A popular Malay proverb, '*Kais pagi makan pagi, kais petang makan petang*' manifestly illustrates the hard life in the rural areas sustained by a subsistence economy.

The Malay intelligentsia did not attack the system with dramatic or violent protest. Instead they expressed their criticism of Malay society in various journals and publications. Among these critics was Zainal Abidin Ahmad who wrote in 1923:<sup>89</sup>

*"The poverty of the Malays is an all-round poverty. It envelops them on every side... They are poor in all...equipments which can lead to success and greatness. They are not, however, naturally of poor intellect ...potentially, they possess such qualities... but the actualised part... is still too poor to bear comparison with what we find in other progressive peoples in the country."*

The enforcement of the Malay Land Reservation Act of 1913 was possibly a shrewd tactic, to retard the process of Malay proletarianization, and constrain the emergence of Malay capitalists, as the 'Reserve land' had no market value. While the Act denied the Malays participation in commerce, trade, land and property development, it also gave more opportunities for the expansion of Chinese mercantile capital. At the same time European companies had taken half of the agricultural and

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<sup>87</sup> The Malay Mail, March 1901 quoted by Malik Munip, 'Perancangan Pentadbiran Kolonial Ingeeris: Kesannya Keatas Ekonomi Melayu,' in Zainal Kling (ed.), *Masyarakat Melayu: Tradisi dan Perubahan*, (Kuala Lumpur: Utusan Melayu Pub., 1977), pp.136, 141-142.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid.

<sup>89</sup> Malay Mail, December 1, 1923, He was known as Zaaba and was a teacher at Kuala Kangsar Malay College from 1918 until he moved to the Translation Bureau at Sultan Idris Teacher Training College, Tanjung Malim in 1924. See also Ingelise Lamont Lanman 1988, "The Fabric of Malay Nationalism," p.218.

mining land. Thus the Malays were left out of the mainstream of economic development.<sup>90</sup>

Although there were economic changes and communications developments in the Malay States, and the gap between rural and urban areas narrowed, uneven development occurred when the British concentrated their attention on the west coast or the Federated Malay states. This situation exacerbated regionalistic sentiments among the Malays, which became embedded within traditional Malay political culture. Nevertheless, in reality, all Malays were left behind in comparison with non-Malays or immigrant communities.

Zaaba and other Malay writers and journalists<sup>91</sup> in the 1920's, linked economic individualism with Malay nationalism or 'capitalistic nationalism'.<sup>92</sup> In short, the poor and the weak were considered a burden and obstacle to 'Malay nationalism'.<sup>93</sup>

### *Islamic Reformism and Malay Nationalism.*

Historians have described the period beginning with the publication of *Al-Imam* (1906)<sup>94</sup> and the founding of *Kesatuan Melayu Singapura* (The Singapore Malay Union) in 1926 as a religious phase in the history of the emergence of Malay Nationalism,<sup>95</sup> since *Al-Imam* was based on ideas of social and political, as well as religious, change.

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<sup>90</sup> Fatimah Halim 1990, 'Transformation', p.68. See also Lim Teck Gee, *Origins of a Colonial Economy Land and Agriculture in Perak 1874-1897*, (Penang: Universiti Sains Malaysia, 1976).

<sup>91</sup> Most of the works in 1920's and 1930's have been reprinted, see Zaaba, 'Kemiskinan Orang Melayu', in Ungku Abdul Aziz, *Jejak-jejak di Pantai Zaman* (Kuala Lumpur: Penerbit Universiti Malaya, 1975); Zaaba, *Perangai Bergantung Pada Diri Sendiri* (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1982); Ishak Haji Muhamad, *Putera Gunung Tahan* (Petaling Jaya: Pustaka Budaya Agency, 1973), translated by Harry Aveling, *The Prince of Mount Tahan* (Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann, 1980); Ishak haji Muhamad, *Anak Mat Lela Gila*, (Kuala Lumpur: Federal Publication, 1975); Abdul Rahim Kajai, 'Cerita Awang Putat', in *Koleksi Cerpun-cerpun Malaysia* (Kuala Lumpur: Penerbit Universiti Malaya, 1977).

<sup>92</sup> Shahrudin Maaruf 1988. *Malay Ideas*, pp.62-90.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*, p.87.

<sup>94</sup> W.R.Roff, "Kaum Muda - Kaum Tua: Innovation and reaction amongst the Malays, 1900-1941," in K.G.Tregonning (ed.) *Paper On Malayan History*, (Singapore: Dept. of History, University of Malaya, 1962), pp 162-192.

<sup>95</sup> Khoo Kay Kim, "The Malay Peninsula: A Political survey, 1900 - 1941" in Zainal Abidin Wahid (ed.) *Glimpses of Malaysian History*, (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1970), pp 79-80, and see also W.R.Roff 1967, *Malay*

The origins of Malay nationalism were not primarily political in nature, but it was very clear that Malay ethnic consciousness<sup>96</sup> emerged from their economic backwardness compared to the aliens in the country. Increasing economic domination by Chinese and Indian Chettyars, and participation of English educated Indians and Ceylonese in the government service sharpened these ethnic differences.

The Kaum Muda, through their medium *Al-Imam*, emphasised religion not specially as an end in itself but as a means to an end, i.e. greater unity among the Malays and economic improvement. However, the Kaum Muda were confronted by the Kaum Tua, who represented a powerful force among traditional Malay elites and 'orthodox' ulama, and controlled such machinery for governing Islam, as The Council of Chiefs and the Ulama in Perak or the Council of Religion and Malay Customs in Kelantan<sup>97</sup>.

The Council of Religion and Customs and their counterparts were appointed by the Sultan and acted as an advisory body to him. The Council commonly had a majority of non-theologian members drawn from the royal household and senior chiefs, with the ex-officio addition of the state Mufti (or Shaykh ul-Islam) and the Chief Kadi. These last functionaries were the principal religious officers of state. The Mufti determined the fatwa (legal opinion), correct law and doctrine. The Chief Kadi, was the senior magistrate of the religious courts. The Kadi and his assistants, who held nominal control over all aspects of religion within the state, were, to some extent, limited by the isolation of the rural areas, and by the relative inefficiency of their officers at district level.

The Kaum Muda, or the reformists, were concerned that man use his *akal* (reason) to determine the truth about religion, as about anything else, and disapproved

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Nationalism, pp 56-90; Radin Soenamo "Malay Nationalism, 1900-1945", JSEAH 1,(March 1960) pp 1-28; George Maxwell, "What is Malay Nationalism?", *Straits Times Annual*, (1941), pp.109-113; and K.P.London, "Malay Nationalism", *Far Eastern Quarterly*, 2, (February 1943) pp.209-222.

<sup>96</sup> Hussain Mutalib, *Islam and Ethnicity in Malay Politics* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp.18-23.

<sup>97</sup> W.R.Roff 1967, *Malay Nationalism*, p.74.



of blind acceptance of intermediary authority.<sup>98</sup> The perfection and purification of Islam was seen not simply an end in itself, but rather as an impetus to and prescription for socio-economic changes in Malay society, which were said to be retarded by traditional Malay Islamic practice. The Kaum Muda played two important roles; as fundamentalists, and as purists who criticized orthodox ulamas. They represented an attempt by those Muslims with a more intensive experience of metropolitan Islam to purify ritual and belief from local innovations, and they were modernists who intended to rationalize reformulations of Islamic practice in order to compete in the modern world. They advocated, for example, greater freedom for women to receive education and participate in social affairs<sup>99</sup>. The Kaum Muda and Kaum Tua conflict was fostered at the village level<sup>100</sup>:

*The disruptive effects of the dispute were considerable, the adherents of each side refusing to pray with the others in the mosque, or to attend weddings and other ceremonies held by the opposition. Though such faction fights were often, . . . patched up after a time, they were not uncommon in Malay villages, as one of the unsettling effects of new ideas."*

As a reaction grew toward Kaum Muda, their reformation ideas were blocked from spreading to the grass-roots. By 1925, the Kaum Tua had denied the entry of the Kaum Muda's publications into some Malay States. Moreover, they enforced the requirement to have *the tauliah* (letters of credential and authority) from the Sultan for teaching Islam in a particular state. This practice has indeed been implemented to the present day.

Political awareness among the Malays could also be traced back to the formation of *Jam'eah Al-Khairiah* (a welfare society of Malay students) in Cairo.

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<sup>98</sup> See Ozay Mehmet, *Islamic Identity and Development: Studies of the Islamic Periphery*, (London and New York: Routledge, 1990), p.11-35.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid., pp. 78-79.

<sup>100</sup> Roff 1962, "Kaum Muda - Kaum Tua", p.183 ff 63. Amongst the arguments that arose between the Kaum Muda and the Kaum Tua was one concerning whether it was permissible for a Muslim to wear European dress, and whether the taking of interest from a post-office saving accounts and rural co-operative societies was lawful or not; also the holiness of the local keramat (spirit shrines) or whether a teacher had correctly interpreted a verse of the Quran.

The society published two monthly journals called; *Seruan Azhar* (1925-28) and *Pilehan Timour* (1927-28). These journals inculcated the concept of Pan-Islamism, Pan-Malayanism (union between Indonesia, The Malay Peninsula and Borneo), and anti-colonial nationalism; indeed it was the Middle- East educated group of religious Malays who formed the Kaum Muda. However, the idea of Pan-Islamism or a rejuvenated Islamic world failed, and its political ideas of international Islamic unity had little influence in the Malay Peninsula. But more important in the long run was "the growth of the idea of a closer union between Malaya and Indonesia...From this idea, developed the discussion of colonial rule as the major obstacle to true progress and reform."<sup>101</sup>

#### *Malay Identity.*

These groups of Arabic educated elites had produced a small but challenging group of 'religious-social reformists'. However, their movement failed to arouse the Malay masses, and had little appeal in the rural areas. Most of these Islamic reformists were from the urban Muslim bourgeoisie of the Straits Settlements, and were of Arab and South Indian stock (well known among the Malay community as *peranakan*), rather than *Melayu Jati* (pure Malay). In the late 1920's, the Malays considered these two 'peranakan' as outsiders, and always referred them as 'DKA' (Darah Keturunan Arab) or the 'descendants from Arab blood', and *DKK* (Darah Keturunan Keling) or the 'descendants from Indian blood'. These labels were used polemically to draw attention to their 'usurpation' of leadership roles. It was evidence of "the extent to which this was already recognized and felt"<sup>102</sup>.

Anti Arab feeling had played an important part in the formation of *KMS* - Kesatuan Melayu Singapura (the Singapore Malay Union) in 1926. This opened its membership to 'persons of Malay stock indigenous to the Malay Peninsula and

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<sup>101</sup> Ibid., p.89.

<sup>102</sup> Ibid., p.220.

archipelago<sup>103</sup>. The KMS was the first Malay movement inclining to politics.<sup>104</sup> Most of the KMS leaders were English educated journalists, government servants and merchants, and KMS's activities were limited to the urban Malays in Singapore, Melaka, and Penang. Nevertheless KMS played its role in establishing a Malay national daily "*Utusan Melayu*", which published its first issue on May 29, 1939<sup>105</sup>.

### *The Depression, Elites and Political Movements.*

The 1930's witnessed the development of Malay consciousness and aspirations. The Malays realized that they were confronting the Chinese who were claiming a larger share in the government and administration. Moreover, the Malays suffered hardship in the great depression to an extent that had never been experienced before. They also suffered from exploitation by the colonial capitalists, and especially the Indian Chettiars' money lenders' schemes and the Chinese '*Padi Kunca*' (Credit system), that drove Malays into debt. These situations encouraged the emergence of new elites to form nationalist-type organizations to spear-head the betterment of the Malays.

### *The Radicals.*

In this situation, a radical Malay political elite emerged. Most of them were of Malay village origin and had received Malay vernacular education at the Sultan Idris Teacher Training College (SITC). They had formed the *KMM (Kesatuan Melayu Muda)*, the Young Malay Union in 1938. This aimed at unity with Indonesia under the banner of *Melayu Raya* (Greater Malay Nation), and also tried to use Islam as a vehicle for Pan-Malayan Nationalism:

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<sup>103</sup> Ibid., p. 191.

<sup>104</sup> KMS was formed with the aim of encouraging its members to play a greater role in public and government affairs; of sponsoring Malay progress and interest in politics and education; of making representations to the Government on behalf of the Malay community in all matters concerning the right and freedom of the Malays; and of fostering higher and technical education for them, Ibid.

<sup>105</sup> *Utusan Melayu* had a bitter struggle for existence against competition from *Warta Malaya*, *Lembaga*, *Saudara* and *Majlis* which were financed by non-Malay-Arabs, Malay-Arabs, and Jawi Peranakan.

*"This group became increasingly political as it attacked colonialism, the forces of capitalism and traditional Malay society, and it established links with Indonesian nationalists in the Netherlands East Indies."*<sup>106</sup>

Two Malay dailies were used by KMM's leaders to propagate anti-British sentiments. However, the KMM's radical ideas seemed to be rejected by the other Malay elites, the aristocrats and bureaucrats. KMM also failed to gain mass support within the Malay community which was a divided and politically 'conservative' society..

#### *The Conformists.*

Another Malay group was the 'conformists', composed of the English-educated Malay elite, most of whom had the twin advantages of traditional status and modern education, known as the Malay Administrative Class<sup>107</sup>. This elite had gained favour from the colonial government, in the same way that the latter had also favoured the old aristocracy:

*"...in the absence of a powerful landed class, Malay society had always given its respect and loyalty to bearers of office, whose status was measured by their proximity to the centre of power."*<sup>108</sup>

Most of this elite were from the traditional ruling class. The decision to absorb the Malay traditional elite into the colonial bureaucracy of the Federated Malay States was a political one. The upgrading and promoting of the MAS (The Malay Administrative Service) officers to the MCS (the Malayan Civil Service) was a recognition by the colonial government of their importance. Moreover, the MCS was the key policy-making service. The position of the Malays in the British administration was reinforced by their position in the Malay social structure; they continued to fulfill their function as an aristocratic elite while in reality they became a 'modernised' bureaucratic elite within the colonial civil service. Although some in

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<sup>106</sup> A.J.Stockwell 1979, *British Policy and Malay Politics*., p.xv.

<sup>107</sup> Khasnor Johan, *The Emergence of the Modern Malay Administrative Elite* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1984.), p.3.

<sup>108</sup> *Ibid.*,p.4.

this Malay administrative elite became 'Anglophile', and transformed their daily life into a western style one and became isolated from the Malay masses,<sup>109</sup> there were a few who tried to act as official spokesmen for Malay opinion, thus representing the aspirations of the Malay community<sup>110</sup>.

The Malay traditional-bureaucratic elites were, by the late 1930s, leading quasi-political Malay associations. In March 1938, the *Persatuan Melayu Pahang*<sup>111</sup> (the Malay Association of Pahang) was formed, under the Presidential leadership of Tengku Ahmad, and also Dato' Hussain Mohamad Taib. The latter was one of the state's four major traditional chiefs, a member of the state council and also a senior MAS (The Malay Administrative Service) officer in Pahang, acting as its Vice President.

In Perak state, the *Perikatan Melayu Perak* (The Perak Malay League) was also formed in 1938, and was led by members of the traditional-bureaucratic elite. Among these were Abdul Wahab Tok Muda Aziz, who later inherited the traditional title of *Dato' Panglima Bukit Gantang*, one of the traditional chiefs. Important here were also Zainal Abidin Abbas, Megat Yunus and Raja Kamarulzaman.

In June 1938, Tengku Ismail Tengku Mohd Yassin, a lawyer and former MCS officer was elected President of *Persatuan Melayu Selangor* (the Selangor Malay

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<sup>109</sup> Looking down on the Malay masses occurred until the Second World War. The Malay college, Kuala Kangsar, the only source of the joint Administrative Service in 1930, had 124 students consisting of 46 *anak raja* (Prince), and 78 sons of the *Orang Besar*, Penghulu and a few sons of 'orang biasa' (commoners). The Malay power elite petitioned against the selection of commoners to MCKK, they refused to sit 'side by side with the children of people who were once our slaves' Nordin Selat, *Kelas Menengah Melayu: Satu kajian Perkembangan Gaya Hidup*, (Kuala Lumpur: Utusan Melayu, 1976), p.136. Access to MAS and MCS for the Malays was created by the colonial administration. This Malay elite became detached from the Malay masses. Their affluent life style was disturbed after Independence when more Malay commoners joined MCS and this was followed by the formation of government statutory bodies. They strengthened their position as an elitist service which dictated policies and regulations for other government agencies. Later the MCS officers in Kuala Lumpur called themselves 'officers of the central agency'. They enjoyed domination of political leaders until Dr Mahathir came along, wishing to control issues and design policy himself. Subsequently, MCS officers felt Dr Mahathir's administration had changed and checked their 'colonial' style through special devices such as the 'clock-in-system,' productivity, performance and meritocracy instead of seniority-based promotion, the code of conduct (*Etika Kerja*), and implementation of reduction of the number of civil servants to a minimum. 'Clean, Efficient and trustworthy' was a broad message which they now had to deliver to their political masters.

<sup>110</sup> Mavis Puthucherry, *The Politics of Administration : the Malayan Experience*, (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp.24-27.

<sup>111</sup> Roff 1967, *Malay Nationalism*, p.236.

Association), while Raja Bot Raja Yahya, a territorial chief, became Vice President.<sup>112</sup>

*The Congress of the Malays.*

By 1939, Malay associations had also been formed in other Malay States. In August 1939, Persatuan Melayu Selangor and Kesatuan Melayu Singapura had organised a national congress of the Malays in Kuala Lumpur, with the objective of consolidating the efforts of the Malay race and the Malay associations. The Congress made an appeal for wider Malay unity above particular state loyalties.<sup>113</sup>

The second congress was held in December 1940, with more Malay associations taking part, including some from Sarawak and Brunei. This congress proposed a plan for Malay economic development to the British government, the appointment of a Malay in all overseas missions and as Assistant Director of Education, and wider opportunities in English education<sup>114</sup>. These proposals were in line with the 'special position of the Malays' British policy, which had hitherto failed to help the Malays in securing government appointments.

However, the congress was very conservative and had a strong western-elitist bias, shown by the absence of a radical political programme, and it was unable to see beyond the traditional Malay political structure. Though political consciousness was emerging among the Malays, they still held to a strong regionalism or 'parochial Malay nationalism'.<sup>115</sup> The congress even failed to arrive at a definition of a Malay. Nevertheless, the formation of Malay associations "did provide a potentially acceptable framework -in the long run the only acceptable framework -for Malay political action."<sup>116</sup>

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<sup>112</sup> Ibid.,p.237.

<sup>113</sup> Ibid.,p.242.

<sup>114</sup> Ibid.,p.246.

<sup>115</sup> Cheah Boon Kheng, *The Masked Comrades: A Study of the Communist United front in Malaya, 1945-48* (Singapore: Times Books, 1979), pp 2-3, Roff 1962, *Malay Nationalism*, pp 247-248, and Wang Gungwu, *Community and Nation* (Kuala Lumpur : Heinemann, 1981), pp 201-209.

<sup>116</sup> Roff 1967, *Malay Nationalism*, p.247.

It might be argued that in spite of the impact of British rule and the economic penetration by the non-Malay immigrant population, Malay Nationalism was slow in maturing before 1941. Respective state loyalty and allegiance to particular rulers circumscribed the development of Malay politics. The Malay mind before 1941 was still largely based on their concept of 'derhaka' (treason), and the 'daulat' (sovereignty) of the Sultan.<sup>117</sup> "It was the nature of the Malay to be wholly loyal and submissive to the government, to the authorities, to the rulers, and any unfamiliar movement was feared by them."<sup>118</sup> Besides, British policy encouraged the traditional Malay submissiveness toward their rulers. However, when the Malay rulers were forced by the British to sign the Malayan Union treaty, traditional Malay political culture broke down, and the aroused Malay masses organised nation wide protests, against this policy.<sup>119</sup>

*Malay Politics in the Second World War.*

*The Kesatuan Melayu Muda* (KMM), under such radical leaders as Ibrahim Yaakob, Ishak Haji Mohamad and Ahmad Boestamam, professed to look forward to the overthrow of British colonialism, and of the entire fabric of indigenous feudalism, which had been 'safe guarded' by the British. The political development of the Malays was one of the most important features of the Japanese occupation. Moreover, Japanese Military Administration policy<sup>120</sup> encouraged the growth of political consciousness amongst the Malays<sup>121</sup>.

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<sup>117</sup> As far as the Malays were concerned, political involvement traditionally resulted in punishment, or at the very least, severe disapproval. The rakyat were discouraged from meddling in politics since the polity of the state and its people were in the hands of the Sultan. Fatimah Halim 1990, 'Transformation,' p.69.

<sup>118</sup> Ibid.

<sup>119</sup> Cheah Boon Kheng, "The erosion of ideological hegemony and royal power and the rise of post war Malay nationalism, 1945-1948", JSEAS, XIX, 1, (1988), pp 1-26.

<sup>120</sup> Yoji Akashi, "Japanese Military Administration in Malaya with special reference to the Sultans, the Islamic religion, and the muslim Malays, 1941-1945," Asian Studies, 7, 1, (April 1969), pp.88-110, and Y.Itagaki, "The Japanese policy for Malaya under the occupation, with special reference to Nationalism," in K.G.Tregonning (ed), *Papers On Malayan History* (Singapore: Dept. of History, University of Malaya, 1962), pp 256-267.

<sup>121</sup> Zainal Abidin Wahid 1970, *Glimpses*, p.93. The Japanese military administration encouraged a greater awareness at all levels of Malay society. For example, an Islamic conference of the Malays from the Peninsula and Sumatra was held in April 1943; an All-Peninsular journalists conference in October 1943; campaigning for Malay unity throughout the Peninsula; the

The KMM, capitalising on Japanese military strength, tried to oust British power and to set up a Malay republican state, including Sumatra and Java, and called "Melayu Raya" (Greater Malay State). The KMM leaders were given roles in the Japanese administration. For example, Ibrahim Yaacob, the leader of the KMM, was appointed the commander of *Giu-Gun*, (The Malay Volunteer Army) ,better known among the Malays as PETA (*Pembela Tanah Air*), at the rank of Lieutenant Colonel

At the same time, Malay administrators began to acquire a greater sense of independence, and political awareness, self confidence and loyalty to the Japanese, who came to rely heavily on them<sup>122</sup>. This was generated by the fact that the Japanese government began to realise that the war was not going in their favour. Thus they started to take measures to combat the possible return of Allied power, and to encourage the Malays to take up the issue of independence<sup>123</sup>.

These circumstances were exploited by radical Malay leaders in forming KRIS -*Kekuatan Rakyat Istimewa* (All-Out Effort of the People)<sup>124</sup> to fight for independence within "Indonesia Raya". On August 12 1945, KRIS, led by Ibrahim Yaacob, met by chance with Ir.Soekarno and Dr Hatta at Taiping to discuss joint moves toward independence of the Malay Peninsula and Indonesia. However, the plan broke down due to the sudden surrender of the Japanese Army.

#### *The Malays in the interregnum phase.*

There was confusion and turbulence in the Malay Peninsula during the transition period between the Japanese surrender and the regaining of control by the British Military Administration. The Malay community was confused and in a dilemma when they were harassed and threatened by the Chinese guerillas of the

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setting-up of the Kunrensho (college) in Melaka ; and the sending of some Malay students for further study in Japan, see also A.J.Stockwell 1977, *British Policy and Malay politics*, pp.9-10.

<sup>122</sup> Cheah Boon Kheng 1988, "Postwar Malay Nationalism", p.20.

<sup>123</sup> Zainal Abidin Wahid 1970, *Glimpses*, p.96.

<sup>124</sup> Yoichi Itagaki 1962, " Japanese policy for Malaya", pp.262-264.



MPAJA (the Malayan People Anti Japanese Army), well known as *Bintang Tiga*, which took over the Malay Peninsula for fourteen days<sup>125</sup>, "They discovered that neither the Malay aristocracy, nor the Malay bureaucracy, the Malay Police Force nor the Malay Volunteer Army were of any help. Every strata of Malay society seemed helpless in facing the new foe."<sup>126</sup> An attempt by Ahmad Boestamam to launch a coup, through his clandestine organization called KITA -*Kiri Tanah Air* (the National Left wing) only managed to take over the Perak Shimbun printing press building in Ipoh, the place where Ahmad Boestamam and his radical friends were working as the editorial staff of the Japanese official organ<sup>127</sup>.

Furthermore, the stirring up of anti European sentiment by the Japanese, the introduction of patriotic feelings through both the Malay Peninsula and the Japanese co-prosperity sphere, and the general tenor of extremism and violence, made a deep and lasting impression on the Malays. They felt that as *bumiputera* (sons of the soil), they had the right to determine the fate of their country. The brutal action of MPAJA terrorists toward the Malay community, during the 14 days reign of terror, was seen as reflecting the attitude of the Chinese towards the position of the Malays in their own country. The Chinese have always been considered as *bangsa asing* (foreigners) by the Malays since those unforgettable and unforgiveable days of the terror. Until 1969, Malay sentiment toward the Chinese was extremely adverse, to the extent that the Chinese were seen as enemies who endangered the future survival of the Malays.

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<sup>125</sup> The MPAJA which was controlled by the Chinese dominated Malayan Communist Party, had a membership of more than 7000 men. During the War the MPAJA was supported by the British in arms, provisions and training. As a resistance movement, MPAJA played an important role in harrasing the Japanese positions. When a political vacuum occurred , the MPAJA took the opportunity, came out from the jungle and assumed political supremacy in certain areas around the Peninsula. The British Military Administration then disbanded the MPAJA. Some of the MPAJA members, with other new recruits and supporters of The Malayan Communist Party, tried again to overthrow the British government in an uprising in 1948, after failing to gain power via constitutional means. The MCP was subsequently banned by the government which declared a State of Emergency in order to curtail the Communist guerilla movement. The MCP, backed by the Chinese Communist Party, waged guerilla warfare until December 1989 when they officially agreed to disarm, 34 years after the first talks in Baling in 1955.

<sup>126</sup> Cheah Boon Kheng 1988, "Post war Malay nationalism", p.21.

<sup>127</sup> Ahmad Boestamam 1972, *Merintis Jalan ke Puncak*, (Kuala Lumpur: Pustaka Kejora), p.3.

*The Post-war political attitude of the Malays.*

The Japanese occupation and the Malayan Union Policy acted as catalysts for an immediate change in the political attitude of the Malays<sup>128</sup>.

There were two basic schools of thought that now dominated Malay political life ; the left and the right. The left wing continued the pre war movement. It was developed from the KMM to KRIS, and by 17 October 1945 KRIS had adopted a new name, PKMM -*Parti kebangsaan Melayu Malaya*, or the Malay Nationalist Party.

The PKMM, as a republican party advocated immediate independence, and planned to establish a central government called 'The Malay Union', which would comprise the nine Malay states and the Straits Settlements<sup>129</sup>. In order to secure its goals, the PKMM relied on three militant youth leagues, namely the API -the Angkatan Pemuda Insaf; the GERAM -the Gerakan Angkatan Muda; and the AWAS -the Angkatan Wanita Sedar. Of the three leagues, the API was the most violent.<sup>130</sup> The PKMM conference of November 1945 agreed to the slogan 'Merdeka'(independence) proposed by the API. However, the PKMM struggle for independence did not obtain support from the Malay elites, who considered the former's ideas too drastic, while the Malay masses, who were politically illiterate, assumed that 'merdeka' was an 'unthinkable' idea. Nevertheless, it should be noted that PKMM was the first Malay political party that fought for independence, but the situation and the political attitudes of the Malays, at that time, were unfavourable for PKMM's political stratagem.

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<sup>128</sup> See Abdul Latif Sahan 1959, "Political attitude of the Malays," p.50.

<sup>129</sup> Ibid.,pp 12-13.

<sup>130</sup> See Harry Miller, "History of A.P.I." *The Straits Times*, 17 July 1949, p.4.

*The Malayan Union*<sup>131</sup>: Cause and Reactions.

The Malayan Union proposal was based on the implicit assumption that the left-wing Chinese and western-educated non-Malay elites would be the dominant forces in Malay Peninsular politics for many years. Victor Purcell, who sat on the Malayan Planning Unit that was responsible for drafting the Malayan Union policy, wrote that "Modern Malaya [is] the joint creation of British and Chinese enterprise"<sup>132</sup>. At the same time the Malays began to ponder the reliability of the British, who had not provided adequate defence arrangements for the country, due to the speedy surrender to the Japanese, the British government having failed to fulfil its obligation of protecting the Malay states against the Japanese <sup>133</sup>.

Both the way the Malayan Union was introduced and its content caused changes in the political attitudes of the Malays. In fact, the British government failed to anticipate the furious Malay reaction to the Malayan Union proposal:<sup>134</sup>

*"They feared that the Malayan Union would mean the further loss of their traditional privileges and also the Malay political birthright, that as 'sons of the soil', thereby enabling non-Malays to share if not dominate the state politically. The Malay elite was quite confident that only the people's collective unity and will could change British policy. ...Only they could save the rulers, their traditional elite, their country and themselves as a people, if they remained united."*

The new trend in post-war Malay politics was a great increase in consciousness of political rights, responsibility and power. This made the Malays a new powerful force and a solid entity, stronger than before. The majority of the Malays were involved in opposing the Malayan Union and there were for them three

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<sup>131</sup> There are several different interpretations for this fundamental shift in Britain's traditional 'pro-Malay policy. Studies pioneered by James Allen have speculated on the Whitehall's 'anti-Malay sentiments' on the one hand, and admiration for the Chinese on the other (J.de.V.Allen, *The Malayan Union*, New Haven, 1967, p.9). Nordin Sopiee 1974, *From Malayan Union*, pp 17-17) has indicated that the Malayan Union policy sought to create a Malayan consciousness and nationalism, and also a framework for decolonialization. Cheah Boon Kheng, "Malayan Chinese and the citizenship issue, 1945-48, in RIMA, 12, 2, 1978, p.99 has tried to prove the need to inculcate into the people a Malaya-centered loyalty as the motive behind the citizenship proposals. Before that M.R.Stenson, "The Malayan Union and the historians", JSEAH, 10, 2, (1969), p.345 blamed the British who refused to acknowledge the existence of a permanently multi-racial society during the 1930's.

<sup>132</sup> Victor Purcell, *The Chinese in Malaya* (London: Oxford University Press, 1948.), p.vii.

<sup>133</sup> Zainal Abidin Wahid 1970, *Glimpses*, p.100.

<sup>134</sup> Cheah Boon Kheng 1988, " Post war Malay nationalism," p.22.

important issues that could not be compromised. These were: common citizenship, the power of the Malay rulers, and full jurisdiction of the British government in the nine Malay states<sup>135</sup>.

The Malay press, including *Utusan Melayu*, *Majlis*, and *Warta Negara*, played significant roles in arousing Malay feeling. *Utusan Melayu* urged Harold MacMichael "to make the details of the proposal public, as it was the people of Malaya who would be affected by them."<sup>136</sup> Indeed, the Malay press carried a considerable number of letters and reports criticising the Malayan Union. *Utusan Melayu* pointed out that the Malay's future was in danger and suggested, therefore, that the Malays should take a more active interest in their own affairs and revive their old associations.<sup>137</sup> For example in Perak, the *Perikatan Melayu Perak* (the Perak Malay League) was reregistered on 27 January 1946, and by the end of February, there were 15 branches throughout the state, with a total of more than 30,000 members. The *Perikatan Melayu Perak* had also set up a special committee on the Malayan Union<sup>138</sup>. Also the *Warta Negara* initiated the idea of organising a convention of Malay representatives in the Peninsula to discuss the formation of a strong political party for the Malays<sup>139</sup>.

In general, the Malays gave an energetic response to these press views. The period from October 1945 to January 1946 saw the Malays busily organising themselves, reviving old organizations and forming new ones.

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<sup>135</sup> For the Malays response to the Malayan Union, their principles and practicalities see Stockwell 1979, *British Policy and Malay Politics*, pp 73-86.

<sup>136</sup> Ishak Tadin March 1960, "Dato' Onn 1945-1951", *JSEAH*, 1,1, p.63 quoted *Utusan Melayu*, 12 October 1945.

<sup>137</sup> *Ibid.*, pp 64-65

<sup>138</sup> see M.A.Fawzi Basri, "Perak sebelum dan selepas Perang Dunia Kedua: suatu analisis tentang nasionalisma orang Melayu," *Analisis*, (Journal of the Northern University of Malaysia), Vol.1, No.1, (1986), p.152. The committee members of the *Perikatan Melayu Perak* were Dato Panglima Bukit Gantang (President), Zainal Abidin Abbas (Vice President), Hashim (Secretary), Raja Haji Ahmad (Treasurer), Haji Ismail Hamzah -the State Mufti (in charge of Religious Affairs), Toh Muda Wan Mohd Nor (Economic Affairs), Toh Muda Hashim (Information Affairs), Dr. Megat Khas (Education Affairs), and Raja Haji Shahar Syah (International Relations). A special committee on the Malayan Union was headed by Zainal Abidin Abbas with Raja Kamarulzaman, Sulaiman Drus and Megat Yunus Megat Mohd Isa as its members; this committee later was adopted as UMNO's Anti Malayan Union Department.

<sup>139</sup> *Warta Negara*, 10 November 1945. see also Ishak Tadin 1960, "Dato Onn", p.65.

*The Changing of Political Values.*

In Johor Bahru, eight Malay associations joined together to form *Persatuan Melayu Johor* (The Johor Malay Association), under the leadership of Dato Abdul Rahman Yassin, a senior officer of the Johor State Civil Service. In Muar, Johor, Dr Hamzah led the *Kesatuan Melayu Muar*. Dato Onn Jaafar<sup>140</sup>, the District Officer of Batu Pahat, later Johor Menteri Besar, formed another organization called the *Pergerakan Melayu Semenanjung* (The Peninsular Malay Movement of Johor). In Kedah, there were two well known organizations namely: the *Kesatuan Melayu Kedah*, and the *Saberkas*. In Kelantan, the *Persekutuan Persetiaan Melayu Kelantan* and the *Persatuan Melayu Kelantan* were the leading Malay associations on the east coast of the Peninsula. On the west coast, in the State of Perak there existed two commanding associations, the *Perikatan Melayu Perak*, which was formed in 1938, and the *Persatuan Melayu Perak* (Perak Malay Association) which was formed later. In Selangor, the state level organizations were the *Pergerakan Kebangsaan Melayu Selangor* (the Selangor Malay National Movement), and the *Kesatuan Melayu Selangor* (KMS) under the leadership of Zaaba and Yunus Hamidi, both of whom played important roles in the first post-war Malay congress. Other influential state level Malay associations were the *Persatuan Melayu Perlis*, the *Persatuan Melayu Negeri Sembilan*, the *Persatuan Melayu Trengganu*, the *Persatuan Melayu Seberang Prai*, the *Persatuan Melayu Pulau Pinang*, the *Persatuan Melayu Melaka* and the *Pergerakan Semenanjung Melayu Melaka*.

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<sup>140</sup> Dato Onn Jaafar was born in 1895 at Johor Bahru into an aristocratic family of mixed Bugis Malay and Turkish blood. Educated at Aldeburg Lodge School, Suffolk, England, and the Malay College of Kuala Kangsar, Perak, he started his career as apprentice Clerk at Johor State Secretariat. Then he was promoted into various posts up until 1926 when he was deported to Singapore. From 1926-36 Dato Onn was a journalist writing social critiques. In 1936 he was summoned back to join the Johor Civil Service as the Private Secretary to the Crown Prince of Johor, then District Officer of Batu Pahat, before being appointed Menteri Besar of Johor after the war. He was elected the first UMNO President. After resigning from the state civil service, Dato Onn became a full time politician. In 1951, he resigned the UMNO Presidentship and formed the Independent Malayan Party - the first multi-racial party, and was appointed member of the Federal Legislative Council as well as being concurrently appointed as a member of the Internal Affairs Department - a pre independence self-government ministerial post - and the founder Chairman of RIDA - Rural Industry Development Authority - a development agency for the Malays which is now known as MARA. In 1953, he made a political change by forming a Malay political party named Parti Negara, and continued his political career as the member of Parliament from 1959 until his death in 1963.

In the early stages, the Malay protests were initially against the *jus soli* citizenship. When the White paper on the Malayan Union was published on 23 January 1946, the Malay aristocratic elites felt deep resentment against the Malayan Union, especially since the Malays felt their rulers had 'sold out' the rights of the Malays by signing the Union treaty. Malay newspapers which reflected public opinion, referred to the signing of the agreement as "Sultan-sultan kena mainkan" (the Sultans have been hoodwinked)<sup>141</sup>. This negative attitude toward the Sultans indicated a significant change in Malay political culture.<sup>142</sup>

In Johor, the Malays broke the tradition of 'blind loyalty' to the Sultan. On February 1, 1946 the rakyat of Johor assembled at the Abu Bakar Mosque of Johor Bahru. They accused the Sultan of having committed 'derhaka' (Treason) against the rakyat, since the Sultan was no longer protecting them, this being against the spirit of traditional agreement between Raja and Rakyat,<sup>143</sup> and the Johor state constitution. The Johor Malays had lost their respect for the Sultan and they shouted 'Down with the Sultan' (Turunkan Sultan). The Johor Malay elites accused the Sultan of having violated the Johor constitution, which specified that the Sultan was not allowed to surrender the state to any foreign power without first consulting, and getting the blessing of, the State Legislative Council. The *Majlis*, a vocal Malay paper, ran an article on the Malayan Union, on February 6, accusing the Sultan of betraying the people. It claimed that the people's collective rights were higher than those of the Sultan, and that without the rakyat there would be no raja, but without the raja, the rakyat could simply choose a new one.

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<sup>141</sup> Cheah Boon Kheng 1988, "Post war Malay nationalism", p.23

<sup>142</sup> Another episode of the Malay masses coming into conflict with the Malay rulers was in the Constitutional crisis of 1983 which continued until 1991, see Chapter V and VII.

<sup>143</sup> In the myth of agreement between Sang Sapurba and Demang Lebar Daun, it was agreed the ruler must not oppress and do injustice to his rakyat while the rakyat must be loyal to the rulers. See page 3-6 of this chapter.

In fact, from the end of January 1946, there were massive but orderly Malay demonstrations in Kedah, Kelantan, Johor, Selangor, Perak and Trengganu.<sup>144</sup>

On 24 January, Dato Onn, the President of the Pergerakan Melayu Semenanjung Johor, wrote a letter to the *Majlis*, proposing that a congress of Malays be held, as early as possible, to discuss the fate of the Malays in the Peninsula, and to resolve the differences that existed between the various Malay associations<sup>145</sup>. Dato Onn and Dr Hamzah Abdullah of Johor, and Dato Haji Abd Wahab (Panglima Bukit Gantang)<sup>146</sup> of Perak, suggested that the Malay convention be held at Melaka. The Pergerakan Melayu Semenanjung Melaka was the natural host of the meeting, but the venue was later shifted to The Sultan Sulaiman Club in Kuala Lumpur<sup>147</sup>. Mohd. Yunus Hamidi, the Editor of the *Majlis*, and Zaaba, who acted also as an official of the Persatuan Melayu Selangor, were the men responsible for organising this historic Malay congress.

### *The Congress of Malay unity and UMNO.*

On 1 March 1946, thirty nine Malay associations<sup>148</sup> from the Malay Peninsula and Singapore came together to attend the congress at the Sultan Sulaiman

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<sup>144</sup> See *Straits Times*, 25-26 January 1946 and 2 March 1946.

<sup>145</sup> Ishak Tadin 1960, "Dato Onn", p.68.

<sup>146</sup> Abdul Wahab bin Toh Muda Aziz was born in 1905 at Sayong, Kuala Kangsar, son of one of the traditional leaders of Perak. He gained his law degree at London University in 1930. From 1931-1947 he practised the legal profession through his own law firm. When his father died, he inherited a traditional title of Toh Muda (means 'designated'), and was later appointed to the title of Orang Kaya Dato Panglima Bukit Gantang. Following changes in the Federal and State constitution he was appointed first Menteri Besar of Perak (1948-59). In UMNO, he was the first Secretary General (1946-48) and later Vice President (1948-51), and the first Chairman of the Perak UMNO when Perikatan Melayu Perak, founded by him, was revoked to make way for UMNO. In 1953 he formed another political party to confront UMNO in the 1955 Federal Election.

<sup>147</sup> Ramlah Adam 1979, *UMNO*, p.5.

<sup>148</sup> For detail see Mohd Yunus Hamidi, *Sejarah Pergerakan Politik Melayu Semenanjung*, (Kuala Lumpur: Pustaka Antara, 1961), pp 17-24. Amongst the organizations were, from Johor: Pergerakan Melayu Semenanjung Johor, Persatuan Melayu Keluang, Kesatuan Melayu Muar; from Kedah: Kesatuan Melayu Kedah and Saberkas; from Kelantan: Persekutuan Persetiaan Melayu Kelantan, and Persatuan Melayu Kelantan; from Melaka: Persatuan Melayu Melaka, and Pergerakan Melayu Semenanjung Melaka; from Pahang: Persatuan Wataniah Pahang, Persatuan Melayu Pahang, and Persekutuan Guru-guru Melayu Pahang; from Pulau Pinang: Kesatuan Melayu Seberang Prai, Kesatuan Melayu Pualau Pinang, and Persatuan Melayu Pulau Pinang; from Perak: Perikatan Melayu Perak, Persatuan Melayu Perak, Persetiaan Muslim Telok Anson, Persatuan Melayu Cenderiang, and Persekutuan Muhibbah Malim Nawar; from Selangor: Pergerakan Kebangsaan Melayu Selangor, Persatuan Melayu Selangor, Ikatan Setia Kampung Bharu, Dewan Perniagaan Melayu Malaya, Persatuan Penghulu-Penghulu Selangor, Persatuan Guru-Guru Melayu Selangor, Darul Ehsan Club, Persatuan kaum Ibu Selangor,

Club, Kampung Bharu Kuala Lumpur. It was a great show of strength in which all put aside their state regional loyalties. In the three day congress, the Malays agreed to a proposal of forming a central organisation to be named the United Malays National Organization or *UMNO*; the word 'national' was chosen to connote that the Malays were not only a race but also a nation<sup>149</sup>. The originally proposed name of the organization was the *Pertubuhan Melayu Bersatu* or the United Malays Organization, but the meeting accepted a motion to amend it by adding the word *kebangsaan* or National. In fact, the name that was agreed by the delegation was the *Pertubuhan Kebangsaan Melayu Bersatu* or PERKEMBAR. The English translation of this was the *United Malays National Organization* or *UMNO*, by which the party has been well known until the present time. It was also decided that a committee for the drafting of the UMNO constitution be formed, consisting of Dato Onn of Johor, Dato' Bukit Gantang of Perak, Dato Nik Ahmad Kamil of Kelantan, and Dato Hamzah and Zaaba, who were both from Selangor<sup>150</sup>. Zainal Abidin Abbas<sup>151</sup> of the Perikatan Melayu Perak<sup>152</sup> was appointed chairman of a nation wide campaign against the Malayan Union.

On 18 March, the British Government put their plan into effect, without enforcing the controversial clause on the *Jus Soli* citizenship. The leader of the congress regarded the British move as a challenge to the pride of the Malays. The

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Persekutuan Melayu Ulu Selangor, Persekutuan Boyan Selangor, Persekutuan Melayu Sabak Bernam, Wakil Kaum Darat [Orang Asli] Selangor, and Persatuan Melayu Jawatan Rendah Selangor. Other organizations which attended the Congress were Persekutuan Melayu Perlis, Persatuan Melayu Negeri Sembilan, and Kesatuan Melayu Singapura.

<sup>149</sup> Majlis 4 March 1946. According to the Majlis (1 March 1946) Dato' Hamzah Abdullah suggested the organization be called the United Malay Organization, then Zaaba proposed an amendment by adding the word 'National'. This was passed by the meeting. Another source states that the word National was proposed by a member by the name Mohd Arus Lafaz (see Ramlah Adam 1978, *UMNO*, 9.12)

<sup>150</sup> Yunus Hamidi 1961, *Politik Melayu Semenanjung*, p.56.

<sup>151</sup> He was born on 11th January 1907, was an English educated Malay and began his career in the Malay Administrative Service (1926-1940) followed by the MCS (1940-1955). Among the government posts held by him were Assistant District Officer Tanjung Malim, RIDA Deputy Chairman, and Director of The Federal Social Welfare. In the political arena he started out as Secretary of Perikatan Melayu Perak, the UMNO Secretary General (1947-49), and in 1951 became a founder member of IMP and Parti Negara. In 1963, he joined the United Democratic Party -a multi racial party.

<sup>152</sup> Mohd. Yunus Hamidi 1961, *Politik Melayu Semenanjung*, p.56.



Malays, then reconvened an emergency meeting of the Malay associations on March 30, with a view to finding ways and means of countering the British move.

The Malays then launched a nation-wide non-cooperation movement from early April; firstly, all the Malays were requested to join in a 'berkabung' (an act of mourning by wearing white cloth on their songkok) for one week beginning from 1 April, as a sign of protest; secondly, officially the Malays boycotted the Malayan Union by not recognizing its Governor-designate. Even the rulers were required to participate by not attending any official functions in connection with the Malayan Union, under threat of being disowned by the rakyat.<sup>153</sup>

Malay unity and its strength was shown publicly before their Sultans, at the Station Hotel of Kuala Lumpur on the 31 March. However, on 1 April, the Malayan Union was promulgated without the presence of Malay rulers. The Malays also pressured the British by withdrawing Malay members from the Advisory Council of the Union, "as their position is untenable for them to attend the funeral rites of their birth rights and liberty. It is considered the opinion of the people that any Malay taking part should be disowned."<sup>154</sup> For the unity of the Malays, the slogan "*Hidup Melayu*" (may the Malay flourish or long live the Malays) was agreed on. This slogan was officially introduced in a Malay assembly in Melaka on May 3, and was used by UMNO until 1953, when it was changed to 'Merdeka' (Independence). 1946 has since been remembered by the Malays as the historical year of Malay unity, or sometimes as the Malay myth of "Semangat 46" (the spirit of 46).

#### *The Inauguration of UMNO .*

" *Hidup Melayu*" (Long Live the Malays) was the basic political philosophy of the Malays who were associated with the formation of UMNO, which led to the downfall of the Malayan Union. *The United Malays National Organization* was

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<sup>153</sup> Majlis 2 April 1946 which was quoted by Cheah Boon Kheng 1988, "Post war Malay nationalism", p.24.

<sup>154</sup> Ishak Tadin 1960, "Dato Onn", p.72 as quoted from the *Malay Mail*, 2 April 1946.

formally inaugurated in its first general assembly at Istana Besar, Johor Bahru on 11 May 1946<sup>155</sup>. The UMNO assembly also accepted the draft of the UMNO Charter which became a guideline for the administrative structure and the political process until a new constitution was introduced in 1949. From its official launching as a political party, UMNO lost no time in getting into action.

*"UMNO was a secular, Ataturk-style political party, patterned explicitly on the nationalist model of Kemalists then in power in Turkey. It was the creation of the 'Ultra-progressive' wing of Malay nationalists, known as the 'Turkish-style party' which, while borrowing Kemalist nationalism avoided its secularism."*<sup>156</sup>

It could be concluded that UMNO succeeded in uniting the Malay intelligentsia drawn from English, Malay and Islamic educated Malays. Therefore, UMNO became a melting pot of Malay organizations regardless of their ideological differences. Nevertheless, the PKMM decided to withdraw from UMNO when their motions on the number of representatives and the pattern and colour of the UMNO flag were rejected by the General Assembly. The PKMM was the forerunner of the *Partai Sosialis Malaya* (The Socialist Party of Malaya), which was formed in 1955. UMNO also gave special treatment to the Malay religious elite by forming a party bureau called 'Jabatan Agama' (Religious bureau), which organised the Ulama's Conference in 1951. The conference sponsored the creation of the *Persatuan Ulama SeTanah Melayu* (The Malay Peninsula Ulama Association) which gave birth to *PAS -Parti Islam SeTanah Melayu* (The Pan-Malayan Islamic Party) in 1953. These three groups of the educated Malay elite offered an implicit challenge to the traditional status quo, and hence to the 'traditional' elite.

However, the value system and the basic structure of Malay society remained largely unchanged. The feudalistic elements of the traditional Malay way of life have indeed helped to mould contemporary Malay political culture. However, there has

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<sup>155</sup> Ramlah Adam 1978, *UMNO*, p.35.; Stockwell 1979, *British Policy and Malay Politics*, p.76; and Ishak Tadin 1960, "Dato Onn", p.73.

<sup>156</sup> Ozey Mehmet 1990, *Islamic Identity*, p.107.

been a gradual transformation in the traditional class stratification with the emergence of a modern Malay middle class. While English education had produced a small Malay middle class, Malay vernacular education created the Malay teachers who became a strong force in political development. However it was the Kaum Muda which had opened the Malay mind to socio-economic development. Their conflict with the Kaum Tua, which advised on Islamic teaching to the Malay Rulers, retarded the reformist idea of the Kaum Muda from influencing the villagers. Thus Islamic reformist ideas were not fully successful in transforming Malay political attitudes. This vacuum was filled by the KMM, but the lack of evidence of political awareness among the rakyat at this time seems to indicate that KMM radicalism was rejected. The old Malay middle class, which had become a part of the colonial bureaucracy maintained the status quo, and their aristocratic blood helped them exploit the respect and the loyalty given by the rakyat. The Second World War, however, changed Malay political attitudes when Malay nationalism was set alight in the hearts and minds of the Malay leaders. Social mobility among the rakyat, generated through educational development, created a new intelligentsia and a new pattern of elites. Each group contributed to the change in Malay political attitudes and articulated the spirit of Malay nationalism to the Malay masses.

Traditional political culture had been shaped by the Malay ruling class and the passivity of the Malay masses in a feudalistic society. Indeed, during the colonial era, the ruling class was infused with 'western colonial culture' which transformed some of the Malay ruling elite into an 'anglophile' Malay middle class, another Malay peripheral group. Therefore, the Malays came to rely on the Malay school teachers and the religious teachers in their villages to illuminate their future. Political consciousness, however, originated from the urban Malay intelligentsia while the KMM's radicalism, with its republican ideas, was beyond Malay political thinking. Therefore, the Malay associations which had been formed in the late 1930's became a potential vehicle for political discourse after the war. These associations were led by

the traditional ruling elite who still enjoyed respect and were able to dominate the Malay masses.

UMNO was a Malay political party that sprang from changes in Malay political attitudes, and was comprised of Malays from all walks of life. However, it was the Malay intelligentsia that played the leading role in forming, structuring, organising, and controlling the party. In order to have a clear understanding of the framework of the party, in the following chapter I will discuss the organizational structure, systems and political processes of UMNO.

## Chapter Two

### *UMNO 1946-1978: Organisational Developments.*

In chapter one, the discussion emphasised traditional Malay political culture and its changes. It uncovered Malay political attitudes after the Second World War concentrating on the formation of UMNO as a vehicle for Malay nationalism. This chapter will briefly examine changes in the party in its early years, its objectives, structure and systems. Finally, this chapter will also trace the problems of leadership confronted by the party leaders before 1981, when Dr Mahathir took over the leadership.

#### *The Early Years of UMNO*

Dato Onn was elected as the founder President of UMNO, and was given the task by the first Assembly of organizing an Executive Committee. The UMNO Headquarters, which originated from the Secretariat of the Johor Bahru 11 May UMNO Assembly, was shifted to Ipoh, Perak, when Dato' Panglima Bukit Gantang Abdul Wahab Aziz was chosen as UMNO Secretary General. Then, Perak state became the nerve centre of the UMNO administration until 1949<sup>1</sup>. During those years UMNO gained widespread support from the Malays throughout the Peninsula. From there on, UMNO began to promulgate the myth of being 'the champion of the Malays' and even as being synonymous with the Malays. Thereafter, UMNO was institutionalised as part of the social structure of the Malay community, and became a symbol of Malay *esprit de corps*..

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<sup>1</sup> See Maymon Ariff, "UMNO semasa beribu pejabat di Perak 1946-1949", (Kuala Lumpur: Unpublished Graduation Exercise, Dept. of History, the National University of Malaysia, 1974). In the second UMNO General Assembly on 29 and 30 June 1946, it was agreed that the political bureau would include the Anti-Malayan Union Campaign committee, formed by the first Malay Congress in Kuala Lumpur. Committee members were all from Perikatan Melayu Perak. See also Fawzi Basri 1986, "Perak", p.145.

### *The Organizational Structure of UMNO.*

In its formative years, UMNO was a political party based on affiliated membership, and was composed of the Malay organizations that had attended the 1-3 March 1946 Malay Congress. With that membership system, UMNO became a party which had *an indirect structure*<sup>2</sup>. The UMNO Charter of 1946, provided that there should be three powerful authoritative bodies in UMNO, namely; the General Assembly, (*Perhimpunan Agung*), the Supreme Council (*Majlis Tertinggi*) and the Office of the Secretary General at the party Headquarters. This vertical structure evolved until 1949, when UMNO officially restructured its membership system by becoming a 'direct membership party'.

In the General Assembly of the 11 and 12 May 1947, held in Kota Bharu, Kelantan, the Executive Council tabled a proposal for a 'direct membership' system in UMNO. The proposal empowered the Assembly to reorganise UMNO from an affiliated based party to a 'branch-based party.' This would give the party a better control over, and coordination of its membership, and activities, and would also enhance the efficiency of party management.<sup>3</sup> The strategy was to foster loyalty of UMNO members to their national leader.

The idea to transform UMNO into a direct membership party was opposed by co-founder members of UMNO such as, Kesatuan Melayu Singapura, Persatuan Melayu Pulau Pinang, Kesatuan Melayu Johor, and Persatuan Melayu Sabak Bernam. However, in 1948, UMNO agreed to accept the proposal, but a clause provided for affiliated membership in the UMNO structure. However, the decision caused the withdrawal of Perikatan Melayu Kelantan and Kesatuan Melayu Johor. Meanwhile, others were willing to dissolve their respective organizations within the new form of

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<sup>2</sup> See Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State*, trans. by Barbara and Robert North (London: Methuen 1954), pp 5-17.

<sup>3</sup> A.J.Stockwell 1979, *British Policy and Malay Politics*, p.118. The party charter prevented it from accepting direct membership, an individual became an UMNO member through the affiliated body. The original constitution handicapped the UMNO leaders from controlling the party and activities which relied on the personalities in the affiliated bodies.

UMNO. Perlis, Kedah, Perak, Selangor, Melaka, Pahang and Trengganu had already had their state divisions of UMNO by mid-1949.<sup>4</sup>

Officially, the new constitution of UMNO was endorsed on 29 May 1949, repealing the UMNO Charter of 1946. The constitution introduced significant changes in the structure of the party, its management and its political network. "By mid-1949 UMNO, spanning the Centre and State levels, could be described as a truly national political party."<sup>5</sup>

The Constitution of 1949 reiterated the objectives of UMNO as laid down in the 1946 Charter<sup>6</sup>:

*1 (a) To organise and maintain in Malaya an efficient political organization and to form a centre of united action.*

*(b) To strive for an independent and sovereign state of Malaya.*

*(c) To promote the political, social, cultural and economic advancement of the people, and more particularly of the members of UMNO.*

However, the 1949 constitution still gave the state level much control over the members and their activities in the individual states. The situation became worse when Dato' Onn resigned from UMNO and formed a new established party- Parti Kemerdekaan Malaya (The Independence of Malaya Party) in 1951. Furthermore, strong Dato Onn supporters had control over some UMNO state branches. Tunku Abdul Rahman, the newly elected UMNO President, was keen to make UMNO a strong organization by extending central control over the village branches. In 1953, the Supreme Council drafted a new party constitution, which later became a centre of conflict within the leadership of UMNO, especially between the Tunku and Datuk Bukit Gantang, the Chairman of the Perak State UMNO Division. However, the new

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<sup>4</sup> B.H.Sharuddin, *The Federal Factor in the Government and Politics of Peninsular Malaysia*, (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1987), p.277.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid..

<sup>6</sup> *The Constitution of the UMNO, 1946*, (Johor Bahru: Johore Government Printer), clause 2; UMNO file in the Straits Times Library, Singapore; and see Abdul Latif Sahan 1959, "Political attitude of the Malays", pp 56-57.

constitution was enforced in 1955, and became a permanent feature of UMNO. By 1955, UMNO had 55 divisions, and 11 State UMNO Executive committees. Structurally, the UMNO Constitution of 1955 provided four levels of organization; firstly, the UMNO Central Committee or as it was known, the Supreme Council or *Majlis Kerja Tertinggi*; secondly, the State UMNO Committee (*Jawatankuasa UMNO Negeri*) or, as it came to be known, the *Jawatankuasa UMNO Perhubungan Negeri* (the State Liaison Committee) Unit; thirdly, the Divisional Committee or *Jawatankuasa Bahagian*; and finally, the Branch Committee or *Jawatankuasa Cawangan*.

#### *The General Assembly.*

The General Assembly, according to the UMNO Charter of 1946, was to be held annually, and attended by a two person delegation from each of its affiliated organizations. But in 1949, when the new constitution was enforced, the UMNO General Assembly was constituted by delegations from the State UMNO organizations.

In the 1955 Constitution<sup>7</sup>, delegates of the UMNO General Assembly consisted of members of the Supreme Executive Council, the head of each State Executive Committee, delegates elected by each State Divisional Conference,<sup>8</sup> the head and two other members of each State's UMNO Youth, and not more than two delegates from each affiliated body.

In 1960, UMNO reorganised its party structure, and centralization of power to the President, in the name of the Supreme Council, took place. The constitution's amendment<sup>9</sup> dropped the State Delegation Conference, and the executive power of

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<sup>7</sup> Undang-Undang Tubuh Pertubuhan Kebangsaan Melayu Bersatu, Dipersetujukan dan diluluskan oleh Persidangan Perhimpunan Agung UMNO yang ke 10, 25-26 Disember 1955.

<sup>8</sup> See Table I on the number of UMNO Divisions in 1984.

<sup>9</sup> Undang-undang Tubuh Pertubuhan Kebangsaan Melayu Bersatu, dipersetujui dan diluluskan oleh Persidangan Perhimpunan Agung UMNO Yang Ke-Tiga Belas, pada 16 dan 17 April 1960.



the State UMNO. Since then, the General Assembly has been directly represented by delegates elected by a Divisional Conference of Representatives (*Persidangan Perwakilan Bahagian*). In 1971, the representation of Youth and Women's Movements increased from three to five members.<sup>10</sup> Not until 1985, were members of the House of Representatives who were ordinary and affiliated members given rights as representatives in the General Assembly, but without voting rights.<sup>11</sup>

From 1960 onward, the UMNO General Assembly consisted of the members of the Supreme Executive Council (Majlis Kerja Tertinggi), three delegates each from UMNO Youth and Women's Movements, the Head of each Division (or his representative if he was also a Supreme council member<sup>12</sup>), delegates elected by each Divisional Conference of Representatives, and three delegates from each affiliated member association.

The UMNO Constitution provided for the right of Divisions to send one representative for every 500 members who had paid up their subscription for the current year.<sup>13</sup> However, in 1979, the maximum number of representatives was limited to 10 delegates for each Division.<sup>14</sup>

There are three main functions of the Annual General Assembly, namely: to determine party policies; to study the duties of the Supreme Council; and to elect members of the Supreme Council.<sup>15</sup> In its absence, the Supreme Council has been given the power to act on behalf of the General Assembly.

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<sup>10</sup> *Perlembagaan UMNO*, Dipersetujukan dalam Persidangan Perhimpunan Agung Khas pada 8 dan 9 Mei 1971, p.21. Clause 12 section 4 (c), hereafter this document is known as *Perlembagaan UMNO 1971*.

<sup>11</sup> See *Perlembagaan UMNO*, dipersetujukan dalam Persidangan Perhimpunan Agung Khas UMNO, pada 29 September 1985, p.31, Clause 12 section 4 (g), and *Perlembagaan UMNO 1971*, p.22, clause 12 section 4 (f).

<sup>12</sup> *Perlembagaan UMNO 1985*, p.30, clause 12 section 4 (d).

<sup>13</sup> *Perlembagaan UMNO 1971*, p.21 clause 12 section 4 (b).

<sup>14</sup> *Perlembagaan UMNO*, Dipersetujukan dalam Persidangan Perhimpunan Agung Khas UMNO pada 8 Julai 1979, p.28 clause 12 section 4 (b).

<sup>15</sup> *Perlembagaan UMNO 1971*, pp.20-21, clause 12 section 3 (a), (b), and (c).

### The Supreme Council.

The apex of the UMNO structure is the General Assembly or in its absence the Supreme Executive Council<sup>16</sup> or *Majlis Kerja Tertinggi*. The earlier office bearers of the Supreme Council consisted of the following:

1. *Yang DiPertua Agung* (President)
2. *Naib Yang DiPertua Agung* (Vice President)
3. *Setiausaha Agung* (Secretary General)
4. *Bendahari Agung* (Treasurer General)
5. *Ketua-Ketua Jabatan* (Head of Departments)

The founder departments or bureaus from 1946 were as follows<sup>17</sup>:

1. *Pejabat Perkara-perkara Wang* (Financial Affairs )
2. *Pejabat Perkara-perkara Agama dan Pelajaran* (Religious and Educational Affairs)
3. *Pejabat Perkara-perkara Iktisad* (Economic Affairs)
4. *Pejabat Perkara-perkara Dakyah* ( Information Affairs)
5. *Pejabat Perkara-perkara Membantah Malayan Union* (The Anti-Malayan Union Affairs).

In 1947, new departments or bureaus were formed, namely *Jabatan Perkara-perkara Buruh* (Labour Affairs), *Perkara-perkara Ternakan dan Tanaman* (the Agricultural and Veterinary Affairs). Also an extended and renamed department called the Department of Women, Social Welfare and Information was set up, this last department being under the charge of the party President<sup>18</sup>.

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<sup>16</sup> The Constitution of the United Malay National Organization 1971 (hereafter named Constitution of 1971), Clause 11.

<sup>17</sup> UMNO 10 Tahun, (Pulau Pinang: Daud Press, 1957), p.10 and Ramlah Adam 1978, *UMNO*, p.37.

<sup>18</sup> See Lenore Manderson, *Women, Politics and Change: The Kaum Ibu UMNO, Malaysia, 1945 -1972*, (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1980), pp 57-60. According to the author, the national office bearers of UMNO were allocated responsibility for individual departments within UMNO, with the Department of Women, Social Welfare, and Publicity placed under the administration of the UMNO President. In 1947 Puteh Mariah of Perak was appointed Officer in-Charge

Being the highest body after the General Assembly, the Supreme Council's main functions are to formulate policy and execute resolutions passed by the Assembly, and also to manage the organization as a whole. The UMNO Headquarters is the nerve centre of administration headed by the Secretary General, with the assistance of salariat officers.

When the new UMNO constitution was introduced in 1955, the Supreme council was comprised of 'the UMNO officials,'<sup>19</sup> fifteen elected members and seven appointed by the President. The number of appointed members was reduced to five in 1960. The respective heads of the party central youth and Women's movements are automatically represented in the Supreme Council, and these leaders are then elevated to the status of Vice Presidents. In 1971, the number of the Supreme Council was increased to twenty and the President's appointed members were also increased to seven. In 1985, the Supreme Council elected members were further increased to 25. At one time, the UMNO Supreme Council members numbered 37, ten of whom were appointed by the President<sup>20</sup>.

However, the number of UMNO officials has not changed much since 1955. The officials are the *Yang DiPertua Agung* (the term was changed to *President*<sup>21</sup> in 1971), *Timbalan Yang DiPertuan Agung* (Deputy President), and the post of Naib Yang DiPertua (Vice President), which before 1955 consisted of only three members one of which was elected, the other two being drawn from the Pemuda and Kaum Ibu. In 1955, two more elected Vice Presidential posts were incorporated. The other

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
of the Women's Department. On 1 September 1947, the Kaum Ibu meeting held their meeting separately, and Puteh Mariah was appointed UMNO Women Department Secretary. Then the 1949 UMNO constitution recognised the formation of its Women's wing called *Pergerakan Kaum Ibu* or The UMNO Women's Movement until 1971 when the movement became known as *Pergerakan Wanita UMNO*.

<sup>19</sup> The official (*pegawai*) of UMNO constituted the President, Deputy President, 3 Vice Presidents, Secretary General, Treasure, and Information Chief.

<sup>20</sup> John Funston 1980, *Malay Politics*, p.171.

<sup>21</sup> See *Perlembagaan UMNO 1971*, pp.9-10, clause 9, section 3 (a), (b) and (c). Since 1971, Yang Dipertua Agung UMNO is known as *Presiden* (President), followed by his other deputies known as *Timbalan Presiden* (Deputy President), and *Naib Presiden* (Vice President).

Fig.2  
The Structure of UMNO based on the 1955 Constitution.



Source: *Perlembagaan UMNO 1955*.

officials were the Secretary General, Treasurer, and Party Information Chief, who were all appointed by the President.

The constitution has empowered the Supreme Council to formulate party policies and to table them before the Assembly<sup>22</sup>. It has also been the duty of the Supreme Council to supervise the Government in implementing the party's policies.

The Supreme Council has the responsibility of electing members to represent UMNO in any organization or meeting and to make regulations regarding political appointments. The most significant function of the Council is to determine candidates for election for the House of Representatives and State Legislative Assemblies and to regulate, supervise and determine any matter in connection with elections.<sup>23</sup>

The disciplinary power<sup>24</sup> that was given to the Supreme Council includes the power to dismiss Supreme Council members who fail to perform their duties effectively, or those whose actions appear to run counter to the party's policies. The Council also has the power to suspend or withdraw the membership of individuals and to suspend or dissolve the Divisional or Branch committees. Concerning membership<sup>25</sup>, the Council has been given the power to permit any person to be a party member of any given Branch, to issue permission for readmission, and to determine appeals from individuals whose application for ordinary membership has been refused by the Division or Branch.

In a situation of crisis<sup>26</sup> in the other levels of the party's structure, it is the duty of the Supreme Council to settle these disputes. The Council also has the power

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<sup>22</sup> Constitution of 1971, Clause 11, section 1, pp 16-17.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., Clause 11, section 3, p.17.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., Clause 11, section 8, pp 13-14.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., Clause 11, section 16-20, pp 19-20

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., Clause 11, section 7-14.

to convene meetings of party Divisions or Branches and this Division or Branch functions only if its establishment is recognised by the Supreme Council.

The Supreme Council has been an all powerful body since the constitution has given it blanket power to assign any function or other proceeding for the efficient running of the party<sup>27</sup>.

The Supreme Council also has administrative power, through which the UMNO Headquarters became the machinery of party management. The Secretary General is the head of administration, and he has been assisted by the salaried administrative staff. Dato' Senu Abdul Rahman of Kedah and Dato Hussein Mohd.Nurdin of Perak were among the longest serving Secretary Generals of the UMNO. The Headquarters of UMNO was strengthened by the appointment a full time Executive Secretary in 1966. Musa Hitam was the first Executive Secretary who was responsible for consolidating the UMNO management system<sup>28</sup>. By 1980, the administration of UMNO at State and Divisional level had been streamlined by the appointment of full time staff who were administering the party offices at their respective levels.

#### **The State UMNO Liaison Committee.**

The idea of a Liaison Committee started with the formation of *Jawatankuasa Penaja UMNO Daftar Terus* (The Direct UMNO Membership Protem Committee), which was formed at state level in 1948. This committee comprised representatives from all districts in each State. This state level UMNO, was previously known as *UMNO Bahagian*, (UMNO Division). The UMNO Constitution of 1955, provided for the establishment of an *UMNO Negeri* (a State UMNO) when twelve Divisions were successfully formed in any given state.

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<sup>27</sup> Ibid., Clause 11, section 21, p.20.

<sup>28</sup> Among those who held the title of UMNO Executive Secretary were Dato Musa Hitam (who later became the Deputy President and Deputy Prime Minister), Adib Adam (former Melaka Chief Minister and a Federal Minister), Khalil Akasah, Kamarulzaman Bahadun, and Nasaruddin Alang Saidin MP. When UMNO was restored in 1988, Dato' Mohamad Rahmat, the Secretary General convinced the party President to appoint Yaakob Haji Mohammad as the new UMNO Executive Secretary.

Until 1961, the UMNO Negeri of each state was an autonomous and a powerful coordinating body, with wide executive power and the state UMNO leaders were elected by a State Delegates Conference. This annual conference comprised members of the State UMNO Executive Committee, the Head of the Divisional Executive Committee, the Vice-Head of the Women's Movement, Delegates elected by the Divisional Delegates meeting, the Head of the State UMNO Youth Supervisory Committee and two UMNO Youth representatives from each Division. The State Delegates Conference also elected its delegates to the General Assembly.

The State UMNO Executive Committee consisted of the Head, the Deputy Head, and not more than 10 others who were elected by the State Delegates Conference. The Secretary, Treasurer, Information Chief and not more than five others were appointed by the State UMNO Head. Two Vice-Heads of the respective State's Youth and Women's Movement, who were elected by their respective State Delegates Conference, were also members of the State Committee.

Before 1961, the State Executive Committee had the power to select candidates for General Elections, and control the party structure in the states. This power had encouraged the enhancement of a detached party machine, while the State Executive Committee became a political organism that generated power struggles, factional and group tussles, which were intensified on the eve of nominations for the first General Election in 1959. In the case of Perak, Ghazali Jawi was the State UMNO Head controlling the selection of candidates especially for the UMNO state constituencies. When he formed the *kerajaan* (state government) he was appointed Menteri Besar and lined up his state cabinet members who, by a coincidence, were mostly from constituencies around the higher reaches of the Perak river, and descendants of Southern Thai Malays. The discontented faction capitalized on the issue of 'Malay cliques' of Hulu (upstream) and Hilir (downstream) to express their protest. In fact, there existed a power struggle throughout the party, but regional sentiments had been used to mobilize support. It could not be denied that all Perak

Menteri Besar were from upper Perak, including Ghazali Jawi<sup>29</sup> (formerly an irrigation officer) from Grik, Ahmad Said (a rubber dealer) from Lenggong, Shaari Piai (a coffee dealer) from Kuala Kangsar, Kamaruddin Mat Isa (a Malay teacher) from Selama, Wan Mohamad Wan Teh also from Grik and a relative of Ghazali Jawi. In 1982, the Menteri Besar was from Lower Perak.

Factionalism and group conflict also took place in other states which led to the Supreme Council's intervention and control of the state party structure. It was decided that the power of party state committees should be reduced, but the UMNO state leaders blocked this, appearing thus to be leaders who escalated factionalism within the state, ceasing to take advice from headquarters, and ignoring the basic policies of the party. This led to constant strife and bickering within the party:<sup>30</sup>

*"...there are some leaders at state level who aspire to grab the post of Menteri Besar and to pack the (state) Executive Councils with their own men."*

In 1959 Tunku Abdul Rahman identified aspects of the 1955 constitution which weakened UMNO as a national political party. He therefore continuously tried to undermine 'loyalty' to state party structures. The proposals of the UMNO Constitutional Revision and Amendment Committee were tabled at the Thirteenth UMNO General Assembly in 1960.

The amendment, which was enforced in 1961, politically reduced the power of the State UMNOs. Representation to the General Assembly was chosen from Divisional Conference, not as under the 1955 constitution in which State UMNOs controlled voting power. From then on the UMNO Negeri were limited to the role of a state 'coordinating body', without having representatives to the General Assembly. 1961 appeared the decisive year in which the state UMNOs lost their control over the


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<sup>29</sup> Ghazali Jawi had to face conflict with Sulaiman Bulon from the Lower Perak area. The power struggle invited interference from the Supreme Council which proposed Sulaiman Bulon to take the newly created post of Deputy Menteri Besar. When the Menteri Besar was involved in another conflict with the Sultan, Ghazali Jawi was then posted to Egypt as the Ambassador, in another political manoeuvre of the State Executive Committee who just happened to be from Northern Perak. Sulaiman Bulon lost his political base in the state when he was called to Kuala Lumpur for a Federal deputy ministerial post.

<sup>30</sup> D.E.Moore 1960, 'The United Malay National Organization', p.118.



Fig.3  
The Structure of UMNO based on the 1960 Constitution.



Source: *Perlembagaan UMNO 1960.*

members in their state. The Liaison Committee had no power over policy-making, or any executive power, and only had power to recommend candidates for elections. Even the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the State UMNO Liaison Committee, were now appointed by the President in the name of the Supreme Council. In some states where there was conflict, the Supreme Council took over the Chairmanship, as happened in Trengganu, Kelantan, Perak and Negeri Sembilan, and also Pulau Pinang.

In 1971, all State Liaison Committees were given the power to regulate and coordinate the activities of Divisions in their respective states, and to liaise between the Supreme Council and their Divisions. Despite being messengers of the Supreme Council, the role of the State Liaison Committee was only clearly felt by UMNO members when the Committee was running the Annual convention of UMNO at state level, which was becoming a new tradition in UMNO. Occasionally, the State Liaison Committee was instructed to take over the administration of a suspended UMNO Division. In a later development, all Malay Menteri Besars and Chief Minister of Melaka automatically became the Head of the UMNO State Liaison Committee. The relation between UMNO state level and the central level normally depended on the personal relation between the Menteri Besar, who was also the Head of the state UMNO, and the President, who was also the Prime Minister. This represented the beginning of a new chapter of 'patronage politics' in the political structure, transforming the power struggle from state to national level.

The Menteri Besar who was also the chairman of the committee extended his influence to control 'votes' from his state in the General Assembly. The UMNO state chairman managed to be the 'power broker' and traded 'block votes' for political power in UMNO. The number of General Assembly delegates was limited after 1974, and this was followed by a secret voting device imposed on delegates in 1975, but state block-voting was not reduced. When all the Menteri Besar and the Chief

Minister of Melaka were in the Supreme Council, UMNO developed into a formal highly-centralized and tightly-knit party organization.<sup>31</sup>

### **The Divisional Committee.**

The UMNO Division is a vital structure in the UMNO, and organises political activities at district, and village levels. When UMNO was formed, its strength relied on the substance of the affiliated organizations. Most of them did not have a branch at district level, and not one had a branch at the village level. In 1955, a clause in the UMNO constitution provided for the creation of *Bahagian* or Divisions, which were formed at district level.<sup>32</sup> However, not all districts had an UMNO Division; for example, in 1955 in Johor, there was a combination of two or more districts constituted into a division, such as the Johor Bahru, Kota Tinggi and Mersing Division, and also the Batu Pahat and Keluang Division. But in Perak in the same year, Divisions existed in almost all districts. By 1960, UMNO Divisions were formed in every Federal electoral constituency, and under direct supervision of the UMNO Supreme Council.

According to the UMNO constitution<sup>32</sup>:

*"A Division shall have at least 500 members who have paid up their subscription and who shall be approved and recognised by the Supreme Council on the recommendation of the Liaison Unit"*

The formation of an UMNO Division, had in fact, taken place as early as 1948. For example Bentong UMNO Division was formed when Persatuan Melayu Pahang (PMP) refused to be dissolved to give way for the establishment of Pahang State UMNO. The leadership of the PMP's Bentong Branch took the initiative in forming an UMNO Division, which was the first UMNO Divisional Committee to be formed in Pahang state<sup>33</sup>. In normal cases, the formation of an UMNO Division was

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
<sup>31</sup> Shafruddin 1987, *The Federal Factor*, p.302.

<sup>32</sup> The UMNO Constitution of 1949, Clause 19, section 1.

<sup>33</sup> Ramlah Adam 1978, *UMNO*, p.46.

Fig.4

The Committees and Bureaux of the Central UMNO 1984-1987.



( ) CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE/BUREAU

Source: Pengata Tahunan UMNO 1985

initiated by the State UMNO leader who called a special meeting of the district, representatives from each Mukim being based on the number of the registered UMNO members in the mukim; one representative for a Mukim having less than 300 registered members, two representatives for those having 300-500 members, three representatives for 501-700 members, four representatives for 701-900 members, and five representatives for the Mukim that had recruited a membership more than 900.<sup>34</sup> Melaka state, until 1973, had only one division headed by Ghafar Baba, although it had four Parliamentary electoral constituencies. Its reorganisation into four divisions was not without cost, Ghafar Baba, who opposed the 1960 constitutional amendment, lost his political grip on the Melaka UMNO.

By 1951, there were 39 UMNO divisions throughout the Peninsula with a membership strength of 100,373. In Perak, UMNO had 27,547 members, the highest number; this was followed by Johor which had 24,806 from its seven existing Divisions. Until 1984, UMNO had 114 Divisions, but due to the constitutional amendment of 1983 the number increased to 132 Divisions in the Malay Peninsula and one Division in the Federal Territory of Labuan in the state of Sabah.<sup>35</sup>

The Divisional Committee was made up of a Ketua (Head), Timbalan Ketua (Deputy Divisional Head), three Naib Ketua (Vice Heads), including one each from the Youth and Women's Movements, a Divisional Secretary, Treasurer and Information Head (the latter three posts appointed by the Divisional Head). Other committee members were elected by the Divisional Delegation Meeting, which derived from the 1971 Constitution, comprising twelve elected members and not more than five appointed members.<sup>36</sup> In 1985, the number of elected

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<sup>34</sup> Ibid., p.65 which is quoted from the UMNO's Headquarters, see the file UMNO/SG 123/1949.

<sup>35</sup> Table I is adopted from *Berita Harian*, March 10, 1985. In 1984, the Parliament had 177 seats, 132 seats for Malay Peninsula, 24 Sarawak and 16 Sabah and one in Labuan. Three more additional seats were later allocated for Sarawak parliamentary constituency making the total seats 180 at present.

<sup>36</sup> The Constitution of 1971, Clause 16, section 2 (h).

committee members was enlarged to 15<sup>37</sup>.

Table I.

*UMNO Divisions and State Electoral Voters for the Malay Peninsula  
in 1984 .*

	State	No.of Divisions	No.of Voters
1.	Perak	23	854,582
2.	Johor	18	758,816
3.	Kedah	14	539,999
4.	Selangor	14	650,076
5.	Kelantan	13	419,699
6.	P.Pinang	11	464,036
7.	Pahang	10	128,163
8.	Trengganu	8	242,816
9.	N.Sembilan	7	263,083
10.	Melaka	5	219,929
11.	Federal Ter	5	408,568
12.	Perlis	2	79,741
	Total	132	5,029,508

The Annual Divisional Delegation Meeting<sup>38</sup> was normally held before the party's General Assembly. It was attended by the Divisional Committee members, the

<sup>37</sup> Perlembagaan UMNO, Fasal 16, seksyen 2 (g).

<sup>38</sup> Shafruddin 1987, *The Federal Factor*, p.287 mentions that in 1960, there was a change of name at divisional level whereby the Divisional Delegate Meeting (DDM) became known as the Divisional Conference of Representative (DCR). However, in the English version of UMNO's Constitution of 1971, clause 15 used 'Divisional Delegation Meeting' for the translation of Mesyuarat Perwakilan Bahagian. Only in the UMNO constitution of 1985, was Persidangan Perwakilan used, which could be translated as Divisional Conference of Representatives

Head of each Branch, and representatives from each branch, based on the principle of one representative to fifty registered members. Three representatives of the Divisional Youth and the Women's Movements respectively also participated. The UMNO constitution also provided a clause for UMNO members of Parliament, State Legislative Assemblymen, City Councillors, Municipal, Town, District, Local and also Rural Councillors to be represented in the Divisional Delegation meeting but without voting rights<sup>39</sup>.

Voting rights are a vital element in the Annual Divisional Delegation meetings, as they have been a determining factor in the UMNO leadership election process. The nomination of the national leaders is proposed by the Division Delegation Meeting, and the meeting has also to take the decision of which ten<sup>40</sup> members will represent them at the General Assembly. Significantly, Divisional meetings have been the tool for promoting, maintaining and removing the leadership at the divisional and central level.

In spite of the fact that power has been very much centralised in the Supreme Council, in fact the President of UMNO, the Divisional Committee still has the administrative power to supervise their Branches, including their establishment and functioning, to solve disputes arising in any Branch, and to propose the termination or moratorium on membership in particular cases, and also to propose suspension and dissolution of a Branch to the Supreme Council<sup>41</sup>. The *de facto* power of the Division is to control the operation of any matter respecting elections, in which the Supreme Council relies on the total involvement of Divisional committee and branch leaders. However, on the decision of candidature for general elections or bye-elections the Division has the power only "To consult the Supreme Council in respect

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<sup>39</sup> The Constitution of 1971, Clause 15, section 6 (c), and Perlembagaan UMNO 1985, Fasal 15, Seksyen 10 (h).

<sup>40</sup> Perlembagaan UMNO 1979, Fasal 12, seksyen 4 (b). However, a suspended Divisional Committee, did not have any elected representatives. The Ad hoc Administrative Committee appointed by the Supreme Council was given the power to appoint any of the Divisional members to represent the Division (Fasal 12, seksyen 4 (b)).

<sup>41</sup> See The Constitution of 1979, Clause 16, section 13 (d)-(i).

of nomination of candidates for election to the House of Representatives and State Legislative Assemblies."<sup>42</sup> Since local government authorities were no longer elected, the Division was given the power to propose the candidates for the City, Municipality, Town, Local and District Councils within the boundary of their Divisions<sup>43</sup>. In short, the UMNO Divisional level had only administrative power, and normally transmitted the directives of UMNO Headquarters and the State Liaison Committee Secretariat to its Branches.

### *The UMNO Branch.*

In 1949, when the UMNO constitution was introduced, UMNO Branches started at the Mukim level, then eventually, they were expanded to almost every Malay Village in the Mukim<sup>44</sup>. The UMNO Branch is the basic structure of UMNO, known to politicians as the 'political base', Branches having been the strong-hold and the source of UMNO political power.

The UMNO Branch Committee<sup>45</sup> is comprised of The Head, Vice Head (Naib Ketua), Secretary, Treasurer, Information Chief (the latter three being appointed by the Branch Head), ten persons elected by the Branch Conference, and three persons appointed by the Branch Head.

Every UMNO Branch has been directed to form a Youth Wing and a Women's Section, each of which have their own Committee members, and hold separate Annual Meetings respectively. However, the Annual UMNO Branch Conference is attended by all members of the Branch. Moreover a representative of the Division normally attends to observe these Branch Conferences.

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<sup>42</sup> Ibid., Clause 16, section 13 (a).

<sup>43</sup> Ibid., Clause 16, section 13 (b).

<sup>44</sup> See Shamsul A.B. 1986, *From British To Bumiputera Rule*, p.155.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., Clause 19, section 2 (a)-(g).



There are three main functions<sup>46</sup> of the Branch Committee, namely: to execute orders from higher authorities; to train members to be loyal to the party and its principles; and to instil a spirit of comradeship and to encourage mutual help amongst party members. The Branch has only administrative power such as to organise meetings, conferences and other activities. Nevertheless, the Division relies on their Branches for a pool of man power and Branch support for any activity at Divisional, State or National level.

In the formative years, the Branch had concentrated on political issues. After independence, the Branch focussed their interest on development projects such as putting pressure on higher authority, through leadership influence, and lobbying for the construction or renovation of a new mosque or a new 'surau' (small mosque), and public utilities (such as tarmac roads, water supply, electricity and telephone). For its part, the Youth wing, after the independence period, was more inclined to social work, sports, recreation and cultural activities. The activities of the Kaum Ibu, eventually to be known as the Wanita UMNO, after 1957 became less significant at Branch level because of heavy home commitments. However, during election campaigns their activities were stepped up.

The influence of UMNO at the village level has depended on party leadership involvement in other associations or institutions in their 'kampung'. These include *Persatuan Ibu-bapa dan Guru* (the Parents and Teachers Association), *Jawatankuasa Masjid* (The Village Mosque Committee), the Youth Club, *Persatuan Peladang* (the Farmers Association), which is under the auspices of the Ministry of Agriculture, and also *Pusat Pembangunan Pekebun Kecil Getah* (the village Rubber Small Holder Development centre), under the patronage of the RISDA (the Rubber Industry Small Holder Development Authority), an agency of the Ministry of Land and Regional Development. The *Jawatankuasa Kemajuan and Keselematan Kampung* (the Village Development and Security Committee) better known as the *JKK*, through which

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<sup>46</sup> Ibid., Clause 19, section 13 (a),(b) and (c).

village development projects are channelled, has been under the control of the UMNO leadership since it was revitalised<sup>47</sup>. Generally, the UMNO Branch Head has held the post of Ketua Kampung, normally automatically empowered through authority as appointed Chairman of the JKK. Conflict has normally occurred when the Ketua Kampung has been overthrown as the Branch Head, due to problems with the former's leadership and influence, or because of a 'power struggle' amongst the party's brokers in the village.

Other party agents that have contributed to UMNO were the representative of *Guru Sekolah Dewasa* (teachers of Adult Education classes), later renamed as *Guru Kelas Kemajuan Masyarakat* (teachers of Community Development Classes), better known as Guru KEMAS.<sup>48</sup> Normally the candidates have been selected by the authorities from a few primary or secondary educated UMNO women, whose names are recommended by the local UMNO to hold the post. Those appointed are mainly responsible to their District Supervisors, some of whom are UMNO Divisional leaders.

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<sup>47</sup> This was known as Jawatankuasa Kemajuan Kampung (the Village Development Committee) or JKK when it was introduced by the Government in 1962. It was set up with the aim of mobilizing popular participation in the government's rural development program. In 1972, under the name *Gerakan Pembaharuan* (Reformation Operation), JKK was revitalised with a security function and became known as *Jawatankuasa Kemajuan and Keselamatan Kampung* (The Village Development and Security Committee) or JKKK.

<sup>48</sup> KEMAS, had its own organization, and Headquarters in Kuala Lumpur, at state and district level, It was a government agency under the Ministry of National and Rural Development. It started with *Kelas Pelajaran Dewasa* (the Adult Education Classes) which were introduced in the late 1950's, through which UMNO started their flanking strategy in giving support to the Malays. These tactics were intensified by the revitalisation of *Kelas Pelajaran Dewasa*, through a new name and dynamic structure, as *Jabatan Kemajuan Masyarakat* (the Community Development Department). This department had its own Director General, and its machinery at state level was headed by a Director. At District level there was a Supervisor and his Assistants, who supervised KEMAS teachers at kampung level. Since the KEMAS staff at State, District, and village level were political appointees, UMNO's supporters were usually appointed to various posts in KEMAS. Believing that UMNO had given them their salaried posts, they felt obliged to serve as party workers under the direction of their superiors. KEMAS teachers at village level were responsible to a supervisor at District level, who normally held a senior post in the UMNO Divisional Committee.

### *The UMNO Youth Movement*<sup>49</sup>.

By 1949, UMNO had its own youth wing called 'Perikatan Pemuda' or the Youth League. The Pemuda UMNO was established with the following aim: "to teach and to train Malay youths to work, to be good and responsible citizens [rakyat] and also to improve their fitness, their minds, and their emotional life."<sup>50</sup> The Pemuda UMNO upheld the party motto, which was *Bersatu, Setia dan Berkhidmat* or Unity, Loyalty and Service. This was elaborated in the objectives of the Pemuda UMNO, which included the unification of Malay youth, the encouragement of a spirit of devotion and loyalty to the nation (bangsa), state (negara) and religion (agama). After independence, the function of the Pemuda UMNO was to encourage youth in the field of politics, economics, culture, arts, sport, religion and social welfare"<sup>51</sup>.

Structurally, the Pemuda UMNO has its own organization at National, State, Division and Branch level. According to the UMNO Youth League's by-law of 1949, the UMNO President has the power to appoint leaders of the UMNO Youth at Central, State and Divisional levels.<sup>52</sup> The Central UMNO Youth was formed on 26 August 1949 at the UMNO General Assembly which was held at Seberang Prai. Hussein Onn (later the third Prime Minister of Malaysia) became the first Youth League Head, while Haji Ahmad Abdullah Fahim [Haji Ahmad Badawi] and Sophe Sheikh Ibrahim were the first representatives of the UMNO Youth League in the UMNO General Assembly.

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<sup>49</sup> For related literature on Pemuda, see Ramlah Adam 1978. *UMNO*. pp.52-55; Hambali Abdul Latif . *Perjuangan Pemuda UMNO*, (Kuala Lumpur: Sriwangi, 1985); Noor Azizah Abdul Aziz . "Kepemimpinan Dato Harun dalam Pergerakan Pemuda UMNO Malaysia: Satu Tinjauan. (Unpublished Graduation Exercise, the National University of Malaysia 1984); Subky Latif and Chamil Wariya . *Dilemma Pemuda*. (Kuala Lumpur: Amir Enterprise, 1976); Subky Latif and Chamil Wariya . *Dilemma Pemuda UMNO*. 2nd Edn.,(Kuala Lumpur: Media Intelek, 1985); and Aminuddin Mohd.Yusof and Mohd. Ali Kamarudin, *Kepemimpinan Pemuda UMNO: Antara Personaliti dan Situasi* (Bangi: Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 1988).

<sup>50</sup> Undang-Undang Perikatan Bahagian Pemuda 1949, Perkara 1, bilangan 7.

<sup>51</sup> The Constitution of 1971, clause 22, section 1 (a).

<sup>52</sup> When the New UMNO was first formed in 1988, clause 7.8.1.2. gave the party President power to appoint the Ketua Pemuda and the Ketua Wanita. This was considered by some party members to be undemocratic, but it had been normal practice in UMNO until 1955 when Ketua Pemuda was elected by Pemuda General Assembly.

Up to 1950, during the early stages of the formation of the Youth League at State and Divisional level, the Secretary of UMNO at State and Divisional level was appointed acting head of the UMNO Youth League at their level. Until 1955, an UMNO Youth bye-law dictated the age limit of its membership, as between 16 and 35 years old. Later the upper age limit was increased to 40 years through an amendment to the UMNO 1955 constitution.

Other changes that occurred in the Pemuda UMNO organization related to the role, function and expectations of the UMNO members themselves. Dato Abdul Razak Hussein (later the second Prime Minister of Malaysia), took over the leadership of Pemuda in 1950, but was replaced by Sardon Haji Jubir in August 1951, when the former was elected as the UMNO Deputy President. In the UMNO General Assembly in March 1951, a Pemuda UMNO motion to replace the UMNO slogan of 'Hidup Melayu' with 'Merdeka' (Independent) was passed by the UMNO delegates. However, the top UMNO leaders remained very pessimistic about the ability of the Malays to achieve independence. Sardon Jubir was successful in developing the Pemuda as a pressure group within UMNO, especially in pressing the Supreme Council to fight for independence. The UMNO Youth also proposed changing the name of 'Perikatan Pemuda' [Youth League] to *Pergerakan Pemuda UMNO* [UMNO Youth Movement] in 1955. In 1965, the Supreme Council decided that the Divisional Secretary automatically became Secretary of the Pergerakan Pemuda, and a post of Assistant Secretary of Pergerakan Pemuda was established, appointed by the Head of Pergerakan Pemuda. In an amendment to the constitution of 1965, it was also approved that the upper limit on the membership of Pergerakan Pemuda be 40 years old, with the exception of the Head and appointed committee members.

The Pergerakan Pemuda UMNO also has its own State Liaison Committee, members of which had been drawn from Divisional Youth leaders. By the mid 1960's the States' Youth Leaders and their Deputies were appointed by the National Head of Pergerakan Pemuda, and it became the prerogative of the State Youth Head to appoint

the Assistant Secretary, Treasurer and Information Chief. However, the UMNO Youth Central Committee is comprised of elected Committee members and not more than 5 appointed members. In 1978 a post of full time Executive Secretary of Pergerakan Pemuda UMNO was created, and there was also an appointed Assistant Secretary for Pergerakan Pemuda UMNO<sup>53</sup>.

The Pergerakan Pemuda UMNO, in its attempt to extend its influence among non-partisan Malay Youth, launched a national youth Malay organization called the *Pergerakan Pemuda Desa* (the Rural Youth Organization). However, the plan was not successful until the formation of *Pergerakan Belia 4B* (the 4B Youth Movement), under the leadership of Haji Suhaimi Dato Haji Kamaruddin in the mid 1960s.<sup>54</sup> He attained political power, including becoming the Head of Pergerakan Pemuda (1978-1982) through his 4B supporters, who also held various posts and were active members of Pergerakan Pemuda UMNO at State, Divisional and Branch levels.

The Pergerakan Pemuda UMNO also enjoyed a very short period of control of the national youth movement by affiliation to the Malaya Youth Council.<sup>55</sup> When Sanusi Joned MP, became the President of MAYC (the Malaysian Association of Youth Clubs), it seemed that MAYC would also become another UMNO base. At Village level, there is normally only one youth club, led by UMNO youth members, but at the District level there has always been a 4B and MAYC District committee, which formed District Youth Councils with other youth organizations. The politicization of the voluntary youth organizations was being felt by the mid 1970's.

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<sup>53</sup> For example in 1978, when Haji Suhaimi lead UMNO Youth, he appointed Zainal Husman, his Secretary General of 4B, to be his Pemuda UMNO's Assistant Secretary.

<sup>54</sup> Haji Suhaimi Kamaruddin was a leader of the Malaysian Islamic Study Group (MISG) when he read law in the United Kingdom, and he inclined to support PAS. After serving in the Judiciary Department, he contested the Dengkil State constituency in the General Election of 1969, and became Selangor State EXCO. He then stood for a Parliamentary seat in 1978 and became a Deputy Minister, and also Ketua Pemuda. In the Malaysian Youth Council he was a committee member until 1972. He managed to amend the 4B on the youth age limit, and restructured the 4B District, which was based on the District administration boundary to the Parliamentary constituency. His leadership declined after 1982 and his position worsened in 1991 when there was an attempt to topple him from power. See chapter 8, and *Mingguan Waktu*, '4B tetap tolak Suhaimi', December 15, 1991, p.1.

<sup>55</sup> M.A.Fawzi Basri, *Pergerakan Belia Di Malaysia: Satu Catitan Ringkas mengenai Perubahan dan perkembangan Majlis Belia Malaysia, 1950-1980*, (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Youth Council, 1980), p.22-27, and 105.

But Haji Suhaimi Kamaruddin, the leader of 4B, failed to oppose Anwar Ibrahim of ABIM for the Malaysia Youth Council presidency in early 1972. Moreover, in 1982, Haji Suhaimi lost his seat as Ketua Pemuda UMNO to Anwar Ibrahim.

### *The Pergerakan Wanita UMNO.*

When this was formed on 25 August 1949, it was known as *Pergerakan Kaum Ibu UMNO* (the UMNO Women's Movement), until it changed to *Pergerakan Wanita UMNO* in 1971. Originally, in 1947, women's affairs had been managed by Jabatan Kaum Ibu UMNO (the UMNO Women's Department). Between 1947 and 1949, there were 14 affiliated members of Kaum Ibu UMNO<sup>56</sup>. A salariat staff called 'Timbalan Pegawai Kaum Ibu' (Deputy Women Officer) was appointed to organise Kaum Ibu activities at state level.

There therefore had to be Pergerakan Wanita UMNOs at branch level, consisting of elected leaders such as, a Ketua (Head), Vice Head, and three to five elected members. This was then increased to ten elected members in 1971. The post of Secretary, Treasurer and additional members being appointed by the Head of Wanita. The Wanita branch normally elected two representatives for the Divisional UMNO Wanita delegation meeting.

At Divisional level, Pergerakan Wanita UMNO Bahagian had elected leaders called Ketua (Head), who automatically held one of the Divisional Vice Head's posts, Naib Ketua (the Vice Head), and three to five elected members. With the constitution's amendment in 1972, Pergerakan Wanita was allowed to appoint its own Assistant Secretary and additional appointed members.

The Pergerakan Wanita UMNO also established its state committee to control their movement. In 1960, when UMNO amended its constitution, the Women's State

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<sup>56</sup> Namely, the female members of Pergerakan Melayu Johor, Persatuan Melayu Keluang, Pergerakan Melayu Semenanjung Melaka, Persekutuan Melayu Negeri Sembilan, Pergerakan Kebangsaan Melayu Selangor, Darul Ehsan Club Jeram, Persekutuan Melayu Ulu Selangor, Persatuan Melayu Daerah Seremban, Persatuan Melayu Pahang, Perikatan Melayu Perak, Kesatuan Melayu Kedah, Seberkas Kedah, Persatuan Melayu Perlis, and Persatuan Kaum Ibu Selangor. See Ramlah Adam 1978. UMNO. p.57

Committee lost its executive power, and was only given the function of a liaison committee.

In 1955, the Divisional Wanita delegates to the Wanita UMNO General Assembly were chosen on the basis of one seat for every 750 members; in 1960, this was changed to one seat for every 500 members. Since 1971, the Pergerakan Wanita General Assembly has had the power to elect five representatives as their delegation to the UMNO General Assembly.

The National Committee of Pergerakan Wanita has been led by elected committee members, comprising the Ketua (Head), Naib Ketua (the Vice Head), 10 elected members, and also not more than five members appointed by the Ketua Pergerakan Wanita UMNO Malaysia<sup>57</sup>. Other appointed posts have been Assistant Secretary and Assistant Treasurer. In 1959, to strengthen the Wanita UMNO machinery, Rahimah Abdul Rahman was appointed full time assistant secretary. Then she was replaced by Rahmah Othman (1968-1976).<sup>58</sup>

The Pergerakan Wanita has played a vital role in determining UMNO political power, especially in the elections, and the ceremonial activities of UMNO. They claim to be 'the powerful and strong army [fighting] for the success of [the UMNO] candidates.'<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>57</sup> See byc-law 1972 in UMNO. *Peraturan Pergerakan Wanita yang telah dipersetujukan dengan pindaan oleh Majlis Tertinggi UMNO pada 15 Januari 1972*. (Kuala Lumpur: UMNO HQ), clause 6, section 1 (a) to (g)

<sup>58</sup> She resigned from the office to contest the Selayang parliamentary seat, and then contested Shah Alam parliamentary constituency. Before she had quitted UMNO to lead the Pergerakan Wanita of Semangat 46, she was a Deputy Minister of Transport, and also the Deputy Head of Pergerakan Wanita UMNO Malaysia.

<sup>59</sup> Manderson 1980, *The Kaum Ibu UMNO*, p 203.

### *The UMNO Membership.*

The UMNO constitution has categorised its membership into two groups, namely; *Ahli Biasa* or the ordinary members and *Ahli Bergabung* or affiliated members. UMNO has a prerequisite for its ordinary members, that is the person must be a Malay or a bumiputera.. During the formative phase, to be an ordinary member of UMNO, one had to be born in the Malay Peninsula or, if from outside the Peninsula, one's mother or father had to be a Malay, and had to have been domiciled not less than five years before the application for UMNO membership. Section 3 in clause 5 of the UMNO 1949 Constitution also defined that one must be a Muslim, a speaker of the Malay language and practice Malay customs. However the *Orang Asli* (the aborigines) in the Peninsula were allowed to be UMNO members. Another condition to be an UMNO ordinary member was that one must be not less than sixteen years old.

Generally, UMNO members had to accept and support the UMNO's motto; 'Unity-Loyalty-Service' (Bersatu, Bersetia dan Berkhidmat). This meant showing unity and loyalty in supporting party policies and objectives. Thus, they had to accept and support directives from the higher authorities in UMNO, -especially the candidates in elections, -along with other policies.

Theoretically, every member had the right to speak, to express his or her opinion, to vote in party meetings, and the right to choose, and to be chosen for, any office in the party. However, due to lack of education, during the formative years, most of the rural area UMNO members were illiterate. Moreover, they had internalised the non-participating political culture and continued patron-client leadership relations. The Malay masses were confident that their educated leaders would only introduce changes on their behalf.

Even in 1979, UMNO was still facing membership problems, including cases of double membership, i.e. individuals holding the chairmanship and being committee members of more than one Branch or Division, or concurrently holding the post of



Chairman or deputy Chairman and committee member in the same level of the UMNO structure. There were cases of members holding the post of Auditor while serving as committee member of the Branch or Division. However, these deviations were rectified by the Supreme Council in 1979<sup>60</sup>.

#### *The Criteria of membership.*

As a mass party<sup>61</sup>, UMNO has its formal machinery of enrolment, comprising the signing of a definitive undertaking and payment of an annual subscription. The potential ordinary member normally has to submit his or her application to the Branch Secretary, and an application form for membership has to be signed by the applicant and proposed and seconded by two ordinary members<sup>62</sup>. The Supreme Council has absolute power in accepting, rejecting, suspending or readmitting any member of UMNO.

As for membership figures, by mid 1951, UMNO had 100,375 registered members in its 36 Divisions. Before the old UMNO was dissolved on February 4, 1988, membership was claimed to be 1.5 million<sup>63</sup>.

#### *Degree of Participation.*

The participation of the UMNO membership could be represented as three concentric circles of participation. The widest comprised the *electors* who voted for the candidates put forward by the party for the General Elections or by-elections. Generally, the most loyal UMNO electors were the Malay women, who mostly were very passive members of UMNO, but their contribution was badly needed during

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<sup>60</sup> Perlembagaan UMNO 1979, Fasal 8, seksyen 4 (a) - (f)

<sup>61</sup> Maurice Duverger 1954, *Political Parties*, pp 62-71.

<sup>62</sup> The Constitution of 1971, clause 6, section 2.

<sup>63</sup> Safar Hashim, 'Pemilihan UMNO: Antara Tradisi dengan Amalan Demokrasi, Dewan Masyarakat (May 1987), p.7. See Chapter VI for detailed discussion on the breakdown of UMNO and its development before and after the 'Power struggle' of July 1987..

polling day, although they were indifferent to political issues. The electors were committed to the party as a result of the political myth that only UMNO would serve the Malays.

The second circle was made up of *supporters* of UMNO, who were not necessarily just electors. They were the active members who always participated in UMNO's activities. Some of these supporters were politically literate and had an education at least at secondary level; or they would be retired government officials, especially teachers, police and military personnel; and Malay youths. A researcher has categorised these UMNO supporters according to class and occupation: the village bourgeoisie; the village petty bourgeoisie; the village proletariat; and the peasantry<sup>64</sup>. This group of supporters has been the main source of UMNO political dynamics. The people in this group joined UMNO with varieties of interest and motives, serving the party voluntarily. They always had at least some information concerning the opposition parties and joined hands with party workers in distributing party propaganda and diffusing UMNO ideology. Some of these supporters liked to attend UMNO meetings or rallies in order to enrich their political knowledge, but always deferred to the UMNO leadership. This group also participated in preparations for election campaigns and were involved in attacking and capturing the opposition party's voting strongholds.

The third circle were the party workers, comprising office bearers, salariat staff of UMNO, and so called 'development agents', such as the supervisors and teachers of KEMAS. They were the party brokers or political entrepreneurs at the local level, and this group played a vital role in UMNO. Before independence, when the spirit of *Merdeka* superseded other motives, this group contributed to the efforts of Committee members at various levels of UMNO. As the Malays became more politically literate, UMNO was challenged in 1959 by PAS - the Malay-Islamic based

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<sup>64</sup> See the classification by Shamsul A.B. 1986, *From British to Bumiputera*, pp 118-19. It is preferable to define the peasantry and illiterate UMNO members as electors, based on their passive role in the party.

party. Thus UMNO had to revise their strategy and tactics, so they needed a long term and effective election machinery.<sup>65</sup> KEMAS played the role of the eyes and ears of UMNO, and were ready to be mobilised for any political battle.

#### *The Party Election System.*

The election of the Branch Committee was carried out every year during the Annual Meeting under the supervision of representatives from its Division. Theoretically, branches were responsible for nominating their Divisional leaders; however, the influence of the Branch Head normally became a salient determining factor. The Branch meeting often utilised an open voting system, and a secret ballot was only used when it was felt necessary.

However, at the Divisional Conference of Representatives the common practice was for the members to cast secret ballots for the election of the Divisional Executive Committee or sometimes for selecting ten Divisional representatives to the General Assembly and the nomination of candidates for the Supreme Council. Since the party management at Division level provided the clerical staff, it was possible to systemetize the election procedure including the distribution of nomination forms, confirmed nomination forms and well-presented ballot papers. The State Liaison Committee normally supervised the running of the divisional election process. There was a biennial election of the Divisional Committee, whilst elections for the Supreme Council were held triennially. The Annual Meeting of the divisions or the General Assembly was at its most interesting when the party election was on the agenda. Apart from this, the Conference or the Assembly was full of rhetorical speeches which sometimes were received with humourous replies and Malay *pantun*, these latter being another cultural element of UMNO.

The nomination of the Supreme Council members was carried out by the UMNO Divisional meeting. However, the nominations did not necessarily reflect the

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<sup>65</sup> See page 74-77 on the party machine in the General Election.

real voting pattern. Divisional delegates were subject to influence, and other political tactics that made them change their decision at the last minute. After the implementation of the secret ballot, press speculation always influenced the public, as has happened since the 1978 party election. The Head of Division often had their shadow delegation chosen by the Divisional Conference, in order to secure loyal delegates. Normally the Heads of Division were also members of Parliament or State Assemblymen, and controlling voting was part of their obligation to their patron at the State or Federal level. Controlling voting was another feature of political 'trading' in the party, and also represented an 'investment' in the UMNO political market.

### *The Party Machine in the General Election.*<sup>66</sup>

The party structure normally was transformed into an election machine during election campaigns. Generally, UMNO controlled the organisation of the election machine for Barisan Nasional except in the constituencies represented by the MCA, the MIC and the Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (GRM).

The UMNO State Liaison Committee was responsible for organising the election machines in the states. Despite the fact that the party President chose candidates for election, and the UMNO Supreme Council decided on the party manifesto, it was the responsibility of the State, Division and Branch levels to ensure that UMNO won the election. Therefore, strategically and tactically, these levels of the party, ran the show. Nevertheless, the mass media and other information agencies also played important supporting roles.

Structurally, the Chairman of the State UMNO Liaison Committee was appointed the Director of the election campaign. He was responsible for organising the Barisan Nasional Election Committee at state, district and village levels.

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<sup>66</sup> Based on document 18/87, SC (5), The National Archives of Malaysia, Kedah Branch and interviews with some UMNO leaders in Kedah, Perak, Selangor, Johor and Pahang.. This document was published by the Kedah UMNO Liaison Committee for the Secretary of Election Operations at State, Divisional and Branch levels [Peti Undi]. The same structure and process were used by UMNO throughout the country. In by-elections, all UMNO Divisions in the state and some from other states gave their support to the Division which was responsible for operating the election campaign, even UMNO Supreme Council members were involved in supporting UMNO candidates.




Basically, the State UMNO Liaison Committee extended to form a State Barisan Nasional Election Committee. The Deputy Chairman of the UMNO State Liaison Committee was normally appointed Deputy Director of the election, while other Barisan Nasional components become Vice Directors of the Barisan Nasional State Election Operation Committee. The committee had its specialized sub committee under the direction of certain Directors, such as the Director of Finance, the Director of Information, the Director of Women and Vote Persuaders (Pengaruh Wanita dan Perayu Undi), who coordinated their operations to convince women voters to vote for the party. The Director of Socio-economic Development coordinated information and the dissemination of development projects during the campaign. The Director of Youth Operations and Posters coordinated the effort to collect the youth vote, strengthening party morale by the use of posters. To streamline the campaign, the Head of each UMNO Division also sat in this committee and functioned as the chairman of the Regional Election Action Committee.

The Regional Election Action Committee, in fact, was an extension of the UMNO Divisional Committee and Barisan Nasional Divisional Committee. The Committee had specific tasks, which could be assessed by the appointment of a Chairman of Ten House Committee, who was responsible for coordinating all its sub-committees at UMNO Branch level. The Chairman of Transport was responsible for planning the car pool and distributing motor vehicles for the campaign and to ferry voters on polling day. The controlling of the budget for party workers in every Polling Station Committee's Operation Room was the responsibility of the Chairman of Food Supply who coordinated with the UMNO Branch Food Catering sub-Committee. Information and propaganda for party's workers and supporters was coordinated by a Committee at Regional and Polling Station Committee level.

Most important was the 'nucleus' level, the UMNO Branch which was transformed into a party machine called *Jawatankuasa Peti Undi* (the Polling Station Action Committee). The Head of the UMNO Branch became the Head of Peti Undi

Fig.6

The Organizational Structure of State Barisan Nasional's Election Committee.



Source: 'Panduan Setiausaha Bilik Gerakan Pilihanraya, UMNO Kedah 1986'.

who was assisted by various heads of the task force. Among these was the Head of the Operations Room who was responsible for mapping the party situation graphically, and normally delivered a briefing session for the committee or visiting party leaders. He was equipped with volunteers, who worked as groups of informers, and the party 'Intelligence Support section'. These workers were able to intermingle with members of the opposition party to collect information. The Head of Ten Houses not only monitored their 'loyal' voters, but also followed up on the 'fence sitter' voters in the village. He always worked together with the Head of Women and Vote Persuaders sections to integrate them into UMNO. Thus, the Head of Ten Houses managed to improve his influence on voting patterns in the ten houses under his control.

UMNO not only relied on the rural voters but the women who formed the majority of voters. Therefore, the Head of the Women's Movement was automatically appointed to lead 'kumpulan perayu undi' or Vote Persuaders groups to convince rural women to vote for UMNO. The group rendered their services by distributing special cards to voters in the villages to inform them of their voter registration numbers and their polling stations. Indeed, the card also persuaded the voters to vote for Barisan Nasional.

On polling day, the party machine concentrated on two main tasks: to ferry voters and to deliver special favours to all voters in order that they should vote UMNO. The Transport committee provides a fleet of cars to ferry voters to and from polling stations. Whilst in the car, the driver and his assistant were responsible for convincing his passengers of the need to vote for UMNO or Barisan Nasional. Since opposition parties also provided the same service, competition existed. It was a duty of the driver to ensure their passengers were delivered to the UMNO Registration Hut or *Pondok Panas* (Shade Post) which was a few yards from the polling station.

The workers in the Pondok Panas Posts were responsible for accompanying the passengers from the polling station transport terminal to their registration station



to reensure the passengers' names were in the Electoral Register. In fact, this last minute checking gave UMNO party workers a final chance to persuade the public to vote for UMNO candidates.

### *The UMNO leadership.*

The Bureaucratic elite and aristocratic elite were the group that controlled the decision-making process in UMNO from its formation until 1981. Dato Onn, the Menteri Besar of Johor- the top Johor State Civil Servant, from an aristocratic Johor family, was elected by Malay representatives to be the first President of UMNO (1946-1951). The second President of UMNO (1951-1970), Tunku Abdul Rahman Putera, was a government legal officer and a Kedah royal family member. Tun Abdul Razak, the third President of UMNO (1970-1976) was also a law graduate, a top Pahang civil servant, moreover, and one of the traditional 'Orang Besar Empat' of Pahang. The fourth President of UMNO (1976-1981), was Tun Hussein Onn, also a United Kingdom law graduate. His career began in the Johor State government, being the eldest son of Dato Onn Jaafar -the founder President of UMNO. While Dr Mahathir Mohammad the President of UMNO (1981-1988), was a medical practitioner and among the few Malay graduates from a local University at that time, he was also from an urban Malay middle-class family in Alor Star, the capital state of Kedah.

### *Dato Onn Jaafar : the founder President (1946-1951).*

Dato Onn's leadership was at its highest peak between 1946 and 1949, and his ideas were always accepted by UMNO members. Reorganization of UMNO as a direct membership party strengthened UMNO. The growth of Dato Onn's power was a result of the belief that only UMNO would rescue the Malays in the face of encroachment by the non-Malays and the negative attitude of the colonial government.

Dato Onn succeeded in institutionalising UMNO as a vehicle for Malay politics. But by 1948, there seemed to have been an evolution of Dato Onn's attitudes which inclined him to personalize his power. When the UMNO General Assembly rejected his proposal on Jus Soli citizenship for non-Malays voting 14:8 against, Dato Onn resigned from the party in June 1950. However, after he was convinced by his supporters, Dato Onn was willing to be renominated as the UMNO President. In the UMNO General Assembly at Kuala Kangsar on 27 August, Dato Onn was elected as UMNO President with the voting 66:3. This was the beginning of the tradition that the UMNO Presidentship could be challenged.

Dato Onn, who was still confident of his personal authority and of the support of the majority of the UMNO members, was influenced by MCA's political objectives, and in 1951 he bulldozed through the idea of transforming UMNO into a multi-racial party, changing its name to the United Malayan National Organization, and opening UMNO membership to the other races in the Peninsula. This explosive idea represented a milestone in his leadership of UMNO and the Malays were no longer willing to compromise with him and labelled him as a traitor. Dato Onn wanted to make the Malays' view wider than 'the kampung view.'<sup>67</sup> But the Malays eventually felt that he had been hoodwinked by the MCA leadership<sup>68</sup>, and he left the UMNO on 26 August 1951, while the Malays still unwilling to share political power with so-called *orang asing* or foreigners whose loyalty was suspect.

In managing UMNO, Dato Onn received support from most of his Supreme Council members. In theory, the principle of election should have prevented the formation of an oligarchy<sup>69</sup>, but in reality to strengthen his leadership and political power, Dato Onn indirectly had formed his own 'Inner Circle'. This could be seen when he appointed four UMNO Supreme Council members to join him in the

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<sup>67</sup> Dato Onn's view on the need for the Malay to change their political 'exclusivism' was quoted in *British Malaya*, vol.xxiv,no.3. (July 1949), p. 266.

<sup>68</sup> See *The Straits Budget*, 2 April 1953.

<sup>69</sup> See Chapter V, which will discuss democracy and oligarchy in UMNO.

Communities Liaison Committee; these were Dato Panglima Bukit Gantang (the Vice President of UMNO), Dato Zainal Abidin Abbas (The UMNO Secretary General), Dr Mustafa Osman and Salleh Hakim<sup>70</sup>. Dato Panglima Bukit Gantang and Zainal Abidin Abbas left UMNO when Dato Onn resigned in 1951, and they never returned to the organization, and always opposed it throughout the rest of their political lives. The inter-party struggle that split UMNO in the 1950's, also created problems of loyalty for the Malay civil servants who had split into UMNO's camp and Dato' Onn's camp<sup>71</sup>.

*Tunku Abdul Rahman: The Happiest President (1951-1970).*

Tunku Abdul Rahman was not a new name in UMNO, having been appointed by the UMNO General Assembly to a three-man UMNO mission which had planned to have talks in London in 1946 on the Malayan Union issue<sup>72</sup>. In 1951, he was approached by Abdul Razak Hussein, his colleague when he led the Malay society of Great Britain,<sup>73</sup> to be an UMNO presidential candidate.

The Tunku's name was put forward by Bahaman Shamsuddin, the other candidates being C.M.Yusof, a member of the aristocratic elite from Perak, and Haji Ahmad Fuad, a religious leader, both well-known in UMNO. This was the second time the UMNO Presidentship had been contested. On Sunday, 26 August 1951 Tunku was elected the second President of UMNO.

The first task of the Tunku Abdul Rahman was to pick men who could be members of his inner circle. "He wanted men with an undoubted sense of loyalty, sacrifice and integrity".<sup>74</sup> Apart from Dato' Abdul Razak, who served as his Deputy,

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<sup>70</sup> The Straits Times, January 11, 1949.

<sup>71</sup> Mavis Puthucherry 1978, *The Politics of Administration*, pp.31-33.

<sup>72</sup> See files UMNO/ SG 15/ 1946 and *UMNO Sepuluh Tahun* which recorded his unceremonious removal.

<sup>73</sup> See Abdul Aziz Ishak, Wan King Chcong and Tan Kah Jee, *Tengku Abdul Rahman: The Architect of Merdeka* (Singapore: Tan Kah Jee, 1957). pp 76-77.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid.,p.84.

Sardon Jubir (formerly leader of Kesatuan Melayu Singapura), Syed Nasir Ismail of Johor, Bahaman Shamsuddin of Negeri Sembilan (serving MCS officer at Teluk Intan), Dr Ismail Abdul Rahman, and Abdul Aziz Ishak a journalist were among those selected by the Tunku. Dr Ismail's brother, Mohamad Yassin was given the task of acting Secretary General of UMNO.

Among the UMNO leadership, the Tunku's political decisions were not always well-received and he failed to impose his authoritarian leadership style on all the Executive Council members. The Tunku was often branded as a 'colonial stooge' and as too accomodating to non-Malay demands, and he was even criticised by his inner circle members on the question of Malay interests<sup>75</sup>. Although Tunku welcomed opposition and constructive criticism, very often he was inclined to make a decision on the spot.<sup>76</sup>

Making contradictory, conflicting and jarring statements<sup>77</sup> was another problem of the Tunku's style of leadership. When the Alliance between UMNO and MCA was formed in 1953, his leadership style became more skillful. He perhaps for the first time fully appreciated the seriousness of the business of being a political leader.<sup>78</sup>

For a certain section of UMNO members, the Tunku had compromised on the 'Merdeka' question in response to MCA's political demands. In 1952, the Malays saw a change from Tunku's idea of 'Malaya for the Malay' to the compromised mixture of 'merdeka' government. The other group in UMNO strongly backed the Tunku's idea as the best strategy to achieve independence, especially since UMNO confronted the *Parti Kemerdekaan Malaya* (The Independence Malaya Party) led by Dato' Onn.

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<sup>75</sup> Ibid., pp 105 - 111.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid., p.105.

<sup>77</sup> Harry Miller 1959, *Prince and Premier*, p.120.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid., p.129, and see also R.K.Vasil, *Ethnic Politics in Malaysia* (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1980), p 90.

In June 1955, the Tunku's leadership experienced great difficulty over the issue of the distribution of the 52 seats for the coming Federal Legislative Election. The UMNO General Assembly opposed his demand for a more 'reasonable' distribution of seats among the Alliance components. Although the Malays constituted about 84.2 per cent, the Chinese 11.2 per cent and the Indians only 4.6 per cent of the electorate, Tunku tried to convince the UMNO Assembly not to foster the idea of having 90 per cent of the Alliance candidates being Malays. Through his plan to cause a 'no confidence' vote, the Tunku publicly demonstrated his autocratic style by threatening to resign his position as President if his idea was rejected. After getting a vote of confidence from UMNO members, who were anxious to achieve independence, Tunku distributed the seats as follows: UMNO 35, the MCA 15 and the MIC 2. The MCA and the MIC secured an increased number of seats not through their own efforts and influence, but thanks to "the goodwill of Tunku Abdul Rahman."<sup>79</sup>

However, there was dissatisfaction in UMNO, since some leaders thought they deserved to stand in the election but had not been selected; The Kaum Ibu UMNO also intended to boycott the election if none of their members were selected to contest<sup>80</sup>. In short, many elements in UMNO were unaccustomed to making compromises and concessions which were essential to hold the Alliance coalition together.<sup>81</sup> In the election, UMNO candidate Haji Sulaiman Palestine<sup>82</sup> lost to PAS in the Krian constituency, and some UMNO members contested as independent candidates. Tunku was now gaining extra power, not only was he the President of UMNO, but would also soon be the Chief Minister of the future independent nation.

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<sup>79</sup> R.K.Vasil 1980, *Ethnic Politics*. p.94

<sup>80</sup> Lenore Manderson 1980, *Women, Politics and Change*. pp.112-113.

<sup>81</sup> Gordon P.Means. *Malaysian Politics* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1976), p.162.

<sup>82</sup> In the General Election of 1959 he won a state seat in Pulau Pinang and was appointed Speaker of the State Assembly. After 1969 he served in UMNO HQ and was later appointed the UMNO Information Chief until 1978 when he challenged Hussain Onn in the UMNO Presidency election. Though he lost he was still in the party until 1987, when he joined Team B and became one of the founder members of the Semangat 46 Supreme Council.

In 1956, the Tunku expelled Khatijah Sidek, the Head of Kaum Ibu and also one of the Vice Presidents, on constitutional grounds<sup>83</sup>. The Tunku's leadership was challenged by certain UMNO members when the Alliance memorandum to the Constitutional Commission of 1957 was considered by UMNO members to favour compromise with the Chinese,<sup>84</sup> especially by granting jus soli citizenship, which might jeopardise Malay interests. Some UMNO members began to protest at the way that the Tunku was guiding the fortunes of the Malays. In the UMNO General Assembly in August 1956, Haji Sulaiman Palastine, called on the Tunku to quit the presidency saying he should "concentrate on the Chief Minister's job"<sup>85</sup>..

The period after the election of 1955 was a honeymoon period<sup>86</sup> for UMNO-MCA relations. However, in UMNO itself there was discontent; UMNO national leaders and state leaders were struggling over the control of UMNO Divisions and Branches in the states. Therefore, the Tunku had the UMNO constitution amended in 1959, when power was centralised under the Supreme Council. The amendment was enforced in 1960. After that the State UMNO leaders became powerless, while UMNO leaders at Divisional and Branch levels began to focus their allegiance on the UMNO Central Committee. The Tunku became a powerful UMNO President, with his inner circle in the Alliance, while renewing his inner circle in UMNO itself. This included Mohd.Khir Johari, and Senu Abdul Rahman, both having served as UMNO Secretary Generals under the Tunku. At the same time, Syed Nasir Ismail, Syed Jaafar Albar, Rahman Talib and some others appeared as 'fighters' for Malay political supremacy, and this group later was branded as extremist or 'ultra' within UMNO. Tun Abdul Razak, the Deputy President was fully behind this group, and in fact, in the 1960's, rivalries involving individuals and factions in UMNO were uncovered<sup>87</sup>.

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<sup>83</sup> Lenore Manderson 1980, *Women, Politics, and Change*, pp.113-114.

<sup>84</sup> Diane K.Mauzy 1983, *Barisan Nasional*, pp.20-22.

<sup>85</sup> Aziz Ishak et. al. 1957, *The Architect of Merdeka*, p.147

<sup>86</sup> Mahathir bin Mohamad 1982, *Malay Dilemma*, p.7.

The period between 1959 to 1969 saw a waning of the Tunku's credibility as a Malay leader. The myth of his perfect working combination with Tun Razak, his faithful and patient deputy, began to fade away. Tunku's leadership, which had promoted the belief that the Malays could not make progress in the economic sector, caused the business sector to become nearly an exclusive Chinese domain. Some UMNO members saw Tunku and his inner circle as consistently capitulating to Chinese demands and applying watered-down tactics in the implementation of National Education and Language policies. Tunku then pressurized some 'ultra' personalities to leave his circle. Tunku also saw that the educated Malay youth and other Malay pressure groups had been used by the 'ultra group'<sup>88</sup>, to criticize himself for his generosity toward the Chinese by granting them citizenship and allocating them more seats in the elections. Racial tension was felt towards the end of the 1960's, when other political parties also exploited the racial question to get political support. These developments contributed to the May 13 incident<sup>89</sup>. Tunku then acknowledged that there was a struggle for power within UMNO<sup>90</sup>.

*the so-called "Ultras" have generally kept quiet although they never ceased to be active, carrying out an intense underground campaign among the younger generation, the so-called "Intellectuals".*

Unfortunately for the Tunku, the moderate group in UMNO also changed their perception of the leadership, especially when the Alliance produced an adverse performance in the 1969 General Election. By then Tunku realised that he was only a *de jure* or titular leader of UMNO, and his patronage was no longer accepted by the Malays, and *de facto* power was now being held by other UMNO members. The 1969 Emergency declaration and the formation of the National Operations Council,

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<sup>87</sup> G.P.Means 1976, *Malaysian Politics*, pp.194-199.

<sup>88</sup> Tunku Abdul Rahman, *May 13: Before and After* (Kuala Lumpur: Utusan Melayu Press, 1969), pp.130-131. See also Appendix C.

<sup>89</sup> For detail see Goh Cheng Teik, *The May Thirteenth Incident and Democracy in Malaysia* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford Universiti Press, 1971); Leon Comber, *13 May 1969: A Historical Survey of Sino-Malay Relations*. (Singapore: Graham Brash, 1983); Felix.V.Gagliano, *Communal Violence in Malaysia 1969: The Political Aftermath* (Athens:Center for International Studies, Ohio University, 1971);Tunku Abdul Rahman 1969. *May 13: Before and After; The National Operation Council, The May 13 Tragedy: A Report*. (Kuala Lumpur: The National Operations Council, 1969).

<sup>90</sup> Tunku Abdul Rahman 1969. *May 13*. p.136.

under the directorship of Tun Razak, amounted to a silent *coup d' etat* which had taken place both in UMNO and the government. Tun Abdul Razak became the real leader of the Malays. and the de facto Head of Government from 18 May 1969 till 12 May 1970.

*Tun Abdul Razak Dato' Hussein (1970-1976): The New Order President.*

Tun Abdul Razak was appointed Prime Minister on 22 September 1970<sup>91</sup>, incorporating Tun Dr Ismail in his cabinet as his deputy. Two new faces then joined the cabinet, they were Ghazali Shafie and Hussein Onn. Both Tun Abdul Razak and Tun Dr. Ismail, took over the unopposed posts of President and Deputy President of UMNO respectively, in the January 1971 General Assembly. The meeting also revealed the political disillusion of UMNO members, who decided to create a pool of dynamic leadership to protect the future of the so-called 'neglected' Malays.

Tun Abdul Razak as UMNO President formed his inner circle through the election of the Supreme Council members in 1971, and through Cabinet reshuffles between 1973 and 1974. Khir Johari, the Education Minister, and also the Tunku's confidant, was replaced by Abdul Rahman Yaakub of Sarawak and later by Hussein Onn. Khir Johari also failed in the contest for the UMNO Vice Presidentship, which was won by Hussein Onn MP, the Minister of Education in January 1971. Musa Hitam<sup>92</sup> of Johor, from the 'ultras' was called back into cabinet. while Dato Harun

<sup>91</sup> William Shaw, *Tun Razak*, p.220.

<sup>92</sup> He was born in Johor Bahru on April 18, 1934, educated at the English College of Johor Bahru and the University of Malaya, Singapore. He was a student activist, and played a major role in UMSU, PBMUM, GPMS, and the International Student Secretariat in Holland. In February 1965, he was appointed Political Secretary to Sardon Jubir, senior cabinet minister and UMNO Vice President. Musa was acting UMNO Secretary General when Syed Jaafar Albar resigned in August 1965. He was then appointed the first UMNO Executive Secretary when Khir Johari became the UMNO Secretary General. In August 1968, Khir Johari who was also Chairman of the Alliance Candidate Selection Committee announced Musa Hitam as the Alliance candidate for the Segamat Utara Parliamentary by-election. Musa Hitam retained his seat in the General election of 1969 and was appointed Deputy Minister to the Deputy Prime Minister and he was dismissed by the Prime Minister on July 28th 1969. In December 1970 he defeated Sharif Ahmad by 238 votes to 66 for the Pemuda UMNO Deputy Head, and was elected a member of the Supreme Council. In 1971 he took an appointment as Officer with Special Function with FELDA, and took over the Chairmanship of FELDA. He became Deputy Minister of Trade and Industry in January 1973, and was promoted to the position of Minister of Primary Industry in September 1974. He then became Minister of Education and secured the UMNO Vice Presidentship in 1976. When Dr Mahathir became Prime Minister, Musa Hitam was appointed Deputy Prime Minister and was confirmed as Deputy President of UMNO in 1981. See Bruce Gale 1982, *Musa Hitam*.



Idris, the Menteri Besar of Selangor became the UMNO Vice President by virtue of his position as Head of Pemuda UMNO. Harun Idris then managed to bring back Dr Mahathir<sup>93</sup> to UMNO through one of the branches of Selangor. Also Dr Mahathir was rehabilitated by Tun Razak as an UMNO Supreme Council member. Another personality highlighted by Tun Abdul Razak was Tengku Razaleigh<sup>94</sup>, from the Kelantan UMNO State Liaison Committee.

Tun Razak had infused new blood in the UMNO top ranks as part of his strategy to firmly control UMNO and draw up an agenda for political change. New blood was brought in to assist him to expedite UMNO and government policies in line with Malay aspirations<sup>95</sup>, causing a new rift in UMNO between the so-called 'New' and 'Old' order.

In the June 1972 General Assembly, the party was portrayed as united as never before<sup>96</sup>. However, some in Tun Razak's circle were not happy with Harun Idris, the Menteri Besar of Selangor. They convinced Tun Razak that Harun Idris was a maverick<sup>97</sup>, and from then on, Tun Razak waited for the right time to get rid of

<sup>93</sup> Born in Alor Star on December 20, 1925, he was educated at Sultan Abdul Hamid College before getting his MBBS degree from University of Malaya, Singapore in 1953. He joined the government medical service in 1954 for three years, before becoming a private practitioner in Alor Star. He was a member of Kesatuan Melayu Kedah, and the Saberkas associations both affiliated to UMNO. Mahathir automatically became a member of UMNO in 1946. In 1964, he won the Kota Setar Selatan Parliamentary constituency, but failed to retain the seat in the election of 1969. He was branded as 'ultra' in UMNO, and was expelled by Tunku in 1970. He was recalled by Tun Razak in 1972 as UMNO Supreme Council member, a Senator, to hold a top post in FAMA, and to Chair the Higher Education Committee before he was appointed Minister of Education. He was elected UMNO Vice President in 1975. In 1976, he was appointed as Deputy Prime Minister and was endorsed as Deputy President of the UMNO in 1978. He was sworn in as Malaysia's fourth Prime Minister on July 18, 1981, and took over the UMNO Presidentship at that year's General Assembly. See J. Victor Morais 1984, Mahathir.

<sup>94</sup> He was born into the Kelantan Royal family on 13 April 1937. After being educated at MCKK and Anderson School, Ipoh, he obtained his BSc (Econs.) from Queen's University, Belfast, and a Law degree from Lincoln's Inn, London. In 1962 he applied for UMNO membership, and was elected Head of the Ulu Kelantan UMNO Division. Subsequently he was appointed as the Secretary of the Kelantan UMNO State Liaison Committee, and sat in the UMNO Supreme Council. In 1967, he was the Head of the State Liaison Committee, and won a State Assembly seat in 1969. In 1971, he held the post UMNO Treasurer, and became a member of Parliament in 1974. He earned his reputation when he was given the task of leading the newly created governmental business corporations such as PERNAS, PETRONAS and Bumiputera Bank. He was called up to serve as Minister of Finance in March 1976 until July 1984. In UMNO, he was elected Vice President in July 1974 replacing Hussein Onn who became Deputy President. He retained the post until 1981. He lost to Musa Hitam for the Deputy Presidentship in 1981 and 1984. In 1987 he lost to Mahathir in the UMNO Presidency election. See Ranjit Gill 1986, Razaleigh., and Anon, *Mengapa Saya Tentang Mahathir: Tengku Razaleigh*. (Petaling Jaya: AZ Distributors, 1989).

<sup>95</sup> Diane K. Mauzy 1983. *Barisan Nasional*. p.40.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*, p.41.

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*, p.100. One high official believed that if Dato Harun was in a Vice-presidential position this time, he would contest for the deputy presidency next time. In fact, Harun Idris, it has been speculated, was responsible for the failure of Ghazali

him. The case of the 'Mohd. Ali and Joe Bugner', World Boxing championship match organised by Pemuda UMNO dragged Harun Idris into a legal battle in Court on a corruption charge. To send Harun Idris far away from the UMNO main stream, Tun Razak offered him an ambassadorial post, which he rejected. Tun Razak, in an effort to reduce the unwanted old elements, had formed an Anti Corruption Agency to expose 'corrupt' UMNO leaders. Other tactics included 'promotion' to 'higher' titular posts, such as Secretary General, Ambassador, Speaker of *Dewan Rakyat*, Deputy Speaker or President of *Dewan Negara*. Some remained silent after being appointed chairmen, board members in Government corporations or in national and multi-national firms. Indeed, the New Economic Policy could be considered as a gift for these written-off UMNO leaders.

By 1973, the situation in UMNO under the leadership of Tun Razak could be seen from the implications of a speech by Tun Dr Ismail. This can be translated:<sup>98</sup>

"...we must avoid the clique disease or 'factionalism', meaning one group crosses to the south, one to the east, and one to the west. 'Factionalism' is similar to 'warlordism' in China before the Communists took over power, when that country was divided into certain areas controlled by the warlords respectively; there was a General in control in the north, some controlled the south, others were in power in the east, and another General in power in the west.

In a big and influential party like UMNO, if factionalism or the clique disease were inflicted upon us, we should be inevitably divided.

Tun Dr Ismail's sudden death in that year did not give rise, however, to great intrigue and conflict in UMNO. Tun Razak placated the two senior UMNO Vice-Presidents "while quietly insisting on his choice of

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Shafie in the UMNO election for vice-presidency in the 1972 General Assembly. Harun was believed to have used the block vote of the Selangor delegation to ruin Ghazali's chances. Harun's personality and leadership was seen as strong in the eyes of the Malays. Harun's heroic image in the 13 May, 1969 event, and his influence in Pemuda was the main reason that convinced Tun Razak to slow down Harun's advance in the party. The cases of Bank Rakyat and Mohamed Ali and Joe Bugner's Boxing championship were used in order to oust him from politics, see Marwilis Haji Yusof, *Terbuang Tapi Terbilang*. (Selangor: Marwilis Publisher, 1987), p.41.

<sup>98</sup> A. Karim Haji Abdullah, *Amanat Tun Dr. Ismail*. (Temerloh: Pemuda UMNO Temerloh Timur, 1973), p.23.

Datuk Hussein Onn<sup>99</sup>, with barely a murmur from the party rank and file."<sup>100</sup> In fact, Tun Razak's political power never faded; the formation of a coalition government under the name of *Barisan Nasional* (the National Front), made him a most powerful Prime Minister. Indeed, Barisan Nasional provided Tun Razak with better means of executing his large scale political and socio-economic policies, such as The New Economic Policy, the National Education Policy, and other national policies including Tun Ismail's brain child 'ZOPFAN'-the conversion of the Southeast Asian region into a neutral zone. Within UMNO, the constitutional amendment of 1971 had given the Supreme Council decisive power over the UMNO structure; in fact Tun Razak had become the key decision-maker concerning UMNO policies, which were normally endorsed by the Supreme Council.

The 1975 UMNO General Assembly saw a decline in Tun Razak's leadership. His influence and power were challenged by the old guard and other groups in UMNO. Rumours became rife within the organization and spread through the nation, on the retirement of Tun Razak, who was thin and tired looking, while Dato Hussein Onn, his deputy, was recovering from a heart attack that would eventually shorten his service in government. Syed Jaafar Albar and Harun Idris stood for the post of Vice President, but Tun Razak broke with UMNO tradition by indirectly naming his candidates. Tun Razak knew that his decision and tactics would detract from his leadership but politically his persistence helped his team to win:<sup>101</sup>

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<sup>99</sup> He was born in Johor Bahru on 12th February 1922. After finishing his education at the English College in 1940, he joined the Johor Military Forces as a cadet officer and was sent to Dehra Dunn Military Academy in India. In 1945 Capt. Hussein Onn was appointed as the Commandant of the Johor Police Depot, and in 1946, became a member of his father's *Pergerakan Melayu Semenanjung* Johor, then, one of UMNO's affiliated associations. In 1949, he was the first Ketua Pemuda UMNO, and was then appointed as UMNO Secretary General. He joined his father's IMP in 1952, then undertook further study in Law at London's Lincoln Inn. He rejoined UMNO in 1968 after being persuaded to do so by Tun Razak, his brother-in-law. In 1969, he became an MP for Johor Bahru constituency. He was Minister of Education and a member of the Supreme Council in 1970 and was elected to be UMNO Vice-President in 1972. He was appointed Deputy Prime Minister in 1973, then was elevated to Deputy President of UMNO. He became the acting President on January 15, 1976, and the President in 1978. In 1981, he handed over the government and UMNO leadership to Dr. Mahathir. After being involved in the tussle between UMNO Baru and Semangat 46, he underwent a heart operation in Seaton Medical Centre, San Francisco USA, and died at the age of 68 on 29 May 1990.

<sup>100</sup> Diane K. Mauzy 1983, *Barisan Nasional*, p.79.

<sup>101</sup> Fan Yew Ten, *The UMNO Drama: Power Struggle in Malaysia* (Kuala Lumpur: Egret Publication, 1989), p.69.

"Ghaffar Baba obtained 838 votes, followed by Tunku Razaleigh with 642 votes and Dr Mahathir with 474 votes. Dato Harun Idris and Tan Sri Jaafar Albar obtained 427 and 374 votes respectively. Tun Razak's people had also won overwhelmingly in the Supreme Council election. 16 out of the 20 incumbents were re-elected; only one of seven UMNO Youth candidates was voted in..."

Tun Razak's personality and credibility began to be questioned by UMNO members, and rumours of a grand design to topple him spread, using character assassination and deliberate slander. The old order in UMNO also spread rumours that Tun Razak was influenced by a so-called Communist element, capitalizing on the diplomatic relations with China. The appointment of Abdullah Ahmad as Tun Razak's Political Secretary, and Abdullah Majid as Deputy Minister and Parliamentary Secretary in the Prime Minister's Department were signalled as evidence of this. Resentment towards the growing socialist influence surrounding Tun Razak was great. Senu Abdul Rahman as Secretary General felt embarrassed when his President bypassed him and relied on Khalil Akasah, the UMNO Executive Secretary. These socialist elements derived their political influence almost entirely from their closeness to the Prime Minister and his confidence in them.<sup>102</sup>

On 14 January 1976, Tun Razak died of leukaemia in London, and Dato' Hussein Onn became a reluctant Prime Minister on 15 January.. The sudden death of Tun Razak left UMNO with unresolved party problems, and set the agenda for a leadership conflict. Tun Razak's inner circle of advisers was left in a vulnerable position and came under attack at the UMNO Youth meeting which referred to the former leader as a communist threat within UMNO.

*Dato Hussein Onn the fourth UMNO President: a reluctant Prime Minister (1975-1981).*

Hussein Onn then inherited UMNO's problems. He himself continued to breach the so-called 'traditions' of the organization. He appointed Dr Mahathir as his Deputy Prime Minister. This appointment came as a surprise to UMNO members. A

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<sup>102</sup> Harold Crouch, Lee Kam Hing and Michael Ong, *Malaysia Politics and The 1978 Election* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1980), p.21.

disappointed Ghafar Baba, the most senior UMNO Vice President since 1962, refused to join Hussein Onn's new cabinet. To protect his political position, Ghafar Baba remained Secretary-General of the Barisan Nasional, and continued to 'support' the party leadership.

Hussein Onn was confronted by Harun Idris who embarked on a nation-wide campaign to rally his supporters, attacking the party leadership. Certain sources claimed at the time that Hussein Onn was influenced by some other personality in UMNO<sup>103</sup> to take action against Harun Idris. So on March 18, 1976 Hussein Onn called an emergency meeting of the UMNO Supreme Council which pressed Harun Idris to resign from the party and government, threatening expulsion if he refused. Hussein Onn also called all Selangor UMNO State Assemblymen up for a briefing at Fraser's Hill in order to legally expel Harun Idris as Menteri Besar of Selangor. However, the expulsion of Harun Idris from UMNO was not well received among some UMNO members, for different causes and reasons.

The UMNO Youth Assembly of 1976, urged the Supreme Council to reinstate him as an UMNO member. Harun Idris supporters also received sympathy from the old guard and Tunku Abdul Rahman. They managed to place Syed Jaafar Albar, known as *Singa UMNO* (The Lion of UMNO), who was then over sixty years old, as the Head of UMNO Youth. Moreover, Harun's case was also used by some UMNO personalities with vested interests to attack their opponents within the organization.<sup>104</sup>

Dato Harun was portrayed as being victimised by those alleged communist elements in the UMNO and the government. Finally, on November 3, 1976, six politicians were arrested under the Internal Security Act (ISA) for alleged communist involvement, including Abdullah Ahmad and Abdullah Majid, Deputy Ministers in Dato Hussein Onn's cabinet. Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie, the Minister of Home Affairs,

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<sup>103</sup> Yusof Harun, "Senu: Harun Jadi PM" in *Dallog Dengan Pemimpin*. (Kuala Lumpur: Penerbitan Pena, 1986), p.84.

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*, p.22.

came into the limelight of UMNO through the arrest of Abdullah Ahmad and Abdullah Majid. The "communists" in UMNO became his means of making a final bid for power in party elections.

Another attempt was made by the UMNO old guard to discredit the Hussein Onn leadership, half of whose presidency was taken up in tackling Harun Idris's political manoeuvres. In the 1978 General Assembly, with the support of Dato Harun's followers, the old guard backed Haji Sulaiman Palastine, who was also the UMNO Information Chief, as the candidate for the UMNO Presidency, being nominated by Sungai Besi Division. In the election, Dato' Hussein Onn retained the post with 898 votes, while Haji Sulaiman Palastine secured only 250 votes. The pattern of votes, however implied that the leadership of Dato' Hussein Onn, was damaged. On medical grounds Hussein Onn became increasingly reluctant to lengthen his leadership of UMNO and the Government.

On 25 June 1981, the General Assembly witnessed a change of power in UMNO from Hussein Onn to Dr.Mahathir. On 17 July, the nation witnessed the ceremonial end of Tun Hussein Onn's period of government. From that day, Dr Mahathir designed a new style of leadership, inheriting and managing existing UMNO conflicts, but also creating a new political culture in UMNO.

It could be concluded that from being a mass political party, UMNO was transformed into a direct membership organization in 1949. Reorganization in 1955 and 1960 created the permanent structure of UMNO, in which the UMNO President in the name of the Supreme Council became a powerful leader. Power shifted from state to national level and a power struggle developed at Supreme Council level. However, UMNO leaders relied on the rural Malays who formed the basis of UMNO grassroots support. In terms of political participation, they could be classified into three types: electors, supporters, and party workers. UMNO enjoyed general Malay support until the formation of IMP and PAS. It was the struggle for independence

that allowed UMNO to succeed in controlling the country's political system and shaping its political culture.

The party structure, as we have said, normally transformed itself into an election machine during the election campaigns. The central committee planned the general strategy including the publishing of the party manifesto, and decided on the candidature for the party. The state level recommended the party candidates and coordinated the whole election machine in the state, with the Chairman of the State Liaison Committee becoming the Director of the campaign. He was assisted by a task force, comprising representatives from the parties in the Barisan Nasional alliance. However, tactics were applied differently according to the constituencies; therefore the UMNO Division which was transformed into a Regional Election Action Committee played a vital role in ensuring that UMNO would win in the elections. The most important area was at the village level, where the UMNO Branch was transformed into an election machine called *Jawatankuasa Peti Undi*. Its sub-committee called Ten Houses Committee functioned to control votes for UMNO, while the group of Perayu Undi convinced the fence sitters and those who were inclined to support the opposition parties.

UMNO has been successful in leading the Alliance party since the election of 1955. Dato Onn Jaafar left UMNO in 1951, after his vision was rejected by the UMNO Members. The Tunku led UMNO from 1951 to 1970, confronted by internal problems on the issues of Merdeka with non-Malays, his pessimistic beliefs concerning the advancement of the Malays in business and industry, and also his stand on national education and language policies. These problems led to the poor performance of UMNO in the General Election of May 1969. A silent coup d'etat after May 13, marked the end of the Tunku's leadership. The Malays relied on Tun Razak to expedite Malay development in economic, and socio-political aspects. Therefore, Tun Razak inherited the presidency of UMNO uncontested, compared to the Tunku in 1951, after Dato Onn Jaafar's resignation in the previous year.

Conflict in UMNO developed during the Tunku's era, his policies were confronted by the 'ultras' and Malay intellectuals, who supported Tun Razak. But Tun Razak then was criticised when he called Hussein Onn to serve in his cabinet as Minister of Education. Tun Razak also broke with party tradition by passing over senior Vice Presidents by appointing Hussein Onn as Deputy Prime Minister and acting Deputy President of UMNO in 1973, when Tun Dr Ismail died, and by indicating his favourites, Ghafar Baba, Tengku Razaleigh and Dr Mahathir in the 1975 General Assembly. The old order group supported Syed Jaafar Albar and Harun Idris, who opposed Tun Razak's move. This group began an attack on Tun Razak's leadership, including the "communist element" in the party and government, by whom Harun Idris had been victimised. Hussein Onn, who was a reluctant Prime Minister, faced continuing internal conflict in UMNO. He expelled Harun Idris from the party and government, which caused him to be challenged by Sulaiman Palastine in the 1978 party election. When he chose Dr Mahathir as his deputy, more discontent developed in UMNO. Therefore, Dr Mahathir, who felt he understood the party's main problems, was ready to change and develop a new political culture for the Malays, UMNO and the government. He was confronted by the challenge of the modernization of the Malays, the emergence of a new Malay middle class, and the outgrowth of the New Economic Policy and National Education Policy and the rising tide of Islam. These developments were to influence changes in UMNO.



## Chapter Three

### Modernity and Tradition: *The Conflict of Interests in UMNO.*

In this chapter the development of, and changes in, the values of UMNO are discussed. Special emphasis will be given to political modernization, its impact on the party and how it helped the emergence of new Malay elites. The part played by both the government's stress on education as a social mobilizing agent<sup>1</sup> and economic development in the process of political modernization<sup>2</sup>, will be considered.

The changes involved in psychological modernization affect four areas of mental functioning: ego structures, attitudes, cognition (or handling information), and behavior<sup>3</sup>. Emphasis will be given to political corruption<sup>4</sup>, as it is also one of the consequences of modernization, and had an impact on political development in UMNO. How public policies shape and direct the modernization process will also be looked at, and how development has clearly changed the value system contained in Malay political culture.

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<sup>1</sup> Deutsch argues that social mobilization is an overall process of change that happens in certain areas of a country which is moving from a traditional to a modern state. Old values are eroded and new patterns of socialization and behavior become evident. Social mobilization changes attitudes, values, social expectations from traditional environment to a situation that exposes them to open communication with new life styles linked to urbanization and industrialization. Economic development provides material potential and creates materialistic attitudes. Deutsch suggests that there are three main characteristics of modernization of political life namely: enforcement of new values; differentiation and specialization of political institutions; and increasing political participation. These three variables are interrelated, and influence each other. Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," *The American Political Science Review*, LV, 3 (September 1961), pp.493-514.

<sup>2</sup> This concept is adapted from S.P. Huntington's, "Political Development and Political Decay," *World Politics*, XVII,3 (1965), and *Political Order in Changing Societies*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968). He envisages a relationship between political development and political decay. There are two variables that decide political development; the scope of support and level of institutionalization..

<sup>3</sup> The following works have been used in analysing change: Alex Ankeles and David H. Smith, *Becoming Modern: Individual Change in Six Developing Countries* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard, 1974); Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society* (Glencoe, Ill: Free Press, 1958); David McClelland, *The Achieving Society* (New York: Free Press, 1967); Joseph A. Kahl, *Measurement of Modernism: A Study of Values in Brazil and Mexico* (Austin, Texas: 1968, Latin America Monograph No.12; Kenneth S. Sherrill, "The Attitude of Modernity," *Comparative Politics* 1 (2) (January 1969), pp.184-210.

<sup>4</sup> The definition of political corruption is based on James C. Scott, *Comparative Political Corruption*, (Englewood Cliff, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 1972). As a deviation from certain standards of behaviour, the emphasis will be given to top-heavy corruption. Scott identifies structural factors, structural change and community values as causes of corruption. Corruption has also been taken as influence from a political perspective, since corruption is the uninstitutionalized influence of wealth on a political system. The core processes of political corruption are *political goods* (money, information, permits, licences, *transaction relationships* (bribery, nepotism), political resources, and individual office holders.

Modernization and commercialization erode the institutions of group solidarity, mutual help and cooperation, which were previously the norm and ideology of the community. The institution of *Kerah, Hantar serah, Berderau, Meminjam, Gotong royong* and *Kenduri* have been phased out in the case of the Malays, as they are transformed from community-oriented to individual-oriented<sup>5</sup> persons.

### **The May 13 Incident: a Turning Point.**

The May 13 incident in 1969<sup>6</sup> marked a turning point in Malay political thinking in that it became clear that strengthening political power is not secured without 'control' over both power and the economy. The Tunku's idea of a *quid pro quo* was no longer practical since the MCA and the Chinese community wanted a bigger share of political power. The non-Malays, especially the Chinese, were, indeed using the 'soft-leadership' of the Tunku to maintain the myth that the Malays, who were dependent on the government, were not capable in business and commerce<sup>7</sup>. The Malays also felt that Chinese obstacles and resistance to implementing public policy such as the National Language Act, the National Education Policy, and rural development, had always been a constant factor. Therefore, the May 13th incident, represented in fact, a 'volcano' that exploded because of rising dissatisfaction among the major ethnic groups. The Malays, felt that their tradition of '*budi*' (soft, gentle, generous and courteous) had been challenged by the Chinese since 1945. It was believed that this happened in almost every General Election, and also whenever the government tried to introduce new policy.

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<sup>5</sup> Wan Hashim Wan Teh, "The Decline of Traditional Institutions in a Malay Peasant Community," *Akademika*, XI, (July 1977), pp.31-62.

<sup>6</sup> See Felix V. Gagliano, *Communal Violence in Malaysia 1969: the Political Aftermath* (Ohio, Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1970).

<sup>7</sup> This was reflected in Tunku's cabinet in which MCA leaders always held the posts of Finance Minister, and Minister of Commerce and Industry. UMNO leaders took over these ministerial posts after 1970. Hussein Onn and Tengku Razaleigh were among the earlier Ministers of Finance. Later it was held by Daim Zainuddin (1984-1990), and at present is held by Anwar Ibrahim (since March 1990). MCA stated the change went against the *Perikatan* tradition.

"The May 1969 riots have been apotheosized as a symbol and a strong reminder of Malay control over the apparatus of coercion and its potential for development if Malays continued to be economically backward relative to the non-Malays. Its potency for quelling non-Malay demands for termination of Malay privilege has been realised by later generations of leaders fighting to hang onto their position. Support from the Malay masses not only served to promote the change in leadership but also strengthened their hand during negotiations with non-Malay fractions of the capitalist class".<sup>8</sup>

Though the size of the Malay elite was still small in 1969, it managed to propel changes in government policies towards Malay political and socio-economic development. The Parliamentary system before 1969 seemed to represent an accommodation to Chinese political pressure. The loss of MCA seats reflected the protest of the urban Chinese towards the failure of the MCA to fight for their interests, while the success of PAS in denying a few seats to UMNO, was a warning concerning UMNO's compromising attitude towards the Chinese. This was a manifestation of Malay frustration on the execution of policies and programmes for Malay development in socio-economic aspects.

The establishment of the National Operations Council in 1969, following the suspension of parliamentary rule, accelerated Malay development, especially in education and economics.

### *Education.*

After 1970, a carefully planned and implemented national education programme was introduced by the government in order to foster vertical socio-economic mobility among the Malays. In fact, this had been one of the promises made by Malay political leaders who led the movement for independence. The Malays felt that, though the Independence constitution of 1957 was generally "a political victory"<sup>9</sup> for the Malays, it was not fully executed, in comparison to the

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<sup>8</sup> Fatimah Halim, "The Transformation of the Malaysian State", *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, XX (1), 1990, p.72.

<sup>9</sup> Yshimitsui Takei, John C.Bock, and Bruce Saunders, *Educational Sponsorship By Ethnicity: A Preliminary Analysis of the West Malaysia Experience* (Athen, Ohio: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1973), p.9. The authors proposed that this was a victory, as Malay rulers were retained as titular heads of the individual states and the nation as a whole, Islam was elevated to the position of a national religion and within ten years after independence the Malay language

effect of the *jus soli* citizenship for the non-Malays. Even up to 1969, Article 153, clause 2 of the Federal Constitution pertaining to Malay privilege, was the expression of a hope rather than a reality. That clause empowered the Yang Di Pertuan Agong (the Head of State) to:<sup>10</sup>

"... safeguard the special position of the Malays and to ensure the reservation for the Malays of such proportion as may be deemed reasonable of positions in the public service (other than the public service of a state) and of scholarships, exhibitions and other similar educational or training privileges or special facilities given or accorded by the Federal Government -and, when any permit or licence for operation of any trade or business is required by federal law, then subject to the provisions of that law and this Article, of such permits and licences."

There were three main steps<sup>11</sup> taken by the government to develop the Malays through the education system namely; *structural changes*, *examination changes*, and *economic assistance* or the strategy of educational sponsorship on the basis of ethnicity<sup>12</sup>. The education system was geared towards mobilizing the Malays in pursuit of the goal of reducing economic disparities between Malays and Chinese. Tertiary education, which functions as a source of modern elites, was also given priority after being neglected during the colonial and the immediate post independence eras. Table II shows the imbalance in the number of students at the University of Malaya, the only university functioning before 1969.

#### 1. *Structural Changes.*

In reorganising the occupational parity between the Malays and the Chinese, a number of structural changes in the education system were devised. The first of these was the introduction of the 'National School' -the secondary and primary school which uses the Malay language, the national language, as the medium of instruction.

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was supposed to become the country's sole official language. The most important victory was Article 153, Clause 2 relating to the special position of the Malays.

<sup>10</sup> K.J.Ratnam, *Communalism and the Political Process in Malaya* (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1965), pp.110-111.

<sup>11</sup> Yoshimitsui Takei et.al 1973, *Educational Sponsorship*. pp. 10-11.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., p 3, and 10-11. This strategy was designed not only to remove discrimination, but to reverse patterns of social stratification in a given society.

Concurrently, in 1958, the government also provided the 'remove class' -a transition class for acclimatizing students from National, Chinese and Tamil primary schools, to English medium secondary schools. The concept of 'remove class', in fact, replaced the concept of 'Special Malay Class' - another educational experiment which was introduced after the Second World War<sup>13</sup>.

Table II

*The Number of Students at the University of Malaya by race within each faculty, for the Year 1967-1968.*

Faculty	Chinese	Malays	Indian	others
Agric.	126 63.37%	60 29.70%	9 4.45%	5 2.48%
Arts	300 37.53%	966 45.31%	230 10.79%	136 6.37%
Engin	293 89.6%	11 3.37%	14 4.28%	9 2.75%
Science	721 82.12%	84 9.57%	39 4.47%	34 7.17%
Medical	273 70.18%	70 17.99%	27 6.94%	19 4.89%
Education	127 59.07%	51 23.72%	28 13.02%	9 4.19%
Economics	217 52.04%	159 38.13%	30 7.19%	11 2.64%
Total no.	2059	1401	377	223

Source: Based on Sufian Hashim 1975, pp.314-8

Before 1969, special boarding schools exclusively for Malay medium students were established in major town areas, such as Sekolah Alam Shah in Kuala Lumpur

<sup>13</sup> Tham Seong Chee, *Malay and Modernization: A Sociological Interpretation* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1977), p.100.

and Sekolah Sultan Abdul Halim, Jitra, Kedah. Sekolah Tuanku Abdul Rahman Ipoh catered for Malay boys, while Sekolah Tun Fatimah Johor Bahru, and Sekolah Tunku Khursiah Seremban admitted English-medium Malay girl students. Sekolah Menengah Sri Puteri of Jalan Kolam Air, Kuala Lumpur became a boarding school for special academically selected Malay girls. Since then, the Malay College in Kuala Kangsar has also been an open boarding school for selected Malay male students from all social strata. The Royal Military College became another prestige education institution that provided leaders for Malaysian society. These exclusive boarding schools were also considered as the socializing centre for intellectually promising students from rural areas.

It was later realised, that not enough Malays were getting into university<sup>14</sup>. Until 1966, the annual enrolment of Malay students at the University of Malaya, the only tertiary institution at that time, was not great.

Another attempt to guide more Malays into professional areas took place with the introduction of a new concept of Science Secondary School and MARA Junior Science Colleges. Most of the products of these educational innovations were sent on to further study abroad, especially to the United Kingdom and North America.

In the meantime, in response to political pressure to provide mobility in education, and at the same time to implement the national language as the medium of instruction at tertiary level, the government established two universities in 1969 and 1970 respectively; the Science University in Pulau Pinang<sup>15</sup>, and the National University in Kuala Lumpur. This was then followed by the up-grading of the Technical College to the Technology University of Malaysia, and the Agricultural

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<sup>14</sup> Tun Mohamed Suffian bin Hashim. *An Introduction to the Constitution of Malaysia* (2nd. edn., Kuala Lumpur: Government Printers, 1976), p.315.

<sup>15</sup> In April 1969 Profesor Hamzah Sendut, Vice-Chancellor-Designate set up the University of Penang. Its first intake of 57 students matriculated in June. The University was officially founded on 4 October 1971, when the incorporation order was signed by the Minister of Education. Its name was changed to the Science University of Malaysia in April 1972, see Prof. Sharom Ahmat (ed), *Universiti Sains Malaysia: The First Ten Years 1969 - 1979* (P.Pinang: Universiti Sains Malaysia), 1979, pp.1-17.

College to the University of Agriculture. The RIDA College<sup>16</sup>, which was formed to produce Malay professionals was also reorganised, in order to help the government to produce more Malay technocrats. The RIDA College was renamed the MARA Institute of Technology.

In expediting the implementation of the National Education Policy, a number of Teacher Training Colleges were also established. These developments assisted the Malays to enter the teaching profession. Malay youth was also encouraged to enter vocational and technical skills institutes; vocational Secondary Schools, and Polytechnic institutions were also established to cater for this.

Redefinition of the specific aims of education occurred in 1971 to meet the objectives of the Second Malaysia Plan.<sup>17</sup> This redefinition of education policy gave the Malays opportunities to develop their ability in the fields of Science and technology. To make this possible, ten pilot science secondary schools were launched for 1,200 Malay students in 1971. These schools were again boarding schools that formed another source of Malay professionals, most of whom were later sponsored in order to pursue their tertiary education abroad.

The government also planned to enlarge the enrolment in tertiary education in local and overseas institutions.<sup>18</sup> By 1985, 13,475 Bumiputera students were trained at certificate level, and 226 of this number graduated from institutions overseas. The figures at Diploma level were 27,045, (2,100 of them trained overseas). Bumiputera degree holders in 1985 were estimated at 29,875, including 6,034 who graduated from various institutions overseas. In 1980 the number had been 5,194 as compared to

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<sup>16</sup> Dewan Latihan RIDA (The Rural Industrial Development Authority), forerunner to ITM was formed in 1956, as an experimental centre providing short-courses in commerce and cottage industries to 25 English-educated rural Malay youths. In 1972/73, ITM provided education for more than 3,500 students in an array of 56 professional, technical and scientific courses. By the 1980's, almost all states in Malaysia had an ITM branch campus. See *Director's Review: MARA Institute of Technology July 1972 to June 1973* (Shah Alam: ITM, 1973).

<sup>17</sup> Among the aims were included (i) the orientation and expansion of education and training programmes towards meeting the manpower needs of the country, and (ii) the improvement of the quality of education in order to build a progressive society oriented towards modern science and technology. Francis Wong Hoy Kee and Paul Chang Min Phang, *The Changing Pattern of Teacher Education in Malaysia* (Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann Educational Books, 1975), p.94.

<sup>18</sup> *The Mid-Term Review of the Fifth Malaysia Plan, 1986-1990* (Kuala Lumpur: National Printing Department, 1989), pp.276-278.

11,538 Chinese and 2,676 Indians<sup>19</sup>. The enrolment of Bumiputeras abroad had increased to 14,531 by 1986. An increase of 86.8% was expected between 1986-1988, and a decrease of ten percent between 1988-1990<sup>20</sup>.

Abroad, the environment and new social phenomena began to have a socializing effect on Malay students. Their political attitudes could be divided into three types: activist, conformist, and apathetic. In fact, while many continued to sustain the Malay and Islamic tradition, the adoption of western culture influenced the patterns of social life among some Malay students abroad.<sup>21</sup>

## *2. Economic Assistance.*

Article 153 of the constitution was not effectively implemented as a consequence of the immediate execution of *jus soli* citizenship for the non-Malays<sup>22</sup>. Clause (2) of the article ensured the reservation of scholarships, exhibitions and other similar educational and training privileges or special facilities for the Malays, who were defined as *Bumiputera*. The National Operations Council realised that in the year 1959-1960, out of 332 students at the university of Malaya there were only 62 Malays, and only 358 Malays out of 1,736 students in 1965. By

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<sup>19</sup> The Fourth Malaysia Plan 1981-1985 (Kuala Lumpur: National Printing Department, 1981), p.352, table 21.3.

<sup>20</sup> The Mid-Term Review. p.278.

<sup>21</sup> See Chapter IV on the students role in Malay politics.

<sup>22</sup> During the period of 1957-1970, a total of 1,743,051 non-Malays became citizens by registration and another 15,773 by naturalization. One of the most important decisions made by the non-Malay leaders concerned the recognition of the weakness of the Malay community in the economic field, and the need, in the interests of national unity, to remove that weakness, for in Malaysia poverty is a national problem rather than merely a Malay problem. Article 153 was written into the constitution with this in mind. Tun Mohammed Sufian Hashim *An Introduction to the Constitution of Malaysia*. (2nd edn. Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, 1976), pp.286-288.



the session of 1968-69, out of 5,566 students there were still only 1,825 Malays<sup>23</sup>, whereas the proportion of Malays in the whole population was more than 50%<sup>24</sup>. In fact, in 1970, Malays represented 52.7% of a 9.1 million total population, which then increased to 55.3% in the census of 1980<sup>25</sup>. The average Malay annual growth in the birth-rate between 1957-1970 was 3.1%, compared to 2.3% for non-Malays. The publishing of a white paper *Towards National Harmony* and the enforcement of the Constitution (Amendment) Act 1971 provided an opportunity for more Malays and other Bumiputera to pursue their secondary and tertiary education.

With government scholarships, bursaries and other forms of financial assistance being made available, more Malays were able to transform themselves, thus hoping to expedite the process of Malay modernization and that of other Bumiputera.. By 1973, the Malaysian Administrative and Diplomatic Service and States Civil Service had changed. From being exclusively aristocratic and urban Malay-educated family domains, they opened their doors to the young rural-educated Malays, who began to form a major proportion of the administrative officers of this elite service, which had been an important element during the colonial era and after. Some of them joined government corporations and also banking and financial institutions. This group of Malay intelligentsia formed a new urban Malay middle class.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> Ibid., p.314.

<sup>24</sup> The estimated population between the census of 1957-1966 as follows:

Year	Malays	Chinese	Indian/Paki'	others
1957	3.1	2.3	707,108	112,420
1959	3.3	2.4	751,491	120,796
1961	3.5	2.6	796,880	129,519
1963	3.8	2.8	843,952	148,101
1966	4.1	3.0	919,616	176,394

source: Vital Statistics West Malaysia, 1966, p.3.

<sup>25</sup> Khoo Teik Huat, 1980 *Population and Housing Census of Malaysia: General Report of the Population Census*, vol.1, (Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Perangkaan Malaysia, 1983), pp.17-18.

<sup>26</sup> For a discussion of the Urban Malay see pp 111-118 of this chapter.

*The New Economic Policy.*

In 1971, the government launched a public policy that would serve to correct racial imbalance in the economy. This was known as the New Economic Policy, whose aims were stipulated in the Second Malaysia Plan 1971-1975 as:<sup>27</sup>

*(1) To reduce and eventually eradicate poverty by raising income levels and increasing employment opportunities for all Malaysians, irrespective of race;*

*(2) To accelerate the process of restructuring Malaysian society to correct imbalances, so as to reduce and eventually eliminate the identification of race with economic function,*

The imbalance implied that the structure of the colonial economy had continued in the post-independence era without any major changes. Accordingly, the Plan stated its intention of creating a specifically Malay commercial and industrial community. By the early 1980's, the target of increasing the percentage of Malay professionals and technical workers was being met. However, at managerial level, the results were less successful<sup>28</sup>.

The opportunities created by the New Economic Policy were not only seized by the Malay elite and selected numbers of Malay masses, but also by UMNO itself, which capitalised on the chance to transform the party from a financially poor to a wealthy one, becoming a point of attraction for potential leaders of the party.

The New Economic Policy was actually intended to create a viable Malay middle class and to ensure a 30% Malay participation in equity and employment in all sectors of the economy by 1990. Ideologically, it has also served as a tool for solving the problem of rural poverty and, more specifically, the exclusion of the Malay masses from the capitalist sector.<sup>29</sup> In reality, however, the policy is used to justify government intervention in the area of labour organizations and

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<sup>27</sup> Second Malaysia Plan 1971-75 (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, 1971), p.2.

<sup>28</sup> R.S.Milne and Diane K.Mauzy, *Malaysia: Tradition, Modernity, and Islam* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1986), p.137.

<sup>29</sup> Fatimah Halim 1990, *Transformation of Malaysian Society*, p.72.

capital restructuring, both fundamental prerogatives of a capitalist function.<sup>30</sup>

*UMNO's Business Empire.*

Until 1969, UMNO depended on Chinese businessmen, most of whom were closely aligned to the MCA, to finance the Alliance party in General Elections.<sup>31</sup> This made UMNO subservient to the MCA's demands for seats, and other Chinese political pressures.<sup>32</sup> While blaming the MCA as the party of *tawkey* (businessman), UMNO began the tradition of appointing a few UMNO Supreme Council members as active or sleeping partners in the *tawkey's* business ventures, The partnership scheme becoming popularly known as *Ali-Baba* ventures<sup>33</sup>. However, some UMNO leaders also started businesses which dealt with government tenders and contracts.

The Tunku's idea was that the Chinese were interested in business and the acquisition of wealth, in contrast to the Malays who wished to become civil servants<sup>34</sup>. The above situation changed when Tun Razak took over UMNO's leadership. Nevertheless, according to Daim Zainuddin, the UMNO Treasurer and formerly also the

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<sup>30</sup> Ibid. This was done by the wholesale acquisition of major companies, initially in the plantation and tin mining sector, followed by the financial sector; and then pressure on companies to restructure their equity to comply with NEP requirements, and by the rapid establishment of new state enterprises preferably in joint ventures, with multinational firms especially in the fast-moving industrial sector.

<sup>31</sup> See Heng Peng Koon, *Chinese Politics in Malaysia: A History of the Malaysian Chinese Association* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 164-68.

<sup>32</sup> The MCA (The Malaysian Chinese Association) was formed in 1949 as a voluntary organization, making money through its Welfare Lottery Scheme in order to subsidize the Chinese settlers of New Villages. Leadership of the MCA was controlled by Chinese businessmen who transformed the MCA into a political party which accumulated their assets and finance through assorted business ventures. KSM (Koperasi Serbaguna Malaysia) and MPH (Multipurpose Holding) have been their business arms.

<sup>33</sup> Dr.Syed Hussein Alatas, *Siapa Yang Salah: Sekitar revolusi Mental dan Peribadi Melayu* (3rd pm., Singapore: Pustaka Nasional, 1974), p.51. See also Syed Husin Ali, *Malay Peasant Society and Leadership* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1975), p.35. It was ironic that although some of UMNO leaders managed to project their image as Malay extremists, in actual fact, they had an alliance with non-Malays who had business interests through a well known system of business called 'Ali-Baba'. Ali referred to the Malay who constitutionally had privileges in seizing opportunities to get licences, permits and contracts from government. A lack of capital made them 'sell' their rights of operating those businesses to Chinese 'lawkey' who are referred to as Baba. Ali and Baba became quite interdependent. See also Jomo K.Sundram, *A Question of Class: Capital, the State, and Uneven Development in Malaya* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1988), p.266.

<sup>34</sup> Mahathir Mohammed 1982. *Malay Dilemma*. p.15.

Finance Minister<sup>35</sup>:

"UMNO has been involved in business for a long time- from the time of the first prime minister- because you need funds to run the party and to fight the election. Nothing is free. Either you do it openly, as UMNO does now, or you use nominees, as in the past. UMNO has chosen to do it in an open manner. In the past we never declared that Fleet was a nominee, but by the time Dr Mahathir became prime minister, all nominee companies were known."

UMNO's involvement in major business began when Fleet Holdings was formed in 1972<sup>36</sup> by Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah, the UMNO Treasurer, under the direction of Tun Abdul Razak, the President, with the intention of raising cash for the party. Originally, the Fleet group aimed at controlling the Straits Times, the oldest and the largest newspaper in Malaysia. By the end of Tengku Razaleigh's stewardship, the Fleet Group had substantial holdings in 23 Malaysian corporations and was making profits<sup>37</sup>. The Putera World Trade Centre has often been portrayed as reflecting UMNO's success in business, sheltering the UMNO headquarters and generating a lot of pride among UMNO members.<sup>38</sup>

Daim Zainuddin was appointed Director of the Fleet Group and served as its group chairman until 1984 when he was appointed Finance Minister.<sup>39</sup>

"Many of the companies involved in the post-Razaleigh round of takeovers were indirectly linked with Daim's family or tied to his

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<sup>35</sup> See the interview with Daim Zainuddin in *Far Eastern Economic Review*. 5 July 1990, p.50

<sup>36</sup> A letter from Hajjah Marina Yusoff to Dato Seri Dr Mahathir Mohammed, the UMNO President, dated April 14, 1987. For further discussion of UMNO in business, see Edmund Terence Gomez, *Politics in Business: UMNO's Corporate Investments* (Kuala Lumpur: Forum, 1990).

<sup>37</sup> In 1983, Tengku Razaleigh handed over the Fleet Group to Daim as new Treasurer of UMNO, with assets valued at MS500 millions, and liabilities at MS56 million. See also Dough Tsuruoka. "Fleet's stormy voyage." in *Far Eastern Economic Review*. 5 July 1990, p.52-53.

<sup>38</sup> The UMNO complex was officially opened on 26 September 1985. This complex, which consists of a multi story office building named after the first UMNO President, Menara Dato Onn; an Assembly hall, meeting rooms, shop units, exhibition hall, a restaurant, and a multi-story international hotel. The UMNO complex cost MS400 million, and is one of the notable buildings and landmarks in Kuala Lumpur city.

<sup>39</sup> Mohd Desa Pachi, an accountant then took over the chairmanship of the Fleet Group. However, Daim Zainuddin's influence remained. Among Daim's men in the group was Ahmad Sebi Abu Bakar, who was appointed to control the mainstream media of the New Straits Times group. He later controlled Syarikat Televisyen Malaysia, the only private Television broadcasting company (TV3), which was subsidiary of the Fleet Group. Ahmad Sebi relinquished his post after the 'Lalang Operation'(1987). He also sat on a few boards of companies. The TV3 is at present under the command of Mohd Nor Azam, former Political Secretary to Prime Minister.



activities as manager of the Urban Development Authority-owned Peremba from 1979-84." <sup>40</sup>

It is important to note that the mainstream news papers, *The New Straits Times* (an English-language daily), *Berita Harian* (a Malay-language daily), and *Shin Min Daily News* a Chinese-language daily have been under the umbrella of the Fleet Group,<sup>41</sup> and played an important role in UMNO power struggles. Moreover, they have also given strong backing to UMNO. The Utusan Melayu Group was another UMNO controlled mainstream media group which published Utusan Melayu, Utusan Malaysia, Utusan Zaman and various popular magazines.<sup>42</sup>

The UMNO business empire was considered not only as the party's financial source, but also as a means of attracting support from the business world for UMNO's political leaders, so that they could advance their political careers.<sup>43</sup> Moreover, one of the consequences of the New Economic Policy was the emergence of political business groups who brought changes to UMNO's tradition.

### *The Mental Revolution*

In 1968, UMNO Youth launched a programme called "*Revolusi Mental*" or Mental Revolution. Its aim was to change the way of thinking, the world view and attitudes of the Malays to comply with the current situation that required them to be more dynamic in striving for progress in all aspects of life<sup>44</sup>.

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<sup>40</sup> Far Eastern Economic Review. 5 July 1990, p.52..

<sup>41</sup> E.T.Gomez 1990, *UMNO's Corporate Investments*, pp.62-63.

<sup>42</sup> See chapter VI for further discussion of the role of the mass media in the UMNO conflict 1987.

<sup>43</sup> However, when Daim Zainuddin resigned as Finance Minister on 15 March 1991, he said that UMNO had no business connections, "all the party assets are with the Official Assignee. Renong is not owned by UMNO. As UMNO Treasurer, I have nothing to do with Renong. It is only some people's assumption and impression that UMNO is in control of Renong." The party had no shares at that time. In fact, all its shares had been sold. The Official Assignee had so far collected more than S200 million from the sale of shares alone. The United Engineers Shares, for example were disposed of at a price of \$7.10 per unit. Of the Putra World Trade Centre building, he said "if we can prove that more than 51 percent of UMNO Baru members are members of the previous UMNO, then the assets of UMNO will go to UMNO Baru." Ironically he recapitulated that "Because the party forms the Government, the party should not be involved in business." When he was asked if shares were bought by those connected with the party, he said "it does not matter. The fact remains that the UMNO has no interest [in the business]." See *New Straits Times*, March 14, 1991.

<sup>44</sup> Senu Abdul Rahman, et.al., *Revolusi Mental* (Kuala Lumpur: Penerbit Utusan Melayu, 1971), p.3. In fact a committee on the Mental Revolution was formed in early 1968 under the chairmanship of Ali Haji Ahmad (The Vice Head of UMNO Youth), Hamzah Alang as secretary, and Abdullah Haji Ahmad (then the Vice President of UMNO) acting as Coordinating Secretary. This committee comprised a group of Malay intellectuals, most of whom were English-educated from local and

"A mental revolution was indeed felt to be necessary in order to rid the Malays of their insecurity toward more aggressive immigrant groups and associated urban and capitalist activities which for too long were typed by fictional literature as a source of moral peril and cultural alienation for good Malays and Muslims."<sup>45</sup>

The Mental Revolution identified the negative cultural traits of the Malays, stemming from traditional society, and their psychological inferiority complex, that impeded their economic development<sup>46</sup>. The attitude of the Malays towards economic development delineated in the *Revolusi Mental*, paralleled many of the observations made in western scholarship.<sup>47</sup>

At the same time, Dr Mahathir published a thesis entitled *The Malay Dilemma*<sup>48</sup> where he mentioned the importance of heredity as the cause of Malay 'backwardness'. Nevertheless, the cultural experiences that the Malays had undergone were also indicated as the major factor in their present situation.

However, his thesis and also the *Revolusi Mental*'s were challenged by a Malay scholar, Dr. Syed Hussein Alatas, who emphasised the economic and structural impediments and the historical evolution of the economic exploitation of rural Malays. According to Alatas, the growth of the 'spirit of capitalism' had been retarded for centuries, by forms of exploitation by the Malay ruling class<sup>49</sup>.

It is difficult to determine whether the Mental Revolution campaign by UMNO had a great impact on the Malays in general, or UMNO's members in particular. Nevertheless, Malay intellectuals and politicians had come forward, and

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overseas tertiary education, such as Senu Abdul Rahman, Ali Haji Ahmad, Dr. Rais Saniman, Abdullah Haji Ahmad, Raja Mohd. Affandi, Prof. Taib Othman, Dr Kahar Bador, Ali Abdullah, and Raja Azman Raja Ismail.

<sup>45</sup> Fatimah Halim 1990, "Transformation of Malaysian Society," p. 72

<sup>46</sup> See *Revolusi Mental* 1971, pp. 75-76 for the attitudes of traditional Malay society, and pp. 355-356 for the Malay 'inferiority complex'.

<sup>47</sup> B. Parkinson, "Non-Economic Factors in the Economic Retardation of the Rural Malays". *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 1 (1967), pp. 31-46. The Malays' economic stagnation was caused by their attitude towards economic development: their resistance to change; opposition to cooperatives; the belief in the adage 'better the devil you know'; and the Malays' dislike of full-time specialization in any one occupation. Today, these arguments are considered out-dated, for the Malays are as responsive as any other race to economic development. See also an article by Mohd. Fauzi Haji Yaacob, 'Kemunduran ekonomi masyarakat Melayu- satu tinjauan sosio-budaya,' in Zainal Kling (ed.) *Masyarakat Melayu: Antara Tradisi dan Perubahan* (Kuala Lumpur: Utusan Publication, 1977), pp. 143-173. He argued against Parkinson's thesis that correlates the poverty of the Malays with religion.

<sup>48</sup> See Dr. Mahathir Mohammed 1970, *Malay Dilemma*, passim.

<sup>49</sup> Dr. Syed Hussein Alatas 1974, *Siapa Yang Salah*, h. 23-24..

reached the conclusion that the Malays must change their attitudes and search for new values which would be congruent with their changing environment.

The MAYC organised a seminar on the Future of Youth in Kuala Lumpur on 31 October 1967, in which Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie, one of the top government civil servants, urged Malay youth to oppose the pressure of 'tradisi kolot' (primitive traditions)<sup>50</sup>. The Malay youth were challenged to search for new values and norms, the idea being to move towards a dynamic society, compatible with a changing environment, through a silent revolution. Ghazali Shafie urged the Malays to take Kamal Attaturk and his Turkish revolution<sup>51</sup> as a model for opposing the trappings of 'primitive society'. He pointed out that, the Turks, despite change, were still religious. Ghazali Shafie challenged the youth by asking where were the 'Kamal Attaturks of Malaysia' who could lead a revolution against 'primitive culture'<sup>52</sup>.

Some intellectuals demanded that Malays change their attitudes, which had been firmly based on adat resam (Malay custom), arts and aesthetic fantasy<sup>53</sup>. Dr. Mahathir<sup>54</sup> acknowledged that urban Malays had accepted a money economy, but said that most of the rural Malays had yet to accept it. He urged Malays to change their attitude towards enjoying 'privacy' based on the self-contained house, and to be more open to living in a flat or housing estate.

Musa Hitam encouraged attitudes of 'kurang ajar'<sup>55</sup> (literally meaning to reject social norms or to be less well-mannered, i.e. less courteous). He criticised the Malays for having a dependent attitude toward the Government in the provision of facilities, without expecting to play any role in rural development. Thus in 1968, the

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<sup>50</sup> Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie, "Belia Perlu Menentang Tekanan tradisi Kolot", *Dewan Masyarakat*, (March 1968), pp.4-6, quoted from a weekly paper *Berita Minggu*, November 12, 1967.

<sup>51</sup> See A.C. Milner, "The Impact of the Turkish Revolution on Malaya," *Archipel* 31 (1986), pp.117-130.

<sup>52</sup> *Dewan Masyarakat*, March 1968, p.6.

<sup>53</sup> A.Razak Abdullah, "Revolusi Mental Dalam Masyarakat Melayu", *Dewan Masyarakat*, (May 1968), pp.17-23.

<sup>54</sup> Dr. Mahathir Muhammad, "Revolusi Mental Dalam Masyarakat Melayu", *Dewan Masyarakat*, (March 1968), pp 18-19.

<sup>55</sup> Musa Hitam, "Biarlah Kurang Ajar Sedikit", *Dewan Masyarakat*, (March 1968), pp.23-25.



government launched '*Gerakan Maju*' (Operation Progress)<sup>56</sup> as an experiment to inculcate the spirit of self-achievement and hard work.<sup>57</sup>

An *Utusan Melayu*<sup>58</sup> editorial expressed the view that the mental revolution was indeed gaining in momentum. There were changes in Malay attitudes and thinking. However, they were not sufficiently satisfied with the ability of the Malays to face competitive life in modern society. *Utusan Melayu* emphasised the need to change Malay thinking as a priority, putting the responsibility on Malay intellectuals, and also continuing to remind the Malays that political power alone was not enough without other forms of power, especially economic. *Utusan* also hoped for the emergence of new and more dynamic Malay thinking, more radical and more forceful than before.

Until 1968, the Malays, were a conservative community, left out of the mainstream of modern commercial and industrial development. The Tunku Abdul Rahman confessed that Chinese companies and business firms were quite reluctant to help the Malays. It was left to the government to provide assistance and facilities to enable Malay participation in business and economic development. The non-Malay opposition leaders also questioned the ruling party policies that they considered very communalistic. But Khir Johari, one of the senior UMNO leaders, replied that '*kemurahan hati*' (the generosity) of the Malays in complying with the idea of sharing power in 1955 had been an important concession for the sake of independence, in which the Malays also accepted the non-Malays as citizens. He said that although the Malays were branded as beggars, they had '*maruah*' (dignity) so "we are not paupers

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<sup>56</sup> Between 1965-1970, a series of sloganeering and awareness-changing campaigns were launched, such as the *Gerakan Jaya Diri* (Operation Self-Help), and *Gerakan Pembaharuan* (Operation Renewal), see Shamsul A.B. "Formal organisations in a Malay 'administrative village': an ethnographic portrait (Kent: University of Kent at Canterbury, Centre of South East Asian Studies, Occasional Paper No.15, March 1991), pp.18-21.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, p.24.

<sup>58</sup> *Utusan Melayu*, February 28, 1968

in our own country".<sup>59</sup> Therefore, the Malays, as natives refused to be like the Red Indian in the United States or the Maori in New Zealand<sup>60</sup>.

Another writer commented on UMNO's proposed 16 features of the so called new values and traits for modern Malays,<sup>61</sup> basing themselves on five principles to create affluence for the whole nation, namely ; freedom, peace, prosperity, justice, and respect. At the same time, an academic accentuated the need for Malays to get rid of their 'feudal' and 'slave' mentality (*jiwa hamba*)<sup>62</sup>.

During that 'mental revolution' campaign, the Malays realised that clause 153 of The 1957 Federal Constitution seemed not to have been effectively implemented by the government. Senator Ghaffar Baba<sup>63</sup> confirmed that in 1968 the whole of Malay property in Melaka was equivalent to the property held by a few Chinese millionaires in the state. In fact, the Malays then did not even have a bank, insurance company, or pawn-shop. They concluded that in Malaysia, the Malays were 'left-out', and the most backward in all aspects of life<sup>64</sup>.

However, the Malay peasants, who are strong adherents of Islam, have proved to be supporters of economic and political modernization, as long as such processes

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<sup>59</sup> M.Noor Azam, "Penyakit Perkauman Menular Makin Hebat: Kesan Dari Dewan Rakyat", *Dewan Masyarakat*, (March 1968), p.34.

<sup>60</sup> Sulaiman Alias, " Hak Istimewa Orang2 Melayu," *Dewan Masharakat*, (May 1968), p.13.

<sup>61</sup> See Akmal, " Revolusi Mental: Isi, Matalamat, Pelaksanaan," *Dewan Masharakat*, (June 1968), p 7. The proposed values and traits included self-reliance, consolidation of nationalism and unity, struggle for mutual benefit, imitation of non-Malay trends in business, resilience, etc.

<sup>62</sup> Syed Husin Ali, " Feodalisma dan Jiwa Hamba," *Dewan Masharakat*, (March 1968), pp.20-22, 45.

<sup>63</sup> He was born in Negeri Sembilan on 18 February 1925, received his primary education in Melaka, and later was selected to train as a teacher at SITC Tanjung Malim. His political involvement began in the PKMM when he was in SITC (1948). In 1951, joined the UMNO as secretary of the UMNO Melaka division, and became the chairman from 1954 until 1974, when he was appointed chairman of Kuala Lumpur Federal Territory UMNO Liaison Committee.. He won the Melaka Luar constituency in the pre- independent Federal Legislative Council elections. After winning the Tanjung Kling state seat in 1959, he was appointed Melaka Chief Minister. When the Melaka UMNO faced a crisis, Ghafar Baba was pulled into Kuala Lumpur in 1967 as the MARA chairman; he was then appointed Senator, and later became a Minister Without Portfolio. He contested a Federal seat in the General Election of 1969 replacing Tun Razak as Minister of National and Rural Development. He was withdrawn from the cabinet when Hussein Onn formed his cabinet in 1976. He then led Kompleks Kewangan, a government subsidiary company, and continued his service as Secretary General of the Barisan Nasional. He was appointed Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National and Rural Development in 1986.

<sup>64</sup> See Sulaiman Alias 1968, "Hak Istimewa", p.12.

do not go against the principles of Islamic teaching and do not touch their religious values.

It is undeniable that the Malay's world view changed during the period of the New Economic Policy. If materialism is used as a yardstick of modern society, then the Malays became members of it. If urbanization is a prerequisite to modernization, then the Malays also qualified. Independent variables such as job opportunities in urban areas and economic pressure, caused the Malays to venture into different fields other than agriculture which had previously been the basis of Malay life.<sup>65</sup> The migration of the Malays to urban area was considered to represent a transformation of the semi-educated and uneducated Malays from rural-village existence, to an urban-village existence. They brought modified village traditions to urban life.

### *The Urban Malays.*

The growth of the Malay urban population increased from 7.3% in 1947 to 11.2% in 1957, and 14.9% in 1970 to 25.2% in 1980<sup>66</sup>. Generally, the urban Malays may be divided into four categories:<sup>67</sup> (i) the professionals and intellectuals, (ii) businessmen, (iii) civil servants, and (iv) unskilled workers.

The Malay professionals consist of lawyers, architects, accountants, engineers, medical doctors, veterinary surgeons, dentists, surveyors, and so on. In 1983, they formed 23.4% or 7,477 of the total of 31,915 professionals in Malaysia.<sup>68</sup> The Malay intellectuals comprise academics from institutions of higher education, writers and journalists. Most of them have lived and served in the city and major town areas.

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<sup>65</sup> Wan Hashim Wan Teh, "Struktur Ekonomi Modern : Perubahan Sistem Nilai Masyarakat Melayu Luar Bandar," *Akademika*, IX (July 1976), pp. 41-52.

<sup>66</sup> See Khoo Teik Huat 1983, *General Report*, pp.17-18.

<sup>67</sup> Sanusi Osman, "Politik dan Perubahan Sosial di kalangan Orang Melayu di Kota," A working paper presented in the Political Science Seminar at Universiti Sains Malaysia, 3-4 February 1989.

<sup>68</sup> Khoo Teik Huat 1983, *General Report*, pp.17-18..

The number of Malay businessmen is larger than the Malay professionals and intellectual groups. However, only a few have been involved in the urban economy, in areas such as manufacturing, distribution, finance and banking, and shipping, exports and imports. This component of Malay entrepreneurs normally participate as members of the Malay Chambers of Commerce. Some of them have been involved in leading UMNO at Branch, Divisional and State levels. The other component of Malay businessmen, who lack experience, efficiency and technical knowledge, are mostly involved in trading based on small capital and without sophisticated management. As petty traders they are under the patronage of *Persatuan Penjaja Kecil Melayu* or the Malay Petty Traders Association. Those who have good contacts with the government, venture into government contracts or business and development projects.

In urban areas, the number of government officers and general staff is much larger than Malay businessmen. The officers consist of Malays in the administrative and diplomatic service, quasi-government bodies, the education service, and other government services. Indeed, government service has been attractive, since it provides career development and future security, including promising salary schemes, social facilities, and pension schemes. There are four levels of government servants. Category A generally consists of those who have a tertiary education qualification; Category B is for those who hold a diploma qualification; category C is the clerical and technical level in which ones entry point is based on passing the Malaysian Certificate of Education (equivalent to the GCSE in England). Government servants in category D mostly consist of other general staff, and unskilled workers.

The majority of urban Malays are in the lowest income group<sup>69</sup>, the majority working as unskilled workers and labourers in the private sector. In an effort to supplement their income, they run small mobile businesses called '*Pasar Malam*'

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<sup>69</sup> See Mohd. Razali Agus, "Persepsi Golongan Berpendapatan Rendah Terhadap Agensi-Agensi Kerajaan Di Wilayah Persekutuan," *Man and Society*, vol.6 (1985), pp.57-64.

(night market trading) or do other part-time jobs. They are connected to a new feature in urban areas called "Kampung tanah haram", presently known as Kampung Setinggalan<sup>70</sup> or illegal squatters villages. These are sometimes named after a place or a personality such as Kampung Abdullah Hukum, Kampung Kerinchi, Kampung Batu Muda, Kampung Cheras Baru, Kampung Pantai Dalam, Kampung Datuk Harun, Kampung Cubadak Indah, Kampung Congo and Kampung Bumi Hijau. In fact, the Malay squatters areas were a 'transplantation' of the 'Malay Village' into suburban areas. An UMNO branch has been formed at each kampung setinggalan level, as an instrument to legitimize their right to occupy government land<sup>71</sup> and other reserved areas. The concentration of Malay squatter villages in certain urban areas, has given UMNO an opportunity to extend its base into urban areas. Titiwangsa, Lembah Pantai and Batu are among the parliamentary constituencies that have been controlled by UMNO after the growth of urban Malay squatter areas facilitated by industrial development.

There have been cases where squatters, who were otherwise reluctant to be resettled in other areas, have been encouraged by being given flats or 'Rumah Panjang' (a type of wooden army barracks). However, this development has caused local political leaders to lose their supporters and their political base. Thus, certain UMNO leaders were willing to fight for the legalizing of the settlements, rather than give support for resettlement in planned-areas with better housing facilities. Malay squatter areas have, then, developed as modern Malay villages in the urban areas. By the 1980's, UMNO, with the support of Malay squatters, began to expand its base to

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<sup>70</sup> Azizah Kassim, "Pemindahan Penempatan Semula Setinggalan : Beberapa Masalah Dalam Perlaksanaannya," *Man and Society*, vol.6 (1985), pp.37-56.

<sup>71</sup> The case of the Bumi Hijau squatters was a protest against the development of a modern housing project in the area, see *New Straits Times*, May 3, 1985. The squatter village of Bumi Hijau was started in the early 1960's, when they occupied a private Rubber estate which was bought by the government. By 1985, 900 families had settled there. The local UMNO promised land titles, in order to legitimize the housing site. Tension arose in 1982 when the 313 acres of land were bought by a government sponsored housing developer, the Government Officers Housing Co.Ltd (SPPK) which was a joint-venture with United Consortium, at a price of 37 sen per square-feet. See Azizah Kassim, "Pemindahan dan Penempatan semula", Appendix 2, pp.55-56.

urban areas. Thus squatter areas have become an important political issue for urban-based UMNO leaders<sup>72</sup>.

*Changes and achievements.*

In the mid-1970's, Dr Mahathir admitted that so-called western materialistic values had spread and taken root in the Malay community<sup>73</sup>. The focus was now on materialism as the basis of life, in which the possession of wealth was seen as the very foundation of human happiness or misery: the more property one has or manages to acquire, the happier one is - so the notion goes "... The poor are poorer, the rich, richer"<sup>74</sup>. Challenges of the competitive life in the urban context caused the Malays to become hard working for the sake of their own survival and achievement.

For the lower income groups of urban Malays, their opportunities to experience social mobility to a higher level were limited. Their aims were to look for a site in squatter areas or seize the opportunity to buy a low-cost house, get a better job, obtain a *gerai* (petty trading stall) or a site for a small business, and finally look after their children's education, especially through getting government educational grants. The UMNO branch in each squatter village was the agent and clearing house for the ambitions of these groups of people. The Malays also believed that urban areas provided them better education facilities for their children, a great contribution to the improvement of their life. As a result of money and status becoming the goals of the modern Malays, they migrated to urban areas, as education was considered an investment for their children and the future<sup>75</sup>.

Malay professionals, intellectuals, and entrepreneurs form the Malay middle-class. Their life-style is comparatively different from other urban groups, and

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<sup>72</sup> See Azizah Kassim, "Politik Selingan: Satu Kajian Kes di Kuala Lumpur," *Malaysia Masa Kini*, (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Historical Society, 1985), pp.136-147.

<sup>73</sup> Mahathir Mohamad, *The Challenge* (Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk, 1986), p.4. The Malay version of his work was published by Pustaka Antara in 1976.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid.

<sup>75</sup> Sanusi Osman 1989. "Politik dan Perubahan Sosial." p.19.

especially Malays in the rural areas. Even though most of them were originally from the rural areas, their positions, social-life and environment have transformed them; their contacts with the power elite or politicians have enabled them to obtain business licences, taxi permits, loan facilities, allocations of shares in the stock exchange, facilities and opportunities in business, promotion in their careers, and scholarships. For these reasons, the Malay middle class has strongly defended the existing policies and supported leaders who are willing to support their aspirations<sup>76</sup>.

In business, the Malay middle class is divided into two categories; (i) small time businessmen, who are known as the Malay *petit bourgeoisie*, most of whom started their business with as little as M\$10,000.<sup>77</sup> By 1975, it was estimated that there were 150,000 Bumiputera petty traders in the country<sup>78</sup>; (ii) the Malay *bourgeoisie*, or what Dr Mahathir called the 100 Malay millionaires, who in fact, are "Malay politicians, bureaucrats and aristocrats who have wasted no time in using their influence to enrich themselves."<sup>79</sup>

The Malay Middle Class and other urban Malays have found that the New Economic Policy pushed them to be more materialistic. Political power was identified as the vehicle for their personal interests. In 1979, Malay middle class attitudes changed; they became more active in politics. This coincided with the revision of allowances and fringe benefits of members of Parliament and members of the State Assembly. The revised allowances and benefits, especially the pension scheme for *wakil rakyat* was considered better than those in the civil services<sup>80</sup>.

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<sup>76</sup> Ibid., p.16.

<sup>77</sup> Abdul Ghani Othman, et.al., *A Study of Small Bumiputera Enterprises in Kuala Lumpur and Johore Bahru* (Kuala Lumpur: Faculty of Economics and Administration, University of Malaya, 1980), p.84. These conflicts could be followed in *Malaysian Business*, April 1976,p.83; *Puspaniaga* Dec 1973/Jan.1974, pp.16-21.

<sup>78</sup> *New Straits Times*, 25 April 1977.

<sup>79</sup> Lim Mah Hui." Contradiction in the Development of Malay Capital: State, Accumulation and Legitimation", *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 15 (1985), p.44.

<sup>80</sup> See Akta 237: Akta Ahli Parlimen (saaraan) 1980 and Enakmen Anggota Pentadbiran dan Ahli Dewan Negeri (saraan) 1980. The Monthly allowance for state assemblymen was increased to \$2,000, while parliamentarians received \$3,000. They enjoyed attractive benefits, such as travel, transport, meeting, subsistence and laundry allowances; free road tax, telephones, and free permits for personal weapons. Special compensation for death or accident while on duty, ranged

**Table III**  
**The Salary Scheme of Malaysian Politicians**  
**1980-1992.**

<i>Post</i>	<i>Present salary 1980-91</i>	<i>New salary Since 1992*</i>
Prime Minister	M\$8,500	M\$17,000
Deputy Prime Minister	M\$7,500	M13,500
Minister	M6,500	M\$11,050
Deputy Minister	M\$5,000	M\$11,050
Parliamentary Secretary	M\$3,500	M\$8,000
Speaker of Dewan Rakyat	M\$5,000	M\$9,200
Deputy Speaker	M\$1,000	M\$2,000
President of Dewan Negara	M\$5,000	M\$9,200
Deputy President	M\$1,000	M\$2,000
Member of Parliament	M\$3,150	\$M4,800
Senator	M\$2,100	M\$2,800
Head of Opposition	M\$2,000	M2,800

\*Source: *Mingguan Malaysia*,  
December 22, 1991.



The Administrative and Diplomatic Service, more widely known as *PTD* (*Perkhidmatan Tadbir dan Diplomatik*) has been an elite service in the country since colonial times. The Malay value system holds administrators in high regard, and it also acknowledges the rank, status and power that go with office<sup>81</sup>. However, the service has deteriorated in status since Dr. Mahathir has held the Premiership<sup>82</sup>. The Mahathir-Musa administration seemed to show little respect for the bureaucracy. They, unlike previous governments who worked closely with civil servants, got impatient when tied up with red tape. They have not made any bones about their orders, and do not sweep things under the carpet if the bureaucracy is in trouble.<sup>83</sup> Mahathir's anti-corruption drive and promulgation of a 'hard-work ethic' hit the Malay-dominated civil service hard. Since then the Malay administrative elite have been struggling to retain their service's reputation. However, they quickly began to recognise the minister or political appointee in their organization as their *political master*.

The interference of politicians in the civil service seemed to elevate the former's image as the 'real power elite'. Under the pretext of serving the people, directly or indirectly, the politicians made use of the government machinery. The Malay business community also had to endure political interference, especially with

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between \$60,000 - \$1.5 million. Those who were appointed as Chief Ministers, received a monthly allowance of \$5,000, State Executive Council Members were given \$3,000; Federal minister \$6,500; Deputy Minister \$5,000; Parliamentary Secretary \$3,500; and Political secretary \$3,500. The Monthly allowance for Prime Minister was \$8,500 and \$7,500 for his Deputy. See Dewan Masyarakat, September 1986, pp.11-12 and Utusan Malaysia, 9 February 1989. In early 1992, the salary scheme for these politician was reviewed for the creation of better pay and allowances (see Table III).

<sup>81</sup> Mahathir Mohamad 1986, *The Challenge*, p.97.

<sup>82</sup> In fact, the relationship between the political elite and the administrative elite began to deteriorate as far back as 1967. For example, in the case of the politician Michael Chen (Parliamentary Secretary to Deputy Prime Minister) versus Hassan Ibrahim (District Officer of Ulu Langat) on the acquisition of land for the Agriculture College at Serdang, see the dialogue in Dewan Masyarakat, May 1968, p.10. Berita Harian, October 5, 1967 reported a statement of the UMNO Executive Secretary, Musa Hitam, criticizing young administrative officers who tended to enjoy or were eager to own prestigious cars such as Volvo and MG-Bs, and played golf rather than rendering a service to the office administration. As their counter argument, the young Malay officers blamed the politicians (*wakil rakyat*) for interfering in administrative matters in which they were not qualified, since most of the *wakil rakyat* lacked knowledge and academic qualifications. Some of the *wakil rakyat* had only used bicycles before being elected. Academic qualifications became a new value for young intellectuals, while the *wakil rakyat* valued their political power as giving them a right to meddle in the administrative machinery. (Berita Harian, October 12, 1967). As a matter of fact, UMNO's State Assemblymen in the 1960's and 1970's comprised members who generally had only a primary education. In those years, UMNO found it difficult to recruit qualified-Malay officers to be UMNO candidates in the election for state or federal seats. See Ainol Jamal, Harun Dedah Rasuah Politik, (Subang Jaya: Tra-Tra, 1982,) p.20.

<sup>83</sup> Anon., "M & M: Ready for launch". Asiaweek. March 19, 1982, p.25.

regard to decision-making, the acceptance of tenders, contracts and permits. Significantly, concessions were not based on qualifications and ability; rather, they depended on political support or political relationships.<sup>84</sup>

Political power, money and status consciousness were now the top issues in the Malay hierarchy of needs. The beginning of an affluent life caused the middle class to drift into a modern wave of change, but this later caught them in a dilemma, a crisis of identity.<sup>85</sup>

While this process led to the transformation of politicians into the ruling class, and the real Malay leaders, the Sultan and the old ruling class increasingly exercised only symbolic leadership.

#### *Rural Malays and the change of political climate.*

Generally, by the 1980's the Malay rural areas under UMNO's influence had improved through rural development projects such as road construction, electricity supply, water supply, and lastly telephone lines. Other development projects, such as the construction or renovation of mosques, surau (mini-mosques), Multi purpose halls, and new school buildings, were also undertaken. Indeed, these physical developments were prerequisites for the political influence of UMNO.

In rural areas, the environment also changed. Improvements in the communication system provided more information. With the arrival of television, the mass media began to strongly influence the rural Malays. Their relatives or families who were working or living in urban areas also contributed to their changing attitudes toward politics.

The attractions of modern life in towns was responsible for creating a lack of educated Malays to lead and generate socio-political activity in Malay villages.

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<sup>84</sup> Zulkipli Salleh. "Antara Politik dengan Pentadbiran Awam: Yang Penting Kejujuran dan Kecekapan." *Dewan Masyarakat*. March 1987, pp. 8-9.

<sup>85</sup> This will be discussed in the chapter IV, "Islamic Fundamentalism and Malay Nationalism: a Conflict of Ideology."

These younger educated Malays would normally have their own accommodation around their working places in the suburban areas. Even Malay teachers, who traditionally occupied teacher residential houses that were provided in the school compound, also vacated these, since they now bought or rented houses in town. They no longer were part of the village community as before. In the case of those appointed by the UMNO Branch as office bearers, they only appeared in meetings, and on other formal political occasions. Thus, there was a decline in the role of the teacher as informal leader in rural areas.

Despite rural development in the villages, the economic situation and environmental problems caused by development itself also affected the momentum of change. Rubber prices decreased, and paddy growing also faced problems of irrigation, unpredictable climate, shortage of man power, price, marketing and other difficulties. At the same time manufacturing industries were developing, therefore, a lot of Malays began to try their luck in unskilled jobs in industrial areas. Some of them migrated to Pahang, Johor, Perak, and Trengganu to transform their lives as *peneroka* (settler)<sup>86</sup> in FELDA land schemes. These schemes then produced new well-structured modern Malay villages<sup>87</sup>, which inherited, however, the old village traditions and political culture.

*The 'Flying Leader' (Pemimpin Terbang) and absentee Headship.*

In the absence of young educated-Malays in the villages, the leadership of UMNO Branches was mostly held by pensioners or villagers who could devote more effort to party work. In some cases, there were branches which failed to hold their youth wing annual meeting, lacking a quorum. The KEMAS teachers who would normally live in the village had, in the absence of Malay school teachers or educated Malays, played a vital role generating UMNO meetings and activities. It was felt

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<sup>86</sup> See Yaakub Harun. "Cabaran dan Masalah-masalah Pembangunan Dalam Perkampungan FELDA".in *Masyarakat Melayu: Antara Tradisi dan Perubahan*, edit. by Zainal Kling, (Kuala Lumpur: Utusan Melayu, 1977), pp.239-270.

<sup>87</sup> Sulong Mohamad, *Petempatan FELDA: Perspektif Perancangan Bandar dan Desa* (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1985).

that, basically leaders should be *anak tempatan* or 'local-born', leadership very seldom being given to an outsider, except those who lived in the village due to marriage.

It was the Malay political tradition to have 'anak tempatan' (local born) as their local leaders. But the need to have so-called educated and successful personalities, as the pride of the village and district, meant that frequently local leaders came from urban areas. Thus, the local born leader occasionally was from the urban middle class who had been groomed for UMNO leadership at district level. This process produced a new feature known as the *flying leader*, (Pemimpin Terbang) a personality, normally from the middle class, who had an eye on a political appointment at the Divisional level as a passport to candidacy in elections, and who would hold a key position at branch level in order to prove that he had a political base. With a little support from other branches, he could secure a place in an UMNO division. In legitimizing his image as a potential '*Yang Berhormat*', he then 'flew' to be with his grassroots supporters in order to organise activities at his branch or divisional level, after being given tasks by the divisional committee. This flying leader would normally appear in his village or at the weekly or monthly divisional activities. Thus, in legitimizing their political role they become 'weekend villagers.'

In the case of flying leaders who had been elected as UMNO Branch Heads, and who lived in Kuala Lumpur or any other major city, concerning themselves with business transactions and other social activities in the cities, they would normally rely on the Vice Head or branch secretary to manage the party in their absence. This confidant would be provided with a modern communication system, financial support and other facilities, as long as they could sustain the popularity of the 'flying' Branch Head. In fact, this type of leader would also normally hold a position at the divisional level, membership of the State UMNO Liaison Committee and a position at the National level.

Generally, members of Parliament who were appointed to cabinet posts, or other political appointments at national level, would have to live in Kuala Lumpur.

Some of them planned their political itinerary in order to visit their political base - branch or division, weekly. In this context, there seemed to emerge another political feature called *absentee Headship*: this type of politician frequently relied on his political secretary or 'Wakil Peribadi' (Personal Representative) to attend to the welfare of grassroots supporters and voters.

*Political corruption: Money politics.*

The fall of the Malay States into British hands was an extreme example of the consequences of corruption. But by the end of this century, the Malays and their political ruling elite were facing a new extreme pattern of corruption.<sup>88</sup> This involved money politics in the party, the misuse of funds, and the abuse of power. This corruption was caused by the passion for wealth and power which controlled the thinking and the emotions of the power elite.<sup>89</sup> Therefore, politics without morality tends to corrupt.

The political myth that UMNO was the only party that could sustain Malay power, and serve and develop the people, reinforced the view that the UMNO and Malays were the same thing. This had also become a political asset to UMNO, and except in certain areas in Kelantan, Trengganu and Kedah, UMNO had a strong base. However, when the new elements of modern culture began to be felt in UMNO branches the spirit of unity began to wane. Political objectives also changed from 'unity for independence', to 'community development'. Thus, by the 1970's, the Malay rural community was more influenced by self interested goals. Those who had

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<sup>88</sup> The definition of political corruption is based on views put forward by Arnold J. Heidenheimer (ed), *Political Corruption: Readings in comparative Analysis*, (New York: Holt, Rhinehart and Winston, 1970). pp.4-6. The 'Public-Office-centred' defines corruption as being tied particularly to the act of bribery, but also as a general term covering the misuse of authority for personal gain, not necessarily monetary. The 'Market-Centred' definition emphasises corrupt civil servants who regard their public offices as a business, the income of which they will seek to maximize. Users of the term 'Public-Interest-centred' define it as 'the pattern of corruption which can be said to exist whenever a power-holder is charged with certain actions, i.e. when a responsible functionary or officeholder, is by money or other rewards, illegally provided for, induced to take action which favours whoever provides the rewards and thereby does damage to the public and its interests.' Political corruption is related to a politically obligated relationship which could be categorised into four types: Kinship based system; the traditional patron-client-based systems; the modern boss-follower-based system; and civic-culture-based system.

<sup>89</sup> Sanusi Junid, 'Perhimpunan rakyat jihad membasmi kemiskinan,' in Zakri Abadi, *Sanusi Junid: Pencetus Idea Pemikir Bangsa* (Kuala Lumpur: MYZ Berhad, 1991), p.236.

political insight, often joined UMNO just to help them to get land<sup>90</sup>, licences and permits, scholarships for their children, and other material benefits. It was clear that UMNO leaders had opportunities for lucrative rewards through timber and mining concessions, petrol stations, and so on, because of their political connections. Historically "wealth " had been controlled by the traditional ruling elite; later, it was shared by the Aristocratic-Bureaucratic ruling elites. In the period between 1957 to 1969, the UMNO-Malay ruling elite gave rights of economic distributive capability to the MCA -the Chinese ruling elite. However, after the tension of the 'Malay rights' versus ' Chinese rights'<sup>91</sup> question in 1969, the distributive capability passed under the control of UMNO leaders -the modern Malay ruling elite.

Money politics had appeared as a new 'culture' in UMNO with the involvement of Malay businessmen and professionals in that organization. Their presence was encouraged by the implementation of the New Economic Policy and the National Education Policy<sup>92</sup>. This new Malay entrepreneurial and commercial elite began to flex its economic muscle in search of political patronage and power. The struggle for party positions and personality clashes during the branch and divisional UMNO election campaigns introduced a new dramatic element into UMNO. Indeed, this drama was dangerous to UMNO, and tended to make it appear as a 'rich man's club'.

A manifest change in UMNO culture could also be seen in almost every UMNO General Assembly meeting. If in 1960's the UMNO members' took their own initiatives to attend meetings, staying in third class hotels along Tuanku Abdul Rahman Road or Raja Muda Road, in the 1980's the scenario changed dramatically. The UMNO delegations and observers now travelled in groups to Kuala Lumpur,

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<sup>90</sup> Hussain Mohamed, " Pembentukan dan Manifestasi Kesedaran Politik Desa," in Dr.Zainal Kling (ed.), *Masyarakat Melayu: Antara Tradisi dan Perubahan*, (Kuala Lumpur: Utusan Melayu, 1977), p.112.

<sup>91</sup> *Far Eastern Economic Review Yearbook 1970*, p.187.

<sup>92</sup> Harold Crouch. "Politik Wang di Malaysia." in *Dasar-Dasar Ekonomi Mahathir*. edited by Jomo. (3rd edn. Kuala Lumpur: INSAN, 1987), pp.55-54.

staying in prestige hotels, like the Hilton, Pan-Pacific, Merlin, Holiday Inn, and other well-known hotels, according to the state or the capability of their sponsors. The cost of meals, especially lunches and dinners was born by the Heads of Divisions or political sponsors, if this was not provided for by the party..

UMNO leaders were divided concerning the culture of 'money politics' in the party. The traditional elite in the party was confident that money politics would be temporary in nature.<sup>93</sup> However one influential journalist considered money politics as a disease of the ruling party.<sup>94</sup> For his part, a former UMNO leader who had become a businessman and housing developer described money politics in UMNO as 'a thing that must happen, very difficult to suppress.' He further blamed UMNO leaders who formed camps in the party and started to interfere with, instead of promoting, free elections in the party. These, he argued never took place in UMNO at that time.<sup>95</sup>

Musa Hitam expressed his concern that money politics had led to class-based tension within the party.<sup>96</sup>

"Let not those people who are bent on making money out of politics weaken the party. Let us not come to a stage where we are compelled to compromise our dignity and esteem for the sake of money. UMNO members must know that the power its leaders have been enjoying comes from the grassroots, that is, the kampung folk. and leaders who have been guiding the party have come from kampungs."

The election of UMNO Division Heads, initiated money politics, as this post was considered a passport to selection as an UMNO candidate in general or by elections. For example in 1984, the UMNO divisional committee election became

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<sup>93</sup> See the views of Senator Toh Muda Dr A.Fadzil in Sabiah Ani, "Politik wang bersifat sementara?," ERA, November 23, 1985, p.15. He highlighted the absence of autonomous organizations, as in the United States, which control the finance and political campaigns for elections. He agreed that the rampant culture of money politics arose because politics had offered opportunities for accumulating wealth. He considered it had originated for 4 reasons; he blamed society for not considering money politics as disgusting; secondly he blamed the open society that naturally accepted negative attitudes; thirdly, he assumed that this culture was natural in a developing country, and fourthly, he saw the recruitment and existence of Malay entrepreneurs in UMNO as another factor.

<sup>94</sup> Interview with Haji A.Samad Ismail, "Money politics penyakit parti yang berkuasa," ERA, Jun 1, 1985, p.28.

<sup>95</sup> See the article entitled "Politik wang: Apa kata Datuk Senu," ERA, June 8, 1985, p.13.

<sup>96</sup> New Straits Times, 19 July 1985.

tense as members speculated that the parliament and states assemblies would be dissolved before 1987. Top UMNO leaders sent their messages to make sure certain names were proposed and supported for the Supreme Council seats in 1987. The number of nominations normally indicated the extent of popular support for these names, and their supporters then suggested various political strategies and tactics to make their patron win. Various methods of political deception were applied to overpower their political opponents. This is how factions originated in UMNO along with money rewards and other forms of political subsidies.

UMNO members were thus introduced to a tradition of *political subsidy* - candidates for branch and / or divisional committees provided meals and transport for party members who attended campaign meetings or lobbying-talks. This was especially the case with members from rural areas. Some of the candidates organised special dinners in well known hotels in the states capital cities, a few day before the election. In some cases, one or two days before an UMNO divisional delegation meeting, a large number of delegates were 'kidnapped' (a practice of isolating supporters from being influenced by their opposing group) and given first class treatment, such as free food and lodging at well-known hotels in town. They were persuaded to vote for their sponsor for the betterment of the local UMNO. The isolated delegates were then transported to the meeting place, most likely having been also supplied with pocket money.

There were cases when elected branches or division delegates were given free group 'political-leisure' tours to Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and even to Tokyo. To a certain extent, there were cases where local UMNO leaders were subsidised to go to Mecca to perform their Hajj<sup>97</sup>. Since then, the race for the post of UMNO Heads of Divisions has become very costly; it being likely that UMNO leaders would spend between M\$100,000 to M\$200,000 for the post on average,

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<sup>97</sup> Harold Crouch 1987. "Politik Wang", p.55



while the highest known spending case was said to have involved around M\$600,000<sup>98</sup>.

There were some UMNO national leaders who expressed their apprehension about the culture of money politics that had become institutionalised in UMNO. '*Kekayaan*' or wealth had become the main concern of these Malay power elites, and this phenomenon inspired the rest of Malay community to recognise '*kekayaan*' as the end and manifest value of their modern life. Indeed, the way the traditional ruling elite class acquired its wealth during the feudal era, was now reproduced by the modern ruling elite.<sup>99</sup> They were practising a *Machiavellian* polity, indifferent to the question of morality, and devoting themselves entirely to the pursuit of power.

The government itself was by now playing a direct role in the economy. Great efforts were made to increase the opportunities for the Malays and other bumiputera to begin and to expand their businesses. Dr. Mahathir promulgated the idea of transferring government assets to the private sector. This was known as the privatisation policy<sup>100</sup>. However:<sup>101</sup>

Political demands from Malay entrepreneurs to participate in privatised projects forced decision makers to work out compromises between the competing interest groups. For example, the conflicts among bumiputera contractors over the decision to give the North-South Highway project to UEM were resolved with the decision to award subcontracts to the two contractors who did not succeed in getting the original contract.

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<sup>98</sup> Ibid.

<sup>99</sup> See chapter 2, p.7 and Milner 1982, *Kerajaan*, p.20.

<sup>100</sup> See *Dasar-Dasar Utama Kerajaan Malaysia* (Kuala Lumpur: INTAN, 1988), p.48.

<sup>101</sup> Mavis Puthucheary, "The NEP and Privatisation: Conflict in Economic Policy?," in V.Kanapathy et.al. eds., *The Mahathir Era: Contribution to National Economic Development* (Petaling Jaya: International Investment Consultant, 1989), pp. 71-72. The big projects which had been privatised were the North-South Highway (M\$3.5 billion); the Selangor water project (M\$750 million); City Hall sewerage project (M\$370 million) City Metrolink (M\$134 million); the Jalan Kuching/Kepong Interchange; Sabah-Labuan interconnection; Kuala Lumpur garbage disposal scheme; and the North Kelang straits bypass. Telecom became a pioneer of the privatisation of government departments, and is now known as Syarikat Telikom Malaysia or Malaysia Telecommunication Company. This was followed by the National Electricity Board which would be known as Tenaga Negara (National Power). In 1992, the postal service was privatised.

The economic recession, the constitutional crisis<sup>102</sup> and political pressure from inside and outside UMNO, however, impeded implementation of the privatisation policy.

### **Political Corruption: *Misuse of Funds.***

The case of the Bank Bumiputera Finance (BMF) scandal in 1982 was the most notorious case of a misuse of power and funds. This and other cases implied that the creation of a Malay middle class in the context of NEP trusteeship, had in fact " encouraged rent-seeking behaviour by networks of 'distributional coalitions' working in cartel-like networks, interlocking directorships, collecting transaction fees and making huge capital gains through stock acquisitions and speculative deals..."<sup>103</sup> Having been disappointed with the unexpected reaction of Malay entrepreneurs, Dr Mahathir expressed his regret and spoke on morality, questioning the integrity of such characters by stating that " we live in a society which no longer has any honour."<sup>104</sup>.

For his part, Harun Idris as an UMNO strong man exposed the rampant practise of political corruption in UMNO. He asked the Malays, to make the decade of eighties, a decade of rechanging attitudes away from self-centredness back to giving priority to religion, nation and country.<sup>105</sup>

Finally, Dr.Mahathir admitted that it had been a mistake on the part of the government in the past to urge businessmen to 'think big'. 'Thinking big', which previously meant harvesting huge profits, now turned out to be also the accumulation of losses. Thus, he advised Malay traders to begin to "think small, not big"<sup>106</sup>.

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<sup>102</sup> This will be discussed in the following chapters.

<sup>103</sup> Ozay Mehmet, " Mahathir, Ataturk and Development," in V. Kanapathy et. al. eds., *The Mahathir Era*, p.46.

<sup>104</sup> *The Star*, 16 January 1987. Dr Mahathir reacted to untrustworthy personalities who had breached trust in the public business organizations and the cooperative movement. The recession uncovered dishonesty in the business world and its perpetrators. Malaysia then witnessed the arrest of leading businessmen who had previously been honoured in receipt of the nation's highest awards and titles such as *Tan Sri* and *Dato*.

<sup>105</sup> Ainnol Jamaal 1982, *Harun Dedah Rasuah Politik*, p.93.

<sup>106</sup> *New Straits Times*. 7 July 1990.

On the eve of the 1987 party election, Anwar Ibrahim, the Ketua Pemuda, warned UMNO members that the party was no place for wealth seekers because political service for self-interest was against UMNO's objectives. It was seen as one of the reasons which had led to various recent crises in the party. He urged party members to detect and to eject those who joined the UMNO leadership 'with the aim of accumulating wealth.'<sup>107</sup>

*Political Corruption: Abuse of power.*

UMNO itself had changed from a 'poor' political party that had always relied on Chinese tycoons and the MCA to fund the costs of the Alliance in Federal and States Elections, to a wealthy political organization through which government policies reflected the interests of Malay millionaires and entrepreneurs. Both the UMNO Headquarters building itself and involvement in business were new symbols of the organisation's progress. Political opportunities attracted the Malay middle class to join UMNO, since they foresaw a better life through politics. However until they grasped power, they pretended to be sacrificing themselves and serving the poor rural Malays.

Since UMNO dominated the government machinery, there was an inclination on the part of some leaders to appoint political allies to political posts in government agencies, government corporations, and UMNO business interests. The ability of UMNO members to influence the leader in such appointments was a yardstick of political power or influence. For example, it has recently been realised that Anwar Ibrahim has managed to squeeze his men and his strong supporters into important posts in government agencies, and the party.<sup>108</sup>

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<sup>107</sup> *New Straits Times*, February 21, 1987.

<sup>108</sup> His political manoeuvres were noticed by other politicians when he persuaded the Prime Minister, who was also the party President, to appoint members of his clique as Political Secretary to the Prime Minister, Political Secretary of the Minister of Youth and Sports, and an MP, Nasaruddin Alang Saidin of Parit, as UMNO Executive Secretary and The National Front Executive secretary. The Bank Islam, Education Ministry, The International Islamic University, and YPEIM- Yayasan Pembangunan Ekonomi Islam Malaysia (the Malaysian Islamic Economic Development Foundation) were among other

Almost all state UMNOs have their own multi-storey building. Through banking and financing facilities, UMNO secured loans for its state party buildings, or Wisma UMNO Negeri, as symbols of the prestige and the success of the organization. In some states, the Chief Ministers, who were also state UMNO leaders, managed to build a multi-storey building for their Division in the district capital<sup>109</sup>. It became common for Bank Bumiputera which normally financed the projects, to control the ground floor of UMNO buildings.

The UMNO at state level was also involved in business, sometimes in the form of joint ventures with non-Malay businessmen. Most UMNO members ignored or had no information about these businesses. However when UMNO was declared illegal by the High Court in 1988, and all its assets and properties were frozen, then the reality was exposed.<sup>110</sup>

The 1980's saw a rapid increase in the publication of political propaganda in Malaysia. It became a trend that many books were circulated before, during and after an UMNO General Assembly. Syed Husein was one of these well-known authors and publishers of these best sellers. Political writers were normally specifically motivated to attack, support, and promote certain personalities who were vying for power in UMNO. This type of political writer was sometimes known as *penulis upahan* or

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institutions under his influence, beside a psychological warfare organization, The National Civic Department (Biro Tatanegara) of the Prime Minister Department.

<sup>109</sup> For example, under the leadership of Tan Sri Othman Saad, the Menteri Besar of Johor and Head of Pagoh UMNO Division, the Division had its own multi-storey building at a strategic point in the town of Bandar Maharani, Muar, though the area was not in the Pagoh constituency. The idea was to enable the division to have a regular income for party administration and activities.

<sup>110</sup> See the details in S.H. Alattas, *Challenger: Siapa Lawan Siapa* (Kuala Lumpur: Alnujum, 1987), pp.183-209. There was the libel case of Musa Hitam versus a political writer, Syed Husein in the High court. Syed Husein accused Datuk Musa of receiving MS1 million for Johor UMNO. Musa won the libel suit, in which Justice Lim Beng Choon judged the motive of the dependants as an attempt to influence delegates to the detriment of Musa Hitam when they published the book in April 1987, shortly before the UMNO election; and that the writing was motivated by malice and that libel was committed in order to establish the author as a reputable writer and for reason of financial gain. See also *The New Straits Times*, August 22, 1990, p.1. A.Kadir Yasin, the Chief Editor of the New Straits Times (the paper that Musa Hitam branded as a hostile paper), commented on a statement Musa Hitam made after winning the suit -that the Court decision was '*a nice wrap-up to my political career*'. The New Straits Times and Berita Harian were inclined to promote Anwar Ibrahim as Malaysia's future top leader, and the continued existence of Musa Hitam in UMNO would 'delay' this projection. See the comment in *The New Straits Times*, August 23, 1990, p. 8.

'mercenary writer.'<sup>111</sup>

Since to maintain power and influence was very costly, there were UMNO leaders who were involved in business. They would normally do things indirectly, through borrowed names to run their businesses.<sup>112</sup>

These situations invited opportunists who were willing to become 'modern slaves' to their leaders, and to ensure their "masters" security in the power structure; in return the master would provide tangible economic benefits. Modern patron-client relationships came to dominate UMNO, whereby allegiance and service was rendered to the leader rather than to the party. Indeed, subordinates or supporters would often develop a plan to elevate their leader to the centre of power. Apart from political manoeuvring, two new elements appeared in UMNO culture; the use of '*surat layang*'<sup>113</sup> (the poison pen letter) and the return to the bomoh (black magician).

Another traditional cultural element that was still practised in Malay society was associating oneself with those in power. This included making use of leaders' names as a strategy to gain political confidence. There was one case where a member of the UMNO Supreme Council who had lost his grasp on local politics tried to use the President's name to regain his political position.<sup>114</sup> However, this politically corrupt leader failed in his attempt to 'return to power', but on other occasions some succeeded through deploying the same tactics. In some UMNO divisions, the tradition of '*mengenang budi*' (to feel grateful) or '*membalas budi*' (to repay an obligation)

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<sup>111</sup> Ahmad Mokhtar Hj. Mohamad, *People Power: From People for the People* (Kuala Lumpur: Penerbit Dinamik, 1990), pp. 120-123.

<sup>112</sup> In 1991, the press examined these unhealthy developments in UMNO; it was a habit of UMNO delegations to demand that priority be given to them in licences, permits and government contracts under the pretext that they were people who had done everything for the fate and the future of the Malays. It was believed the Crisis of UMNO in 1987 developed from this attitude of selecting certain 'UMNO members' to receive licences, permits and government contracts. see Gamal Nasir Mohd. Ali, 'Apakah peranan Pemuda dan Wanita merealisasikan Wawasan 2020', *Mingguan Malaysia*, November 10, 1991, p.16).

<sup>113</sup> This will be discussed in chapter V.

<sup>114</sup> See for example the case of a former State Assemblyman and State Executive Councillor who was appointed Chairman of a quasi-government body, and the UMNO Supreme Council member who made an attempt to be nominated as designate-candidate for a Parliamentary seat. He was said to have convinced the Divisional committee that his aims were agreed to by the party President. Though his attempt failed, it divided opinion, and the resulting power struggle affected the division. See ERA, October 26, 1990, p.35.

became conflicting pressures. Nevertheless, they were an asset for the old guard in the party. The political trauma in the case of Parit Buntar UMNO Division clearly showed how an old guard member and his faction could become antagonistic towards their Head of Division, who had been created and supported by them, because they thought the newly elected Head had left-out the old guard and supporters from having a role in the divisional party structure. In their campaign of opposition to their Division leader, they used the traditional proverb 'Kacang lupakan kulit' (symbolically meaning a man who forgot his obligations due to his success). This stratagem was manipulated during the election campaign for the UMNO leadership succession.<sup>115</sup>

In this sort of power struggle every attempt and effort was made to win, even to the extent of using 'bomoh' or 'pawang' who practise black magic.<sup>116</sup> Competition for material well-being as the result of modernization had come to its culmination. Therefore, it was natural for leaders involved in such stiff competition to seek any source of strength. Bomoh or pawang, an institution which had almost vanished, was now revitalised. The bomoh became an extra source of political energy, and a sort of 'fire-power' to attack opponents. Indeed, some used bomoh as a 'forward-defence' for their political positions.

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<sup>115</sup> The classic case was in Parit Buntar UMNO Division, when two factions in the division were formed, one led by Ismail Abdul Rauf (a former State Executive Councillor and also former Head of Division), and the other under Idris Abdul Rauf (a former Head of Division and former Federal Deputy Minister). Their conflict ended with the suspension of the Division. When Idris Rauf did not resume his seat, Ismail Rauf claimed that he proposed Abdul Rahman Sulaiman (Former Principal Assistant Secretary in Perak State secretariat) to replace Idris Rauf to contest for Parliamentary seats in the 1982 General Election. Abdul Rahman Sulaiman was then appointed as Chairman of FAMA (a quasi-government body which administered the marketing of agricultural crops), and when the division resumed business, he was elected to lead it. Ismail Rauf, then used 'kacang lupakan kulit' as his political reason to oppose Abdul Rahman's leadership, and then united with his political enemy- Idris Rauf- in order to make a greater impact in his challenge to the party leadership. see " Parit Buntar Bergolak Semula" in ERA, October 26, 1985, p.35. The reunification of these two-party camps for the purpose of challenging their common enemy on a national level will be discussed in chapter VI.

<sup>116</sup> See Talib Bin Haroon, 'Peranan Seorang Bomoh: Satu Kajian Khusus tentang Seorang Bomoh Di Kampung Tuk Kau Guar Chempedak, Kedah,' (Unpublished Graduation Exercise, Faculty of Islamic Studies, the National University of Malaysia, 1974), pp.62-63, The writer has differentiated between white and black magic, the use of white magic being permitted by Islam, with the intention of making use of the *Jin Islam* (good spirits) in helping the bomoh to treat his client. However, black magic, which normally uses evil spirits, is forbidden, since the evil spirit has the ability to implement destructive measures.

*Political Corruption, the use of Black Magic, and Factionalism.*

The bomoh or pawang<sup>117</sup> was institutionalised and had played an important role in traditional Malay life. From 1960 to the mid-1970's the bomoh institution seemed to have become almost extinct in Malay society.<sup>118</sup> When *the dadah* (drugs) problem became prevalent in urban areas, this gradually encouraged the reemergence of bomohs as an alternative to the drug addict rehabilitation programme. Socially, then, the bomoh has been accepted again as a 'vital' institution for certain groups or interests in modern Malay society.

In an investigative article, *Dewan Masyarakat* depicted the causes and use of black magic or supernatural power by politicians in their power struggles in UMNO<sup>119</sup>. UMNO leaders throughout the whole structure were willing to use the bomoh as long as their aims were accomplished. When desperate, they would spend much money on the most powerful and effective bomoh, from either the country itself or from such countries as Indonesia and Thailand.

The process and political consequences of modernization<sup>120</sup> in UMNO led to the formation of political cliques or factions.<sup>121</sup> Therefore, factionalism became

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<sup>117</sup> Bomoh or Pawang was a medical institution in olden days before the coming of Islam. The animistic element of superstition, was then coloured with the use of certain verses of the Quran. The Pawang was a 'medical practitioner' with supernatural power who became an important third party, and also acted as messenger or 'superstition machine' in achieving the aims of the client as directed by the pawang. Some pawang used 'hantu' (ghosts), some keep jin (evils). This type of bomoh or pawang would do 'evil' in order to achieve the aims of clients. However, the religious Malays in the village sometimes played the role of bomoh or dukun without using supernatural power, only by reciting verses from the Quran in praying to Allah. These two types of bomoh have been used by politicians for protecting and sustaining their power or political influence. We will discuss this tradition of using bomoh and pawang in chapter VI.

<sup>118</sup> See Manning Nash, *Peasant Citizens: Politics, Religion, Modernization in Kelantan, Malaysia* (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1974), pp.60-62.

<sup>119</sup> See an article entitled, "Perbomohan dalam UMNO: Dampangi Bomoh Jika Mahu Memimpin UMNO?," *Dewan Masyarakat*, April 1987, pp.6-12.; Muhd.Mansur Abdullah, "Penggunaan Kuasa Bomoh dari Sudut Psikologi", *Dewan Masyarakat*, April 1987, pp 13-14.

<sup>120</sup> See John H. Kautsky, *The Political Consequences of Modernization* (New York: John Wiley, 1972.).

<sup>121</sup> There have been numerous definitions of faction which reflect the peculiarities of various cultural contexts. The definition of Belloni and Beller, used for the purposes of this discussion, are : "*either groups of individuals who cluster around the personality of a great leader... or groups of individuals who have some value-ideological, programmatic, economic interest-in common, which is the basis of their coming together in an organised group, without fundamental regard to who they are.*" Frank P.Belloni and Dennis C.Beller, "The Study of Party Factions as Competitive Political Organizations," *Western Political Quarterly* 29, no.4 (December 1976),p.544. See also the anthropological approach of Norman K.Nicholson, "The Factional Model and Study of Politics" *Comparative Political Studies*, 5, no.3 (October 1972), pp.291-314..

another dependent variable in UMNO politicking, cohesion, and continuity, while cultural norms could be identified as independent variables. However, some writers have suggested indices of volatility and durability as more accurate indicators. At the same time, ideology or policy, and power and patronage have been stressed in discussing factional goals. Branch-type parties like UMNO showed considerable vulnerability to patronage, which seems to be the underlying factor provoking intra party factional conflict. Personal factors, common social or geographic origins, common functions or friendship groupings cannot be entirely ruled out as independent variables in relation to the existence of factionalism.

The new reputation of UMNO as a financially strong party attracted more Malay entrepreneurs and professionals who now offered their services. Nevertheless, UMNO still had its traditional supporters- the Malay teachers. However, by 1987, teacher influence had largely been replaced by that of businessmen.<sup>122</sup> The change had a significant impact on the party's election performance.

#### *Malay Teachers.*

Malay teachers<sup>123</sup> were traditionally the back-bone of UMNO leadership at branch and divisional level. Moreover, they represented the majority of UMNO delegates in the General Assembly, and a strong pressure group in general. Most of them were members of the KPGMS (Kesatuan Persekutuan Guru-Guru Melayu Semenanjung)-The Federation of the Malay Teachers Union. In 1959, a crisis developed between the UMNO leadership and the KPGMS over the issues of Malay

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<sup>122</sup> Maria Samad, 'Rise of the Businessmen Delegates,' *The Sunday Star*, March 29, 1987. See Chapter 6 for the implication of the change to the UMNO crucial election in 1987.

<sup>123</sup> Before 1958 most of these were Malay primary school teachers. Some of them received their training in the Sultan Idris Teacher Training College, some had local training or were directly appointed as trainee teachers. English educated Malay teachers were plunged into the Malay vernacular primary school when government introduced teachers graduating from a new-crash teacher training programme call DTC (The Day Teacher Training Centre) which took candidates with minimum qualifications i.e. LCE [Lower Certificate of Education]. Other qualified teachers were trained in Kirby and Brinsford Lodge Teachers College in England. In Malaysia, teacher training colleges for Malays were formed in Tanjung Malim (SITC) for boys and Melaka for Malay girls. The rapid development of secondary schools, especially in rural areas, gave more opportunities for the Malays to become teachers at secondary schools. While Teacher Training Colleges produced qualified teachers, other crash programmes were introduced to fulfill the demand for more teachers, called RTC (Regional Teacher Training Center), formed in almost every district. RTC candidates were teachers who had to attend weekend-professional classes to certify and to confirm them as qualified teachers. These groups of trained teachers were also involved in UMNO.



Medium secondary schools and the national language. UMNO had to pay a bitter price at the General election of 1959 in connection with this. Thereafter, the Malay teachers' power and influence in the UMNO began to decrease especially with the emergence of Malay business elites or entrepreneurs during the era of *Dasar Ekonomi Baru* (the New Economic Policy).<sup>124</sup> Before 1969, teachers had been among the members of Parliament and state assemblymen but now Ghafar Baba, was the only remaining pre-Independence Malay teacher who had survived in the top UMNO leadership.

The implementation of the National Education Policy, and the Malays' special constitutional position had given some Malay teachers, who had passed various examinations, the opportunity to further their study in tertiary education, and gain a first degree qualification. Most of them were now active in UMNO. Among them were individuals later appointed Deputy Minister, Menteri Besar, political secretary, members of state Executive Councils, in addition to holding positions as members of Parliament and the States Assemblies. This was often on top of maintaining a key post in UMNO at various levels. Some had taken advantage of government economic policy to transform themselves into businessmen or entrepreneurs.

The rapid developments in education caused Malay teachers to serve in different districts or states. The Education ministry teacher posting policy discouraged them from serving in their own villages or states, since their services were often needed somewhere else. But there were cases where the teacher arranged to switch-back to his own district for political reasons. Since the Malays preferred to have a local-born person in their local UMNO team, outsider Malay teachers would very seldom be given a key position in a local organization.

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<sup>124</sup> See Lim Mah Hui 1985, "Malay Capital" pp.37-63; Lim Mah Hui and William Canak. "The Political Economy of State Policies in Malaysia." *Journal of Contemporary Asia*.11 (1981), pp.208-223; Yue-man Yeung. "Economic Inequality and Social Injustice: Development Issues in Malaysia -Review Article." *Pacific Affairs*. 55 (1), (Spring 1982), pp.94-101; R.S.Milne. "The Politics of Malaysia's New Economic Policy." *Pacific Affairs*. 49 (2),(Summer 1976), pp.235-262.

*The revival of traditionalism.*

Dr Mahathir also influenced the Malays in their thinking towards the functions of the traditional elite and the institution of monarchy.<sup>125</sup> In fact, there were cases of tense relationships between Sultans and the heads of some state governments -the Menteri Besar. The allocation of state economic resources was a salient factor in these conflicts. The traditional elite also wanted to participate in accumulating wealth like the new Malay ruling elite. They also asked for concessions in tin mining, timber, housing development projects, and other construction projects.

The traditional elite gained support from their business partners, normally Chinese, and also from Malays who gained political influence through the backing of the traditional elite, some of whom were UMNO members.<sup>126</sup> In fact, Malay opinion has been divided on the need for the institution of constitutional monarchy. There are Malays who have considered the system as a waste of time and money, but there are others who believe the monarchy should be maintained as a symbol of Malay political identity.<sup>127</sup>

In UMNO itself, there were a few members of the traditional elite who became leaders at national and state levels. Before the leadership crisis of 1987, they consisted of Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah of the Kelantan royal family, a graduate in economics and law, and related to the present Sultan of Kelantan; and Dato' Najib Tun Razak, a law graduate; in fact he was one of four senior traditional chiefs in Pahang called *Orang Kaya Syahbandar Indera Pahlawan*, inheriting the title when his father, Tun Razak died in 1976. Both Tengku Razaleigh and Najib had graduated in Britain, and then became strong forces in UMNO through their supporters in their home states and other interest groups, and also through their position in government.

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<sup>125</sup> See Chapter V on the conflict between Dr Mahathir and the monarchy in 1983.

<sup>126</sup> For Dr Mahathir's view on this business linkage, see his Presidential Speech at the 1991 UMNO General Assembly, in *UMNO Ke Arah Abad Ke-21* (Kuala Lumpur: UMNO, 1991), pp.5-9.

<sup>127</sup> See the text of the speech of Rafidah Aziz, Head of the UMNO Women Movement, *Bersatu Pasti Berjaya*, (Kuala Lumpur: UMNO, 1990), pp.4-5.

Toh Muda Dr Fadhil Che Wan, a medical practitioner, who was designated one of the eight Perak state senior traditional chiefs, the *Orang Kaya Panglima Kinta*, became Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. He was considered to be a potential Perak State Menteri Besar. However Dr Fadhil's chances were overshadowed by Tan Sri Ramli Ngah Talib, who presently holds the post of Menteri Besar of Perak. Moreover, a political move was made by certain politicians and members of *Dewan Negara*.<sup>128</sup> Ramli Ngah Talib was given the role of a traditional titular chief, being given the title *Orang Kaya-Kaya Seri Agar Di Raja* by the Sultan.<sup>129</sup>

Another traditional element that has featured in UMNO culture has been the emphasis on prestige and status, the government being the source of status, wealth, prestige and security. The traditional elite and the Malay political ruling elite who formed the government have shared in bestowing 'Bintang dan Pingat' or the state and Federal honours, awards and medals.<sup>130</sup> These have had the effect of elevating the recipient's prestige and status.

UMNO members who were considered to have served the nation at their own political level, were normally recommended to state awards which commemorated the Sultan's birthday. State awards and medals were regularised according to hierarchy and eligibility. Normally the Head of an UMNO Branch was awarded the lowest category medal such as Pingat Jasa Kebaktian (PJK), or Pingat Pangkuan Negara (PPN) if the awards were Federal. Committee members at Divisional level could receive higher awards such as Pingat Pekerti Terpilih (PPT), Perkhidmatan Masyarakat Cemerlang (PMC), and other equivalent honours. In the case of Federal

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<sup>128</sup> The Inner Palace Advisory Council chaired by the Sultan of Perak, whose members consisted of selected traditional Chiefs, and representatives of the ruling party (UMNO).

<sup>129</sup> On Dato' Seri Agar Di Raja or well known in the History of Perak as To' Sagor, see C.N.Parkinson, *British Intervention in Malaya 1867-1877*, (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1964), pp.125, 237, 294, 302-04, 337; F.Swettenham, *British Malaya: An Account of the Origin and Progress of British Influence in Malaya*, (London: John Lane Bodley Head, 1906), pp.205-211; and J.F.A.McNair, *Perak and the Malays*, (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1972), pp.375-382.

<sup>130</sup> In fact, the practice of bestowing the power elite with honorific titles was not known to Malay tradition. Indeed, these awards and medals had been introduced in the Malay States by the Sultan of Johor in 1885, followed by Kelantan in 1912. Other Malay States created their state awards and medals after 1948. see Ahmad Fawzi Basri, *Johor 1855-1917: Pentadbiran dan Perkembangannya*, (Petaing Jaya: Fajar Bakti, 1988), p.139.

awards they were decorated as Ahli Mangku Negara (*AMN*). A Head of an UMNO Division, who normally would be an MP or State Assemblyman, especially if he was a State Executive Council member or Federal Deputy Minister, normally would be awarded a Dato'ship. Such was the case with Darjah Paduka Mahkota Perak (*DPMP*), Darjah Setia DiRaja Kedah (*DSDK*), Darjah Sultan Ahmad Shah Pahang (*DSAP*), Darjah Paduka Mahkota Johor (*DPMJ*) and other equivalent awards. Those who had held this state award, could also be given higher Federal awards such as Kesatria Mangku Negara (*KMN*), Johan Setia Mahkota (*JSM*) or Johan Mangku Negara (*JMN*). These awards had their effects on socio-political and economic influence, given their prestigious status in Malay society<sup>131</sup>.

By 1989, almost all Menteri Besar and Chief Ministers had been decorated with the Federal honour 'Panglima Setia Mahkota' which carried the title of *Tan Sri*. In fact, the practice of bestowing the power elite with honorific titles has become part of the Malay tradition. These titles have been considered a status symbol of the upper class, consisting of politicians, businessmen, and high ranking government officials from all ethnic groups. These were given the title of Tun, Tan Sri and Dato'. To some extent members of the upper classes often attend state functions together. They belong to the same exclusive clubs, playing golf together and sharing other activities.<sup>132</sup>

In the UMNO machinery, the lower ranking party members are given awards to motivate them to serve the party. They feel satisfied if their names and their titles are printed in the party annual report or party publications, and they are pleased to be associated through this recognition, with top party leaders. They feel obliged to

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<sup>131</sup> In fact the tradition of bestowing Federal awards and medals was begun in 1958. Before that a few personalities in the Malay Peninsula had been honoured by the King and Queen of England. Sultan Abu Bakar was among the first Malays to be knighted by Queen Victoria. The first Malay Administrative Officer to be knighted was Raja Tun Uda, who then became the first Governor of Pulau Pinang. Presently, almost all states have an annual list of recipients divided into at least three categories; Military and Police, Political, Voluntary organizations and other civilian lists. These exclude the lists made under the discretion of Sultan, his palace office and the Menteri Besar. All political lists are normally sent to the State UMNO Liaison office, or the Menteri Besar's office for approval, before being submitted to the State Secretary's office for final approval.

<sup>132</sup> S. Husin Ali, *Malay Peasant Society and Leadership* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1975), p.35.

support their leaders and party. This was then another new aspect of patron-client<sup>133</sup> relations in Malay political culture.

The consequences of Malay modernization have changed the Malay attitudes toward politics. The Malays were supposed to have maintained their non materialistic simple life of unity and cooperation. However, UMNO was aware of the factionalism and the glaring disunity in the party, and recognised that UMNO was a rural-based party, and so should return to the practise of 'politik kampung', or Village politics, and politics that emphasised service to the party motivated by Malay nationalism rather than materialistic incentives. According to this view UMNO should not be elitist oriented but should be return to the *rakyat*, stressing collective responsibility and neighbourhood awareness, unity and friendship rather than individualism. Moderation should predominate over extravagance and corruption. The Membership should not be a mercenary army but feel committed to UMNO.<sup>134</sup>

It could be concluded that there were paradoxes and contradictory values within UMNO and the Malay community in the era of the New Economic Policy. Even Dr Mahathir expressed the fear that there was a tendency among some young people to join political parties, "because they wished to become candidates in elections and not because they wanted to contribute towards nation-building."<sup>135</sup>

Although political corruption was being practised among the power elite, no concrete evidence could be presented. In Criminal Breach of Trust cases of the last five years, at least 450 company directors, 427 businessmen, but only 168 Government servants<sup>136</sup> have been involved. These circumstances have backed the

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<sup>133</sup> This will be discussed in chapter V.

<sup>134</sup> See the comment on 'Politik Kampung' by Prof. A. Bakar Hamid, "Datuk Musa Dengan Nilai Kekampungannya" in ERA, (October 12, 1985), p.7. In fact, Musa Hitam realized that there had been political corruption in UMNO since 1976. He refused to be nominated as a candidate of Ketua Pemuda UMNO (The Youth Head) though he was then the Vice Head replacing Dato Harun Idris. He gave his reasons as: to avoid cliques in UMNO, the fact that he was not rich; and that he objected to the misuse of power, giving rewards, or awarding licences in order gain support. See Subky Latif and Chamil Wariya, *Politik Dilemma Pemuda UMNO*, (Kuala Lumpur: Amir Enterprise, 1976), p.83.

<sup>135</sup> "Dr M Offers tips to new crop of political leaders," in *New Straits Times*, August 14, 1990. p.2.

<sup>136</sup> See the Inspector-General of Police, Tan Sri Mohamed Haniff Omar's statement in *New Straits Times*, August 11, 1990.p.9. During the economic slow-down between 1985 and 1988, losses were incurred involving CBT cases amounting

image of politicians portrayed by civil servants in the late 1960's, i.e. that politicians stood for office for selfish motives.<sup>137</sup> These motives involved political appetite for power, for publicity and social status, and above all, for the 'money and the glory.' The cultural values in UMNO, then, have evolved through the phases of modernization. Dr Mahathir on the eve of his premiership found that Malay values were changing unsystematically and without guidance. However, tinkering with the current system and setting up new values might invite a senseless conflict and confusion.<sup>138</sup>

The consequences of socio-economic modernization transformed the political attitude of the Malays, and their mobility in education and the economy created a dynamic change in UMNO culture. There was now both an urban middle class, and the rural Malays in the heart of party structure. Materialism and accumulation of wealth had become rampant. These had been part of aristocratic culture in traditional Malay society. However, by the 1980's these had been extended to the educated-*rakyat*, and political entrepreneurs. In the leaders' rhetoric, the *rakyat* now had a more important place than the traditional elite. The political leaders, or the so-called '*wakil rakyat*' now become the real power, and transformed their role to that of a neo-aristocratic elite in a 'modern feudalistic' era. Meanwhile, the role of the traditional elite became peripheral, and politically they operated only as constitutional heads or symbolic leaders. Nevertheless, they were also involved in the struggle for a share in the economic wealth of the states.

Obviously, modernization hadn't totally transformed the Malays. Structurally, the Malays maintained their traditions of loyalty and deference to their leaders. However, the political leaders as agents of modernization succeeded in modifying the

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to S301.3 million compared with S130.5 million as a result of 'cheating'. However, when the economy improved from January last year, only S66 million of losses were incurred involving CBT cases while cheating cases increased, involving S105.3 million.

<sup>137</sup> James C. Scott, *Political Ideology in Malaysia: Reality and the Beliefs of an Elite* (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1968), pp. 69-72.

<sup>138</sup> Mahathir Mohamad 1986, *The Challenge*, p.103.

value system which now highlighted self-interest. At the same time, paradoxically, some UMNO leaders were calling for reviving of the tradition of 'politik kampung' (village politics) in the party. This gave preference to social organizational goals rather than personal ones. Therefore, what had transpired in UMNO was self interested politics but along with that a conflict of values that reflected both modernity and tradition.

## Chapter Four.

### *Islamic Fundamentalism and Malay Nationalism : The Conflict of Ideology in UMNO.*

In the previous chapter, discussion was focussed on the impact of political modernization in UMNO. Emphasis was then given to the role of materialism, which contributed to the practices of political corruption, and conflicts of interest. The major purpose of this chapter is to identify the main political ideology in UMNO and differences of political belief within the party. I wish to examine whether UMNO was an 'ideologically' based party or it merely comprised leaders with varying ideologies, and how UMNO confronted change in Malay society, especially with regard to 'the resurgence of Islam'.

#### *Political ideology.*

The term ideology here refers to the system of ideas of a group, and political ideology<sup>1</sup> refers to shared beliefs which centre on the objects of cognition which affect the minds of members of the society. The sharing of its political orientation, values, and symbols is a part of a group's political culture. There are two functional aspects of political ideology, namely: the factors of solidarity and identity aspects, one directly social, binding the community together, and the other the leadership role of the dominating personality or personalities.<sup>2</sup> Geertz alternatively defines ideology as cultural symbol-systems or as a 'template for the organization of social, psychological and cultural processes.'<sup>3</sup> In political ideology, there is a

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<sup>1</sup> The discussion of political ideology is based on works by Robert Lane, *Political Ideology*, (Glencoe, The Free Press, 1962), T.W. Adorno et.al., *The Authoritarian Personality*, (New York: Harper Brothers, 1950), Florence Kluckhohn and Fred Srodbeck, *Variation in Value Orientation*, (Evanston, Ill: Row Peterson, 1967),

<sup>2</sup> David Apter (ed.), *Ideology and Discontent* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), pp.18-21.

<sup>3</sup> Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures*, London: Hutchinson & Co., 1975, p.216.



relationship between communication, social reality, and power.<sup>4</sup>

*Malay Political Ideology: The evolution..*

Since traditional days, Malays have closely identified with the political belief that '*tak kan Melayu hilang di dunia*', (which means that the Malay would 'never vanish from this world'). They had struggled against the colonial powers to ensure the survival of Malay identity. In the early twentieth century, their social awareness began through the influence of the Islamic reformist movement of *Kaum Muda*.<sup>5</sup> However, until 1946, Malay political orientation toward the British can be identified as either radical or moderate.

Nevertheless, the Malay masses were quite apathetic toward political change, and persisted with a very parochial outlook. George Maxwell observed the disunity among the Malays before the Second World War:<sup>6</sup>

"A Johore Malay is a stranger in Kedah; The Malacca Malay is a curiosity in Province Wellesley; a Kelantan Malay is almost an intruder in Selangor. Malaya has nine States and three Settlements; and there is nothing that binds the Malays of one State or Settlement to the Malays of another one.

However, before 1940, Malay nationalism seemed to have grown steadily, and the nationalist movement showed its interest in the wider field of Malayan politics and economics, " and a still greater appreciation of the need for asserting their inherited rights in the land of their forefathers."<sup>7</sup> Dato Onn saw the problems that faced Malay nationalism -what he called 'tremendous obstacles'- namely the lack of

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<sup>4</sup> see Dennis K.Mumby, *Communication and Power in Organization: Discourse, Ideology, and Domination*, (New Jersey: Alcx Publishing, 1988), p.93.

<sup>5</sup> see W.Roff, "Kaum Muda - Kaum Tua: Innovation and Reaction among the Malays, 1900-1941," in K.G.Tregonning (ed.), *Papers on Malayan History*, (Singapore: University of Malaya, 1962), pp.162-192. Kaum muda was the modernist Malay Islamic educated group of the nascent middle class which attempted to progress along western lines against the blind prejudice of their elders, the Kaum Tua or the conservative established religious scholars. Among the influential leaders of Kaum Muda were Sheikh Muhamad Tahir Jalaluddin al-Azhari, Sheikh Muhamad Salim al-Kalali, Haji Abbas Muhammad Taha, and Syed Sheikh Ahmad Al-Hadi. Kaum Muda was a reformist group trying to encourage Malays to be more progressive in their attitudes to the modern world.

<sup>6</sup> Sir George Maxwell, "What is Malay Nationalism?," *The Straits Times Annual*, 1941, pp. 109 and 113.

<sup>7</sup> Onn bin Ja'afar, "Leadership is lacking for Malay Nationalism," *Straits Times Annual*, (Singapore, 1940), p.93

experience in the intricacies of commerce or enterprise. Looking into the future of Malay nationalism, Dato Onn emphasised a few vital elements; the leadership of the Malays, the transformation of Malay parochial politics, namely from regionalism to unity of thought and aims in a cohesive structure of Malay nationalism- in which a central organization was needed to unite the Malays. Finally he expressed views on the attitude of the educated and intellectual stratum of Malays who were seen as 'too egoistic and self-interested' to be able to throw their support behind a movement which did not appear to guarantee direct and immediate benefits.<sup>8</sup> Nevertheless, he considered that Malay nationalism in 1940 was developing gradually.<sup>9</sup>

The formation of UMNO in May 1946 united various Malay associations which had different political orientations and backgrounds. Thus, the organization comprised English-educated, Malay educated, and Islamic\Arabic educated Malays, each with their own world-view. What they had in common was a belief in the Malay as the owner of the Malay Peninsula.

### *The Semangat Kebangsaan Melayu and Nationalism.*

What is Malay Nationalism?. If nationalism<sup>10</sup> is a struggle against imperialism, then Malay nationalism actually began in 1511.<sup>11</sup> But those early

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<sup>8</sup> Ibid., p. 95.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Historians have categorised nationalism into four stages; integrative, destructive, aggressive, and contemporary nationalism. The Hayes Formula suggested an alternative classification; Humanitarian, Jacobin, traditional, liberal, integral, and economic nationalism. The Kohn Dichotomy sees a fundamental distinction between two basic types of nationalism in the world: i) nationalism in the Western world ( England, the British colonies, Switzerland, and the Netherlands); and ii) nationalism outside the Western world (in Central and Eastern Europe and Asia). Max Sylvius Handman, a political scientist proposed four types namely; oppressive, irredentist, precarious, and prestigious nationalism. A sociologist, Max Wirth, distinguished between different kinds of group power struggles; hegemonous nationalism, particularistic nationalism, marginal nationalism, nationalism of the minorities, German, French, Italian, British and American nationalism. Psychologist, Gustav Ichheiser found two major forms; conscious nationalism, and subconscious nationalism. British novelist, George Orwell used three types of classification; positive nationalism, transferred nationalism, and negative nationalism. See the discussion by Louis L. Snyder, *The Meaning of Nationalism*, (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1977), pp. 112-132.

<sup>11</sup> As they fought against the Portuguese, followed by the Dutch in 1641, and the British in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, as is reported in Naning (1831), Pasir Salak (1874), Pasir Putih (1915) and Trengganu in 1928.

struggles were regional in nature, and did not involve the whole Malay population. However, in 1946 the UMNO managed to bring together Malays throughout the Malay Peninsula, in what has been described as an effort to 'salvage' their future. Therefore, Malay nationalism should be considered to have begun at that date. When UMNO became a dominant nationalist movement,<sup>12</sup> it comprised a coalition of parochial nationalist movements from local and states-based organisations, including the PKMM (*Parti Kebangsaan Melayu Malaya*), or the Malay Nationalist Party. The PKMM, which was formed in Ipoh in mid-October 1945, was the only radical nationalist movement which was based at both national and local level.

*Semangat Kebangsaan* : the meaning and vision..

Nationalism is a central feature of the process of modern social change, and the Malay concept of nationalism is known as '*semangat kebangsaan*' (the spirit of nationality), or '*perjuangan kebangsaan Melayu*'<sup>13</sup> (the struggle of Malay nationality).

Dr Burhanuddin Al Helmy suggested four essential components of nationalism, namely; *Iman* (faith), *Tubuh* (body), *bangsa* (race), and *watan* (country). He describes Malay nationalism as follows:<sup>14</sup>

"Faith depends on the mass of the people. The mass of the people depend on the race and the race depends on the homeland. While one of them could not be separated out, the homeland (country) is

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<sup>12</sup> Hugh Seton-Watson, *Nationalism, Old and New*, (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1965), p.13. He mentions three types of nationalist movements; i) those fighting for independence from foreign rule, ii) those fighting for unification with an already independent state of its fellow-nationals, and iii) the movement which has achieved independence and unity, but has still to create a deeply-rooted sense of nationalism amongst its subjects. Regarding external influences acting on nationalist movements he stated that contemporary political ideas affected movements, such as the nineteenth century's *liberal* nationalism, then *social radicalism* in the age of Mazzini and Garibaldi, *socialism* at the end of 19th century, fascism in the 1930's; and he also considered that 1950's and 1960's Marxist-Leninism influenced nationalist movements. However his analysis was not compatible with the development of Malay Nationalism.

<sup>13</sup> See Kamarudin Jaffar, Dr Burhanuddin Al Helmy: *Politik Melayu dan Islam*, (Kuala Lumpur: Yayasan Anda, 1980), pp.9-19.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., p.10. the original text is : "*Iman berdiri di atas tubuh, Tubuh berdiri di atas bangsa dan bangsa berdiri di atas watan. Salah satu daripada yang empat ini tiada boleh berceraai tinggal dalam binaannya tetapi watan jadi pokok. Ada watan ialah dengan kuat bangsa. Kuat bangsa keluar dari tubuh diri yang sihat kuat dan perkasa seperti pekerja, pahlawan, perajurit dan lain-lain. Maka dalam jiwa pekerja pahlawan perajuritnya terletaklah iman.*"

fundamental. The survival of the homeland results from the strength of the race. The strength of the race results from a healthy and strong mass of the people like the workers, heroes, soldiers and so on. Thus through the spirit of these heroes and workers faith becomes manifest."

Burhanuddin argued that only freedom, an independent nation and homeland (country) could contribute to freedom of religion. Basing himself on that principle, Dr Burhanuddin Al Helmy led the PKMM delegation to the historic Malay Congress in 1946 which formed UMNO.<sup>15</sup>

In the early years after its formation, UMNO included members who held various ideologies and styles of political thinking;<sup>16</sup> for example, the radicals, such as the PKMM, and SABERKAS; the moderates such as local Malay associations, and the rightists which were represented by States' Malay Associations led by the Malay bureaucratic and aristocratic elites.

#### *UMNO and its political philosophy.*

The philosophy of UMNO consisted of the struggle for '*agama, bangsa dan tanah air*'<sup>17</sup> or Islam [religion], the Malays [race], and the Tanah Melayu [homeland or country]. This philosophy was the basis of Malay nationalism in UMNO. But, to understand this, the elite must be identified. Leading UMNO were the Malay aristocratic elite and colonial-trained Malay bureaucratic elite. Indeed, Dato Onn, Tengku Abdul Rahman, Tun Abdul Razak and Hussein Onn, who later became Presidents of UMNO, were from this group of Malays. As members of the traditional elite, who had survived in the administrative structure, they had the capacity to manipulate the Malay masses who were considered politically ignorant and isolated.

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<sup>15</sup> He noted that there are four types of nationalists: pragmatic-nationalists (*nasionalis yang bulat*), pro-right nationalists, pro-left nationalists, right-nationalists, and left-nationalists. The rightists, he argued cooperated or associated with, colonialism and the leftist with socialism or communism (ibid., p.19). By the end of the 1930's, there seemed to exist a coalition between Islamic reformist elements and the Malay left-wing in KMM (*Kesatuan Melayu Muda*). After the war, the Islamic reformists formed a short-lived party known as *Hizbul Muslimin* in 1948. Dr Burhanuddin Al Helmy, as an Islamic reformist was involved actively in the PKMM leadership in 1945-1947.

<sup>16</sup> Ramlah Adam 1978, UMNO, p.43.

<sup>17</sup> Wan Mohd. Mahyiddin, *Politik UMNO dan Isu Nasional: Satu Perbahasan*, (Subang Jaya, Selangor : Pustaka Cipta, 1987), p.93.

Most of the rural Malays were originally ignorant of the notion of nationalism, but colonial policy made them eventually give strong support to it. However, among the objectives of UMNO were also the defence of the principles contained in the Constitution with regard to the official religion (Islam), the sovereignty of the Malay Rulers, the use of a national language (Malay), the fundamental rights and exclusive rights of the Malays and Bumiputeras.<sup>18</sup>

UMNO was the only vehicle for Malay nationalism in 1946, its slogan *Hidup Melayu* (Long Live the Malays) helped the consolidation of unity. When the PKMM withdrew from UMNO six months later, Malays faced a choice: to support UMNO, which meant accepting both UMNO's idea of Malay survival and its elite's status quo position or to join the PKMM which had 'merdeka' (independence) as its objective.<sup>19</sup> However political circumstances eased the PKMM away from the mainstream, giving rise to the idea that the Malays rejected radical and left-wing movements because of their traditional ties with the aristocratic elite, the symbol of Malay power. Between 1948 and 1955, with the banning of left wing political parties, UMNO became the only Malay political party visibly fighting for the Malays.<sup>20</sup>

The taking over of the PAS leadership by Dr. Burhanuddin Al Helmy and his radical group from PKMM and HAMIM (Hizbul Muslimin) in 1956, made a great impact on UMNO ideology. To this man, Islam and Malay nationalism were regarded as compatible and mutually dependent. "Due to certain social and historical factors, Islamic ideals could be realized on the basis of Malay nationalism."<sup>21</sup> Thus,

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<sup>18</sup> The Constitution of UMNO 1971, Chapter 3, clause 3 section 2.

<sup>19</sup> Dr Burhanuddin al Helmy, "Perjuangan Kita", in Kamarudin Jaffar 1980, Dr Burhanuddin, p.56.

<sup>20</sup> In 1948, The British colonial government suppressed radical Malay organizations, to the extent of banning Malay left-wing parties, such as PKMM and its associates API( Angkatan Pemuda Insaf), AWAS (Angkatan Wanita Sedar), BATAS (Barisan Tani SeTengah Melayu), and Hizbul-Muslimin. The situation provided an opportunity for those radical Malay groups to join with UMNO. Some took a militant route by forming a Malay Liberation Army under the patronage of the Malayan Communist Party, while others kept a politically low profile until the formation of the *Partai Rakyat Malaya* (PRM) in 1955.

<sup>21</sup> Safie Bin Ibrahim, *The Islamic Party of Malaysia: Its Formative Stages and Ideology* (Pasir Putih, Kelantan: Nuawi, 1981), p.81. According to PAS, there were three stages of Malay nationalism ; 1951-53 under Haji Ahmad Fuad's leadership when Malay nationalism was not stable; From 1953 to 56 with the admission of the former PKMM and Hizbul

for him there was no contradiction between Islam and Malay nationalism, as he regarded nationalism as a 'means', not the 'end'.<sup>22</sup> In the same way, UMNO regarded itself as a party based on Malay nationalism but guided by Islamic teaching.

*Malay Nationalism: the rights, sovereignty and privileges of the Malays.*

By 1956, a year before Independence, UMNO had reasserted its idea of a Malay nationalism striving for rights (*hak*), sovereignty (*kedaulatan*), and privileges (*keistimewaan*) of the Malays as owners of the country.<sup>23</sup> Therefore, Tunku Abdul Rahman's idea of 'merdeka' together with non-Malays, resulted in divisions among the party members.

Some UMNO members were quite sceptical of the Chinese leaders political manoeuvres.<sup>24</sup> Moreover, it was believed that the Tunku had been intimidated by the warning of Mr Lyttleton, the Colonial Office Secretary, that independence would only be granted if the various races in the country could live and work together.<sup>25</sup> However, when the Tunku's ideas of 'Independence with non-Malay ethnic groups' was challenged, he threatened to resign from the party. Deference to their leader and the hopes of 'merdeka' as a symbol of the UMNO struggle for the Malays, also made the party members prolong their loyalty and they supported non-Malay Alliance candidates to win the Federal election of 1955.<sup>26</sup> However, the objection of Islamic scholars did cause UMNO to lose its Krian seat in the election. The 1959 election

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Muslimin activists and when Dr Haji Abbas was leading the PAS, ideological crystallization had begun; and the third stage began in 1956 when Dr Burhanuddin became President.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> See a pamphlet *Dasar Perjuangan UMNO* dated 1956 in UMNO/SG files, 184/1956.

<sup>24</sup> See Chan Teck Chan, *Dilemma Pembinaan Negara Malaysia Tanah Air Tumpah Darahku*, (Melaka: Chan Tek chan, 1983), p.62. Loyalty and patriotism of the Chinese toward Malaysia was questioned by the so called extremist group.

<sup>25</sup> N.J. Funston 1980, *Malay Politics in Malaysia*, p.138.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., p.46.

result indicated that Malays in Kelantan and Trengganu were especially displeased by the UMNO compromise strategy.<sup>27</sup>

*Pragmatism within the Democratic Nationalism.*

The 'Semangat Kebangsaan Melayu' or Malay Nationalism faded after Independence in 1957. The UMNO leaders referred to *zaman pembangunan* or the period of development, whereby they were concerned with distributing economic resources through the First and Second Five Year Plans. Those plans were considered by the Malay masses as rewards for their struggle for *merdeka*, but their political idealism was lost in the process. UMNO seemed to have become more pragmatic and according to one UMNO research officer :<sup>28</sup>

"The Government and UMNO believe that to play with ideology is to waste time and a deviation from its task, which is national development. Hence, pragmatism rather than ideology is strongly emphasised."

However, in commemorating its twentieth anniversary in 1966, UMNO leaders made another attempt to reaffirm ideology, which was renamed Democratic Nationalism [*Nasionalisme Demokrasi*]. Senu Abdul Rahman,<sup>29</sup> the UMNO

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<sup>27</sup> According to the MCA, who used a low-profile strategy of goodwill and cooperation, the Malays did not use their voting strength and special position against others. Thus through the good offices of UMNO, Malays used their voting strength to help the Chinese in particular. In mid-1956, UMNO's acceptance of *Jus Soli* was not revealed to the public, instead an Alliance conspiracy agreed to let the issue be portrayed as British Government policy and the Reid Commission were seen to be responsible for granting *Jus Soli* to non-Malays. This tactic was used to neutralise Malay hostility towards UMNO. To certain Malay leaders the compromise was a long term triumph of a Chinese political strategy to weaken UMNO leaders. This was proved in the 1959 General Election when the MCA demanded more seats in order to increase its share of political power. This time they used coercive methods under the principle of sharing power, based on an increase in numbers of Chinese voters that were legitimized by *Jus Soli*. see Heng Peng Koon, *Chinese Politics in Malaysia: A History of the Malaysia Chinese Association*, (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp.234-235, see also the Minutes of the Alliance Ad Hoc Political Sub-Committee meeting held on 11 and 25 June 1957. and MCA's *The Malaysian Chinese: Toward National Unity* (Kuala Lumpur: MCA, 1982), pp.55-60, 61-85, and 86-96.

<sup>28</sup> Wan Mohd.Mahyiddin 1987, *Politik UMNO dan Isu Nasional*, p.91.

<sup>29</sup> Senu Abdul Rahman was born in 1919 in Jitra, Kedah. and he was educated in a Malay school before being selected to study at SITC where he developed his political consciousness. After graduating he served as a teacher in Kedah (1939-41). In 1943 he was involved in the formation of SABERKAS which was an active member of the UMNO. He was SABERKAS honorary secretary (1945-1947). In 1948, he arrived in Los Angeles, USA, and completed his first degree in political science. In 1954 he worked for a short while with the Indonesian delegation in the United Nations, and in 1955 he was appointed by Tunku as UMNO Secretary General, this enabled him to produce a pamphlet on *Dasar Perjuangan UMNO*. From 1957 until 1964 he was posted to Indonesia and Germany as the Ambassador of Malaya. In 1964, he was given the task of Director of the Alliance Election Campaign for the 1964 election, and also won a Parliamentary seat and subsequently was appointed Minister of Information and Broadcasting. He succeeded Sardon Jubir as the UMNO Youth

Secretary General, introduced this idea in its new form as the basis of UMNO's struggle in the 1960's.<sup>30</sup> But, Senu's idea was only an attempt to legitimise Tunku Abdul Rahman's political approach. "It may have been that UMNO leaders valued practical ideology more highly than pure; or that the emphasis on Malay nationalism was a shield for not emphasising it in practice; or there may simply have been no awareness of a contradiction."<sup>31</sup>

Malay nationalism in UMNO in 1966 had clearly been replaced by the Tunku's personality, as he was considered to be the image of the party; thus personal attacks on his leadership were seen to weaken UMNO.<sup>32</sup>

### *Socialism in UMNO.*

In 1966, there was another attempt to inject socialist ideas into UMNO and there were calls for 'moderate socialism' aimed at achieving a welfare state.<sup>33</sup> The socialist element observed that different UMNO leaders were talking of a "property-owning democracy, liberal democracy, neither left nor right etc."<sup>34</sup> However, although the General Assembly endorsed the idea of Democratic Nationalism, "there were signs that future attempts to define UMNO's ideological standpoint would meet with greater success."<sup>35</sup> Tun Razak himself when he was in power was surrounded

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leader, but he lost his seat in 1969. However, he still claimed the lime light of UMNO through his position as Secretary General. He inherited Kuala Kedah constituency when Tunku vacated it in 1973, yet he was not given a post in government. He was the longest serving Secretary General of the UMNO.

<sup>30</sup> Senu Abdul Rahman, "Falsafah Perjuangan UMNO," in *UMNO 20 Tahun*, (Kuala Lumpur: UMNO, 1966), p.55.

<sup>31</sup> John Funston 1980, *Malay Politics*, p.140.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, p.122.

<sup>33</sup> Harvey Stockwin, "Socialist UMNO?" *Far Eastern Economic Review*, August 18, 1966, p.300.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.* It is difficult to deny the existence of socialist and radical elements in UMNO, particularly in the light of the arrest and the conviction of two former Deputy Ministers in Tun Razak's cabinet, Datuk Abdullah Ahmad and Abdullah Majid, who were accused of associating with communist elements. They confessed in the hope that their sentence would be shorter, but later withdrew their confessions resulting in them spending an extra two years in detention, see Kassim Ahmad, *The Second University*, (Petaling Jaya: Media Intelek, 1984), p.64 and 93. It was proved that this was a ploy used by the UMNO old guard after almost losing their power in the party and government, and it was also to test Hussein Onn's



by 'socialist' influences<sup>36</sup> and Hussein Onn, who replaced Tun Razak, admitted that there were some UMNO members who were influenced by communist activity and ideology.<sup>37</sup> Whether the constitutional crisis of 1983 represented explicit attempts made by socialist elements in UMNO, or merely represented a leadership conflict between political leaders and the monarchy was difficult to determine. Nevertheless, it was a signal to the Malays that they could question the traditional attitude to the monarchical institution.<sup>38</sup>

It was Dr Mahathir's letter to the Tunku Abdul Rahman in 1969 that reflected the reemergence of Malay nationalism among the 'Young Turks' in UMNO, but this failed to take deep root in the party. The letter accused the Tunku of being pro-Chinese and ignoring the Malays' expectations. UMNO members realized that the party's main positive feature had been its role as protector of the Malays, but it was a proof of rising expectations which were not met by the party leadership.<sup>39</sup>

PAS gained momentum the moment UMNO lost its ideological direction and under the leadership of Asri Haji Muda, UMNO's ideological weaknesses were exposed. PAS convinced the Malays of the failure of Malay nationalism in UMNO to

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leadership. Dr. Mahathir faced the same problem when his political secretary, Sidik Ghouse, was arrested due to his collaboration with communist elements, in the form of the Russian secret service. During his leadership, Mahathir accepted the admission of Kassim Ahmad, former Leader of *Parti Socialis Rakyat Malaya (PSRM)* or the Malayan People's Socialist Party, into UMNO; Kassim Ahmad was later to become one of the UMNO branch leaders in Pulau Pinang.

<sup>36</sup> Harold Crouch, Lee Kam Hing, and Michael Ong, *Malaysian Politics and the 1987 Election*, (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1980), p.22. Most of them entered Tun Razak's inner circle of advisers, and when Tun Razak died in 1976, they were left in a vulnerable position coming under attack from the UMNO Youth meeting in March, 1976.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid., pp.24-25, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, November 12, 1976, and *New Straits Times*, November 2, 1976.

<sup>38</sup> The constitutional crisis of 1983 will be discussed in the next chapter. This crisis began when Mahathir faced the imminent accession of the new Yang DiPertuan Agung (the king). The two most probable candidates were Sultan Idris of Perak and Sultan Mahmud Iskandar of Johor, who were considered strong personalities among the nine Malay rulers. There were strong rumours that Mahathir would have 'difficulty' in handling them if either of them became King. Thus, Dr Mahathir tried to reduce the power of the king in giving royal assent to bills passed by the parliament. The conflict between Mahathir and the monarchy institution was prolonged, and until 1992 it has not resolved. See *Far Eastern Economic Review*, October 13, 1983, pp.17-18; October 20, 1983, p.20; October 27, 1983, pp.16-17; November 3, 1983, pp.16-17; November 17, 1983, pp.21-22; November 24, 1983, pp.19-20; December 1, 1983, pp.14-15; December 1983, 1983, pp.27-28; December 15, 1983, pp.14-15; December 22, 1983, pp.16-17; December 29, 1983, pp.13-15;

<sup>39</sup> Overlooking the rising expectations of the Malays, the Tunku, as the Prime Minister and father of Malaysia, took a complacent stance as regards the success of his role as protector of the Malays and the 'sensitivity-guard' of the Chinese, and described himself as the happiest Prime Minister in the world. His policy was seen by the non-Malays as fair and just for all; love, goodwill and harmony amongst all. See Tunku's message *Alliance Manifesto '69*, p.1, and see also Appendix C.

solve Malay problems and Malay poverty. The loss of seats in the May 1969 General Election was due to the failure of the UMNO leadership to anticipate the rising expectations of the Malays. Syed Jaafar Albar, a member of the UMNO old guard, had cautioned the party in 1966 that "UMNO cannot rely on (building) prayer houses and community centres to win future elections...if it does it is bound to be disappointed."<sup>40</sup>

Malay nationalism made its return after the 1969 May 13 incident. The Malays now pinned their hopes on Tun Razak, who was the Director of the National Operations Council. He was the only leader that might achieve a radical change in policy toward the betterment of the Malays' position in their own country. The losses suffered by UMNO in the election of 1969, reflected the attitude of the Chinese toward the Malays, and the attitude of the Malays toward UMNO's political destiny. For that reason, Tun Razak, who understood Malay expectations, launched the DEB (*Dasar Ekonomi Baru*) or New Economic Policy, and also put into operation the National Education Policy. He believed that the restructuring of society was a vital element in nation-building, automatically denying the Tunku's *quid pro quo* policy which had not been congruent with the changing environment since the mid-1960's. In this respect, the Malays came to regard Tun Razak as a symbol of the reemergence of Malay Nationalism.

#### *The Extremists and the ultras.*

There were Malay nationalists in UMNO who had always been branded as 'extremist' and 'ultra' mainly by the foreign media and by the Chinese community.<sup>41</sup> To the Malays, these personalities were nationalists, who defended Malay nationalism, their rights, sovereignty and privileges. Among them were Syed Jaafar Albar, the party Secretary General, who resigned in protest at the Tunku's decision to

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<sup>40</sup> Harvey Stockwin, "A Matter of Degree," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, July 28, 1990, p.139.

<sup>41</sup> See interview with Dr Mahathir in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, September 18, 1969, pp.698-699.

separate Singapore from the Federation of Malaysia in 1966. This man was known as 'the Lion of UMNO', and was joined by Syed Nasir Ismail, another Supreme Council member, who was referred to as 'the fighter for the National language.' Others included Dr Mahathir Mohamad, a Supreme Council member since 1964, and Musa Hitam who was UMNO Executive Secretary before 1969. These last two were referred to by the Tunku as the 'Ultras', "who manoeuvred themselves into positions in UMNO. Some of them have much contact with people on the ground, especially in the rural areas"<sup>42</sup> Indeed, these 'ultras' wanted to take over the whole administration of the Government on their own as a one-Party-state, which was considered by the Tunku as a challenge to his whole policy.<sup>43</sup>

The Tunku realised that the ultras intended to establish a *new order* in both UMNO and the country. He defended his feudalistic viewpoint and assumed that the ultras would remove the constitutional monarchy and set up a Malaysian Republic.<sup>44</sup>

The ultras succeeded in influencing UMNO members and the Malay masses, especially Malay students in the higher institutions. When the ultras supported MCA's withdrawal from the cabinet after the General Election of 1969, the Tunku thought that the proposal of the 'Ultras' and the young bloods to go it alone was unworkable in the long term. The ultras in UMNO had projected Tun Razak as a new leader of the Malays and Malaysia generally,<sup>45</sup> and indeed, it was probably Tun

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<sup>42</sup> Tunku Abdul Rahman, May 13, p. 120.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid., p.121.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid., p.120. The constitutional crisis of 1983 could prove that he was right.

<sup>45</sup> While the Chinese were worried about the Malay image of Tun Razak, accused of being anti-Chinese, the Malays presumed that Tun Razak would take over the leadership of government and the party as soon as was possible. He was considered to be more energetic, full of vision in the quest for the development in the Malay community. Thus, Tun Razak reintroduced Malay nationalism to UMNO, while, at the same time safe-guarding the interests of other communities. He capitalised on Malay support owing to a political challenge from the Chinese voters who wished 'to sweep out the Malays' (Utusan Melayu, June 6, 1969). In a victory procession of DAP and GRM on the eve of May 13, 1969, Malays were jeered at with provocative words such as *Melayu sudah jatuh* [Malays have fallen], *Melayu sekarang tak ada kuasa lagi* [Malays now no longer have power], *Kuala Lumpur sekarang Cina punya* [Kuala Lumpur now belongs to the Chinese] (Goh Cheng Teik, *The May Thirteenth Incident*, p.21) The situation elevated the image of Tun Razak as leader of Malay unity, and the spirit of Malay nationalism reached the same level as after the World War II, when they were challenged by the Chinese in '14 days of terror' and the British 'Malayan Union'. Therefore, "Malay distrust of the Chinese has long standing but recently enmity has increased..." (Far Eastern Economic Review, June 19, 1969, p.658)

Razak who was behind the ultras in changing the government to meet the aspirations of Malay nationalism.

*The Malay Students and Malay Nationalism.*

Before 1969, the leadership of Malay students at the University of Malaya<sup>46</sup> had shown their concern about the problem of poverty among the Malays. They also styled themselves as the 'conscience of society'. In 1969, campus based organizations such as the socialist Club,<sup>47</sup> *PBMUM* (Persatuan Bahasa Melayu Universiti Malaya),<sup>48</sup> and *PMIUM* (Persatuan Mahasiswa Islam Universiti Malaya), *GPMS* (Gabungan Pelajar Melayu Semenanjung) and *PKPIM*, and the other national organizations of Malay students were involved in political moves to press for a change of UMNO leadership. They hoped that Tun Razak would lead the Malays, and UMNO at that time was expected to ensure Malay supremacy in the government. Anti-feudal sentiments had also penetrated the minds of some Malay students and they supported the UMNO ultra group's attempt to mould the aspirations of the Malays. Later, a series of student demonstrations were held in Kuala Lumpur, Johor Bahru, and lastly at Baling in the middle of the 1970's to demonstrate the Malay students' power and their concern for Malay problems. In that series of

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<sup>46</sup> The University of Malaya was formed in Singapore in 1948, and ten years' later the Kuala Lumpur branch began its sessions and subsequently, became an autonomous institution. *UMSU* (University of Malaya Student Union) was formed in 1948, *PBMUM* (Persatuan Bahasa Melayu Universiti Malaya) followed in 1957. Also in 1948, *GPMS* (Gabungan Pelajar Melayu Semenanjung) was founded by Malay undergraduates of the University of Malaya. *PMIUM* (Persatuan Mahasiswa Islam Universiti Malaya) with a few leaders of GPMS formed *PKPIM* (Persatuan Kebangsaan Pelajar Islam Semenanjung) in 1961. In 1958, the government began to indicate their suspicions of the student movement, including Teacher Training College Student Unions which were prohibited from being members of or affiliated to the existing national student associations. The Government approved the registration of PKPM (Persatuan Kebangsaan Pelajar Malaysia) or the National Union of Malayan Students in 1958. This was a forum for student union coordinating bodies consisting of all Colleges with the UMSU as the secretariat. By 1970, PKPM was under the control of the socialist group and had all university student unions as its affiliated members. The affiliation of PMUKM (The National University Students Union) and KSITM (MARA Institute of Technology Students Union) and PMUTM (The University of Technology students Union) provided an opportunity for Malay student leaders to dominate PKPM. Anwar Ibrahim, who influenced PMUKM, KSITM and PMUTM managed to put PKPM under his wing with PKPIM as his right wing, and ABIM as the main body and base of his political activity.

<sup>47</sup> Among its famous leaders were Syed Hamid Ali of Johor, brother of Prof. Dr Syed Husin Ali President of Partai Rakyat Malaya (The Malayan People Party), and Hishamudin Rais of Negeri Sembilan who fled to London after being on the wanted list after the 1974 Demonstration. Syed Hamid and Hishamudin were controlling UMSU at that time.

<sup>48</sup> Amongst its leaders were Sanusi Osman (now Secretary General of Partai Rakyat Malaya), Nordin Razak (who is now the Director General of Kuala Lumpur City), Mahathir Mohd Khir (lecturer at History Department of the University of Malaya presently), and Zulkifli Ahmad (an entrepreneur).

demonstrations, Anwar Ibrahim was projected as the 'future Malay leader' and the contemporary leader of the pressure group, especially when he took over the leadership of ABIM<sup>49</sup> in 1974.<sup>50</sup>

Ibrahim Ali<sup>51</sup> was another vocal student leader whose anti-establishment attitude reflected Anwar Ibrahim's ideas based on egalitarianism. Ibrahim Ali criticised UMNO's government policy as 'unjust' and as discriminating against the Malay masses. "The progress of the Malay masses is more important than the welfare of a small group of Malay capitalists."<sup>52</sup> Indeed, he considered the government to be a 'slave' of the capitalists. He also made the accusation that the Malay power elite had transformed themselves into a group of pseudo-capitalists who went against the interests of the masses. He called this situation a form of oppression and hoped that 'a society that repressed all type of criticism and denied human rights would reveal itself as unjust and ultimately set off a revolution.'<sup>53</sup>

To achieve greater impact, student leaders also took over the leadership of the Malaysia Youth Council.<sup>54</sup> Anwar Ibrahim defeated Haji Suhaimi in the tussle for the

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<sup>49</sup> For a brief note of the formation and development of ABIM see Dewan Budaya, June 1991, p.144. The pro-term committee consisted of Anwar Ibrahim (Chairman), Sanusi Junid (Secretary), Mohd Zain, Mahmud Kitom, and Dasuki Ahmad as committee members. Lawyer Haji Suhaimi and Abdullah Malim Baginda, Director of Youth also involved in drafting the ABIM Constitution. ABIM was officially founded at the 10th PKPIM Annual General Meeting on August 6, 1971, where Anwar Ibrahim was elected Secretary for External Relations, and Sanusi Secretary for *Dakwah*. ABIM was officially approved by the Registrar of Societies on August 17, 1972. ABIM used the Jamaat el-Islami of Pakistan and the Ikhwan-ul-Muslimi of Egypt as its model for their political actions.

<sup>50</sup> ABIM managed to control a number of student associations which were affiliated to PKPIM and PKPM. Anwar Ibrahim and Haji Suhaimi Kamaruddin were the personalities behind the formation of the National University Students Union (KMUK) whose leaders became ABIM's cadres on campus, Ramli Ibrahim, Halim Arshad, Abu Bakar Chik and Idris Jusi were among those who inclined to Islamic revivalism, Halim and Bakar Chik later becoming PAS activists. Idris Jusi, from PMCKM was instructed to take over the leadership of PKPM as a ploy to control all University Student Unions. In fact, Idris was controlling ABIM in Johor after his graduation and he was given a key post in the Education ministry when Anwar Ibrahim became minister in 1986.

<sup>51</sup> Among Anwar Ibrahim's radical supporters was Ibrahim Ali, the President of KSITM (MARA's Institute of Technology Students Union). He led his Union in a mid-night campus *coup d'etat* in attempt to make the authorities recognise certain courses in the institute as equal to university degrees. KSITM had affiliated to both PKPIM and PKPM. His serious involvement in a series of demonstrations eventually led to his arrest and subsequently isolation in a detention camp with Anwar Ibrahim

<sup>52</sup> Ibrahim Ali, RMK 2 Dalam Kritikan! RMK 3 Dalam Penantian!, (Kuala Lumpur: PKPIM, 1975), p.26.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., p.31.

<sup>54</sup> M.A.Fawzi Basri, Pergerakan Belia Di Malaysia: Satu Catitan Ringkas mengenai Perubahan dan Perkembangan Majlis Belia Malaysia 1950-1980, (Kuala Lumpur: Majlis Belia Malaysia, 1980), pp.47-72.

Presidentship in 1972;<sup>55</sup> Yusof Suhaimi of the GPMS was elected Vice President, and Jamil Mukmin of the PKPIM became the Secretary General. When the council was transformed from being a youth leisure organisation to what claimed to be the 'conscience of society', it became an arena of student activism. Issues such as education, poverty and corruption became priorities for the council. The organization also adopted the slogan '*Menegakkan Kebenaran dan Keadilan*' (to strive for truth and Justice).<sup>56</sup> Then the council leadership moved from egalitarian issues to internationalism and Islamic fundamentalism. Indeed, the hands of Islamic dissidents were strengthened when UMNO leaders failed to promote growth with social justice.<sup>57</sup>

### *The Change of Ideology.*

In the mid 1970's, some Malay university students, both in Malaysia and abroad, were attracted to Islamic fundamentalism, under the influence of Ikhwan-ul-Muslimun in Egypt and Jamaat-el-Islami in Pakistan. They rejected western lifestyle and the ideology of progress. At the end of the decade, the success of the Mullahs in the Iranian Revolution inspired confidence in an Islamic resurgence. In the United Kingdom especially, Malay students formed Islamic organizations with the basic aim of Dakwah (Islamic mission). These included the MISG (Malaysian Islamic Study Group),<sup>58</sup>

*Islamic*

*Representative*

*Council*

<sup>55</sup> In a discussion with Sanusi Junid, November 24, 1991 at the Cumberland Hotel, London, it was thought that Sanusi Junid was the one who had proposed the formation of ABIM in 1971 in order to enable Anwar Ibrahim to take over the leadership of Malaysian Youth Council. He proved this by giving his home address, No.3 Jalan Batai Dalam, Kuala Lumpur as the address of the ABIM Headquarters, when it was registered in 1972. Sanusi proposed the name ADAM [Angkatan Dakwah Malaysia] or Malaysian Islamic Missionary Movement, but then the protem committee agreed with the name 'ABIM' proposed by Osman Bakar. Sanusi Junid also described how they were looking for an ABIM leader with a knowledge of Islam. They even sought the advice of Syed Naguib Alattas (a University of Malaya academic staff), since not one of them had the necessary qualifications. For this reason they invited Razali Nawawi of the Islamic Studies Faculty of UKM to be the first President, and Anwar Ibrahim later on became the Secretary General before being elected President.

<sup>56</sup> See M.A.Fawzi Basri 1978. *Pergerakan Belia Di Malaysia*. p.57.

<sup>57</sup> See Ozay Mehmet 1990, *Islamic Identity* pp.150-167, 190-202. See chapter III on the modernization process after 1970.

<sup>58</sup> Before 1974, MISG (the Malaysian Islamic Study Group) was the only Islamic movement for Malaysian students. A group from MISG then formed IRC (the Islamic Representative Council) and *Suara Islam*, and also ABIM. In the United States of America, ABIM leaders expanded their influence by the formation of MISG. ABIM and PAS controlled MISG in the USA until 1982 when Anwar Ibrahim joined UMNO. While MISG in the United Kingdom was under ABIM's influence, in

(IRC),<sup>59</sup> and *Suara Islam* (The Voice of Islam),<sup>60</sup> followed later by ABIM, and Arqam. They eventually proselytized among the Malay masses and demanded the transformation of Malaysia from a secular into a theocratic state.<sup>61</sup> The fundamentalists<sup>62</sup> became a new force in Malay society apart from the existing traditional and modernist elements and other social forces.<sup>63</sup>

The salient features of Islamic revitalization were: the viewing of Islam as *al-din* (a total and comprehensive way of life); the desire to form a global Muslim community (ummah), promoting Islamic fundamentalist values, ideals and solutions; and the search for unity in general movements so as to produce an

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the United States, it was divided into three groups; pro-PAS, Pro-ABIM, and non-partisan. The non-partisan group comprised of members of IRC. The pro-ABIM group then formed the North American ABIM, the Pro-PAS group identified themselves as the *Hizbullah* group which nowadays has been renamed *Hizbu el-Islami*, a protegee of PAS in the United Kingdom and the United States. When all the Malay Islamic fundamentalists were united they together attacked the UMNO Club abroad. Since 1982, IRC and KMUK have joined, MISG and ABIM form another group, Darul Arqam UK group and Hizbu el Islami were another two separate groups. On the conflict between the ABIM, IRC and PAS, see Anuwa Jamalullail, 'Kumpulan Islam semakin berpengaruh', *Dunia Islam*, April 1990, pp 22-24.

<sup>59</sup> The IRC now popularised as *Majlis Syura Muslimun* (MSM) was formed in Brighton in 1974 under the leadership of Abang Abdullah. Originally, it was a Islamic Dakwah movement which survived in the form of a cell movement. It was politically involved when IRC condemned the Malaysian government as undemocratic, un-Islamic and insensitive towards the opposition. IRC leaders infiltrated ABIM and PAS. When ABIM and PAS realised the 'Trojan Horse' strategy of IRC, they cleaned up the IRC elements. IRC leaders who were western educated Malays were branded by ABIM as 'crooks' (jahat). In May 1991, IRC's leaders united to form 'Jemaah Islam Malaysia' (JIM) in order to change its status from 'a secret association' to an 'identifiable organisation. In the late 1980's, IRC or MSM changed its strategy from an 'aggressive' one to one of 'compromise' as regards other Malay student associations. See Izzat Khalis, 'JIM- badan baru Islam mula mengorak langkah', *Berita Minggu*, June 9, 1991.

<sup>60</sup> Formed in the United Kingdom in the mid-1970's, the Voice of Islam (*suara Islam*) was also a dakwah movement and was transformed into a radical organization. This organisation believed in radical social change in Malaysia to meet the ideals of an Islamic state. Therefore, the leaders of *Suara Islam* called for the unity of the Malay dakwah movement to join their proposed political party, known as *Parti Revolusi Islam* (the Islamic Revolutionary Party) (see *Suara Al-Islam*, vol. 2, 10 & 11, Oct/Nov 1976). However, the party's registration was rejected by the Registrar of Societies, and as a result, a few leaders of *Suara Islam* contested the 1982 General Election as Independent candidates, but they lost their deposits. Some of them then crossed to PAS.

<sup>61</sup> See Mohamad Abu Bakar, 'Islamic Revivalism and the Political Process in Malaysia', *Asian Survey*, Vol.21, No.10, (October 1981), pp.1040-1059, and 'Kesedaran Islam and Komitmen Politik', in Mohamad Abu Bakar, *Penghayatan Sebuah Ideal: Suatu Tafsiran Tentang Islam Semasa*, (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1987).

<sup>62</sup> Fundamentalists exist in any great religion such as Islam, Christianity and also Judaism. In Islam the fundamentalists are known in Arabic as *Usuliyyah* or *Salafiyyah*. They have existed through out the history of Islam, particularly from the era of Ibnu Hanbal, Ibnu Taimiyyah and Ibnu al-Qayyum. In 1974, a group of them led by Sallih Sariyyah formed the Islamic Liberation Party in Egypt. They planned to return to the roots of Islamic teaching. The party inspired an attack on the Military Technical Institute of Egypt in 1974. In 1981, President Sadat was assassinated by a group called 'Jihad'. In Saudi Arabia, the fundamentalists or *Salafiyyah* became an official school of thought known as *Wahabiyyah*. The term *fundamentalism* is linked by the western media to the Islamic resurgence. For a brief discussion on the definition of the fundamentalists and secularists, see Astora, J.B., "Dua Istilah Memecahbelahkan Umat Islam," *Al-Islam*, (January 1990), pp. 11-30.

<sup>63</sup> See the differentiation of those forces in Seyyed Hossein Nasr, *Traditional Islam in the Modern World* (London and New York: KPI, 1987), in part II pp.75-120.

effective force to resolve their problems and plight.<sup>64</sup>

On local campuses, ABIM and PAS put forward leaders to manipulate students politics. They saw victories in campus elections as a measure of UMNO unpopularity among young educated Malays. Indeed, these revivalist or fundamentalist Islamic groups, because of their unitary disposition, began to pose a threat to UMNO.<sup>65</sup>

### *The Islamic Resurgence and UMNO.*

Modernization leads people to greater social participation and attempts to influence change. The revivalists were a movement of the masses, their programmes being neither rejectionist nor assimilationist, but uncompromisingly modern,<sup>66</sup> and unlike the older Islamic modernists, the revivalists were a political movement. In the process of modernization, the state controls political power, while urbanization leads the masses to a political identity. In Muslim countries, a Muslim identity has often been chosen. Since 1923 the leaders of the Turkish Republic chose a secular ethnic identity, and the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent created Pakistan with an Islamic identity. However, these identities were developed by the elites not the masses. In the Malay Peninsula, the Malays developed Malay nationalism and the pragmatism of UMNO, but another alternative existed in an Islamic identity, which wanted go back to the Quran and by-pass established traditions, and this was promoted by PAS and ABIM. "Traditionalism has its head in the sand and has failed to respond to the modern challenge through Islam."<sup>67</sup> Indeed, ABIM and PAS defined negatively Malay nationalism, in order to instigate a sentiment of

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<sup>64</sup> Hussin Mutalib, 'Islamic revivalism in ASEAN states: political implication,' *Asian Survey* XXX (9) Sept 1990, p.878.

<sup>65</sup> B.H.Shafruddin 1987, *The Federal Factor*, 368.

<sup>66</sup> See M.E. Yapp, "Contemporary Islamic Revivalism," *Asian Affairs*, XI (2) June 1980, pp. 172-195

<sup>67</sup> Hugh Leach, "Observing Islam From Within and Without," *Asian Affairs*, XXI (1), Feb 1990, p.8.



antagonism and resentment toward UMNO.<sup>68</sup> They even likened the Malay nationalist movement to the Kemalist movement in Turkey, which, they claimed, had been influenced by Jewish Free Masonry,<sup>69</sup> and Arab Nationalism, which they also claimed to have originated from Arab Christian leadership.<sup>70</sup> Therefore, by inference, they linked UMNO nationalism to Zionism, the enemy of Islam.

Dr. Mahathir made this observation on the impact of the Islamic fundamentalist resurgence on Malay society:

"One of the saddest ironies of recent times is that Islam, the faith that once made its followers progressive and powerful, is being invoked to promote retrogression which will bring in its wake weakness and eventual collapse. A force of enlightenment, it is being turned into a rationale for narrow-mindedness; an inspiration toward unity, it is being twisted into an instrument of division and destruction."<sup>71</sup>

In fact, the rise of Khomeini and his Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979<sup>72</sup> coincided with the collapse of the partnership between UMNO and PAS within Barisan Nasional in 1978.<sup>73</sup> This upset signalled the beginning of a new, more radical approach by PAS leaders, and a full-scale battle for the hearts and minds of the rural Malays. The battle divided the rural Malays concerning religious teachings, splitting families, dividing congregations and even "causing murderous fights

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<sup>68</sup> Nakhaei Haji Ahmad, *Ke arah Politik Bermaruah*, (Damansara, Selangor: RAPI, 1990), p.219.

<sup>69</sup> The Jews mobilised nationalism in West Asia through a group called *Itihad wa Taraqqi* (Society and Progress). Turkish nationalism advocated the belief that the Turks were a supreme race.. Turkish Freemasons designed a coup d'etat to overthrow Turkey's sultanate with the force of the group of Young Turks, including Mustafa Kemal. In fact, the Zionist's grand design was to abolish the Islamic caliphate rule, and replace it with a secular government. Another organization which lent assistance to Mustafa Kamal was Alam Islami (Pan Islamism). The Jewish media generated news and stories which idolised Mustafa Kamal and his secular government. Imam Munawwir, *Mengapa Umat Islam Dilanda Perpecahan*, (Singapore: Pustaka Nasional, 1985), pp.118-131.

<sup>70</sup> This was started in Lebanon by Nasif Yazeji (1800-1871) and Butrus Bustani (1819-1873) using the motto '*Patriotism is an article of faith*'. To them, the essence of Arabic civilization lies in independence from Islam. The American University of Beirut, established in 1866, was the impetus behind Arab nationalism. In Egypt, Lutfi as-Sayyid and Saad Zaghlul propagated Islam to support nationalist movements in a fight against imperialism. They advocated the idea that 'religion for God and country for the people'. It was Dr. Said Ramadhan of Ikhwani al-Muslimun, who opposed Arab nationalism which was considered as new assabiyyah or chauvinism that was unknown to Islam. See Maryam Jameelah, *Islam and Modernism*, 5th edn. (Lahore: Mohammed Yusuf Khan, 1988), pp.161-201.

<sup>71</sup> Mahathir Mohamad 1986, *The Challenge*, p.i.

<sup>72</sup> see Robert Graham, *Iran: The Illusion of Power*, (London: Croom Helm, 1979), pp.208-244.

<sup>73</sup> See Alias Mohammad, *Sejarah Perjuangan Parti Pas: Satu Dilemma*, (Kuala Lumpur: Utusan Publication, 1978), pp. 101-37.

between the followers of UMNO and [the PAS]."<sup>74</sup> The phenomenon of one Muslim branding another as infidel reached its peak during Ramadan in July-August 1982.

By the time Dr. Mahathir was leading UMNO, Islamic propagation (Dakwah) movements already stretched across the Peninsula. These could be divided into groups ranging from moderate to radical, from conformist to activist, and from pro-government to anti-government. Among these organizations were Al-Arqam,<sup>75</sup> Tabligh,<sup>76</sup> Persatuan Ulama Malaysia, ABIM and PÁS. UMNO faced particular pressure from ABIM and PAS, and the revivalists challenged UMNO ideology, *Semangat kebangsaan Melayu*, negatively identifying it as a concept of nationalism coming from the west. To them nationalism was a contradiction to Islam<sup>77</sup> and was also considered to be an obstacle to the total transformation of the Muslim world.<sup>78</sup> But to UMNO, ABIM and PAS were more inclined to politics than 'dakwah'.

Since 1974, the conflict between fundamentalist groups and the nationalists in Egypt has been used by ABIM and PAS as a model in their attempt to break UMNO's influence among the Malays, and to mould a new political force in Malaysia.<sup>79</sup> Accordingly, by the end of the 1970's, both organizations were influenced by the ideas of the Iranian Islamic Revolution which demonstrated that an Islamic state

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<sup>74</sup> Far Eastern Economic Review, August 1982, p.18.

<sup>75</sup> For the history, development and assesment of Darul Arqam movement see Chandra Muzaffar, *Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia*, (Petaling Jaya: Fajar Bakti,1987), pp.44-48.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid., pp.44, and 46-48.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid., pp.56-57. UMNO's Malay Nationalism has been described as a kind of asabiyyah, or sectarianism. It results in loyalty to the sect superseding loyalty to Allah.

<sup>78</sup> Kalim Siddiqui, 'Nation-States as Obstacles to the Total Transformation of the Ummah', in *The Impact of Nationalism on the Muslim World*, edited by M Ghayasuddin, (Shah Alam, Selangor: The Open press/Hizbi, 1986), pp.1-21.

<sup>79</sup> For example, the works of Hassan Al-Banna of Egypt's Ikhwan al-Muslimun and Maududi of Jammaat al-Islami were translated and widely distributed by PAS and ABIM in local campuses and to the public. From then on, many titles, written by so-called fundamentalist scholars from West Asia poured onto the book market and were translated into the Malay language. ABIM played the role of publisher in the early 1970's, while PAS was very productive in publishing Islamic books and distributing cassettes of speeches given by their leaders after 1982. In Egypt, there were groups who linked nationalism and Nasserism (Nasseriyah -named after President Gamal Nasser). Nasser was involved in suppressing the Ikhwan Muslimun, which included hanging a few leaders, including Syed Qutub. See an article by Astora J.B. This consists of an interview with the Egytian scholar Fahmi Huwajdi, *Utusan Malaysia*, November 3, 1989. In the United Kingdom, Malay students who controlled the Students Islamic Centre of Sheffield reprinted the work of A Hasan, *Islam dan Nasionalisma* to instigate Malay students abroad to reject Malay nationalism.

could be established to replace the secular government, overcoming problems through faith and Islam, and preserving Islamic identity. ABIM was pushing its radical ideas in PAS by backing its own leaders in the party structure. In 1978, Fadzil Nor, Nakhaie Ahmad, and Haji Hadi Awang, were ABIM leaders who stood for PAS in the General Election. In effect the former ABIM leadership participated in a silent coup to take over the leadership of PAS. In 1989, Fadzil Nor was then elected President, and PAS appointed Yusof Rawa, the former President, as *Mursyid* or party adviser. Haji Hadi Awang was elected Deputy President, and Nakhaie Ahmad became Vice-President. Other important personalities included Syed Ibrahim (formerly ABIM's Treasurer), Halim Arshad (Former PMUKM President and PKPIM leader), and Abu Bakar Cik (former the National University students leader). ABIM's leaders, and the former leaders of The Voice of Islam and IRC, based abroad, united to change PAS into a radical party<sup>80</sup>. They advocated the formation of an Islamic state as an alternative to UMNO, which ABIM and PAS always categorised as a secular party. PAS and the revivalist groups tried to convince the Malay masses that they were working for Islam, and to go against them meant to go against Islam itself. For that reason, ABIM claimed itself to be the biggest contributor to the Islamic resurgence in Malaysia.<sup>81</sup>

### *The Politics of Holier than Thou.*

ABIM and PAS heavily attacked the UMNO ideology of Malay nationalism after 1978. The conflict between UMNO and PAS was intense after PAS was expelled from Barisan Nasional in 1978,<sup>82</sup> and the PAS government in Kelantan was

<sup>80</sup> Datuk Asri Haji Muda mentioned this situation in an interview he gave when he was forced to leave PAS. He condemned the attitude in PAS which began with the issue of *Kafir-mengkafir*. *Utusan Melayu* and *Utusan Malaysia*, April 27, 1983.

<sup>81</sup> The editorial of *Risalah*, February 1991, p.11.

<sup>82</sup> According to Sanusi Junid the idea of ABIM working with PAS started from the very beginning. However, ABIM was against the idea of 'wakil rakyat' becoming committee members, and ABIM was also against PAS joining Barisan Nasional in 1974. Sanusi Junid was advised by Anwar Ibrahim not to contest the Jerai parliamentary seat but Sanusi ignored this. When Sanusi won the election he was rejected by ABIM and branded as 'munafik' (hypocrite). Previously Fadzil Nor, another ABIM committee member, agreed to follow the advice not to contest in Padang Terap by election even though he had already resigned from the teaching staff of the Islamic college- Maahad Mahmud. However, he was later given a lecturership at the National Technology University. A discussion with Sanusi Junid, November 24, 1991.

taken over by the Federal Government under the Emergency Act, being put under the charge of a senior Civil servant.<sup>83</sup> The Politics of '*Holier than thou*' (aku lebih suci) became pervasive in Malay society, and these developed beyond the issue of *Assabiyah* and Malay nationalism, to the issue of *kafir-mengkafir* (accusation of others as unbelievers). This contributed to another series of conflicts in Malay society,<sup>84</sup> especially in Trengganu, Kelantan and Kedah, being UMNO and PAS strongholds.

Both PAS and ABIM were united social forces that created political pressure which paralysed UMNO with the charge that the latter advocated a merely parochial ideology<sup>85</sup>. ABIM and PAS claimed to uphold an ideology created by Allah, while UMNO ideology had only been created by human beings. Thus, the former was 'holier' than the latter. PAS encouraged the Malays to perceive UMNO as impure, tarnished and as having deviated from Islamic principles. PAS also introduced the Malays to the Iranian Revolution's propaganda and terms, such as Muslim-*Kafir* (infidel-non muslim), *mustazaffin* (the oppressed) and *mustakbirin* (the oppressors).<sup>86</sup> The Barisan Nasional government, led by UMNO, was according to them *kafir*.<sup>87</sup> Thus, PAS successfully used Islam as a medium of protest.

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<sup>83</sup> See Arif Budiman Tahir, *Politik Darurat* (Kuala Lumpur: El Ekhwan Enterprise, 1978).

<sup>84</sup> The UMNO and PAS leaders, and members at the local level, subscribed to 'Holier than thou' politics. A series of conflicts between UMNO and PAS developed at local levels, based on the following issues; 'two imams', performing separate public prayer (*sembahyang Jemaah*), power struggles in the management of mosques, and two separate cemetery areas. See Abdul Razak Ayub, *Perpecahan Bangsa Melayu*, (Shah Alam: Dewan Pustaka Fajar, 1985).

<sup>85</sup> Siddiq Fadil, one of the ABIM leaders, who took over the leadership in 1982, thought the attempt of the group of people who strove for Islam through Malay nationalism was nonsense and baseless (*tidak berasas*). According to him, Islam had its own way, and its quality should be maintained, and that for this reason Islam must not be mixed up with alien ideologies such as nationalism, socialism, capitalism and so on. See Siddiq Fadil, *Kebangkitan Umat: Kenyataan dan harapan*, (Kuala Lumpur: Yayasan Dakwah Islam Malaysia, 1977), p.68.

<sup>86</sup> Chandra Muzaffar 1987, *Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia*, p.85.

<sup>87</sup> PAS then issued a list of *fatwa* (Islamic ruling considered legally binding upon Muslims). Among these were that those who supported UMNO were *kafir*; to have an imam or Registrar of Marriage who was an UMNO supporter was illegal on religious grounds; animals slaughtered by UMNO members could not be eaten; PAS members who died were guaranteed a place in *syurga* (the Heaven), while UMNO members would go to *neraka* (the Hell); the Barisan Nasional was an oppressive government, which did not support Islamic law, and therefore Muslims were not obliged to submit to this oppressive government, they could not follow the advice and act on information given by Islamic scholars who worked with the *kafir* government. See Mukhtar Che Ali, 'Kepemimpinan Y.A.B. Dato' Seri Amar Di Raja, Dato' Haji Wan Mokhtar Bin Haji Ahmad Di Dalam Politik Trengganu: Satu Tinjauan,' (Unpublished Graduation Exercise, Department of Political Science, the National University of Malaysia, 1984/85), p.60.

ABIM and PAS had strong backing from Islamic-based universities, Malay students abroad<sup>88</sup> and local higher education institutions. There existed Islamic groups of cadres specially trained by PAS and ABIM, such as those in Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia known as *Angkatan Tindakan Mahasiswa Islam* [ATMA] (The Islamic Students Action Front), and *Ikatan Studi Islam* (Islamic Study Group). In various Universities these groups normally controlled the Islamic Student Society, being in conflict with other groups such as *Tindakan Siswa Bersatu* [TSB] (the United Student Action) in Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, and other student organizations in other universities which were branded by Islamic group as nationalist or liberal.. These organizations were considered by PAS and ABIM as allied to the government, or in ABIM's famous terms they were referred to as '*Pengampu Kerajaan*' (blind government supporters or pro-establishment). Islamic groups rejected Malay identity for that of Islam, getting moral and sometimes material support from their patron, ABIM<sup>89</sup> and PAS. Their opponents were accused of receiving support from UMNO which was channelled through the *Biro Tata Negara* (BTN) of the Prime Minister's Department. To ABIM, PAS and their revivalist groups, almost every policy planned and performed by UMNO was said to be secular, and not congruent with Islam.<sup>90</sup> They claimed that the New Economic Policy was conceptually un-Islamic,<sup>91</sup> and

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<sup>88</sup> See an article entitled 'Kumpulan Islam Bertelagah dengan UMNO di United Kingdom', *Sarina*, February 15, 1983, p.25.

<sup>89</sup> ABIM sponsored and planned a campaign strategy in the university student unions or Students Representative Council elections. These included putting-forward its own leadership of the student governments in local universities. Normally, the Islamic leaders who represented ABIM and PAS interests were bound to serve in PKPIM and later in ABIM. Since ABIM and PKPIM had their own private schools, students from the schools were their cadres and groomed to take over the leadership of university student unions. When the government ordered the establishment of Students Affairs Divisions in every university, ABIM and PAS launched an attack on the university administration through student organizations in campuses. When Anwar joined UMNO, and the IRC groups were excluded from PAS, the Islamic groups within the universities also divided. For example, in Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia PAS supporters formed IPU (Ikatan Perpaduan Ummah), and ABIM controlled the ATMA, and in the University of Malaya IRC slowly took over the leadership of the student's union.

<sup>90</sup> The fundamentalist groups attacked UMNO's ideology and culture as being very secular. They ridiculed UMNO ceremonial occasions, such as singing the UMNO official song, the procession of 'Bunga Manggar' (decorated flowers) which normally was orchestrated by Wanita UMNO and playing '*Kompang*' (Malay traditional drums) performed by Pemuda UMNO. This was said to be irrelevant to Islamic culture. They deprecated UMNO's traditions as the culture of 'Bunga Manggar and Kompang', which bore negative connotations.

<sup>91</sup> See *New Straits Times*, July 8, 1979 which published Dr Mahathir's reply which stated that 'UMNO championed the accumulation of wealth, power and knowledge, because these were necessary for the defence of Islam.'

that so too was the 'Look East Policy'<sup>92</sup> and the Amanah Saham Nasional (The National Investment Trusts).

However, UMNO continued to receive much support from the younger generation in rural areas. Haji Suhaimi Dato Kamaruddin, the President of the 4B Youth Movement<sup>93</sup> became the Ketua Pemuda UMNO, changing the 4B constitution to enable the organization to have its machinery coincide with parliamentary constituencies instead of being based on district administration boundaries. The 4B at one time was indirectly an UMNO front. When Sanusi Junid was elected the President of MAYC (Malaysian Association of Youth Clubs)<sup>94</sup> in 1973, he also convinced the organization to incline toward supporting UMNO. Politically, the youth movements had better opportunities to place their leaders in local UMNO structures or to be selected to contest in elections.

Another organization which came under heavy attack from ABIM was GPMS (*Gabungan Pelajar Melayu Semenanjung*). The GPMS, which had survived since 1948, reserved its membership and activities for the Malays. ABIM considered GPMS as advocating the idea of Malay nationalism which was also promulgated by UMNO. Thus, as UMNO was harassed by ABIM, the GPMS also faced attacks from ABIM in psychological warfare among the students and youth organizations. ABIM

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<sup>92</sup> See Chapter V..

<sup>93</sup> In Malaysia, the Malaysian Youth Council was the most influential coordinating body of national youth organizations. Among its members were MAYC, 4B, GPMS, ABIM, PKPIM, PKPM, along with other religious as well as welfare-based voluntary youth associations. 4B was based on the concept the 4H Youth organization in the USA. 4B's history began with an attempt made by UMNO Youth in the 1960s extend UMNO influence through the formation of Pertubuhan Pemuda Desa (the Rural Youth Organization), the forerunner of 4B. Consequently, most of the leaders of 4B were also UMNO Youth leaders at National, state and local level. However, some UMNO Youth leaders were committed to MAYC, another youth association that was formed in 1958. Both MAYC and 4B were affiliated to the Youth Council at district, state and national levels. Haji Suhaimi, Harun Idris' nephew, was a lawyer who became a politician. He was a Selangor State Assemblyman, and a member of the Selangor State Executive Council, when he started leading 4B. Through his political influence, 4B ventured into business and acquired state land for the construction of a business complex as well as the 4B Headquarters. He lost in the election of the Malaysian Youth Council's President to Anwar Ibrahim in 1972, yet managed to control 4B leadership until the present day. For further information on the politics of Youth organizations in Malaysia, see M.A.Fawzi Basri 1978, *Pergerakan Belia di Malaysia*, passim.

<sup>94</sup> This was formed in 1958 as a youth club. The MAYC had its affiliated youth clubs throughout the Peninsula. When Sanusi Junid took over the leadership, he developed MAYC as a business-minded organization besides performing youth voluntary activities. Through its cooperative body 'Shamelin', Sanusi Junid built up MAYC as a strong youth organisation. Among MAYC leaders were Tunku Abdullah former Rawang MP and leading Malay businessman through his Malewar Holdings and their Negeri Sembilan Royal business connection-the Antah group; Sidik Ghouse former MAYC Executive Secretary who later became Dr Mahathir's Political Secretary; and Dr Mahathir himself was one of the MAYC's Trustees. The MAYC also received a plot of land from the Selangor government in 1960's on which Wisma MAYC is now built.

was armed with evidence that some of GPMS's former leaders were now in the UMNO leadership, including Musa Hitam and Abdullah Ahmad Badawi who later became Anwar's political enemies in UMNO. From then on the GPMS was seen as pro-UMNO, which implied that GPMS would oppose Islamic revivalist ideas. In that context, ABIM, PAS and their associate groups also refused to identify themselves as Malays but rather as Muslims.<sup>95</sup>

### *UMNO Reactions.*

Repeating the performance of Ikhwan al-Muslimun in Egypt in confronting a government that put emphasis on Arab nationalism,<sup>96</sup> ABIM and PAS imported the Ikhwan's ideas, proclaiming themselves as fundamentalist groups and then joining hands<sup>97</sup> in an offensive to discredit UMNO ideology and its culture, defined as secularist and pragmatist<sup>98</sup> and considered to be antagonistic toward Islam. However, this attempt to win over the Malays failed and the UMNO leadership struck back through its counter-strategy of maintaining that the so-called Islamic fundamentalist groups in reality were religious groups who were manipulating Islam for their own political causes.

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<sup>95</sup> See Ozay Mehmet 1990, *Islamic Identity*, pp.9-29. In my interview with former Malay students leaders who studied in the United States of America and the United Kingdom between 1975-1982, it was stated that the IRC, MISG and ABIM which upheld the concept of universalism and the unity of *the ummah* influenced their members to reject government policies such as the New Economic Policy and the Malay special position in the constitution..

<sup>96</sup> The Ikhwan al Muslimun which was formed in 1954, was the one movement in the Arab world which fearlessly propagated unadulterated faith and was capable of resisting the anti-Islamic ideologies of nationalism and socialism. Dr Said Ramadhan, former leader of Ikhwan considered Arab nationalism as new *Asabiyah* or chauvinism unknown to Islam, "[Islam] is the genuine submission to the will of Allah, the Lord of the worlds, the submission of every affair of life to the commandments of Allah. Unless this happens, no unity of Muslim community can become al Jamiyah al Islamiya". Dr Taha Hussein the Egyptian Minister of Education in the 1950's wanted Egypt to be associated with Western forms of intellectual and cultural life. In fact, in 1920's Shaikh Ali Abd- Ar Raziq was the first *Alim* (scholar) to oppose the khalifate and urged Muslims to adopt secularism and nationalism as their salvation. There later developed the idea of 'socialism as the panacea to economic and moral ills.' See Maryam Jameelah, *Islam and Modernism*, (Lahore: Muhammad Yusof Khan, 1988), pp.161-201.

<sup>97</sup> There were unstructured links between ABIM which represented youthful western and Arabic educated groups and the PAS leadership which consisted of ulama. ABIM was involved in political matters on the ground and believed that Islam encourages full social commitment. After visiting Iran in March 1979, the ABIM leader declared his support for the principles of the Iranian Revolution, and tried to minimise the differences between Sunni and Shi'ite. See Judith Nagata 1984, *The Reflowering of Malaysian Islam*, pp.101, 190, and 225.

<sup>98</sup> See Amaluddin Darus, *Serbasalah Melayu di Malaysia*, (Subang Jaya: Syarikat Abad, 1988),p.229 dan *Harakah*, May 1, 1987.

In the General election of 1978, UMNO felt the impact of a resurgent PAS which used Islam as the party's ideology. To a certain extent PAS leaders tried to influence the Malays proclaiming PAS as *Parti Allah* (the Party of Almighty God). UMNO leaders criticised the PAS strategy which denominated Islamic teaching (Islamic aqidah),<sup>99</sup> as party ideology. ABIM fielded its top leaders in the 1978 General Election under PAS's own banner of confronting UMNO.<sup>100</sup> The whole machinery of ABIM was mobilised in the PAS campaign to gain Malay support in the era which is referred to as that of Islamic resurgence.

In ABIM's view, the acceptance of Islam as an exclusive objective by UMNO, would destroy the very *raison d'être* of the party itself. PAS and its allied forces blamed UMNO which gave priority to maintaining its relation with other parties in *Barisan Nasional* and which did not accept the idea of the implementation of Islamic law in Malaysia.<sup>101</sup>

The first reaction to the revivalist group was in the form of rhetorical statements by UMNO leaders to defend the organization. Hussein Onn, the UMNO President reaffirmed that UMNO had defended Islam in the country, "... we spend so much money on Islam... If we don't ... [PAS] will get us. The party [would], and does claim that we are not religious and the [Malays] will lose faith."<sup>102</sup>

UMNO then launched a psychological war against PAS and some dakwah groups who were labelled as 'communists in white hats, playing up the distinction between Sunni and Shiite Islam.'<sup>103</sup> At the same time, PAS and ABIM put forward

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<sup>99</sup> Haji Dasuki, "Kenapa Aqidah Islam disamakan dengan ideologi PAS," *Mingguan Malaysia*, July 2, 1978.

<sup>100</sup> see article "ABIM dan Politik," in *Risalah* (The Organ of ABIM), July-August 1978.

<sup>101</sup> Muhammad Abu Bakar 1987, *Penghayatan Sebuah Ideal*, p.159 and compared to the statements of the UMNO leaders in *Utusan Malaysia*, Jun 30, 1979; *Utusan Zaman*, April 22 1979, and *Utusan Melayu*, July 18, 1979. In 1991, *Utusan Malaysia's* editorial outlined the approaches toward certain narrow-minded Islamic groups which influenced the Malays negatively, see Editorial of *Mingguan Malaysia*, November 10, 1991, p.9.

<sup>102</sup> See articles by Rodney Tasker, "The Explosive mix of Muhammad and Modernity" *Far Eastern Economic Review*, February 9, 1979, pp 22-25.

<sup>103</sup> Judith Nagata, "Religious Ideology and Social Change:", p.429.



their offensive and defensive strategies through their respective media organs '*Harakah*' and '*Risalah*.'

Biro Agama UMNO (the UMNO Religious Bureau) led by Wan Mokhtar Ahmad, UMNO Vice President, launched their counter-strategy plan in the form of publications and the formation of community service groups in every village. The party information agents were also supplied with books and articles relating to verses in the Quran for guidance in their meeting sessions with UMNO members.<sup>104</sup> A book entitled *UMNO -Tuduhan dan Penjelasan* [UMNO -Accusation and Explanation] was distributed to Malays through the UMNO Religious Bureau in every state. In August 1985, about 396 representatives of the Religious Bureau and information bureau, from states and divisional levels, attended special meetings or *syura* in Kemaman, Trengganu, in order to face the challenge from PAS.<sup>105</sup>

Generally, not many UMNO leaders were brave enough to logically and rationally criticise religion. One article depicted the situation in which UMNO leaders had taken a silent (*membisu*) attitude because they were afraid of being branded as 'unIslamic' (Tidak Islam) or 'less Islamic' (kurang Islam), some even becoming '*pak turut*' (yes men).<sup>106</sup> However, it argued Dr Mahathir was among the few who had a progressive and pragmatic understanding and interpretation of Islam.

#### *The Co-optation of Anwar Ibrahim and containment strategy.*

The 'holy' alliance of ABIM and PAS was disturbed in the General Election of 1982, when Dr Mahathir agreed to 'invite'<sup>107</sup> Anwar Ibrahim, the ABIM President,

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<sup>104</sup> Penyata Tahunan UMNO 1985, p.5. The Bureau published and reproduced seven books and articles entitled: *Pendapat dan Panduan Sekitar Ekstrimis Agama*; *Asabiah Bukan Kebangsaan*; *Beberapa Konsep Tentang Nilai-nilai Islam*; *Penerapan Nilai-nilai Islam -Arah dan Matlamat*; "UMNO memperjuangkan Islam"; "Kejayaan UMNO"; and "Pandangan Islam terhadap Nyanyian dan Muzik."

<sup>105</sup> Ibid.

<sup>106</sup> The editorial of *Mingguan Malaysia*, November 24, 1991, p.9.

<sup>107</sup> A discussion of this will be conducted in the next chapter. In an interview with Sanusi Junid, (London, November 24, 1991), he mentioned that in 1982, he was approached by an ABIM representative, Osman Bakar, who conveyed the message that Anwar Ibrahim had offered himself to join UMNO. Sanusi Junid reported this to Dr Mahathir who declined the offer on the grounds that he only wanted Anwar Ibrahim to be neutralised, not to become a part of the UMNO structure. Osman

to join UMNO in order to bolster its [UMNO] appeal to Muslim Malay voters."<sup>108</sup> However, the entry of Anwar Ibrahim into UMNO politics posed a problem for Dr Mahathir's political game of checks and balances in the party, even though it was a useful tactic to undermine PAS's strategy in the coming election. This entry was a threat to a number of ambitious second-echelon figures in the UMNO leadership and raised questions concerning Mahathir's power base. In the 1982 General election, PAS was defeated. Though Dr Mahathir did not refer to any particular fundamentalist group, he claimed that the election was a defeat for 'deviationists', people who were not interpreting Islam the way it should be interpreted.<sup>109</sup>

The Overwhelming victory of UMNO in the 1982 General Election caused Mahathir to reaffirm his stand on Islam:<sup>110</sup>

"...UMNOs struggle has not ended. Today we face the biggest struggle- the struggle to change the attitude of Malays in line with the requirements of Islam in this modern age... UMNO's task now is to enhance Islamic teaching... Naturally this cause is far bigger than the previous struggles of UMNO. Of course it is not easy to succeed. But UMNO must pursue it, whatever the obstacles, for this is our real cause."

In his statement on joining UMNO, Anwar Ibrahim declared that he was aware of the contradiction arising out of his move, but he reaffirmed that he would not compromise his principles.<sup>111</sup> However, he had strong reasons to join UMNO, including his close relationship with Mahathir since 1969. Indeed, he was convinced and persuaded by the performance of the Mahathir administration, that changes were being made in the government's commitment to disseminate the real value of Islam and to eradicate such evils as corruption,

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Bakar then approached Ibrahim Ali, Tengku Razaleigh's right-hand man. Tengku Razaleigh led the Kelantan UMNO, and needed extra power to destroy PAS in Kelantan for the General Election of 1982, and for his political strategy in UMNO. At the same time, Harun Idris (UMNO Vice President) also agreed that Anwar Ibrahim should join UMNO in his strategy to expel Haji Suhaimi Kamaruddin from the Head of the Pemuda UMNO. Tengku Razaleigh and Harun Idris convinced Mahathir to accept Anwar Ibrahim for tactical reasons.

<sup>108</sup> *Far Eastern Economic Review*, April 2, 1982, pp.23-24.

<sup>109</sup> *Asiaweek*, May 7, 1982, p.42.

<sup>110</sup> *New Straits Times*, September 11, 1983.

<sup>111</sup> *Mingguan Malaysia*, April 19, 1987.

inefficiency and neglect of the poor."<sup>112</sup> As a new broom, Anwar showed loyalty to his new boss<sup>113</sup> and he was appointed Deputy Minister in the Prime Minister's Department. The appointment allowed him to immediately play a key role in the government's counter-attack on the rising movement of Islamic fundamentalism, while changing his own attitudes, style and thinking drastically.<sup>114</sup> To him, UMNO was now no longer a secular political party.<sup>115</sup>

In actual fact, UMNO's new policies towards Islam had started before Anwar joined the party.<sup>116</sup> This included for example, the formation of the Islamic Missionary and Training Institute (INDAH) and the Islamic Research Centre in the Islamic Centre complex, and the setting up of *Yayasan Dakwah Islam Malaysia* (YADIM) or the Islamic Missionary Foundation of Malaysia in 1973.<sup>117</sup> When PAS entered the coalition government in January 1973, UMNO as the leader of Barisan Nasional, agreed in the *Perjanjian 13 Perkara* (The 13 Point Coalition Agreement)<sup>118</sup> in which more recognition was to be given to Islamic values. This was later known as the policy of disseminating Islamic Values or *Penerapan Nilai Islam*. The Formation of Bank Islam (the Islamic Bank),<sup>119</sup> Yayasan Ekonomi

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<sup>112</sup> *Far Eastern Economic Review*, April 2, 1982.

<sup>113</sup> *Mingguan Malaysia*, September 7, 1986.

<sup>114</sup> For a criticism of his changes, see Mohd. Sayuti Omar, *Anwar Ibrahim: Mimpi dan Realiti*, (Kuala Lumpur: Tinta Merah, 1990), pp.33-53 and 111-121. This book became controversial in the 1990 UMNO Election. See Chapter VIII. Another book published by the same author which commented on Anwar Ibrahim was *Merdeka Kedua* (Kuala Lumpur: Tinta Merah, Feb.1990), pp.126-137.

<sup>115</sup> *Berita Harian*, April 19, 1984.

<sup>116</sup> Hussin Mutalib, *Islam and Ethnicity in Malay Politics*, (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1990), p.134. Among them were; a government declaration to revise the national legal system bringing it into line with Islamic law (1978); the Government's declaration to establish a MS26 million Southeast Asian Islamic Research Centre (1979); a declaration stating that Islamic religious knowledge be made an examination subject at the SPM level (1979); the official launching of the National Dakwah Month (1979); a policy declaration proposing the remodelling of Malaysia's economic system into an Islamic one (1980); the building of the first Islamic Teachers' College costing MS22 million (1980); the establishment of an Islamic Bank, Islamic Pawnshop, Islamic Insurance, Islamic Economic Foundation, and setting up of the Islamic Resource Group and the Special Islamic Enforcement Group (1981-82); and finally, a sharp increase in Islamic programmes over radio and television since 1981..

<sup>117</sup> M.L. Lyon, "The Dakwah Movement in Malaysia," *RIMA*, Vol.13, No. 2., December 1979, pp.34-45.

<sup>118</sup> See Alias Mohammad 1978. *Sejarah Perjuangan Parti PAS*, pp.187-191. On December 28, 1972 Tun Razak and Asri Haji Muda of PAS signed an agreement to form a coalition government of the Alliance and PAS which originated in the formation of the Barisan Nasional.

Islam (Islamic Economic Foundation) followed and in March 1982, Mahathir announced that an Islamic university using English and Arabic would be set up. However, these were considered by ABIM and PAS as cosmetic measures and UMNO was expected to bring about salient structural change in the government administration. Thus the UMNO government encouraged the rejuvenation of the Islamic ethos as part of its containment strategy to convince Muslims that UMNO, too, stood to safeguard and promote Islam.<sup>120</sup>

However, the UMNO leadership denied that PAS seriously intended to form an Islamic state.<sup>121</sup> Anwar Ibrahim also changed his tactics, declaring that he had never advocated an Islamic State or an Islamic order for Malaysia since Malaysia was a multi-ethnic country.<sup>122</sup> By 1984, Dr Mahathir changed his tactic from defensive to aggressive, and accused PAS of being under the control of extremists who wanted to coerce non-Muslims to submit to Islamic laws.<sup>123</sup> This accusation distanced PAS from non-Muslim support.

### *The Inclusion of Dr Yusof Nor.*

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<sup>119</sup> The Bill and the amendments were tabled at the Parliamentary session in October 1982. The interest-free Islamic Bank had an authorised capital of MS500 million, of which MS100 million was paid initially. The Bank Islam Malaysia (Malaysia Islamic Bank PLC) rewarded its depositors, who were not necessarily Muslims, through dividends based on the profit-and-loss share scheme. Apart from banking activities carried out along the lines of a partnership, deposit-taking, and trading, the bank also undertook the management of endowed property and estates left behind by deceased clients. See J. Victor Morris, *Anwar Ibrahim: Resolute in Leadership*, (Petaling Jaya: Arenabuku, 1983), p.56.

<sup>120</sup> Hussin Mutalib 1990, 'Islamic revivalism', p.889. see also Hanzah @ Hamzah Bin Hamat, 'Perjuangan Menegakkan Islam di Malaysia oleh PAS dan UMNO: Satu Perbandingan', (Unpublished graduation exercise, Syariah Dept., Faculty of Islamic Studies, the National University of Malaysia, 1989).

<sup>121</sup> In PAS's original constitution, there was no mention of the establishment of an Islamic state. PAS's main objective was 'izzul Islam wa-l- Muslimin' which means 'for the success of Islam and its ummah' (Ahmad Kamar, *Islam Tercabar: Satu Pandangan terhadap Perjuangan PAS*, Kuala Lumpur: Pustaka Ilmu, 1979, p.82). However, the radicalism of PAS was inspired by the success of Islamic Revolution in Iran. PAS strategists adopted tactics with the aim of influencing the public as had been practised by Islamic fundamentalist groups in Iran, see Haji Suhaimi Said (former member of PAS) in *Utusan Malaysia*, July 18, 1990.

<sup>122</sup> *Ibid.*, 36.

<sup>123</sup> *Utusan Melayu*, October 26 and 27 October 1984.

Anwar Ibrahim was projected as the Malay intellectual who promoted the Islamic way of life. In 1984, the 'Anwar Ibrahim factor' was balanced by the inclusion of a modern Malay Islamic scholar. Dr Mahathir invited Dr Yusof Nor, a Middle-East educated and former Deputy Vice Chancellor (Students Affairs) of Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, to join the government as Senator and Deputy Minister in the Prime Minister's Department, being put in charge of the government's Islamic affairs. A moderate and soft (lembut) Islamic personality, Dr Yusof Nor, was in fact, not alone. His entry was considered a strengthening factor in building the moderate Islamic image of UMNO and he joined forces with his Islamic educated friends such as Wan Mokhtar Ahmad, the party Vice President who was also the Chairman of the UMNO Religious Bureau and the Menteri Besar of Trengganu, and Haji Dasuki Ahmad, the Parliamentary Secretary of the Information Ministry. These then won the cooperation of *Pusat Islam* (the Islamic Centre), which was under the command of their colleague, Dr Abdul Hamid Othman,<sup>124</sup> to implement the government policy of disseminating Islamic values. However, they were considered by PAS as corrupt scholars. Meanwhile, Anwar Ibrahim was accused of using Islam, trying to project himself as the champion of Islam, for his own political purposes within UMNO.<sup>125</sup>

Anwar Ibrahim's Islamic credentials were privately questioned by UMNO members who had been Islamically trained at the prominent Al-Azhar University in Cairo. They considered Anwar as a secular-trained leader who had merely used Islam as a platform for his student leadership role.<sup>126</sup> These Islamic scholars had been Anwar's target before he joined UMNO, but now he had to work closely with them in upholding UMNO's policy on Islam.

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<sup>124</sup> He was formerly a university lecturer of the Islamic Faculty of UKM, and was then seconded to the Ministry of Education as the Director of the Islamic Education Division, before being promoted as the Director General of the Islamic Centre. In the 1990 General Election, he was elected MP for Sik constituency and appointed Deputy Minister in the Prime Minister's Department as well as in charge of Islamic Affairs.

<sup>125</sup> See also *Far Eastern Economic Review*, May 7, 1987, p.14.

<sup>126</sup> *Far Eastern Economic Review*, October 1, 1987, p.29.

However, the result of the 1980's UMNO General Assemblies reflected a consensus of UMNO members on the importance of the role of Islam. Wan Mokhtar Ahmad, the chairman of the UMNO Religious Bureau and Menteri Besar of Trengganu, was reelected as one of the UMNO Vice Presidents. In 1984, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, another graduate from the Department of Islamic studies of the University of Malaya and also from a religious family background, was appointed Minister in the Prime Minister's Department that administered the Pusat Islam, and was newly elected UMNO Vice President. In 1987, when Ghaffar Baba, the most senior Vice President was elected Deputy President, the vacuum was filled by Anwar Ibrahim. He relinquished his post as UMNO Youth Leader as a political tactic and, as a result of his 'industrious' efforts at Islamizing UMNO and the government, and as Mahathir's strong man, he managed to secure the third Vice Presidentship. Also, the General Assembly in 1987 gave the highest vote to Dr Yusof Nor, the Deputy Minister who was in charge of Religious Affairs as an UMNO Supreme Council member. Thus, the foreign media observed that, reflecting the mood among Malays, UMNO elections saw several Islamists gain the highest votes in their categories.<sup>127</sup>

According to one of Anwar's supporters, there was a conflict among two types of UMNO Islamicists; the Middle East-trained, led by Wan Mokhtar, Dr Yusof Nor and Dasuki Ahmad, and the secular-trained but higher profile leaders such as Anwar and his group. The achievement of the Islamicists seemed to signal a slowly growing conflict between the forces of Malay nationalism and Islam. It was considered that with the catapulting of Anwar into greater power in UMNO, the party had gradually shifted from 'Malay-cum-Islam' towards Islam as the priority.

To Dr Mahathir, the embracing of Anwar was an asset to both himself and the Islamic image of UMNO. But to certain UMNO leaders, the existence of Anwar created more rifts among the UMNO leaders. Anwar seemed to enjoy Mahathir's confidence and played the role of a king maker, seeming to have 'reward power' and

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<sup>127</sup> *Far Eastern Economic Review*, May 7, 1987. p.14.

'reference power'.<sup>128</sup> By late 1986, he succeeded in controlling the *Biro Tata Negara*<sup>129</sup> and was able to influence the Director of the Bureau to appoint his ABIM hard core to hold appointments in the Bureau at various administrative levels. Therefore, before the UMNO election of 1987, Anwar held the BTN fully in his hands, and his men were ready to move for him in the party under the pretext of Islamizing UMNO and the government.

### *'Riding' the Religion.*

Being promoted as the champion of Islam and portrayed as an influential minister and confidant of Mahathir and Daim Zainuddin<sup>130</sup>, the Minister of Finance who controlled UMNO's business interests, Anwar Ibrahim gained support from the Fleet group communication firms such as the *New Straits Times Press* (NST), *Berita Harian*, and TV3. Ahmad Sebi Abu Bakar of NST and later the leader of TV3,<sup>131</sup>

<sup>128</sup> For example Anwar managed to convince Dr Mahathir and by passed Sanusi Junid, the party Secretary General, on the appointment of 'his man', Nasaruddin Alang Saidin, an MP from Parit, as UMNO and Barisan Nasional Executive Secretary. He also managed to persuade Mahathir to appoint Kamaruddin Jaafar his close ABIM friend as Political secretary to the Deputy Prime Minister, Ghafar Baba.

<sup>129</sup> The BTN had become a target of Anwar Ibrahim since the mid 1980's. BTN had made a counter-attack on ABIM and PAS movements' control of campus politics. BTN played a role in promoting Dr Mahathir, Musa Hitam and Abdullah Badawi to power. In 1984, BTN was criticised by certain groups in UMNO for its role in campaigning for Musa Hitam. Fahmi Ibrahim, who was later identified as a supporter of Tengku Razaleigh discredited BTN's role. Anwar needed to field his men in BTN before the party election in 1987. With the cooperation of Nor Azam, Political Secretary to the Prime Minister, and his father in law, Wan Ismail, they started a clean up operation of the BTN by transferring and terminating the service of BTN staff who were identified as Musa Hitam and Abdullah Badawi followers. The first to go was its Director, Zulkifli Abdul. He was transferred to the Civil Service Department and then was cold-storaged as Director General of the Civil Aviation Department, and his Deputy was given a new task in the newly created Ministry of Culture and Tourism. They reorganised the BTN and more staff consisted of Anwar loyalists from ABIM, and PKPIM especially. Among them were the anti-UMNO student leaders and ABIM-PAS proxies in the campus politics of the 1970s and early 1980's. The prominent figure was Dr Hassan Ali former USA MISG leader, who was *de facto* Director of the BTN who planned and controlled the BTN policy of Islamizing training methods including the introduction of 'Qiyamulail' activity. In 1986, Raja Ariffin, a Deputy Minister at the Prime Minister's Department played an active role in supervising BTN. By 1987, BTN was filled with Anwar's men who were ready to 'shoot down' Anwar's enemies in UMNO. Some of them disliked UMNO, but for the sake of Anwar who was considered to be an the ideal successor to Mahathir, made an attempt to infiltrate certain UMNO divisions.

<sup>130</sup> On July 14, 1984, Dr Mahathir announced a major cabinet reshuffle when the appointment of business tycoon Daim Zainuddin as the Finance Minister was announced. Tengku Razaleigh was transferred to the Trade and Industry ministry and Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie, once predicted to be one of the heirs of the UMNO throne, was dropped. Abdullah Badawi was given the Education ministry, while Anwar moved to the Ministry of Agriculture. The Ministry of Justice which was abolished in 1980, was revived with James Ongkili as the new minister. It was normal practice in UMNO that the Minister of Finance was appointed as Treasurer of the UMNO, managing UMNO's business interests such as Fleet Groups, UEM and so on, see chapter 3.

<sup>131</sup> TV3, the only private TV station, also promoted an Islamic image of UMNO. Apart from a series of talks on Islam by local Islamic scholars, TV3 also introduced a special series called *The Faces of Islam* in which international Islamic scholars aired their views on Islam. Dr. Syed Naguib Alatas, Prof. Kamal Hassan and Anwar Ibrahim were the only Malaysian

Kadir Yassin of the New Straits Times, Nazri Abdullah (the Chief Editor of *Berita Harian*), and Ghazi of *Berita Publications* were among the mass-media personalities who were instructed or volunteered to promote Anwar Ibrahim as the champion of Islam and the rising political star who was considered heir to the UMNO throne and future Prime Minister.

Until 1983, ABIM was still critical of UMNO's Islamization policy, and implied that the policy was another ploy to achieve the political survival of certain personalities and groups through exploiting Islam.<sup>132</sup> ABIM asked for a serious Islamization process which would include basic changes and a priority index of a planned programme such as the abolition of unIslamic practices,<sup>133</sup> implementation of basic Islamic teaching, national harmony, social justice and the raising of ethical values through the implementation of an Islamic education system. ABIM steadily changed<sup>134</sup> its view toward UMNO and the government, since its own leaders now flooded the party and government. ABIM even began to recognise the *Dunia Melayu* (Malay world).<sup>135</sup> Its relationship with PAS began to disintegrate, the latter becoming suspicious since it felt that ABIM had now become an UMNO 'tool'.<sup>136</sup>

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Islamic faces who delivered their ideas on Islam. Thus Anwar gained a reputation as a rising young Muslim scholar, intellectual and Muslim leader who quickly and not surprisingly won recognition from the so called 'Muslim world'.

<sup>132</sup> Siddiq Fadi, *Menyahun Cabaran Abad Kebangunan* (The ABIM President's policy speech at the 12th ABIM Annual General Meeting, 30th July-1st August, 1983), pp.13-19.

<sup>133</sup> Ibid., p.14. ABIM opposed a few government acts which were judged to be against the Quran and Sunnah, such as Akta Pajak Gadai (the Pawn Act of 1981), Akta Lumba Kuda (The Horse Racing Act of 1965), Ordinan Perjudian (The Gambling Ordinance of 1953), and Ordinan Loteri (The Lottery Ordinance of 1952).

<sup>134</sup> What was ABIM's stand and the situation before 1980? According to ABIM, the Islamic resurgence of the 1970's originated from an awareness by the younger generation of Islamic principles (Anwar Ibrahim, 'Kebangkitan Islam Mesti Menyeluruh', *Dewan Masyarakat*, July 15, 1980, p.16). The urban community returned to 'fitrah insaniah' [human nature] and living in the religion accepted by Allah (Kamaluddin M.Zin, 'Belia Kembali ke Mesjid,' *Dakwah*, May 1977, p.10). Furthermore, ABIM also claimed, that at the same time, the younger generation began 'to lose their confidence in the cheap moral values in 'pasar lambak' [open market], capitalism, socialism, nationalism, materialism and so on (Sidek Haji Fadhil, 'Da'awah atau Da'ayah,' *Dakwah*, July 1976, p.8.) Some Islamic scholars were of the opinion that the young were more interested in Islam than the older generation and that Islam was seen as a way of life which gave an impetus to young people. (see statement of Dr Harun Din, Deputy Dean of Islamic Studies Faculty of the National University, in *Keluarga*, August 1978, p.34). The influence of dakwah developed in schools and universities, especially after 1974 when the government began to control student political activities. ABIM also identified those against dakwah as feudalists, modernists, secularists, nationalists, atheists and religious functionaries, associated in unholy alliances in criticizing the dakwah groups. (Mohd. Abu Bakar, 'Dakwah dan Pengislaman Masyarakat Melayu Masa kini: Satu Analisa Pengenalan', in Khoo Kay Kim (ed.) *Tamadun Islam di Malaysia*, (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Historical Society, 1980), p.188.

<sup>135</sup> In 1986 ABIM organised a seminar on Islamic movements in the Malay World, a second seminar was held in 1988. While denying ABIM wanted to maintain *assabiyyah*, ABIM now argued that they would have to face the reality that God had



*The Trojan Horse Strategy.*

In the UMNO Youth General Assembly of September 1982, Haji Suhaimi Datuk Kamaruddin, the incumbent *Ketua Pemuda*, forwarded a motion calling for a ban on all forms of gambling. Although the resolution was passed by the UMNO Youth Assembly, it was not adopted by the party General Assembly. Haji Suhaimi not only failed to exploit the motion on the ban on gambling as a political stunt, but he also had to surrender the leadership of UMNO Youth to Anwar Ibrahim who managed to overpower him by a majority of ten votes.<sup>137</sup> This was the beginning of another new era for UMNO Youth which became the champion of the Islamic cause.

To some observers, the co-opting of Anwar Ibrahim into the UMNO fold just before the 1982 election was a stunning electoral 'ploy' of the party, and his membership of UMNO probably strengthened the party's standing at the expense of PAS.<sup>138</sup>

However, the embracing of Anwar by UMNO could also be considered as a tactical move by Anwar and his group to infiltrate through a 'Trojan Horse' strategy. This had already been proven workable by his counterparts such as Kurshid Ahmad in Pakistan and Hassan al-Turabi<sup>139</sup> in Sudan, when they joined the government rather than continue their anti-establishment attitude, increasing their influence in the governmental structure in order to promote an Islamic constitution. Anwar was said

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created an ethnically and geographically diverse world. See Siddiq Fadil, *Gerakan Islam di Dunia Melayu- Tuntutan Zaman dan Cabaran Lingkungan*, ( a policy speech for the 15th ABIM General Meeting), 6-7 December 1986.

<sup>136</sup> This was stated by Haji Hadi Awang, PAS Vice President, in talks with Malaysian students at the University of Newcastle, England, on December 31, 1990. He said that PAS became suspicious when the meetings of PAS and ABIM were leaked. Sometimes Dr Mahathir's statements on PAS were points discussed in their meetings. He felt that ABIM was no longer sincere in their ultimate aim to have an Islamic state.

<sup>137</sup> Haji Suhaimi failed to get solid support from his Selangor UMNO which, under the influence of Harun Idris, tried to oust him since the former was seen by Harun Idris supporters as an ineffective leader and not radical enough.

<sup>138</sup> Puspha Thambipillai, " Malaysia: Twenty Five and Pragmatic," in *Southeast Asian Affairs 1983*, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1983), p.210.

<sup>139</sup> Hassan al-Turabi was an academic who showed great interest in propagating Islam as a way of life. He had been in a vocal fundamentalist group which insisted on the implementation of Islamic law. Before 1983, he joined Jaafar Numeiri's socialist government, and was responsible for influencing the government to change Sudan, a totally secular state, into an Islamic state. On the 24th May 1983, Sudan fully implemented Islamic syariah law.

to have followed the lead taken by al-Turabi who was considered his 'master' in politics. The implication here was that Anwar Ibrahim was in some way connected to some international Islamic network.<sup>140</sup>

There seems to have existed an international plan on part of fundamentalists to change their strategy in the late 1970's both in the Middle East and in other parts of Asia. The fundamentalist groups 'transformed' themselves to adopt a non-confrontational role. They executed a strategy of 'capturing the fortress from inside', and to infiltrate the state machinery through legal means.<sup>141</sup>

" [for example] by getting their members into Parliament, or by creating a social service parallel to, but more effective than those of the government. In this way they hope to win more adherents and their long-term aim is to create a state of Muslims within the established state."

Thus, ABIM changed their approach toward UMNO, from confrontation to corrective participation and problem solving.<sup>142</sup> To ABIM, Anwar Ibrahim was not giving up his principles and ideals,<sup>143</sup> but was fighting for ABIM's goals from inside the party in power. Soon after, he declared that, little by little UMNO was doing what ABIM had sought, and that he would be a 'third force' from the inside. Indeed, the International Islamic University was now controlled by ABIM and Anwar's supporters.<sup>144</sup>

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<sup>140</sup> See Haji Suhaimi Said, *Orang Melayu Disisi Perlembagaan*, (Temerloh, Pahang: Penerbitan Ujud, 1984), p.65. The names Kurshid Ahmad, Hassan al Turabi, the Lebanese Shia Cleric Sheikh Mohamad Fadhl-Allah, Sheikh Ghanausi of the Tunisian Islamic Trend Movement, Ibrahim Sulaiman of Nigeria, Colonel Muamar Gadaffi of Libya, Muhamad Imaduddin of Indonesia, and Anwar Ibrahim were in list of Islamic fundamentalists, see Hugh Leach, "Observing Islam From Within and Without," *Asian Affairs*, XXI (1) February 1990, pp.8-9. Anwar Ibrahim at the climax of his anti-UMNO period denied rumours that he had received foreign financial aid to enhance his 'influence' in the country.

<sup>141</sup> *Ibid*, p.18.

<sup>142</sup> *Risalah*, February 1991, p.8-11. See Also Siddiq Fadi1 1986, *Gerakan Islam di Dunia Melayu*, who claimed ABIM had now become moderate.

<sup>143</sup> Diane K.Mauzy and R.S.Milne, "The Mahathir Administration in Malaysia: Discipline Through Islam," *Pacific Affairs*, Vo. 56, No.4 (Winter 1983-84), p.637.

<sup>144</sup> Mohd. Sayuti Omar, *Anwar Ibrahim*, pp.114-115. When the International Islamic University was opened in July 1983, Anwar Ibrahim said that the government would ensure that no group could make use of the university for its own purposes. Yet Anwar steadily admitted his own hand-picked academic and administrative staff who claimed to be either his men or ABIM supporters. Thus, the university became his own 'think-tank' for the so-called Islamic cause, as well as a breeding ground for Islamic fundamentalists as well as Anwar's resource centre in order to reaffirm his control over the university. Anwar announced his appointment as President of the university to replace Tun Hussein Onn who was later involved in the UMNO crisis of 1988.

### *The reaffirmation of Malay Nationalism.*

In warfare, camouflage is one of the fundamental tactics for seizing the enemy's position. As soon as he controlled the UMNO Youth, Anwar Ibrahim had tried to make himself acceptable to UMNO. In his first speech to the UMNO Youth General Assembly in August 1983, he reaffirmed the need to enhance 'healthy' Malay nationalism.<sup>145</sup>

He now agreed with the principles of Malay nationalism, which were to defend the fate of the nation (*nasib bangsa*), to maintain their rights, and to uplift Malay status (*darjat*). He referred to *Muqaddimah*, the work of Ibn Khaldun, in advocating Malay nationalism which he no longer considered parochial. Next, he quoted Dr Burhanuddin's philosophy on Malay nationalism, that nationalism is only the means to unite the society, to meet sincere goals with methods and principles that were sponsored by Islamic teaching toward the construction of civilization.<sup>146</sup> He then reminded the Malays that there were opportunists who were riding Islam for personal interests and forming a new class of clergy which was connected to a conservative trend.<sup>147</sup>

### *Changing Tactics For Future Strategy.*

The supporters of Anwar Ibrahim in ABIM changed their views on Malay nationalism. Previously they branded Malay nationalism as unIslamic, now they said

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<sup>145</sup> Anwar Ibrahim, *Generasi Penggerak Zaman*, (A Policy speech of Ketua Pergerakan Pemuda UMNO Malaysia) (Kuala Lumpur: UMNO, August 1983), p.7.

<sup>146</sup> *Ibid.*, p.8.

<sup>147</sup> Anwar Ibrahim, 'Perkukuh Tekad Perjuangan,' the speech of the Head of the UMNO Youth Movement at the 34th UMNO Youth General Assembly, September 26, 1985, in *Penyata Tahunan Perhimpunan Agung UMNO 1986*, (Kuala Lumpur: UMNO, 1986), p.625.

that Malay nationalism was consistent with Islam.<sup>148</sup> They now argued that if UMNO's Malay nationalism really resisted the aspirations of Islamization, how could it be possible for its leaders and activists to disseminate Islamic values and mount Islamic infrastructural institutions such as the International Islamic University, the Islamic Bank and the Islamic insurance company ("Takaful"). One of the ABIM hard core argued that:<sup>149</sup>

"indeed, semangat kebangsaan Melayu (UMNO Malay nationalism) which is based on Malay unity is a flexible nationalism, and not relevant to the practices of nationalism in Europe. The content of Malay nationalism has relied on the worldview of Malay society itself. Nationalism which is based on unity for the sake of maintaining and safeguarding the right of the Malays is not in contradiction with Islam."

One ABIM member did admit that there was a conflict between Malay nationalists and Malay fundamentalists. But on the other hand he pointed out the fact that both groups had many common objectives, security and tranquillity of the Malays being the aim of both parties. There had been a consensus on the determination to oppose colonialism, since this had been a fundamental aim of nationalism as well as Islam. Nevertheless, it was suggested that a new terminology be found for *Semangat Kebangsaan Melayu* (Malay nationalism), even though the *Semangat Kebangsaan Melayu* and western nationalism are not the same.<sup>150</sup> In 1986, ABIM admitted the existence of *Dunia Melayu* (the Malay World) as a reality created by Allah, the Almighty God.<sup>151</sup>

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<sup>148</sup> In 1977 ABIM had rejected nationalism in any form. They criticised Malay nationalism on the premise that the idea was imported from outside and had been a weapon used by the West to disunite the solid state of the Uthmaniah government to the point of total collapse. ABIM also questioned the compatibility between Islam and *semangat kebangsaan Melayu*, when the organization stated that the Malaysia Constitution had denied the position of Islam as a universal religion because the prerequisites of Malay language and Malay custom defined the Malay. It also rejected the definition of Malays as a 100% Muslims, since it included those Malays who rejected Islam as a living system for their economy and socio-politics, those who undermined Islam as 'primitive', and those who lived in *maksiat* (immorally and against Islamic teaching and practises). Thus ABIM was aggressively predisposed against nationalism. Mohamad Abu Bakar, *Penghayatan Sebuah Ideal*, pp.178-179.

<sup>149</sup> Nik Abdul Aziz Haji Nik Hassan, "Islam and Semangat Kebangsaan Melayu," *Jurnal Dakwah: Toward Dissemination of Islamic Values*, (Journal Published by Dakwah Bureau of UMNO Youth), May 1984, p.29

<sup>150</sup> Mohamad Abu Bakar 1987, *Penghayatan sebuah Ideal*, pp.178-180.

<sup>151</sup> See Siddiq Fadil, *Gerakan Islam Di Dunia Melayu: Tuntutan Zaman dan Cabaran Lingkungan* (Kuala Lumpur: ABIM, 1986), p.14 and 18.

*The critical Time of Islamic Resurgence.*

By the end of 1984, the relations between UMNO and PAS in the politics of 'holier than thou' politics reached its climax when the issue of *kafir-mengkafir* (the trading of accusations that others are non-believers) was discussed in the UMNO Supreme Council meeting of 16 September. It was claimed that PAS supporters were planning to set up "suicide squads" (*Pasukan Berani Mati*) and that PAS had ruled that the spilling of UMNO blood was *halal*.<sup>152</sup> PAS not only opposed the Malaysian constitution because it catered too much to *kafir* (non-believers) but also because it has 'caused Malays to become ashamed of their Malay identity.'<sup>153</sup> This issue led to a decision by UMNO leaders to organise a televised debate on the issue of 'Kafir Mengkafir' on November 11, 1984,<sup>154</sup> but it was cancelled on the advice of Yang DiPertuan Agong and the Malay rulers. However, the ruling government made another tactical move to defuse PAS influence among the masses by publishing a white paper on *The Threat to Muslim Unity and National Security*, in which the PAS was presented as an extremist group which 'encourages violence as a path to an Islamic state.'<sup>155</sup> The incident of 'Memali'<sup>156</sup> in November 1985 reflected the

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<sup>152</sup> James Clad, "They Shall Not PAS: UMNO challenges the opposition over who is more Islamic than whom," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, October 18, 1984, p.16.

<sup>153</sup> *Ibid.*, p.17.

<sup>154</sup> The UMNO speakers included Dato' Seri Wan Mokhtar (the Menteri Besar of Trengganu and one of UMNO's Vice President), Anwar Ibrahim (a Cabinet Minister and the Head of UMNO Youth) and Ibrahim Azmi Hassan (MP Kuala Nerus and an Islamic scholar) while PAS was to be represented by the party vice-president Haji Hadi Awang and Nakhaie Haji Ahmad and Supreme Council member Harun Taib.

<sup>155</sup> Rodney Tasker, "Cracking Down On PAS: UMNO intensifies its attack on the small but influential Parti Islam in the name of maintaining unity among Malays," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, December 6, 1984, pp.44-45.

<sup>156</sup> On 19th November, 1985, eighteen people and four policemen were shot dead and 160 people were arrested in the battle between the Police and people at Kampung Memali in Kedah. Before the tragedy, the relationship between the Memali people who were identified as PAS members and the Baling Police district force, was tense. Ibrahim Mahmud, known as Ibrahim Libya, a former government servant, and former ABIM members were involved with Anwar Ibrahim in a peasant hunger demonstration in Baling in 1974. He joined PAS and opened a Pondok (a village religious school) which received support from Memali and the surrounding areas. The local UMNO leader identified Memali as being 90 percent PAS. Ibrahim Libya was on the wanted list of ISA and resisted arrest with his followers. They built barriers around the pondok and were armed with *parangs* and other weapons, such as poisoned arrows, catapults, shotguns and several molotov cocktails. When the Police Force came to outflank the pondok, the Memali people attacked the Police Force and as a result 14 people and 4 Police men died. This incident, in fact, was a battle among Malays, it was due to ideology, development, poverty, and what were considered by PAS members as injustices of the government lead by UMNO. Musa Hitam, Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister of Home Affairs explained that 'The government would act harshly against those who challenged the nation's law or disrupted public order.' PAS then reacted by declaring the fourteen dead were *mati syahid* (died in fighting for the Islamic cause) in order to impress the public that UMNO was an oppressive government. Thus, the

disunity among the Malays in the politics of 'Holier than Thou,' and gave a negative image of PAS.

Meanwhile, within UMNO there was a form of power struggle between the Middle East trained but low profile Islamists, and the secular trained but higher-profile Islamists. In an attempt to legitimise the right of the secular-trained Islamists to perform their role in Islamic propagation, a new approach was implicitly proposed which was called *Pengintelektualan Ulama* and *Pengislaman Intelek* (Intellectualising the Islamic scholars and Islamizing of Intellectuals).<sup>157</sup>

In 1977 and 1978, a group of ABIM's influential leaders left their organisation to join PAS, a move that symbolised their belief in PAS's goals and strategy for Islamic political power. Now, before even ten years had elapsed, the situation had clearly changed. Nakhaie Haji Ahmad, the former PAS Vice President, who had criticised Anwar Ibrahim's decision to join UMNO, decided himself to 'voluntarily' join the party. Many more former ABIM members were sponsored as 'corporate figures' in the business sector, and also in the public sector, as part of their reward for loyal support to Anwar Ibrahim; and some who had been sponsored to join the UMNO structure were selected to contest in the General Election on the UMNO ticket.

More recently, ABIM has seemed discontented with PAS's political stand.<sup>158</sup> Thus, in the campaign in the 1990 General Election, ABIM lent their support to

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Memali incident became part of the PAS campaign to undermine UMNO. See *Far Eastern Economic Review*, December 5, 1985, pp.28-29.

<sup>157</sup> Mohamad Abu Bakar 1987, *Penghayatan Sebuah Ideal*, pp.63-69. In his article on 'Gabungan Ulama-Intelektual dan Gerakan Islam semasa' (The combination of Islamic scholars and intellectuals and the current Islamic movement) the writer mentions how the Ulama (scholars) had been isolated from the current Islamic movement, giving priority only to Islamic teaching (ibadah). However, they urged the ulama to enhance their knowledge in modern disciplines such as sociology, economics, international relations and so on, in sharpening their understanding of the situation and the current crisis.

<sup>158</sup> See Jamaludin Md. Isa, "ABIM sokong Islamisasi?," *Watan*, April 15, 1989. The discontent of PAS toward ABIM was evident when the party reported a statement of ABIM's President on the eve of the general election of 1990 in support of UMNO. *Harakah*, an organ of PAS published a letter from a reader which outlined the relationship between ABIM and PAS: "Apakah dosa PAS dan apakah silapnya kepemimpinan Ulama PAS sehingga ABIM sanggup menghentam PAS dan menyokong kerajaan? Apakah hanya PAS tidak mengemukakan "Model" maka PAS harus ditolak dengan begitu mudah? Dan apakah model yang dicipta oleh UMNO sudah cukup Islamik untuk menerima dasar asobiyah UMNO?..... Hentikanlah tikam menikam sesama jemaah Islam. Peliharalah diri dari menjadi kuda tunggangan, berjuanglah dengan ikhlas, fikirkanlah Islam menyuruh berpadu."

UMNO to ensure 'Muslim domination in politics'. ABIM also declared its support for Government policies and programmes "as required by Islam for the benefit of Muslims in the country."<sup>159</sup>

To a certain extent, PAS was portrayed as 'not holier' than UMNO, and the uncompromisingly Islamic attitude of PAS helped cause the party to be rejected by the Malays. PAS was now presented as a party which consisted of young overseas-educated Malays who were radical Islamists. Moreover, PAS was envisaged as a party full of Islamic scholars, yet incompetent in the knowledge and experience of governing a state, and furthermore lacking in skills in managing economic affairs.<sup>160</sup>

By the first half of the 1980's, the Islamic fundamentalist and revivalist groups started criticizing each other, Darul Arqam being the first target. The IRC and ABIM ended their cooperation. PAS no longer saw ABIM as a 'non-partisan body', especially when ABIM leaders moved toward supporting Anwar, if not UMNO and the government itself.<sup>161</sup> On university campuses, Islamic groups were also competing among themselves due to conflicts among their patrons, PAS, ABIM and the IRC. Therefore, they seemed 'tidak dapat bersama lagi' (unable to get along anymore).<sup>162</sup>

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<sup>159</sup> *New Straits Times*, August 17, 1990.

<sup>160</sup> Baharudin Ali Masrom, *Politik Melayu Abad 21*, (Kuala Lumpur: D'Enterprise, 1989), pp.82-83.

<sup>161</sup> The same trend could also been seen when the Islamic groups on campuses were in a tug of war over the control of the university's student unions. The crisis between PAS and ABIM was reflected in the tussle of IPU and PMI with ATMA and IRC. The IPU failed to gain the support of the ATMA and the IRC in Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia's Student Representative Council. In Universiti Pertanian Malaysia, the PMI only had solid support in the general constituencies, but failed to control the university's residential colleges which were under the influence of liberal-nationalist group. In the Universiti Malaya, the IRC had a political pact with Gabungan Mahasiswa Bersatu (GMB) in confronting the PMI. In Universiti Teknologi Malaysia, the PMI won a simple majority after it had been challenged by the IRC and the GMB. Thus, those Islamic groups which were associated with their patron body outside the campus seemed 'tidak dapat bersama lagi' (no longer together), and their conflict was not managed effectively, PAS, at this point, worried that this development would be a tragedy for their student movement, and that it would be difficult to revitalise. Group interests were given great priority at the expense of idealism. PAS saw with concern that the trend of student bodies inclined to support certain personalities in UMNO more than the programmes and the political philosophy of the UMNO, *Semangat Kebangsaan Melayu*. (see *Harakah*, November 5, 1990.)

<sup>162</sup> *Harakah*, November 5, 1990, see also *Far Eastern Economic Review*, January 25, 1990, and Suhaimi Embong, 'Pengaruh Islam tidak merosot di kampus,' *Dunia Islam*, April 1990, pp.25-26.

### *Semangat Kebangsaan and UMNO's Resilience*

From 1984, while reaffirming that Islam was the best guidance for the whole *ummah* <sup>163</sup>, UMNO reasserted *Semangat Kebangsaan Melayu* (Malay nationalism)<sup>164</sup> in an attempt to enhance this fundamental political philosophy as the core of Malay politics, with the Malays as the crux of Malaysian politics.<sup>165</sup> Musa Hitam, the party Deputy President, reminded UMNO members that they were the masters, and the catalyst for change and, therefore, they had to direct the wave of change, and not drift and be submerged in the winds of change. For that reason the party's resilience needed to be elevated.<sup>166</sup> He also stressed that UMNO must ensure its role as the champion of the Malays, so it was mandatory for UMNO to recognise and to eradicate any negative phenomenon which might jeopardise the unity of Malay politics. It was hoped that there would be an enduring struggle for a better society in the interest of religion, race and nation (*agama, bangsa dan negara*).<sup>167</sup> To UMNO members at large, it seemed that the party Deputy President was resuscitating the flames of Malay nationalism, which had liberated the Malays from colonialism and extricated them from the chains of poverty and ignorance.<sup>168</sup>

In his opening speech to the delegates at the 38th UMNO General Assembly, Dr Mahathir also reaffirmed his view that UMNO accepted the reality and upheld the truth that Malaysia was a multi-racial country, and that UMNO was willing to cooperate with all ethnic groups as long as their endeavours did not go against the

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<sup>163</sup> See *Islam Contoh Yang Baik Bagi Seluruh Ummah* (a message from the Prime Minister on the eve of Id' el-Fitri, (Kuala Lumpur: Information Department, 1984). Dr Mahathir appealed to Muslims in Malaysia to reject extremists and deviant Islamic groups, and uphold the reality of Islamic teaching and its spirituality.

<sup>164</sup> Chung Kek Yoong, *Mahathir Administration: Leadership and Change in a Multi-Racial Society* (Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk Publications, 1987), p.139.

<sup>165</sup> Musa Hitam, *Ketahanan UMNO (the UMNO's Resilience)* (The speech of Dato Musa Hitam, UMNO Deputy President at the opening ceremony of Pemuda and Wanita UMNO Delegations Conference on 24 May 1984, p.7.

<sup>166</sup> *Ibid.*, p.6.

<sup>167</sup> *Ibid.*, p.2.

<sup>168</sup> *Ibid.*, p.3.



national interest and UMNO aims.<sup>169</sup> He referred to the struggle of the Afghan people as an example of a people having to stand alone to liberate their own nation, sacrificing themselves for their beloved country. Although they received sympathy from their Islamic brothers, it was argued their spirit of nationalism was a deciding factor in their struggle.<sup>170</sup>

He commented that semangat kebangsaan did not mean arrogance or insulting others, rather the motivation of Malays was to elevate their ability to be equal or better than others, thus being a respectable, and self-esteemed race. He also quoted the proverb that the Malays would never vanish from this world, but he asked: what type of Malay would be 'perpetuated'?<sup>171</sup> The Biro Tata Negara which was then under the influence of Anwar Ibrahim intercepted the idea mooted by Dr Mahathir and developed the idea of *Melayu Baru* (the new Malays), while promoting Anwar Ibrahim as Mahathir's successor, presenting him as being the only UMNO leader who fought for Islam and was capable of bringing about change in UMNO.<sup>172</sup>

It could be concluded that UMNO consisted of Malays who held to various ideologies brought together under the general notion of *Semangat Kebangsaan Melayu*. 'Merdeka' was the factor uniting them. In reaction to this, UMNO's religious ×

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<sup>169</sup> Dato Seri Dr Mahathir Mohamad, *Jadikan Nasionalisme Prinsip Bimbingan*, [Let the Nationalism be the Guiding Principle], (Kuala Lumpur: Information Department, 1985), p.9.

<sup>170</sup> *Ibid.*, p.27

<sup>171</sup> The new BTN after 1986, Islamised its programmes with more Arabic terms, and they introduced a special activity called 'Qiyamullail' - a special mid night prayer session. They also campaigned for Malays to change their self-image and create a new identity, the concept of *Melayu Baru* or the New Malay, in which Anwar Ibrahim and Dr Mahathir were the role-models. Bina Insan (Human development) was the new name used for the training programme. The new BTN tried to create Malays with their lives and thinking based on *aqliyah, jasaddiah dan ruhiyyah* (mind, body and spirit or faith). The first target were university staff, students and also UMNO Youth. They were capitalising on Dr Mahathir's aspiration to produce a generation of new Malays, and their message was simple; i.e. while they were in support of Dr Mahathir, they also promoted Anwar Ibrahim as Mahathir's successor.

<sup>172</sup> See Baharuddin Ali Masrom, *Politik Melayu*, pp.84-85. It was suggested that UMNO's approach to Islam was now more moderate and acceptable. More leaders who were Islamic educated and had Islamic inspiration were appointed as party and government leaders, this being considered as an indicator that Islam was a factor in UMNO. The writer explicitly asked the Malays to support Anwar in deciding the future of the Malay community. At the same time, under the cover of a series of talks on the new school curriculum and the philosophy of the national education policy, speakers from the Ministry of Education also hinted at Anwar's future ambition to be 'topdog' in UMNO. Thus support from teachers throughout the country was needed. The campaign became rampant on the eve of UMNO's election in 1987. The Aminudin Baki Institute of Education Service Training, which organised courses relating to the management of education, was turned into a fertile campaign ground by Anwar Ibrahim's group in attracting teacher support.

elite counteracted with the formation of PAS. It was a fact that from former UMNO members emerged other Malay political parties such as IMP and Parti Negara led by Dato' Onn, Parti Rakyat Malaya (1955), and Parti Perhimpunan Kebangsaan (the National Assembly Party) led by Abdul Aziz Ishak in 1963. However, PAS has been UMNO's main opposition since the Election in 1955 and has consistently challenged UMNO's ideology. Islamic resurgence in the mid 1970's revived PAS and the Islamic Dakwah movement.

The success of the Iranian Revolution created a new environment, and certain Malay leaders in political parties and interest groups felt that radical Islam could be used as a new force which could change the Malays and simultaneously transform the government. Therefore, Dakwah organizations changed their approach from pure unpolitical "Dakwah" and now they were not only critical toward the government, but formed revivalist groups with the idea of totally changing society in line with Islamic teaching. *Dakwah* movements in Malaysia achieved particular influence among the urban young educated Malays, but the latter were divided on the details of a theocratic state. This was roughly the situation when Dr Mahathir took over UMNO and the government.

The cooptation of Anwar Ibrahim was part of Dr.Mahathir's strategy to contain PAS's attack on the UMNO ideology of *Semangat kebangsaan*. However, Mahathir's decision created disarray in the UMNO structure and order. Religious scholars and some UMNO leaders did not denounce the decision, but they were quite sceptical of Anwar's motives in joining the party. The Islamic resurgence movement challenged UMNO ideology under the direction of PAS and ABIM especially. Although the pressure lessened when ABIM became inclined to support Dr Mahathir in order to help Anwar take power in UMNO, a conflict between moderate Islamic scholars in UMNO and Malays who upheld 'semangat kebangsaan Melayu' developed. Also UMNO loyalists were unwilling to forgive Anwar's previously

destructive attitude to UMNO ideology, and their attitude seemed to continue a form of latent cold war in UMNO against *orang baru* (new comers).

Although Semangat Kebangsaan Melayu was reaffirmed by Dr. Mahathir, the BTN developed a new strategy of *Melayu Baru* which aimed at influencing the Malay-educated young generation. They planned to change the UMNO ideology of *Semangat kebangsaan Melayu*, which had always been considered as unIslamic, and their aims could become reality if and when Anwar were to take over the party leadership and government. A 'trojan horse' strategy was applied, and while waiting for the great opportunity, they slowly infiltrated the party structure.

Materialistic attitudes among Malay politicians would help the above strategy since the latter would be inclined to lend their support to those whom they felt were stronger and more willing to offer them a better position in the party or government. The ideological dilemma in UMNO was that there were in UMNO "...*orang-orang bertopengkan agama untuk merebut kuasa politik...yang bertopengkan nasionalisme untuk mendapatkan wang dan keistimewaan*"<sup>173</sup> (personalities who disguised their religion for the sake of political power, and there were also people who camouflaged themselves under the name of nationalism to gain money and privileges.)

Nevertheless, UMNO's ideology of *semangat kebangsaan Melayu* had obscured the system of domination that frequently characterized the party power structure. Although PAS and ABIM were capitalising on Islamic fundamentalism in attacking UMNO's ideology, UMNO managed to contain this hostility except in Kelantan, and certain areas in Trengganu and Kedah where UMNO received less support from various Islamic groups. ABIM was developing a new strategy in UMNO, supporting Dr. Mahathir's policies as part of their political tactics, with ideology eventually giving way to political manoeuvring for power. In this context, it is possible that ABIM might be reunited with PAS if Anwar Ibrahim took over UMNO's leadership. If that happened however the 'capturing the fortress from inside'

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<sup>173</sup> Musa Hitam 1988, *Nasionalisme: Krisis dan Kematangan*, see the preface

strategy would have been effectively achieved. Thus, religion would have been used above all to gain position in the party.

Malay nationalism was successfully maintained as UMNO's ideology. Since 1955, PAS had been blaming UMNO for not being sufficiently 'Malay'; and in 1978 UMNO was labelled as a party of 'infidels' and not as holy as PAS, which claimed to be the party of Allah. This however, had failed to move Malay grassroots support from UMNO.

The UMNO ideology of Malay nationalism contrasted with Kemalism in Turkey which had rejected Islam as the basis of Turkish identity. Indeed, UMNO as a party safeguarding the interests of Islam, the Malays, and the country, was accepted by the grassroot Malays as the only reliable Malay party. The institutionalisation of UMNO in Malay society as the ruling party made it difficult for PAS and fundamentalists to offer the Malays an alternative party. However, UMNO was not a purely ideological party, rather it seemed to be a governmental party. Indeed, apart from ideology and power creating strife within UMNO, the party's culture, especially the style of leadership, was another factor that made conflict an inevitability.

## Chapter Five

### *Mahathirism and the Challengers: The Conflict of Leadership in UMNO.*

In the previous chapter the discussion concerned the relationship between power and ideology. This chapter examines the elements of leadership in UMNO, leadership style and the structure of the party, which precipitated internal conflict. The discussion will also highlight certain UMNO leaders<sup>1</sup> who were considered to be the main actors in the conflict; they were Dr Mahathir, Musa Hitam, Tengku Razaleigh, Anwar Ibrahim, and Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. These were the personalities who shaped the behaviour and pattern of Malay politics in Malaysia. They were the political leaders who embodied certain qualities of leadership, such as vision and that touch of charisma which made them electable, and who also often functioned as entrepreneurs or independent traders.<sup>2</sup> To what extent they, as politicians, achieved particular goals for themselves, their friends, and the people who elected them, through an elaborate system of bargaining and favour trading, will be examined. In this respect, this chapter will also trace any changes that took place in the patron-client relationship that formed part of the tradition of UMNO politics in particular and Malay society in general.

Dr Mahathir had alleged that Tunku Abdul Rahman's feudalistic leadership manipulated the party's constitution in order to give him complete control of the organization, and that the latter treated appointments to the cabinet as rewards for loyalty to party chiefs and to the Prime Minister. The Tunku was also charged with formulating policies which completely ignored public

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<sup>1</sup> See the definition of leader by Cecil A. Gibb "Leadership," in Gardner Lindzey, *Handbook of Social Psychology* (Reading: Addison-Wesley Publication Co., 3rd print, 1959), pp. 877-920. Gibb described a leader to be an individual in a given office, a focus for the behaviour of group members, a person who exercises influence over others.

<sup>2</sup> Henry Clay Lindgren, *An Introduction To Social Psychology* (2nd ed., New York: John Wiley, 1973), p. 385.

opinion. It was said that nepotism and mediocrity were the norm in his administration.<sup>3</sup>

Dr. Mahathir, who had in 1981 taken over UMNO's leadership, enjoyed great support from the Malays, as had Tun Abdul Razak in 1969, when party members had a high expectation of him. Dr Mahathir had shown his leadership skill in elaborating public policy, and his own vision of the nation. He was responsible for a number of landmarks in Malaysian political history in his attempt to change the attitude and values of the Malay in particular.<sup>4</sup> He succeeded in inculcating awareness in the Malay of the need to achieve development and prosperity in an effort to consolidate the dignity of the nation. These were his main political beliefs. Dr Mahathir was the UMNO President who provided a 'mobilizing' style of political leadership. Indeed, almost any leader is likely to differ somewhat from his predecessors, as this is often how leaders make their mark on political life. Therefore, "the politics of Malaysia in the 1980's has been dominated and shaped by the Prime Minister to an extent seen in no previous Premiership."<sup>5</sup>

### *Mahathirism*

The term Mahathirism is used in three different contexts. The first refers to Dr Mahathir's public policies which were designed to invoke a strong state and a government that would be competent to bring about a new era. Secondly, it refers to

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<sup>3</sup> See Dr Mahathir's direct and indirect comment on Tunku's leadership in his writing in *The Malay Dilemma*, (1970); *The Challenge* (1986), and "Problems of Democratic Nation-Building in Malaysia", *Solidarity*, 1971. Dr Mahathir's views on Tunku and UMNO before 1970 is cited below. He asserted that the Prime Minister was very powerful; the Central Executive Council was not consulted on matters of Government and party policy; a system of patronage and disguised coercion based on the authority of the Government, had united the party; the majority of ordinary party members were not so involved in party systems; the leaders were no longer accountable to ordinary members and faceless supporters, but were accountable only to themselves; and membership of the cabinet was a reward for loyalty to the party chief and acceptability to the Prime Minister. See also Appendix C, pp.402-405.

<sup>4</sup> See Zurinah Hassan (ed.), *Mahathir Pimpinan Cemerlang* (Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Penerangan Malaysia, 1986); Rosnah Majid, "Setahun Bersama Mahathir," in *Koleksi Temuramah Khas Tokoh-Tokoh* (Kuala Lumpur: Utusan Melayu, 1985), pp.145-173; Anon., *Issues of the Mahathir Years* (P.Pinang: Aliran, 1988); *Dasar-Dasar Utama Kerajaan Malaysia*, (Petaling Jaya: INTAN, 1988); and Mokhtar Petah, *Dr Mahathir dan Masa Depan Negara* (Subang Jaya, Selangor: Tra-Tra, 1982).

<sup>5</sup> Roger Kershaw, "Within the Family. The Limits of Doctrinal Differentiation in the Malaysia Ruling Party Election of 1987," *RIMA*, Vol.23,( 1989 ), p.125.

his political strategy in manoeuvring the government and the party. Finally, it refers to his leadership style, in managing the party as well the Government, which differed from his predecessors. In Malaysian politics, where the patron-client relationship has been the basic element in the socio-political structure, politics is regarded as a manifestation of personal beliefs. In the context of the party controlling the government, the UMNO President automatically decided the Prime Ministership, and also, by the power conferred by the party constitution, Dr Mahathir was given the opportunity to carry out his political beliefs with his own leadership style, and a great deal of reformist zeal, projected in his early days, gave the administration a liberal image. "Besides having to respond to the economic crisis of the times which he inherited, and some would claim he exacerbated, Dr Mahathir's administration has also been distinguished by several bold ideological-motivated policy-initiatives".<sup>6</sup>

#### *Political beliefs.*

Dr Mahathir's political belief was moulded by the socialization process of his life experience,<sup>7</sup> which turned him into a disciplinarian,<sup>8</sup> with the qualities of a shrewd businessman,<sup>9</sup> and a leader who had vision for his nation. This could be seen from his ideas expressed in *The Malay Dilemma* (1970),<sup>10</sup> *The Challenge* (1976) and his speeches. He explained that the Malays tend to shield friends and enemies from embarrassment, and in consequence often conceal their true thoughts. He believed it

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<sup>6</sup> Jomo (ed.), *Malaysia's New Economic Policy: Evaluations of the Mid-Term Review of the Fourth Malaysia Plan* (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Economic Association, 1985), p.vii.

<sup>7</sup> See the latest biographical work on him, written by Robin Adshead, *Mahathir of Malaysia* (London: Hibiscus, 1989).

<sup>8</sup> See J. Victor Morais 1982, *Mahathir*, p.5.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p.7.

<sup>10</sup> The latest criticism of Dr Mahathir's ideas in *The Malay Dilemma* was written by Subky Abdul Latif, *The Malay Dilemma: Secebis Kertas Usang* (Kuala Lumpur: PAS, 1990). This book was a basic reading for the PAS's political cadre training. PAS concluded that Dr Mahathir did not bring major change, acted in a manner which he had criticised in 1970, this includes power corrupt, autocratic, and ignoring the role of General Assembly and Supreme Council. For other criticisms on Mahathir's actions, see Raja Mukhtaruddin Daim, *The Malay Dilemma: Bahasa, Bangsa dan Agama* (Petaling Jaya: Agensi Penerbitan Nusantara, 1982), pp.1-50; Dr Syed Hussein Alatas, *Islam dan Sosialisma* (P.Pinang: Seruan Masa, 1976), pp.60-71; and Ahmad Boestamam, *The Malay Dilemma: Sorotan Sekilas* (Kuala Lumpur: Pustaka Antara, 1981).

was necessary, not only to encourage the Malays to know themselves, but also for the non-Malays to understand the Malay reactions to the problems of the day. He also stressed: "Independence on its own does not ensure progress and happiness. When we can stand as tall [as] other nations, then only would independence have meaning."<sup>11</sup>

Destiny played an important role in the political career of Mahathir. The salient feature of his belief system can be summarised as follow:

1. The success of a nation depends on the attitudes and values of the society. The values must be changed in order to achieve prosperity.<sup>12</sup>
2. In relation to that, it is believed that when industry, efficiency, honesty, discipline and other good values are held in high regard and practised, progress is certain to be achieved.<sup>13</sup>
3. There is no conflict between material and spiritual values provided the materialism is submitted to humanitarian sentiments, and considerate and responsible toward the society generally.<sup>14</sup>
4. It is a ridiculous assumption that the Chinese are only interested in business and acquisition of wealth, and that the Malays wished only to become Government servants.<sup>15</sup>
5. Removal of all protection would subject the Malays to the primitive law that would enable only the fittest to survive.<sup>16</sup> 'Constructive protection' is done to make it possible to breed an energetic and resourceful race capable of competing against all corners.
6. The 'soul of slave' (*jiwa hamba*) which had been infused by the colonialists should be replaced by a fresh confidence in order to be a respectable nation.<sup>17</sup>
7. Since pressure groups could generate a state of anarchy, the activities of pressure groups in our country must be monitored by the Government. "Pressure groups do have a role, but like other weapons there is danger in their use."<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> Asia Week, March 19, 1985, p.24.

<sup>12</sup> See his statement in an interview featured in Harun Derauh and Shafie Nor (eds), *Mahathir: Cita-cita and Pencapaian* (Kuala Lumpur: Berita Publishing, 1982), p.

<sup>13</sup> Mahathir Mohammad 1986, *The Challenge*, p.3.

<sup>14</sup> Harun Derauh and Shafie Nor 1982, *Mahathir*, pp.10-11.

<sup>15</sup> Mahathir Mohammad 1982, *The Malay Dilemma*, p.15.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., p.31.

<sup>17</sup> Zurinah Hassan 1986, *Mahathir Pimpinan Cemerlang*, p.1.

<sup>18</sup> Mahathir Mohammad 1986, *The Challenge*, p.120.



8. If every member of society understands the importance of organization and discipline and plays his part out of a sense of responsibility, the society will be stable and progressive.

9. Stamping out corruption needs honesty.

In an attempt to turn his political belief into a reality, Dr Mahathir commanded the party and the government with an authoritarian style of leadership. His political socialization, experience and leadership style were thought to bring Malaysia into a period which was uncomfortable for everybody.<sup>19</sup> 1982 was a significant year that set the tone for this new trend in Malaysian politics which aimed at pragmatism, innovation and stability. However, Dr Mahathir's administration inherited crucial problems in the government and the party, among them being corrupt practices, low productivity and morale, and the economic recession which began in 1981.

The prospect of radical change simply focussed national attention as never seen before, and from July 1981, Dr Mahathir shocked the nation by introducing a series of new policies. This began when he initiated a common time zone for East and West Malaysia. For the civil servant, he introduced a "clock-in" or "punch card" system and wearing of a name tag. In combating corruption and malpractices in government, he strengthened the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), and required ministers and government officials to declare their assets. He reconstructed the Malaysians' view of the world through a trauma which urged them to adhere to 'three senses'; common sense, a sense of purpose and a sense of urgency.

Mahathir's sense of destiny made him work hard and he advocated the philosophy that; "A decision may be wrong, but it is better than no decision. If something goes wrong it is still possible to correct it halfway, but if nothing is done then there is no way of knowing whether a particular move is wrong or not."<sup>20</sup> However as Prime Minister, he faced certain political realities. All judgments and decisions must eventually be compromises between contradicting interests;

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<sup>19</sup> Stuart Dummond, "Malaysia: the new generation takes over," *The World Today*, (September 1981), p.319.

<sup>20</sup> Robin Adshead 1989, *Mahathir of Malaysia*, p.73.

alternatives were limited by financial constraints and democracy had to be tailored to fit the Malaysian reality.<sup>21</sup>

Mahathirism often became controversial and at the same time made Dr Mahathir's era an important one in Malaysian politics. Dr Mahathir introduced radical changes in economic strategy and foreign policy, and he imposed his own particular leadership style. With the legitimate power given to him as the party President and Prime Minister, Dr Mahathir developed his influence by virtue of his position; he used his 'reward', 'coercive' and 'referent' powers.

### *Policies Design.*

Dr Mahathir tried to turn his ideas into reality, applying his own ideas, not those of the UMNO or the administration<sup>22</sup>. He confidently delivered a list of dynamic projects that could put Malaysia on the world map as a potential new industrialising country. He originated the idea of the formation of the Heavy Industry Corporation of Malaysia (HICOM)<sup>23</sup> with its two main industrial projects: the Malaysian national car-Proton Saga in Selangor, and PERWAJA-the steel-iron industry at Kemaman, Trengganu. Among the objectives of HICOM were to foster linkages and to expand the industrial base, and also to enhance the technology transfer process. The realization of the HICOM project began with joint ventures between the Malaysian government and well known industrial firms from Japan. This was termed

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<sup>21</sup> Ibid., p.72.

<sup>22</sup> Ahmad Atory Hussain, *Pembentukan Dasar Awam Malaysia: Hubungannya Dengan Politik, UMNO dan Birokrasi* (Kuala Lumpur: Utusan Melayu, 1985), p.134.

<sup>23</sup> The success of the heavy industry policy was demonstrated in the establishment of factories, such as the Kedah Cement Sdn Bhd; Perwaja Trengganu Sdn Bhd (Perwaja); Petro-Pipe Industries Sdn Bhd; Perusahaan Otomobil Nasional Sdn Bhd (Proton); Hicom-Honda Manufacturing (M) Sdn Bhd; Hicom-Yamaha Manufacturing (M) Sdn. Bhd; Hicom-Suzuki Manufacturing (M) Sdn Bhd; and Perak-Manjung Cement. HICOM was formed in 1980 when Dr Mahathir was the Deputy Prime Minister and as well as the Minister of Trade and Industry. See *Fifth Malaysia Plan 1986-1990*, (Kuala Lumpur: National Printing Department, 1986), p.335; *Dasar-Dasar Utama Kerajaan Malaysia* (Petaling Jaya: INTAN, 1988), pp.9-13; Zurinah Hassan, *Mahathir Pimpinan Cemerlang*, and see also Mustapha Mohamad, *Ekonomi Malaysia: Tohmahan dan Kebenaran* (Petaling Jaya: Media Indah, 1990) which refuted criticisms on Mahathir-Daim economic decisions.

as 'Japanese technology, Malaysian style'. The emphasis on industry was later coordinated through The Industrial Master Plan which was introduced in 1986.

Two main prestige development projects, the construction of 'Daya Bumi' building in Kuala Lumpur, and the construction of 'Penang bridge', were given to Japanese and Korean firms respectively.

The New Economic Policy (NEP) envisaged a more direct role for government. It created a small but growing Malay business community which then contributed to the new relationship between the public and the private sectors, as partners in development. This idea later developed into a new concept based on the Japanese model of *Sogoshisa*, called 'Malaysia Incorporated'.<sup>24</sup>

In 1982, Dr Mahathir, who was devoting himself to studying Japanese technological development industries and their business culture, generated a new policy called '*Dasar Pandang ke Timur*', or The Look East Policy.<sup>25</sup> Explicitly, the policy would, in the longterm, create a generation of disciplined, self-reliant, and resolute Malaysian workers. Implicitly, this was Dr Mahathir's vision of making Malaysia a respectable nation.

### *Privatisation*<sup>26</sup>

Dr Mahathir then introduced another radical change with his privatisation policy. The idea was to encourage economic growth, to reduce the commitment of the public sector in economic activities, and also to accomplish the objectives of the NEP. The telecommunications industry was privatised under the Syarikat Telekom Malaysia, followed by the electricity service which was converted into the *Tenaga*

<sup>24</sup> The idea of Malaysia Incorporated was proposed by Dr Mahathir in his speech at INTAN on 25 February 1983. For a brief survey of this policy see *Dasar-Dasar Utama Kerajaan Malaysia*, pp.51-53.

<sup>25</sup> Originally the policy was aimed at raising national productivity. Dr Mahathir attempted to introduce the process of technology transfer to Malaysia. The other idea was prompted by his admiration of the work ethic of Japanese society. This policy was announced by Dr Mahathir on 8 February 1982. There were three courses of action: *structural change*, which involved the introduction of a punch-card system, name tags, Quality Control Circles (QCC), the open office concept, and the service counter; *a Change of attitude* through the introduction of excellent service rewards, a campaign of cleanness, efficiency, and trustworthiness, and leadership by example; and *training and courses*. See *Ibid.*, pp.99-103..

<sup>26</sup> For a summary of the policy see *Dasar-Dasar Utama Kerajaan*, pp.39-48.

*Nasional* or TEN. Prior to that Edaran Otomobil Nasional (EON) and Pemas International Properties were listed on the stock exchange. Meanwhile, the postal services and railways were put on the agenda for privatisation.<sup>27</sup> The foreign media considered the government's privatisation of state-owned business the most ambitious programme of its kind in Southeast Asia. In Malaysian style privatisation, however, the government continued to play a large role in the ownership and running of companies.<sup>28</sup>

Thus, the Malaysian privatisation policy was closely identified with the views of Dr Mahathir himself, as the champion of bumiputera rights, who had espoused privatisation long before it became fashionable elsewhere. However, Daim Zainuddin, a businessmen cum politician, was the man who translated the policy into action after his appointment to the cabinet, being put in charge of the Treasury in 1984.<sup>29</sup>

### *Reforms in Foreign Policy and International Image..*

Dr Mahathir was an emerging leader on the Asian political scene and one who was putting his own stamp on foreign policy. He negotiated from strength, rather than weakness, for a new deal between Malaysia and the world, mapping out a

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<sup>27</sup> Under Dr Mahathir's administration, a Privatisation Masterplan was established, based on a study undertaken by a consortium of consultants. The plan listed 37 government-owned enterprises to be privatised by 1991. Among these were Tenaga Nasional Berhad, Malaysia Shipyard Engineering PLC, Malaysia Rubber Development Corporation, Klang Port Authority, Melaka Port, Seremban-Port Dickson Highway, Shah Alam Highway, Tanjung Jara Beach Hotel PLC, Government Medical Laboratory and Store, Production and Marketing of Animal Vaccines, Bukit Jong Quarry, Menara Kuala Lumpur, Praton Haus Ltd., New KL-Karak Highway, Pemas OUE (KL) PLC, Sawira PLC, Kayu Sedia PLC, Pemas Hotel Chain (Selangor) PLC, Masmara PLC, and four abattoirs in Kempas (Johor), Mergong (Kedah), Kuantan and Shah Alam. Other enterprises that would be privatised in 1992 were Perusahaan Otomobil Nasional (Proton) PLC, Perak-Hanjoong Simen PLC, Sabah Gas Industries PLC, Pasaranika Dara PLC, Coffee Processing Centre Banting- FAMA, Perma OUE PLC, Kedah Cement PLC, Commercial Vehicle Inspection- Department of Road Transport, Milk Collection Centre-Veterinar Service Department, Timah Dermawan PLC, Ketengah Jaya PLC, Kilang Sawit Panji Alam PLC, and Ketengah Perwira PLC. See *New Straits Times*, February 28, 1991, p.15.

<sup>28</sup> *Far Eastern Economic Review*, December 20, 1990, p.42. See special articles by Dough Tsuruoka "Privatised Patronage," pp.42-44; and "The Share Scramble," pp.44-46. Dr Mahathir also set up the Malaysia Business Council to pave the way for better co-operation between the public and private sectors. The 62-member council was made up of national leaders, top government officials and captains of industry, in which Dr Mahathir himself was chairman, and Ghafar Baba, the deputy chairman. Other UMNO leaders were Rafidah Aziz, and Daim Zainuddin as vice chairmen, while Anwar Ibrahim and Sanusi Junid represented the public sector. Although the appointments were based on their ministerial posts, it seemed that Dr Yusof Nor, the Minister of Public Enterprise had been left out. see *The New Straits Times*, February 26, 1991, p.19.

<sup>29</sup> See an article by Kadir Jasin, 'Corporate Heavyweight, backroom operator', *New Straits Times*, January 17, 1991.

blueprint for a nation that could take pride in itself. He thought that, if the West didn't address his nation's needs he would turn to the East. "The north is too selfish and too preoccupied with its own needs."<sup>30</sup> Thus the 'Look East Policy' represented a new dimension in Malaysia's foreign policy, which signified an important change in the country's traditional linkages with Britain. This was reflected by Dr Mahathir's policy of 'Buy British Last'. Implicitly, the policy implied that Britain would no longer be a model for future Malaysian development. Indeed, Dr Mahathir refused to attend the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting held in Australia in 1982.

Dr Mahathir then tackled Third World problems by playing a diplomatic role in the setting up of a new international forum called the 'South-South Dialogue.'. He boldly expressed the discontent of third world countries regarding the world economic order, which had been dictated by the super powers, the world economic giants and their allied countries in the West. He managed to secure a leading role in the United Nations Anti-Drugs Committee with the intention of making the West give their support to lessen the problem.

His foreign policy also emphasised the role of Islamic countries in influencing the international order. He lent support to Palestine, and became involved in the Afghanistan issue. Nevertheless, relations with the Communist block countries improved, for example with China, having a significant effect when Beijing managed to soften the position of the Malayan Communist Party. Thus, during Dr Mahathir's administration, the external threat became almost insignificant, thereby enabling him to concentrate on domestic problems.

Dr Mahathir then introduced the Japanese management technique of morning exercise and the loyalty assembly. He stressed efficiency and productivity in the administration. The concept of a Quality Control Circle was introduced, and promotion was no longer based solely on seniority but on merit and performance. Dr

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<sup>30</sup>Murugesu Pathmanathan and David Lazarus, *Winds of Change: The Mahathir Impact on Malaysia's Foreign Policy* (Kuala Lumpur: Eastview Productions, 1984), p.21.

Mahathir became very antagonistic toward the so called 'dead wood' in the civil service.

His 'Look East Policy' was responsible for more Malaysians in the civil service and private sector being sent to Japan for training and exposure to Japanese management and technological education. However, his concept of a 'Look East' policy was questioned by a large number of politicians and members of the bureaucratic elite, who failed to understand the idea and its long-term implications, and were uneasy at the drastic substitution of models..

### *Political Strategy.*

Dr Mahathir developed the image of his reformist government in order to meet public expectations. His government espoused the aim of being a 'clean, efficient, and trustworthy' (*Bersih, Cekap dan Amanah*) government. This was the slogan that was created to develop his own political myth.

The first test of his government was when he coordinated the time zones between the Malay Peninsula and Sabah and Sarawak, this idea being symbolically important for the unity of the nation.

In 1982, the General Election indicated the confidence of the rakyat in Dr Mahathir's government. The local media also gave strong support to the new government, referring to it as the "2M" (Mahathir-Musa) administration. Indeed, the government had a very different style from the previous leadership, and to some extent, it represented a new generation that had taken over the government and party.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> Stuart Drummond 1981, "Malaysia:", pp.317-319.

It was during the General Election of 1982, that the 2M's administration launched the new slogan that promised 'Clean, Efficient, and Trustworthy' government. The strategy did achieve the supremacy of the multiparty coalition government of the National Front, the near elimination of the opposition parties, and the emergence of new faces at the national and state levels.<sup>32</sup> Dr Mahathir's strategy proved workable when Barisan Nasional won 132 out of 154 Parliamentary seats, with 60.4 percent of the popular vote.<sup>33</sup>

When his leadership was accepted by the people as clean, efficient and trustworthy, Dr Mahathir then launched the nationwide campaign of 'Leadership by example' (Kepemimpinan Melalui Tauladan). This represented another programme for changing the attitude of the bureaucratic and political elite which Dr Mahathir generated.

Another attempt to enhance the confidence of the people in the party and government's performance between 1982 and 1986, was to introduce another rhetorical slogan for the general election of 1986. This was 'Tradisi Membela Rakyat' (the tradition of Caring for the People) which became the theme of the Barisan Nasional's manifesto.

Since 1981, Mahathir has always been working to strengthen his position and influence in order to make sure his new ideas will be effectively supported. To do this, he followed a 'balance of power' tactic. Realising Harun Idris's power in the party, he took the opportunity, in Hussein Onn's absence, of submitting to the King a memorandum of public appeal for pardoning Harun Idris; the appeal actually being initiated by Tunku Abdul Rahman. Thus, while embarrassing Hussein Onn and undoubtedly contributing to the latter's resignation in 1981, Dr Mahathir enhanced his support among UMNO members, especially Harun's supporters, and the Tunku

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<sup>32</sup> Pushpa Thambipillai, "Malaysia: Twenty-Five and Pragmatic," in *Southeast Asian Affairs 1983* (Singapore: ISEAS, 1983), p.205.

<sup>33</sup> *Election In Malaysia: A Handbook of Fact and Figures on the Election 1955 -1986* (Kuala Lumpur: NSTP, 1990), p.69.

himself. To the Malays, the rehabilitation of Harun Idris in the party structure, was seen as part of the Malay custom of '*mengenang budi*' (gratitude).<sup>34</sup> This gave Mahathir confidence that his future leadership would be accepted and supported.

Another tactic was to appoint Musa Hitam as Deputy Prime Minister. By doing this, he managed to portray the image of a 'reformist government', since both were associated with common 'destiny' to change the government and the Malays' attitudes toward development which was characterized by the press as 'an ideal partnership'. Both of them were symbols of "a new generation of self-made and self-confident Malay leaders, Malay administrators, Malay professionals and Malay businessmen,"<sup>35</sup> representing a new generation of Malay politicians. Both were deeply concerned about their community's access to education, and both were determined that the New Economic Policy should improve the economic position.<sup>36</sup> Neither of them were from the feudal elite, and therefore their administration was in many ways a more popular government. Indeed, Malay intellectuals in particular were hoping that Dr Mahathir would implement the ideas he had put forward in *The Malay Dilemma*.

### *Balance of Power.*

As he held power, Dr Mahathir designed a plan to enhance his own position in the party and the government. The first step was to destroy the PAS through the cooptation of Anwar Ibrahim a few months before the General Election of 1982. Anwar was used then to weaken the PAS struggle for an Islamic state, and by coopting him Dr Mahathir also managed to control ABIM through Anwar's influence.

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<sup>34</sup> Datuk Harun was elected as UMNO's Vice President in the General Assembly of 1981. He was then appointed Director of the Selangor UMNO Election machinery in the General election of 1982. This empowered him to propose party candidates for the election, an action which implicitly meant Harun Idris's power had been restored. However, Dr Mahathir persuaded Harun not to contest in the general election but gave him an important job leading *Koperasi Usaha Bersatu*, an UMNO business interest under the cooperative law. However, Harun Idris became unpopular among the state party leaders for being the Director of the election, and divisional leaders voiced their dissatisfaction. Although Harun denied he had had the final say, it was Dr Mahathir and Musa Hitam who made the decisions, and yet he was blamed.

<sup>35</sup> *Straits Times*, October 23, 1981.

<sup>36</sup> Stuart Drummond 1981, "Malaysia:" p.319.



Thus, PAS lost one of its wings and lost heavily on two political battlegrounds, the General Elections of 1982 and 1986. However, ABIM also launched its long term alternative plan to infiltrate UMNO and the government apparatus.

The cooptation of Anwar Ibrahim was also another strategy of Mahathir to balance the influence of Musa Hitam and Tunku Razaleigh in the party and the government. To make Anwar more compliant, Dr Mahathir backed him to challenge Haji Suhaimi as the Head of UMNO Youth, and also promoted him to Cabinet Minister. Anwar not only enhanced his own position in the party and the government, he also managed to constitute himself as a new force in the party. Thus, Dr Mahathir developed a new faction under his patronage and strengthened his personal position.

The 2M's administration in 1982 replaced almost half of the party's candidates for state and parliamentary constituencies with younger and more educated personalities. It was a major process of elimination of the party's old guard, Dr Mahathir retaining only a few of them at state level. There were four new Menteri Besar aged below forty; these included the Menteri Besar of Pahang, Dato' Najib Tun Razak, former Federal Deputy Minister of Education; Abdul Ajib Ahmad, the Menteri Besar of Johor, who was formerly Political Secretary to Musa Hitam; Abdul Rahim Tamby Chik, the Chief Minister of Melaka, former Federal Deputy Minister of Home Affairs; and Mohd Isa Samad, former member of the state Executive Council, who was made the Menteri Besar of Negeri Sembilan. While at the same time, Rais Yatim, former Menteri Besar of Negeri Sembilan and Adib Adam, the Chief Minister of Melaka, were appointed Federal Cabinet ministers.

These new faces in the Federal Cabinet and at state level gave their loyalty to the 2M's- Mahathir and Musa Hitam. The injection of young blood into UMNO boosted the popular image of the 2M's administration, and created further potential for the party's progress in the future. While these new faces propagated the slogan of clean, efficient and trustworthy government, intuitively Dr Mahathir had also introduced another step in his balance of power strategy in UMNO.

*The Securing of Power.*

In the early phase of his administration, Dr Mahathir was the only symbol of unity in UMNO. However, he was astutely building up his 'inner circle'. Before 1984, Musa Hitam and Abdullah Ahmad Badawi enjoyed close relations with Dr Mahathir, but after the General Assembly of 1984, although this was later denied, Dr Mahathir was already forming his own group which was referred to as '*AIDS*'<sup>37</sup> - a short form for Anwar Ibrahim, Daim and Sanusi, who were the cabinet ministers and the party Youth Leader, Treasurer, and Secretary General respectively. (However, this connotation of AIDS with UMNO gave a hint of impending political catastrophe in the party). In fact after 1981, Dr Mahathir worked closely with Musa Hitam, Abdullah Badawi and Sanusi Junid in the day-to-day running of the Government<sup>38</sup> through the reactivation of the National Action Council which functioned to keep track of the progress of the country's developmental programmes. These four leaders, then, had combined forces to monitor the country both through the council and their own ministerial areas.

However, Dr. Mahathir restrained Musa's influence by retaining Tengku Razaleigh in the government and the party. Under the pretext of giving the General Assembly of 1981 the mandate to decide whether to choose Musa or Tengku Razaleigh as the party Deputy President, Dr Mahathir managed to measure both

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<sup>37</sup> This was referred to with negative connotations or as a syndrome of a political virus which would weaken the party and destroy the Malays. It was based on the world wide disease-AIDS. The AIDS virus developed through sexual or other relations and can attack the body's defence system which normally helps fight off diseases and infections. They become ill and die from illnesses they cannot counter. In the context of UMNO, AIDS implied a group that had been infected with the idea of selfish power. To Dr Mahathir's opponents, AIDS was a dangerous 'political' virus for the Malays.

<sup>38</sup> In addition to his Home Affairs portfolio, Musa Hitam supervised the governmental administration. He was the link between bureaucrats, civil servants, and the Prime Minister. Abdullah Badawi, the Minister in the Prime Minister's Department, was given the task of supervising government agencies such as MAMPU (Manpower Planning Unit) which monitored the efficiency and productivity of government departments; EPU (Economic Planning Unit) which coordinated economic development; Biro Tata Negera (The Civic Bureau); The Islamic Centre and the Public Service department. Sanusi Junid, as Minister for National and Rural Development, was asked to command several agencies including KEMAS (The Community Development Department), The Implementation and Co-ordination Unit (ICU) which was given the task of implementing the New Economic Policy. KEMAS commanded the government and UMNO influence in rural areas. See V.Selvaratnam, 'Malaysia in 1981: A Year of Political Transition', *Southeast Asian Affairs 1982* (Singapore: ISEAS, 1982), pp.247-248.

contenders' influence in the party. In fact, he advised both candidates also to be candidates for the Vice President posts, thus enabling them to secure positions in the party structure. However, both ignored this advice, and indeed, Dr Mahathir directed the political drama of the election of Deputy Presidency. Without his patronage, Musa's victory in 1981 would not have been realized. Thus, Tengku Razaleigh collected 517 out of 1,244 votes in the General Assembly of 1981 in which Musa Hitam had a solid majority of 205 votes.<sup>39</sup>

Significantly, the competition for the party Deputy Presidentship in 1981 sharpened the faction fighting in UMNO. There were camps led by Tengku Razaleigh, Musa Hitam, Mahathir himself, Harun Idris and a few small opportunist groups and fence sitters who would back whoever they saw as the potential winner.

### *The Constitutional Crisis of 1983.*

By the end of the 1970's, Mahathir had studied the problem of the power struggle between the Sultan, as Head of State and the Menteri Besar, as the Head of government. In Pahang, by November 1981, a prolonged power struggle between rival factions within the UMNO state leadership, had forced Haji Abdul Rahim Bakar,<sup>40</sup> the Menteri Besar, to resign; an event which involved the Royal family. The Regent of Pahang withheld his royal assent from several bills, and it was said that,

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<sup>39</sup> The comments on the party election of 1981 can be followed from articles by Mohd. Nor Shamsuddin and Abdul Samad Idris, an UMNO veteran in the weekly *Mingguan Malaysia*, July 5, 1981. Dato' Asri, PAS President commented that the 1981 General Assembly was "the beginning of the power struggle in UMNO," *Watan*, July 7, 1981. For another account of Tengku Razaleigh's version see Abdul Ghani Ismail, *Razaleigh Lawan Musa Pusingan Kedua 1984* (Taiping: IIS Communication, 1983), pp 17-25.

<sup>40</sup> V.Selvaratnam, 'Malaysia in 1981,' pp. 249-251. Haji Rahim Bakar was appointed after the general election of 1978 by Tun Hussein Onn who was Prime Minister and President of UMNO. The appointment was made against the wishes of some state UMNO leaders and the state Ruler, Sultan Haji Ahmad Shah who was also the Yang Di Pertuan Agong between 1979-1984. Haji Rahim as the head of administration was concerned about 40,000 acres of illegal plantation in the state. Consequently he confiscated the land for two government land development schemes. His policy directly confronted the interest of a faction in the ruling elite of the state including the royal family and politicians linked to the royal family. Dr Mahathir directed the National Bureau of Investigation to examine this so-called land scandal, see *New Straits Times*, November 20, 1981.

"This refusal to grant formal assent has created bottlenecks in both the administration and the developmental progress of the state."<sup>41</sup>

In December, another battle occurred in Johor involving royalty. This had started in April 1981 when Sultan Mahmud Iskandar 'bullied' the Menteri Besar,<sup>42</sup> Tan Sri Othman Saad, forcing the Menteri Besar to resign. To make matters worse, the Sultan expressed his dissatisfaction about certain corrupt practices which involved Othman Saad himself.<sup>43</sup> Although, another constitutional crisis was avoided, Dr Mahathir had to take into account the Sultan of Johor's personality.

Another Ruler who worried Mahathir was Sultan Idris of Perak, who had forced the Menteri Besar, Tan Sri Ghazali Jawi, to step down. Both the Sultan of Johor and the Sultan of Perak were considered potentially electable as Yang Di Pertuan Agong (the King) to replace the Sultan of Pahang, who would finish his term by 1984.<sup>44</sup>

*"It was the prospect of either of these two strong willed Rulers... [becoming the King]...that sparked off the recent Constitutional Crisis. [Dr Mahathir] was afraid that the presence of a headstrong and strongwilled Ruler as [the King] might give rise to difficulties with the Federal Government..."<sup>45</sup>*

Dr Mahathir then tabled a bill in Parliament to amend the constitution, which was causing confusion among UMNO members. However, the bill, which had been

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<sup>41</sup> V.Selvaratnam, 'Malaysia in 1981,' p.250. Among this vital legislation was a bill to bring salaries and allowances of State Assemblymen into line with those paid by other state governments in Malaysia.

<sup>42</sup> In September 1981, the Sultan gave the Menteri Besar 24 hours notice to vacate his office as he, himself, wanted to occupy the premises in the belief that the office was once used by his grandfather, the late Sultan Ibrahim. Their relationship soured as a result of the Menteri Besar's comments on the decision to change the agreed order of succession, whereby Tunku Mahmud Iskandar, as Raja Muda, subsequently exchanged his position to Tunku Mahkota-the heir apparent- thus giving him an opportunity to be appointed as the Sultan of Johor. In Johor's state constitution, three posts are filled according to the selection of a Council of Regency, namely, Tunku Bendahara, Raja Muda and Tunku Mahkota. Tunku Mahmud was once the Tunku Mahkota (1959-1961), but he was then demoted to Raja Muda. His brother Tunku Abdul Rahman, the Tunku Bendahara, was appointed the Tunku Mahkota until he was reinstated to his former position on 29th April 1981, in order to make way for Tunku Mahmud to become Tunku Mahkota and the Sultan on the 10th of May of that year.

<sup>43</sup> The NBI's investigation brought Othman Saad into the High Court on 20 September regarding allegations that he and members of the state Executive Council had illegally allocated several hundred acres of state land to other members and their cohorts. Ibid., p.252.

<sup>44</sup> On 9th February, 1984, Sultan Iskandar Shah Al-Haj was elected the eighth Yang Di-Pertuan Agong by his fellow Rulers by a narrow margin. When Sultan Idris Shah of Perak died on 1st February 1984, his successor, Sultan Azlan Shah was elected Timbalan Yang DiPertuan Agong (the Deputy King). The new King's term started on 26th April 1984.

<sup>45</sup> Tan Chee Khoo, *The Monarchy in Malaysia* (Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk Publications, 1984), p.16.

passed by both the Dewan Rakyat and the Dewan Negara, was not given royal assent by the King. This was because the bill had proposed a transferring of the power to declare an emergency from the King to the Prime Minister. Moreover, the King had a limit of fifteen days to give the royal assent, otherwise the bill automatically became law. However, the refusal of the King to give his royal assent, injured Dr Mahathir's reputation, shocking UMNO leaders who were immediately briefed by the leader as he tried to defend his decision. It was known to the public that Dr Mahathir had planned his action without the consent of the party Supreme Council,<sup>46</sup> and there were mixed feelings about this among the Malays. Some UMNO members even accused Mahathir of planning to form a republic.<sup>47</sup> To those who disliked Mahathir, the amendment was seen as paving the way for him to become the dictator<sup>48</sup> of a socialist state.<sup>49</sup> These accusations frustrated Mahathir, and he tested his popularity by showing his willingness to resign, if that was what the people wanted. However his supporters and his clients in UMNO planned immediate large scale public rallies throughout the country to boost Dr Mahathir's position and morale.

The first public rally in support of Mahathir was held by Kedah UMNO; this increased his confidence to sustain his leadership in the party and the government. These public rallies, and closed door briefings to UMNO's Heads of Divisions and Divisional Information Chiefs, were followed by the General Assembly of 1984, which made Dr Mahathir's position more secure. Tengku Razaleigh was one of the UMNO leaders who were not seen to be involved in the issue, while others kept a 'wait and see' attitude. At least seven of the most energetic cabinet ministers went

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<sup>46</sup> Chamil Wariya, *Siapa Kuasai UMNO* (Petaling Jaya: Media Intelek, 1985), 209.

<sup>47</sup> Ainnol Jamaal, *Sekitar Isu Pindaan Perlembagaan* (Kuala Lumpur: Ainnol Enterprise, 1984), p.21.

<sup>48</sup> Kamarazaman Yacob, *Mahathir Menuju Diktator ?* (Kuala Lumpur: Media Jaya, 1988), pp.52-59. In his speech at a public rally in Kedah on Saturday 27th November, 1983, Mahathir made an unexpected remark that he was elected by the *rakyat* and so could not resign unless forced to by the *rakyat*. The remark not only exposed Mahathir's confrontational attitude toward Malay Rulers, but to his political enemies too. It seemed that Dr Mahathir was exposing the Malays to a new political culture. If this was so, it correlated with his speech in Australia in 1979 which stated that in the year 2000 Malaysia would be a Socialist state, see Ahmad Atory Hussein, 'Kepemimpinan UMNO Antara tradisi dan Demokrasi: Satu Analisis,' (an unpublished manuscript, 1989), p.322, footnote 1.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

around the country to explain the 'actual' situation to the people. For their services to their political patron they were later referred to as '*the magnificent seven*'. Among them were Abdullah Badawi, Anwar Ibrahim, Sanusi Junid, Shahril Samad, and Rafidah Aziz. However, the constitutional crisis divided UMNO leaders and members, and there were those who disagreed with the way Dr Mahathir precipitated the issue. Certain UMNO leaders feared the decline of the Malay sultanate, the only Malay traditional institution that was considered capable of safeguarding Malay interests, and without which the future of the Malays could be jeopardised. Some UMNO leaders, for political and personal reasons, were unwilling to be parted from their clientelist linkage with the Malay Rulers. However, certain educated Malays saw the crisis as a turning point in the monarchical system in Malaysia.

The Extra-Ordinary General Meeting of the UMNO Youth Movement was held on 4 November 1983, passing a motion<sup>50</sup> giving support to the party leadership to amend the articles 66 (5) and 150 of the Federal Constitution, by which the Malay Rulers felt that their power would be curtailed. Anwar Ibrahim convinced the meeting that the amendments were aimed at strengthening and enhancing the position and the sovereignty of the Malay Rulers. Tactically, UMNO leaders had their own weapon for gaining support from UMNO members; i.e. the revision of Federal and State election boundaries, through which Parliamentary seats were increased by 22.<sup>51</sup> However, the bill for the revision of the election boundaries also did not receive the royal assent.

The crisis officially 'ended' when Dr Mahathir and the Rulers compromised and accommodated on both sides when the Constitutional (Amendment) Bill of

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<sup>50</sup> See the Minutes of the UMNO Youth Extra-Ordinary Meeting, 4th November, 1983 at the Civic Hall of Petaling Jaya.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid., p.22. This was a statement given by Ghafar Baba during the meeting. If the constitutional amendment had not been given the royal assent until the end of November 1983, the additional Parliamentary seats could not have been implemented in July, 1984. He also mentioned five other points: the amendment was aimed at avoiding contradictions between the people and that Malay Rulers in the future; the additional seats were important for the Barisan Nasional's political interest in the future; the amendment to article 66(5) and 150 not mean that the nation would become a republican state which could only come about through revolution and suspension of the constitution; as long as the present constitution was enforced, the integrity and sovereignty of the Rulers could be preserved; and he also emphasised that the proposed amendment would guarantee that the monarchy would reign for another 300 years.

1984 was passed by the Parliament by a 141-10 vote.<sup>52</sup> The Rulers were given more time to study the bill for the royal assent, and the power to declare an emergency was also retained. In this zero-sum game, Dr Mahathir's leadership had been challenged, though he had managed to win popular support but only at the price of dividing the party. However, unexpectedly, the new king, Sultan Mahmood Iskandar of Johor, changed his attitude toward the Prime Minister, and seemed willing to cooperate with Dr Mahathir, supporting his premiership during the turbulent years after the 1987 party election. But the Sultan of Kelantan continued to be suspicious about Dr Mahathir's political style.<sup>53</sup>

### *Political Style.*

Dr Mahathir thus made the party Presidentship and his Premiership the agencies of his popular reform. His political style and personality had a maximum impact that imposed itself in areas in which he worked. To some extent, Dr Mahathir demonstrated a 'presidential' style of government,<sup>54</sup> being able to by-pass some of the elites, and appeal directly to the ordinary people, the non-elites.<sup>55</sup>

His notable achievement in the first two years of his leadership in the party and the government was that he carried popular opinion with him. He learned to compromise in order to achieve his goals and developed the skills of power-management in the party, leading public opinion, dramatizing issues and dominating

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<sup>52</sup> Murugesu Pathmanathan, "Malaysia in 1984: A Political and Economic Survey," *Southeast Asian Affairs* 1985 p.212.

<sup>53</sup> The Sultan of Kelantan's conflict with Dr Mahathir climaxed in 1990 when the disharmonious relationship between the Sultan and the state Menteri Besar, Dato' Mohamad Yaakob was exposed to the public. Kelantan UMNO leaders asked Dr Mahathir to replace Mohamad Yaakob, to ensure that the party retained power in the state in the coming general election. Dr Mahathir on the other hand believed that if he submitted to the Sultan, it would create problems in other states where Rulers had differences with their Menteri Besars. See *The Straits Times*, Weekly Overseas Edition, (August 11 and 18, 1990), p.10. Dr Mahathir then dragged UMNO members into the crisis when they lost in Kelantan in the General Election of 1990, when Sultan of Kelantan was accused of supporting the opposition. As a result, in the UMNO General Assembly of 1990 and 1991, the resolution of the Malay Rulers was discussed and the Assembly pledged their support to Dr Mahathir.

<sup>54</sup> The concept was based on the leadership style of Dr Mahathir who, it was reported, had a tendency to centralize all constitutional power in his own hands, he prefers a loyal cabinet, accountable only to him, and he was determined to stamp his strong ideological values directly onto the Malaysian people. For a conceptual discussion on the meaning of 'presidential' style, see Wang Gungwu, 'Reflection on Malaysian Elites,' *RIMA*, 20 (No.1), (Winter 1986), pp.115-122.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, p.122.

the policy-making process. With his strong belief in Malaysia as a strong nation, Dr Mahathir was ready for the forthcoming challenges.

### *The Challenges.*

His 'kami-kaze' attitude in handling the constitutional amendment of 1983 was the first test for his leadership. When the Malay Rulers objected to the constitutional change, the Malays were plunged into a crisis of loyalty.<sup>56</sup> The Tunku Abdul Rahman, the former Prime Minister predicted that Malaysia would ultimately become a republican state. In Johor, the Sultan accused UMNO leaders of using their influence to oppose the Malay rulers.<sup>57</sup> He retaliated by ordering that the pictures of Dr Mahathir and Musa Hitam be removed from public buildings in the state. Thus, the relationship between Musa Hitam, who was from Johor, and the Sultan was also affected. In some states, at the climax of the crisis, the Federal flag ceased to be raised.

In Kelantan, the Sultan expressed his dissatisfaction with Dr Mahathir by refusing to cooperate with the Menteri Besar who was also the Chairman of the State UMNO Liaison Committee. This situation then affected the UMNO performance in the next General Election,<sup>58</sup> this also being the state where Tengku Razaleigh had strong support and which had been a stronghold of PAS since 1959. Dr Mahathir's camp began to formulate a theory that the Sultan of Kelantan was influenced by Tengku Razaleigh, who was a close relative to the Sultan's consort, the Raja Perempuan of Kelantan. Significantly, Dr Mahathir saw strong support for the Sultan

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<sup>56</sup> Ainnol Jamaal 1984, *Sekitar Isu Pindaan Perlembagaan*, p.89-90, quoted opinions of UMNO members in particular. Some of them did not just want to be 'yes men,' but wished to be given a clear explanation of the reason for the amendments to the constitution. This, however, did not mean that they did not like Dr Mahathir and Musa Hitam, but that they did not like to take action without clear reasons (*bidan terjun*). It seemed to some that when the situation became difficult, UMNO members became mere political tools. Others acknowledged that they were unhappy with the actions of some Malay Rulers which were 'unbecoming'.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, p.97.

<sup>58</sup> See Chapter VII which discusses the general election of 1990. In brief, the election saw UMNO lose all state and parliamentary seats in Kelantan where the Sultan was blamed for this loss by Dr Mahathir and UMNO leaders as they were seen to be one of the main factors leading to UMNO's downfall. This was also a vital issue in the UMNO General Assembly of 1990.



whom he blamed for the poor UMNO performance in the General Election of 1990. However, strategically Dr Mahathir, let the General Assembly voice his criticism on the monarchical system and its personalities.<sup>59</sup>

*Musa Hitam and 'his tactical withdrawal'.*

When Dr Mahathir began denying, indirectly, that his administration was a 2M's (Mahathir-Musa) administration, bitter relations between Musa and Mahathir developed, and it seemed that the Constitutional crisis of 1983 sparked off the rift. However, there were two contradictory views concerning Musa Hitam's role. When the crisis occurred, some sources said Musa Hitam was the person who advised Mahathir to amend the constitution to curb the power of the King (Yang DiPertuan Agong). Other sources argued that Musa Hitam was quite reluctant to be involved in Mahathir's political manoeuvres. However, Musa Hitam as the Chairman of Johor state UMNO Liaison Committee, was forced to organise a public rally at Batu Pahat to show the support of the Johor Malays for Dr Mahathir.

To Musa Hitam, his position in the party and government legitimized his influence among the party members. However, he was paradoxically caught between his ideal of '*Politik Kampung*' and the materialism which had become the new culture in UMNO. As Musa Hitam saw it, 'reward power' was more in the hands of the Minister of Finance, causing the former to indirectly attack Tengku Razaleigh who was seen as he who had been practicing 'money politics'.

Although Mahathir and Musa had had common experiences in UMNO and probably had the same conception of the future of the Malays and the country, they

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<sup>59</sup> The drama began when the local press reported the dissatisfaction expressed by the Jelutong UMNO Division of Pulau Pinang at the interference of the Sultan of Kelantan in the 1990 General Election. Previously, it had made comments on the role of the palace in the failure of UMNO in Kelantan. The mainstream press had given a wide coverage to the views of members of the UMNO Divisions prior to the issue being discussed in the General Assembly of December 1990. The Pemuda UMNO tabled the motion in the Assembly. This Assembly's resolution then was presented to the King by a delegation from UMNO led by Dr Mahathir, and accompanied by Ghaffar Baba (Deputy President), Anwar Ibrahim (Vice President), Rafidah Aziz (Head of Wanita) and Najib Tun Razak (Head of Pemuda). At state level, the Menteri Besars made a courtesy call to the Malay Rulers to hand over the UMNO resolution. See *Utusan Malaysia*, and *Berita Harian*, November 11, 1990,

had differences in approach and political strategy. Dr Mahathir admonished Musa Hitam for failing to control his 'lieutenants', who were disseminating negative opinions about Mahathir's style of administration, souring their relationship. It was said that Musa Hitam held different views, concerning the basis of public policy. While Mahathir directed the nation to 'Look East', Musa Hitam was said to still favour the 'Look West' approach. Their significant differences were glaring in two of the Mahathir political tactics for confronting PAS, namely; the dissemination of Islamic values in the administration; and the cooptation of Anwar Ibrahim to UMNO. Concerning the former, Musa Hitam hinted to a group of academicians that Mahathir seemed to be an *ustaz* (Islamic religious teacher).<sup>60</sup> In regard to the latter, this was considered a new tactic in the political blockage of Musa's drive for power. At that time, Dr Mahathir was gathering all possible information, through his inner circle including from the press networks of certain people, on the activities of Musa Hitam and the operation of his so called 'lieutenants.' Indeed, it was these lieutenants who had launched several 'attacks' on the Mahathir leadership style and policies to try to make Mahathir lose his confidence and resign. To those whose political and economic survival depended on Mahathir, the character assassination and criticism of Mahathir's policies jeopardised their future.<sup>61</sup> In both Mahathir's camp and Tengku Razaleigh's group it was thought that Musa Hitam was striving to wrest power from Dr Mahathir, and rumours were also rampant in Kuala Lumpur that Musa Hitam aimed to become Prime Minister as fast as possible.<sup>62</sup> For the purpose of window-dressing, Dr Mahathir and Musa Hitam denied their rift, and in the Assembly of 1985, Musa Hitam assured that he would continue to solidly support Dr Mahathir. Before

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<sup>60</sup> Amaluddin Darus, *Serbasalah Melayu di Malaysia* (Subang Jaya: Syarikat Abad, 1988), p.167.

<sup>61</sup> A reflection on the culture of the top leadership in UMNO, their style of administration, leadership, and patron-client relationships in UMNO can be followed from an anthology of short stories *Maharaja Beruk dan Beruk-Beruk Lainnya*, written by Yahya Ismail (Kuala Lumpur: Dinamika Kreatif, 1988). The story of Maharaja Beruk (the Monkey Emperor) was first published in *Dewan Sastera*. The Director General of Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, the publisher, was pressured to take action against the editor, since publication of the story embarrassed the Minister of Education (Anwar Ibrahim) as well as the Prime Minister.

<sup>62</sup> See the development of the conflict between Musa and Mahathir from Musa Hitam's version in Ruhanie Haji Ahmad, *Musa Hitam: Serene in the Storm* (Subang Jaya: Media Indah, 1987).

that, in Johor Bahru, Dr Mahathir had also denied any conflict, and posing before the press to show their cordial relationship represented another attempt to maintain public confidence.

Musa Hitam hoped that Dr Mahathir could clear his path for future power in UMNO by removing Tengku Razaleigh and his camp from the government,<sup>63</sup> after Musa Hitam retained the Deputy Presidentship. The Ministry of Finance held by Tengku Razaleigh was considered a source of influence, because of its reward power, including awarding tenders and government contracts, and distributing of public shares and other financial benefits. Musa needed support to outflank any future challenge from Tengku Razaleigh,<sup>64</sup> but this tactical device then exposed Musa Hitam to the charge that he was planning to confront Mahathir in the party election of 1987. Mahathir, thus, refused to go along with Musa's request to oust Tengku Razaleigh from the cabinet. Instead he transferred Tengku Razaleigh to another ministry which was also influential in awarding business facilities to clients. and Dr Mahathir appointed his close friend, Daim Zainuddin to the Finance ministry. Displeased with Mahathir's decision, Musa Hitam privately wrote to Dr Mahathir in July 1984, that he intended to resign in one year's time<sup>65</sup> By then, their relationship had become sour. However, they managed to maintain their cordial relationship at least in public.

"Musa feels his chances of succession are slipping away, with Mahathir depending increasingly on other UMNO leaders.

The thrust of Musa's grievances are apparently that a tight kitchen cabinet has surrounded Mahathir, effectively excluding him from any real decision-making in the party and government..<sup>66</sup>

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<sup>63</sup> See a letter from Musa Hitam to Mahathir, dated July 5, 1984 on 'TR in the cabinet' in S.H.Alatas, **Challenger: Siapa Lawan Siapa** (Kuala Lumpur: AlNujum, 1987), pp.124-125. This book was an attempt to destroy Musa Hitam's political career and its circulation was stopped by an order of the Courts, when Musa Hitam challenged it in court. The case was heard in court and the verdict was announced in 1990, when the author was found guilty and ordered to pay Musa Hitam for slander and the damage done to his future in politics. Musa himself stated that the end of the suit was 'a final wrap-up of his political career'.

<sup>64</sup> Aziz Zariza Ahmad, **Dr Mahathir Mohamad Fasa Kedua** (Kuala Lumpur: Firma Malaysia Publication, 1988), pp.102-103.

<sup>65</sup> See the hand written letter from Musa Hitam to Mahathir, dated July,31, 1984 in S.H.Alatas, **Challenger**, pp 419-420.

<sup>66</sup> "Mahathir's dilemma," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, March 13, 1986, p.11.

Mahathir implicitly explained to the General Assembly in 1983 that he regarded stability as a priority. In 1984, Dr Mahathir thanked the delegation in the General Assembly of 1981 who had chosen Musa Hitam as his Deputy President. However, he already had his suspicions of Musa Hitam who was rumoured to harbour ambitions to run against both Mahathir and his team.<sup>67</sup>

Tengku Razaleigh's camp saw Musa Hitam's confidential letter to Mahathir asking for Razaleigh to be dropped from the cabinet as the beginning of the rift in 2M's administration.<sup>68</sup> In 1984, Musa Hitam urged UMNO members, for the sake of the party's survival, to have vision and perspective concerning the type of leadership needed by the party. He showed his concern for the continuity of the party tradition of elevating the dignity and the morale of the Malays.<sup>69</sup> But Mahathir also reminded the UMNO delegations of the organizations and customs of the last 38 years, stressing they should be upheld. He blamed those who had given priority to their status and influence in current problems.<sup>70</sup> Ironically, he said this trend was exaggerated by the *orang kanan* (the close supporters) of the candidates, those connected with Musa Hitam and Tengku Razaleigh. Some writers referred to those *orang kanan*, the boys of the camps and their lieutenants, as 'political white ants', (*anai-anai politik*) who would destroy the party.<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>67</sup> Dr Mahathir in his policy speech at the opening ceremony of the General Assembly in 1983 mentioned that he had a good and effective team, especially in Musa Hitam. Mahathir upheld the team spirit. However if one of the members held aspirations not in line with those of the team, the team would be considered a failure. At that time, there were rumours that someone in the team did have ambitions against that team and its leader. See Dr Mahathir Mohamad, *UMNO: Malaysia Bahagia*, [The Presidential speech at the 34th UMNO General Assembly, Hilton Hotel, Kuala Lumpur, Friday, August 19, 1983.], p.33.

<sup>68</sup> Aziz Zariza Ahmad 1988, *Dr Mahathir*, p.102.

<sup>69</sup> Musa Hitam, *Ketahanan UMNO* [the speech at the official opening ceremony of the meetings of the UMNO Youth and Women Movements at Dewan Bahasa and Pustaka, (Kuala Lumpur: May 24, 1984), pp.8-9.

<sup>70</sup> Dr Mahathir Mohamad, *UMNO: Malaysia Bahagia*, p.32. In the original text Mahathir mentions that: " Pada masa-masa yang akhir ini terdapat satu kegiatan yang tidak mencerminkan pegangan kepada tradisi dan adat. Atas nama demokrasi kononnya, adat dan tradisi dikebelakangkan. Mungkin ada orang yang berminat kepada jawatan-jawatan tertentu dalam parti dan kerajaan. Tetapi yang ghairah sekali ialah orang-orang kanan bakal-bakal calon ini. Tidak ada had dan batasan apabila orang-orang ini berkempen. Bahawa akibatnya ialah kehancuran parti tidak sama sekali dihiraukan. Bagi mereka yang utama ialah status dan pengaruh yang didapati oleh mereka jika calon mereka mendapat kemenangan. Sebab itu, hampir dua tahun sebelum pemilihan Majlis Tertinggi mereka telah merancang dan menjalankan kempen mereka."

<sup>71</sup> Alias Mohamed, *Kepimpinan. Demokrasi dan Politik* (Kuala Lumpur: AMW Communication, 1984), p.45.

Two important incidents happened while Dr Mahathir was abroad in 1985; the state election in Sabah on April 21 ; and the Memali incident on November 19. When the *Parti Bersatu Sabah* (PBS), led by Pairin Kitingan, won 26 seats, the *USNO* (The United Sabah National Organization) 16 and Berjaya 6 , Musa Hitam, as acting Prime Minister, rejected the pre-dawn coup of Tun Mustapha of USNO who was in a pact with Berjaya. Instead Musa Hitam followed the wishes of the majority of the people of Sabah who had chosen the PBS as their new state government. The loss of Berjaya embarrassed Mahathir, who had earlier indicated that the Barisan Nasional would 'sink or swim' with Berjaya. To a certain extent, Musa Hitam was attacked by certain Islamic groups and his political enemies for lending support to the Christian government in Sabah.<sup>72</sup>

To complicate things further, the Memali incident in Baling, Kedah, occurred. This was a battle between the Police Force and Malay villagers, who happened to be PAS members under their leader Ibrahim Libya, a religious teacher. Musa Hitam, as Minister of Home Affairs in charge of internal security and public order, was blamed for ordering the Police to attack Ibrahim Libya's followers. Nevertheless, Musa Hitam's men later spread the news that before ordering the 'shooting', Musa Hitam had consulted with Dr Mahathir, who was to have flown to China at that time for an official visit.

The conflict between Mahathir and Musa Hitam, indeed, became known to Supreme Council members, the day before the General Assembly of 1985. Without mentioning any names, Mahathir questioned the loyalty of some Supreme Council members, expressing his anger concerning deliberate slander (*fitnah*) of himself. This became a puzzle not only to the Supreme Council but to party members at large when Dr Mahathir expressed discontent with the latest developments in UMNO.

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<sup>72</sup> S.H. Alatas 1987, *Challenger*, p.89. This author blamed Musa Hitam for expediting the registration of PBS as a political party in order to topple the Berjaya government under Harris Salleh. Harris was said to have supported Tengku Razaleigh in the 1981 and 1984 UMNO elections.

The Supreme Council meeting on the January 15, 1986 was heated. Dr Mahathir made emotional statements, which, to a certain extent, were said to indicate his intention to resign.<sup>73</sup> Dr Mahathir was depressed with personal slanders directed against him, i.e. that he was a dictatorial, corrupt Prime Minister, and one of the richest politicians in the world. Finally, Dr Mahathir declared that many senior government officials and journalists had reported to him that Musa Hitam intended to topple him. Mahathir also criticised Musa Hitam- recommended personalities who had given bad performances, and Musa Hitam's 'boys' who had reportedly defamed his character. Musa Hitam, in a letter, acknowledged that although a few Mahathir policies, and their implementation, had been questioned by him, this had only occurred in their normal private meetings. "Basically, I accept the reality that you are the Prime Minister, and I also accept the principle of collective responsibility."<sup>74</sup> Before he left for Davos, Switzerland, which was his final assignment in the government, in their meeting on January 27, Musa Hitam mentioned his intention to tender his resignation.<sup>75</sup>

On March 16, 1986 Musa Hitam officially resigned as Deputy Prime Minister, UMNO Deputy President and from all other appointments in the party. Although Dr Mahathir was already prepared for the resignation, the party and the Malays were shocked by the news. Musa Hitam then flew to Jeddah to perform the umrah in Mecca, and then took a rest in London. It was at that time, the UMNO Supreme Council persuaded Musa Hitam to withdraw his resignation letter in the interests of the party. Finally, Musa Hitam agreed to hold only the party Deputy President's post as he was elected by the Assembly. His decision created more speculation concerning

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<sup>73</sup> See the resignation letter of Musa Hitam to Dr Mahathir, dated February 26, 1986. This seven page letter was distributed to the Supreme Council members and to some UMNO members.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid., p.4.

<sup>75</sup> For an account of Musa Hitam's time in Davos, see Ruhanie Haji Ahmad 1987, *Musa Hitam*, pp.14-19. Musa Hitam and Dr. Mahathir managed to show their 'cordial' relationship so as to quash rumours of a rift between them among ordinary UMNO members. On February 20, 1986, Musa Hitam and Mahathir were still together in the public eye, even though Musa had already decided to resign from government and UMNO. Musa Hitam instructed his Segamat UMNO Division to prepare a grand welcome for Dr Mahathir's visit. That was the final party activity of Musa Hitam before his resignation six days later.

who would be the next Deputy Prime Minister and if there was a possibility of Musa Hitam challenging Dr Mahathir in the party election in 1987. Would he join forces with Tengku Razaleigh to destroy the Mahathir leadership in UMNO? The situation became intense when anonymous letters, believed to originate from Musa Hitam's political enemies, were circulated denouncing Musa Hitam's tactical withdrawal from the government and the party.<sup>76</sup>

*Tengku Razaleigh 'the people-hearted prince.'* (Anak raja berjiwa rakyat)

It is not very clear whether Dr Mahathir personally disliked Tengku Razaleigh, who had an eye for the top party post. When Tun Dr Ismail, the party Deputy President, and also Deputy Prime Minister, died in 1973, he was replaced by Hussein Onn, a junior Vice President who was also a relative of the Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak. Although Tengku Razaleigh was only a member of the Supreme Council at that time, he enjoyed a close rapport with Tun Abdul Razak who made him acting Vice President to replace Hussein Onn, who had himself been appointed acting party Deputy President. But before that, Tun Razak had explained to Tengku Razaleigh that the post should be filled by Dr Mahathir since the latter was a Supreme Council member who had secured the highest vote in the previous General Assembly. After he had lobbied Tun Razak, Tengku Razaleigh discussed the matter with Dr Mahathir and indicated that Tun Razak had agreed to appoint him [Razaleigh] as acting Vice President, provided Dr Mahathir agreed.<sup>77</sup> Whether that was his own political strategy or it was to show his loyalty to Tun Razak, who was thought inclined to appoint Tengku Razaleigh, Dr Mahathir proposed Tengku Razaleigh's

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<sup>76</sup> The twenty eight page letter gave an insight into the development of the crisis. Besides uncovering the weaknesses of Musa Hitam, the letter also implicated Musa's mens' strategies. The letter questioned the sincerity of his resignation, and denied that the Menteri Besar's mission to London to persuade Musa Hitam to withdraw his letter was an action prompted by the Supreme Council, but that it only represented the 'Menteri Besar Club'. The interesting part was the statement which said Musa Hitam wanted to be the Prime Minister by 1988. The writing and distribution of anonymous letters and books rapidly developed as a new trend in Malay society in 1980's.

<sup>77</sup> Aziz Zariza Ahmad 1988, *Dr Mahathir*, p.290.

name in the meeting of the Supreme Council later on. Tengku Razaleigh thought this was an intelligent move, but Dr Mahathir realised that Tengku Razaleigh had exposed himself as a latent political enemy, since the press at that time were pointing to Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie, the then Minister of Home Affairs, as 'the rising star' who was being groomed to be the future Prime Minister. However, in the 1975 General Assembly, while Hussein Onn was endorsed as new Deputy President, Tun Razak shocked everybody when he hinted that Ghaffar Babá, Tengku Razaleigh and Dr Mahathir might be elected party Vice Presidents. In the election, Ghaffar Baba secured the highest votes, followed by Tengku Razaleigh and Dr Mahathir.<sup>78</sup>

Tengku Razaleigh, being the Minister of Finance, party Vice President, and also the party Treasurer had his own power-base. It was said that Dr Mahathir was not happy with the way Tengku Razaleigh by passed him in policy matters, and he seemed to be exceeding his power as Deputy Prime Minister. Tengku Razaleigh had only consulted Hussein Onn, the Prime Minister, even though Dr Mahathir was also the Minister of Trade and Industry. There were cases of contradictory speeches on trade promotion being made by each of them. This happened when Dr Mahathir led a Malaysian Trade mission to the United States; at the same time, Tengku Razaleigh was also in the country to officiate at the opening of the Bank Bumiputera's branch.<sup>79</sup> In 1978, Tengku Razaleigh's reputation among UMNO leaders declined and the press circulated negative views concerning his leadership style. These included criticism of Tengku Razaleigh's tendency to give emphasis to Kelantan, his individualistic and lavish style of administration, his defiant attitude towards the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, and his overall feudalistic and unegalitarian attitude. A story

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<sup>78</sup> At that time Tengku Razaleigh was not a cabinet Minister, but played an important role in government business and financial institutions, owing to his influence among business circles. PERNAS, Bank Bumiputera and PETRONAS were under his influence. In his biography, it was mentioned that Tun Razak, on the eve of his death, had asked Tengku Razaleigh to join the cabinet. Razaleigh only wanted to be the Minister of Finance, a position which was eventually given to him. He was one of the senior Vice Presidents of the party.

<sup>79</sup> Aziz Zariza Ahmad 1988, *Dr Mahathir*, pp.290-291.



also circulated that Tengku Razaleigh had a special lift in his office, and his reluctance to use the title of 'Tan Sri' was emphasized to discredit him.<sup>80</sup>

In his meetings with Prime Minister Hussein Onn, Tengku Razaleigh was said to have supported the choice of Dr Mahathir as Deputy Prime Minister in 1976, although he would have by-passed the other senior Vice Presidents, including himself and Ghaffar Baba, who was the most senior in the party structure.. In that context, Tengku Razaleigh had felt that he would be the designated Deputy President if Mahathir should take over the party leadership.<sup>81</sup> Another source mentions that there was an agreement among the UMNO leaders that Tengku Razaleigh should be appointed deputy to Mahathir once the latter took over the leadership from Hussein Onn.<sup>82</sup> However, Dr Mahathir changed his mind once he took over the leadership; in a 'divide and rule' tactic he sponsored Musa Hitam as his deputy.<sup>83</sup>

Dr Mahathir deviated from the party tradition<sup>84</sup> by not naming his deputy, rather leaving it to the UMNO General Assembly to decide. Some of the Malay politicians from the state of Kelantan maintained the political hope that Tengku Razaleigh would defeat Dr Mahathir in the political struggle which would occur when

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<sup>80</sup> A.Ghani Ismail 1984, *Razaleigh Lawan Musa*, pp. 38-39.

<sup>81</sup> There are two versions of the background surrounding the appointment of the Deputy Prime Minister and the Deputy President of UMNO. Tengku Razaleigh's source claimed that there was an understanding when he agreed with Hussein Onn's decision to choose Mahathir as his deputy. It was said that Hussein Onn wanted Tengku Razaleigh to be Mahathir's deputy in party and government when he resigned. Musa Hitam's source justified Musa's appointment by spreading the story that Hussein Onn initially wanted to appoint Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie, a senior Minister who had failed to get a Vice Presidentship in Tun Razak's days. However, all three vice presidents ( Ghaffar Baba, Tengku Razaleigh, and Mahathir) disagreed, and Musa Hitam was the man who convinced Hussein Onn to appoint Mahathir as Deputy Prime Minister and acting party Deputy President. See *Ibid.*, pp.3-6.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, p.39.

<sup>83</sup> Ghaffar Baba did not deny such an agreement existed among UMNO top leaders in 1976, although he did not notice that once he gained control Dr Mahathir's strategy changed. He said "Lebih kurang macam itulah, depa tu dah pakat. Boleh tak boleh pakai belum tahu lagi" Ghaffar Baba sent a message to Tengku Razaleigh which told him to be prepared. *Ibid.*, p.40.

<sup>84</sup> Dr Mahathir made the unprecedented decision not to name his deputy immediately, this sparked off much public speculation, and subsequently the press tried to lead public opinion on the future Deputy in party and government. For example, Tun Abdul Rahman named Tun Razak as his deputy, who, when he took over the government named Tun Dr Ismail as his deputy, a decision which was endorsed by the party. Tun Razak subsequently chose Hussein Onn as Deputy Prime Minister on the death of Tun Dr Ismail, and the acting Deputy President which was confirmed by the Assembly in the next sitting. When Tun Razak died, while Hussein Onn took over the Premiership and acting UMNO President, Mahathir was appointed Deputy Prime Minister and acting Deputy President of the party. However, Mahathir left the decision to the Assembly, and those who were elected Deputy President would be appointed Deputy Prime Minister. See Bruce Gale 1982, *Musa Hitam*, p.93.

Hussein Onn resigned.<sup>85</sup> Tengku Razaleigh was also confident that he had the full support of the Kelantan UMNO, most of Trengganu UMNO's votes, some from Perak, Pahang, Negeri Sembilan, and a small number from Johor. The UMNO old guard seemed to throw their support to Tengku Razaleigh, especially Syed Jaafar Albar who was the Ketua Pemuda. To demonstrate his leadership skills, Tengku Razaleigh managed to force PAS out of the Barisan Nasional in 1978, that political coup being considered by Tengku Razaleigh and his supporters as a 'great contribution to the party'. It seemed that Tengku Razaleigh was the only UMNO man who could destroy PAS in Kelantan, and to the Kelantanese, this was the passport for Tengku Razaleigh to be appointed as Deputy Prime Minister or Prime Minister itself.

However, on the eve of the 1981 party election, Tengku Razaleigh's political rivals launched a series of character assassination attacks on him. The slanders, which were a special Malay trait, were whispered to UMNO members, destroying Tengku Razaleigh's reputation and his leadership. He was associated with negative ideas, such as being pro-Chinese, in favour of nepotism, regionalistic, and giving only priority to developing Kelantan etc. Most cabinet ministers gave their backing to Musa in the 1981 party election, Sanusi Junid, a very vocal minister, being known as a man who was very loyal to the party leader. He was one of 'the commanders' in the political attack on Tengku Razaleigh's camp at national, state and divisional levels.<sup>86</sup> He was then picked by Dr Mahathir to be UMNO Secretary General.<sup>87</sup> Tengku Razaleigh only managed to secure 517 votes of the 1,250 delegates, giving Musa Hitam a comfortable majority of 205 votes. However, Dr Mahathir retained Tengku Razaleigh as Minister of Finance and the Treasurer of UMNO.

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<sup>85</sup> A.Ghani Ismail 1984, *Razalieggh Lawan Musa*, p.5.

<sup>86</sup> S.H.Alattas 1986, *Musa Derhaka?*, pp.107-108. Owing to his role in the 1981 election Sanusi Junid was annoyed by Tengku Razaleigh's camp. But his silence in 1984 puzzled Musa Hitam's men, he lost the competition for UMNO Vice presidentship and was appointed Secretary General of the party.

<sup>87</sup> However, he changed his stand on Musa Hitam in 1984, when he felt the latter was not sufficiently supportive to become a Vice President. Thus he remained allied to Dr Mahathir.

After losing the 1981 battle for Deputy President, Tengku Razaleigh's men regrouped and planned their counter-attack for the next battle which would come in 1984. Tengku Razaleigh in his strategy, advised Dr Mahathir to co-opt Anwar Ibrahim to UMNO to balance the power between him and Musa Hitam, under the pretext of destroying PAS in the 1982 General Election. His camp launched an attack on Musa Hitam by referring to what they called Musa Hitam's grand design to topple Mahathir. The attack exploded confidence among the public about the survival of the 2M's administration. Dr Mahathir was also convinced by this idea of outflanking 'Musa Hitam's design'. So he not only quickly gave Anwar a seat in the cabinet, he also backed him to challenge Haji Suhaimi, the Head of UMNO Youth, who was identified by Tengku Razaleigh's camp as a strong supporter of Musa Hitam. All this was seen by political observers as the beginning of a proxy political battle in UMNO.

Ibrahim Ali<sup>88</sup> one of Tengku Razaleigh's tacticians and strategists, claimed that he was involved with Tengku Razaleigh in convincing Mahathir to co-opt Anwar Ibrahim. Tengku Razaleigh's camp then harrassed Musa Hitam's stronghold while infiltrating the camp of some independents. They always hoped that Anwar Ibrahim would throw his support behind them.<sup>89</sup> After the 1982 General Election, they also received support from those who were not satisfied with selections of those to contest the election, especially the people from Johor led by Othman Saad.

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<sup>88</sup> He was a Kelantanese and former student leader, and President of KSITM (MARA Institute of Technology Students'Union) in the late 1970's. He developed a relationship with Anwar who was President of the PKPIM and later ABIM. KSITM was also affiliated to the PKPIM and was involved in a series of student demonstrations in Kuala Lumpur. Ibrahim Ali was also inclined to support PAS. However, after graduation he was involved in an educational business named 'Kuala Lumpur Polytechnic.' It was believed that Tengku Razaleigh had given financial support. In 1978, Ibrahim supported Tengku Razaleigh in toppling the PAS government in Kelantan. He was the man who planned and commanded the demonstration which led to PAS's downfall. The new government was formed by a coalition of PAS defectors in the shape of BERJASA and the UMNO. Ibrahim Ali was appointed BERJASA Youth Leader. He joined the UMNO in 1982 and was then elected as Divisional Head of Youth of Pasir Mas UMNO, which enabled him to participate in the contest for Executive Committee members at national level. He then joined force with Anwar Ibrahim in UMNO Youth. In 1982, he won the Pasir Mas Parliamentary seat. and was then was appointed Chairman of Majuikan, a statutory body in charge of fishery development. His intimate relationship with Tengku Razaleigh had never waned, they still remained together. They fought Dr Mahathir, formed Team B in UMNO and created Semangat 46 to break from Mahathir. However, Ibrahim Ali rejoined UMNO after the 1990 General Election.

<sup>89</sup> A.Ghani Ismail 1984, *Razaleigh Lawan Musa*, pp.75-76. Anwar Ibrahim declared his stand which implied that he indirectly supported Tengku Razaleigh when he stated that ideally, in maintaining harmony, there should be no contest. However as a party is based on democratic principles and freedom, it will have failed if the party took on board Dr Mahathir's assertion that the Deputy President post should not be contested.

In the 1983 General Assembly, Dr Mahathir strategically gave his open support to Musa Hitam. Dr Mahathir had asked the UMNO delegation that the posts of party President and Deputy President not be challenged for the sake of party stability. Meanwhile, Tengku Razaleigh was trapped and received a heavy blow on the eve of the leadership struggle when his name was implicated in the case of BMF.<sup>90</sup> In the 1981 election his enemies had attacked him in the same manner in order to destroy his leadership.<sup>91</sup> That represented a set-back for Tengku Razaleigh, and his camp<sup>92</sup> lost when 1,279 delegates endorsed Musa Hitam. Tengku Razaleigh's votes were reduced, to only 501 compared to 512 in 1981, while Musa Hitam secured 744 votes compared to 722 in 1981. However, it was not very clear, whether the lost votes, had gone to Musa Hitam or Harun Idris, who managed only 34 votes. However, Tengku Razaleigh scored not less than 500 decisive votes for himself.

Nevertheless, although Tengku Razaleigh had acted against the President's wishes not to challenge Musa Hitam who was elected to the post in 1981, Dr Mahathir still kept Tengku Razaleigh in the Cabinet. After the party election of 1984, Tengku Razaleigh was transferred to the Ministry of Trade and Industry. He had already felt that his power and influence had been curtailed when Dr. Mahathir appointed Daim Zainuddin as the new Minister of Finance and Treasurer of UMNO. Under the pretext of streamlining the structure so that all state UMNO liaison chairmen should be the Menteri Besar, Dato' Mohamad Yaacob, the Menteri Besar of Kelantan took over the chairmanship. With that move, Tengku Razaleigh was

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<sup>90</sup> In the Hong Kong Supreme Court, on 2nd May 1984, Mak Foon Than was accused of murdering the Bank Bumiputera representative. He claimed that he collected money from Hong Kong businessmen for Malaysia's Finance Minister. See the report by Teresa Ma "Curiouser and Curiouser: The Mak trial becomes increasingly bizarre and Razaleigh issues a denial allegation", in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, May 17, 1984, pp.17-18.

<sup>91</sup> In 1981, he was accused of being involved in the United Malayan Banking Scandal (UMBC) when it was alleged that he allowed UMBC shares to be bought by the MCA's business arm, *Multi-Purpose Holdings* (MPH) without giving preference to bumiputera institutions. In this case, the UMNO saw that Dr Mahathir intervened in the case by directing UMBC to be shared between PERNAS (the national trading corporation) and MPH, with the remaining 20% share to be open to the public. *Ibid.*, p.18.

<sup>92</sup> *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 7, 1984, p.10-11 Tengku Razaleigh's (TR) faction included Tunku Ahmad Rithauddeen (Trade and Industry Minister), Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie the veteran Foreign Minister and Datuk Manan Othman (Minister of Agriculture), Dato Mohamad Rahmat (The Ambassador to Indonesia and Minister without Portfolio), and Datin Paduka Aishah Ghani (Minister of Welfare).

isolated from the party structure. It was Dr Mahathir's political strategy to cripple those who he thought could jeopardise his leadership and influence in the party.

Between 1984 and 1986, Dr Mahathir's leadership was in turmoil; slander and gossip pressured him constantly. Thus, Tengku Razaleigh kept a low profile until the political climate seemed right, this happening when Musa Hitam resigned from the party and government in 1986. That was the moment when he gathered together the UMNO leaders who were against Mahathir's leadership, among them Harun Idris.

*Harun Idris: a Declining Power Broker.*

It was Harun Idris who originated the move to make Dr Mahathir re-enter UMNO in 1972, and it could not be denied that Dr Mahathir was the man who supported and submitted the memoranda of 'royal pardon ' for Harun Idris to the King. Thus, Musa Hitam was the Minister of Home Affairs who was responsible for releasing Harun Idris from prison. The close comradeship between Mahathir and Harun Idris was obvious to UMNO members, Harun winning the Vice-Presidentship while he was still serving his sentence. When he was released, Dr Mahathir gave him the task of the Selangor Barisan Nasional Director of Election in 1982, and appointed him Chairman of the UMNO cooperative business organisation- *Koperasi Usaha Bersatu (KUB)*.

However, Harun Idris went against Mahathir's wishes of not challenging the incumbent Deputy President in the 1984 party election. While Tengku Razaleigh confronted Musa Hitam so as to block the latter's political advance,<sup>93</sup> Harun in his strategy declared that if he were successful in the election, "he would go against party tradition and would not automatically assume the

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<sup>93</sup> Tengku Razaleigh was two years younger than Musa, and so it was said that if "he fails to make any substantial inroads into the Mahathir-Musa leadership at this time, he could be effectively blocked from any position of power for several years, especially as Musa then could be expected to succeed Mahathir when he eventually stands down." *Far Eastern Economic Review*, May 3, 1984, p.18.

post of Deputy Prime Minister."<sup>94</sup> Rather he would support Tengku Razaleigh to be Deputy Prime Minister.

Harun Idris expressed his unhappiness concerning Mahathir's leadership which he described in term of threats, intimidation and proxy fighting and "which he claimed had filtered down through party ranks to the village level."<sup>95</sup> He denounced Mahathir as a dictator based on the party President's denying the function of UMNO's political committee, and leaving the Supreme Council out in making decisions on policy matters. He alleged that Mahathir had been bulldozing through his personal ideals concerning the rakyat, whether through the party machine or governmental channels. When Harun decided to join the race for UMNO Deputy President, this meant that he stood against Dr Mahathir's wishes.<sup>96</sup>

The growing criticism of Mahathirism put Mahathir under pressure and led to speculation that he would step down. Dr Mahathir seemed to face a difficult problem of maintaining peace. The foreign media and some local press also presented a negative picture of Mahathir's policies and his political style.<sup>97</sup>

Dr Mahathir was a little unhappy when his policy met quite a cool response from his cabinet members, especially concerning the 'Look East' policy. Indirectly he insinuated his remark that he 'Looked East' while Musa 'Looked West'.<sup>98</sup> The only minister who assisted Dr Mahathir in the Look East policy was Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, the Minister in the Prime Minister's Department from 1982 until he moved to

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<sup>94</sup> See the article by Rodney Tasker, "Spanner in the works: A controversial politician springs a surprise with a plan to challenge Musa for UMNO's second spot," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, May 3, 1984, pp.18-19.

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*, p.19.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>97</sup> Some political leaders saw how the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, and *The Asian Wall Street Journal* viewed the 2M's administration. The *Far Eastern Economic Review* in 1984 commented on the manner in which the government had prepared the Civil Law Amendment Act 1984, and viewed it as an uncharitable act, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, October 11, 1984, pp.25-26. It also mentioned how Parliament rejected a motion presented by the opposition, for a royal commission inquiry into bad loans made by the Hong Kong subsidiary of the Bank Bumiputera. From 1985 onwards, Mahathir's economic policies became a public target. Another reflection was from former FEER journalist K.Das, *The Musa Dilemma: Reflections on the Decision of Datuk Musa Hitam to quit the government of Datuk Seri Dr Mahathir Mohamad* (Kuala Lumpur: K.Das, 1986).

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.*, p.52.

the Education Ministry after the party General Assembly of 1984. During that period, Abdullah Badawi was promoted by the press as a 'rising star', and when he won the UMNO Vice-Presidency in 1984 it was speculated that he might be Deputy Prime Minister.

*Abdullah Ahmad Badawi: a soft and gentle (lemah lembut) politician.*

In 1984, as UMNO Vice-President, Abdullah Badawi was given the job of Minister of Education. This was an honour for him, but the press and his political enemies always associated him with Musa Hitam. This was exploited by Mahathir's camp, especially after Musa Hitam resigned.

"Abdullah Badawi's loyalty to Mahathir may not be strong enough for him to gamble his future on it. There is good reason to believe that Abdullah, a sensible and middle of the road gentleman, may not see eye to eye with Mahathir's "visionary" ways."<sup>99</sup>

That was the view among the press correspondents. Abdullah Badawi was even warned by his friends that Anwar Ibrahim, who had influence over Mahathir, had already caused Mahathir's camp to attack Musa Hitam's with which Abdullah Badawi was associated. Until 1986, Abdullah Badawi always believed that he was in Mahathir's confidence, implementing Dr Mahathir's wishes in assuring that Anwar Ibrahim won the Permatang Pauh election of 1982. His loyalty to Dr Mahathir allowed him to ignore the warnings of his close aides that the cooptation of Anwar Ibrahim was a 'Trojan Horse' strategy that would destroy Abdullah Badawi's position. However, being a 'soft' politician, and with his obligation as the Chairman of Pulau Pinang State UMNO Liaison Committee, his confidence in the sincerity of Anwar Ibrahim's joining UMNO led him to instruct the Biro Tata Negara (BTN) which was under his control to go all out to make sure Anwar Ibrahim won the election. Most of the BTN staff, were always sceptical about Anwar Ibrahim's decision to join UMNO, especially as they knew that he

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<sup>99</sup> Ibid., p.132.

had been a registered PAS member in 1978.<sup>100</sup> Being a man who was loyal to his patron, Abdullah Badawi converted his house in Kepala Batas into the operations room of the election to ensure Anwar Ibrahim won the Permatang Pauh parliamentary seat, a victory which improved dramatically Anwar Ibrahim's position in the party and the government.

Abdullah Badawi's position came under attack from the Harun Idris and Tengku Razaleigh camps when they questioned the rôle of the *Biro Tata Negara* (BTN) in the General Assembly of 1984. To split Abdullah Badawi from Mahathir, they categorised Abdullah Badawi as a Musa Hitam supporter. They spread rumours that Abdullah Badawi had been using Biro Tata Negara (BTN), not to promote Dr Mahathir, but Musa Hitam and himself. It being known that Abdullah Badawi was a religious man, a book was published by a 'free lance' writer attempting to damage his reputation by mentioning his attendance at an 'exclusive party'.<sup>101</sup> At the same time, the lives of Abdullah Badawi and Anwar Ibrahim and their families were commented upon, including their wives' personalities, by some politicians, in a character assassination strategy. Abdullah Badawi's religious personality was the weak spot that could be assaulted. In 1985, the factions in UMNO were using the private lives of their opponents as a new weapon to undermine each other. For example Musa Hitam had to deny rumours of a secret marriage and the birth of a child from it.<sup>102</sup> By 1986, Anwar Ibrahim and Abdullah Badawi became the focus of UMNO members

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<sup>100</sup> See the copy of Anwar Ibrahim's PAS membership certificate when he was accepted as a 'direct member of PAS' in appendix 12 of an unpublished Graduation Exercise of Rosli Bin Isa, 'UMNO Sehingga 24hb April 1987: Satu Kajian Krisis Kepimpinan Melayu,' (Bangi: Dept. of Political Science, the National University of Malaysia, 1988/89).

<sup>101</sup> See S.H. Alattas 1986, *Musa Derhaka?*, p.115. In fact, it was the ploy of the New Straits Times to smear the public image of Abdullah Badawi when its paper *The Malay Mail* (Monday, September 2, 1985) published a photograph taken at the villa of Tengku Arif Bendahara of Pahang hosting the Regine's Junior Club debutante fancy dress party. Abdullah Badawi at that time was the Minister of Education snapped in the photo which also showed the wine and other forbidden drinks for Muslims being served. In 1986, the New Straits Times group supported Anwar Ibrahim as an alternative leader to Mahathir. Abdullah Badawi was considered a stumbling block for Anwar, and what is more, Abdullah Badawi was seen as a Musa Hitam man.

<sup>102</sup> See Suhaini Aznam reports, "No ruffled feathers," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, October 10, 1985, pp.15-16.. The General Assembly of 1985 expressed their scepticism concerning leaders' expenses and the misuse of funds especially for travel abroad. They suspected businessmen in the trade delegation had lobbied the ministers while joining the trips. Consequently, Mahathir's frequent trips abroad even for promoting investment were criticised.(p.16)



and the press, and Abdullah Badawi was pushed out of Dr Mahathir's circle, in an attempt to distance Abdullah Badawi from Dr Mahathir.

Furthermore, in the 1984 party election Abdullah Badawi contested one of the three Vice-President posts. He secured the second largest vote, even higher than the veteran Ghaffar Baba. The media in that year, seemed to promote Sanusi Junid and Abdullah Badawi for the Vice Presidential posts. In that contest Musa Hitam and his camp supported Abdullah Badawi, and Sanusi Junid felt that he had been forced out by Musa Hitam,<sup>103</sup> even though he had been a vocal campaigner in making Musa Hitam the Deputy President in 1981. It might be considered a case of '*tidak mengenang budi*' (not to repay an obligation) in Malay culture, though this was a common occurrence in the political game.

The party race in 1984, made the relationship between Abdullah Badawi and Sanusi Junid less intimate. Nevertheless, being in the same camp as Anwar Ibrahim, who was then being portrayed by the press as Mahathir's favourite personality, caused more delay for Sanusi Junid in gaining a top position in party and government.<sup>104</sup>

*Anwar Ibrahim: the newcomer.*

The cooptation of Anwar Ibrahim into UMNO was part of Mahathir's political strategy. Some UMNO members never fully accepted Anwar Ibrahim in UMNO, however, they felt bound by loyalty and respect to Mahathir's wishes, who was at that moment combating PAS for the sake of UMNO's political dominance, as well as attempting to neutralise ABIM.

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<sup>103</sup> Aziz Zariza Ahmad 1988, *Dr Mahathir*, p.123.

<sup>104</sup> In fact Sanusi Junid and Abdullah Badawi had an unfriendly relationship while the former had been the President of MAYC and the latter headed the youth division in the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sport in 1970's. The Malaysian Youth Council, where the MAYC was one of the members, disagreed with the decision of the Ministry to encourage youth associations to desert the council and form a new national youth council. The idea was mooted after the involvement of the council in a series of demonstrations led by Anwar Ibrahim the then President of the Council. Sanusi was selected to contest the by-election and was given a deputy ministerial post, as well as being in charge of the party's information system. In the 1978 general election, Sanusi Junid consistently attacked Anwar Ibrahim who was campaigning on the PAS platform.

Since he did not have a ground base in UMNO, Anwar Ibrahim made use of his rhetorical and philosophical skills. Dr Mahathir might have orchestrated the idea of boosting Anwar Ibrahim's reputation as an Islamic reformer in UMNO, which was exploited by Anwar and his group. So every step he took brought him closer to being a possible future Prime Minister.<sup>105</sup>

To strengthen his position, Anwar brought together in the party and the government his close aides from ABIM. His aides claimed that he had convinced Dr Mahathir to pick his 'youth' candidates to stand for UMNO in the general election of 1986. This made Anwar Ibrahim appear as a new patron in UMNO, the newly elected state assemblymen, and parliamentarians, believing he was the man who had proposed their names to stand as party candidates. Thus, they were obliged to pay for this favour and support Anwar, though some of them did not necessarily share the same political idealism. For reasons of status consciousness, opportunity in business, and for the sake of political survival, they backed Anwar in the party structure.

In the UMNO Youth leadership election of 1986, which was held after the general election, Anwar retained his post for a third term with an overwhelming victory. He won 303 of the total 412 votes cast in the election. In the election, Anwar Ibrahim was challenged by Syed Hamid Albar<sup>106</sup> in what the public perceived as a proxy battle between Dr Mahathir and Musa Hitam.

Since joining UMNO Anwar Ibrahim had to face resistance and pressure from various political forces, including: PAS; those in UMNO who could not accept him; those who pretended to accept him for personal reasons; and those from camps

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<sup>105</sup> Suhaini Aznam's report, "The Umno Backlash: Malay nationalism is predominant at party general assembly," and "A sideshow," in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, October 2, 1986, p.47.

<sup>106</sup> He is the son of Syed Jaafar Albar former Ketua Pemuda UMNO, Deputy Minister of Information and UMNO Secretary General in 1960's. Syed Hamid is a lawyer who had a position in the Senior management of the Bank Bumiputera and also the Head of Bukit Bintang UMNO Division of Kuala Lumpur. In 1986, he resigned from the Bank when it was suggested he contest one of the Parliamentary constituencies in Johor. However, the offer was withdrawn when he was nominated by Dr Mahathir's opponents to challenge Anwar Ibrahim for the post of Ketua Pemuda. However, he found a new lease of life in the 1990 General election when he took over Musa Hitam's seat in Kota Tinggi of Johor. He was then appointed as a Minister in the Prime Minister's Department and Minister of Justice.

opposed to Mahathir. This situation left Anwar with no alternative but to rely on Dr Mahathir until he himself could control Mahathir's camp.

In 1986, Anwar clearly had a strong hold on UMNO, while he was depicted as 'Mahathir's right-hand man', his political enemies inside and outside the party structure narrowing their attacks on him. The situation became obvious when Dr Mahathir elevated him to Minister of Education in a cabinet reshuffle after the resignation of Musa Hitam. Anwar Ibrahim then showed his capability in his transformation of the ministry's policies, introducing Integrated Curriculum for primary and secondary schools based on Islamic values which did not receive much criticism from UMNO members. However, the teachers and his enemies cynically interpreted *Kurikulum Baru Sekolah Rendah* (KBSR) or the new curriculum for primary school as *Kerja Berat Sampai Rebah* (literally meaning to work hard until you are sick), while the *Kurikulum Bersepadu Sekolah Menengah* (Integrated curriculum for secondary schools) or KBSM was interpreted as *Kerja Berat Sampai Mati* (to work hard until you are dead).

More protests came from some conservative Malay linguists, and Anwar's political opponents, when he introduced the use of so called 'standard spoken Malay' known as *sebutan bahasa baku*. Some Malays objected to 'bahasa baku', and went further by making an attempt to reinitil pre-war Malay prejudices toward those who had Arab and Indian origins. As it so happened, Anwar Ibrahim and Dr Mahathir both had Indian blood, and were from Pulau Pinang and Kedah, the northern part of the Malay Peninsula. So they sarcastically interpreted the word 'BAKU' as *Bahasa Anak Keling Utara* (the language of the son of Indians from the North). Indeed, there was an attempt to deny the legitimacy of Anwar Ibrahim and his patron, Dr Mahathir, to lead the Malays, since both were not considered pure Malay. Some even reminded the Malays of the 'betrayal' by the Indian Muslims, which has been accepted as one of the major factors leading to the downfall of Malay Empire of Melaka in 1511. Raja Mandeliar, an Indian Muslim who had collaborated in a conspiracy with the Portugese

forces, was an important negative figure in Malay history being considered a traitor to the Malays. This was used as proof of the untrustworthiness of Indian descendants, in this case, Dr Mahathir and Anwar Ibrahim. However, the use of the 'Raja Mandeliar' case was an ineffective weapon in destroying Mahathir's camp, and politically it was insignificant.<sup>107</sup> The new Malay materialistic culture overran Malay parochial attitudes of the pre-Second World War period when the people were concerned about the origin of their leaders and distrusted the *Malay peranakan*, (Malays with Indian and Arab blood).

With the cooperation of the Fleet communications group's subsidiaries such as the New Straits Times group, Berita Harian and TV3, an image of Anwar Ibrahim, as a clean, religious, and dynamic minister and UMNO leader, was projected. As in warfare, where 'air power' is as important as 'ground force' and 'naval power', Anwar only needed the 'ground support' of the Mahathir camp, and all the new elected MPs and state assemblymen who considered him as the new patron of their political future. Meanwhile, his close ABIM aides played the role of an intelligent combat force to assess his influence on the ground. He also had think-tank groups among the professional elements and academicians who admired his sincere aspiration to 'Islamize' the UMNO and the government. The first step he had taken was to ABIMIZE the party,<sup>108</sup> infiltrating his ABIM men into the UMNO structure at branch and divisional levels, while others were securing positions in many government institutions related to 'Islam', and in the local universities. His loyal ABIM supporters were always convinced that Anwar Ibrahim would eventually take over the

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<sup>107</sup> See for example a booklet by a *nom-de-plume* author A. Maideen, *Anwar Oh Anwar...Aku Rindu Padamu*, (n.p: n.d). On page 8, it mentions that Anwar's grandfather was an Indian Hindu who was converted to Islam and then married a Malay woman. This meant that Anwar is of Indian blood as is Mahathir.

<sup>108</sup> Anwar Ibrahim in defence of his decision to join the UMNO to his ABIM members portrayed UMNO as a 'dirty' organization which he likened to a toilet. He said it was not enough to clean it from outside, [meaning criticising UMNO from outside was not sufficient] instead it should be cleaned from within [meaning its faults should be corrected from within]. (See Ahmad Atory Husein, 'Kepemimpinan UMNO', p.107). However, the PAS point of view asserted that Anwar Ibrahim would not only would fail to 'clean the toilet', but instead he [Anwar] himself would become dirty. This was because UMNO was an established and complex organization that could not be transformed overnight, (Statement of Haji Hadi Awang, in replying to my question on Anwar Ibrahim's motive in joining UMNO, in an interview at the Newcastle University, England, December 31, 1990.)

party and government, as and when Mahathir withdrew from the front line of power. This myth developed a bandwagon of support for him, bringing clients to Anwar Ibrahim in the struggle for power.

*1986: Moving to Front Line.*

1985 was a rough year for Dr Mahathir,<sup>109</sup> however, he confidently tackled political and economic problems. Nevertheless, politicking in UMNO never stopped, and Musa Hitam's rift with Mahathir was no longer a secret of the UMNO top leaders. Mahathir's faction was happy with his firm decision to remain in office, as the Mahathir 'boys' consolidated their position and younger team members rose.<sup>110</sup> Daim Zainuddin and Anwar Ibrahim, as Mahathir men, managed to enhance their reputation in the 1985 party General Assembly, the Mahathir camp managed to undermine some of Musa's positions. They planted the idea of the possibility that Musa Hitam would lead a *coup d'état*, suggesting that he was a master strategist.

Dr Mahathir's decision to appoint new comers in the party structure was questioned by certain UMNO leaders. Therefore, Daim Zainuddin and Anwar Ibrahim became targets as Mahathir confronted hostile allegations from both UMNO factions and opposition parties. He embarked on a political tour throughout the country to combat the crisis of confidence in him, and tried to counter-attack against opposition:<sup>111</sup>

"I can prove I am not the richest man in the world but I know why these stories [corrupt and wealthiest man] are being spread."

"The motive is political, I am holding the highest office in the land, the post of prime minister, and there must be many who are not

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<sup>109</sup> See article by Suhaini Aznam, "A rough road ahead," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, (January 2, 1986), pp.20-24. The recession, problems in Barisan Nasional components (i.e unresolved problem in the MCA leadership, loss of Sabah to PBS, Memali incident, Pan-Electric Industries scandal and involvement of the newly appointed MCA President-Tan Koon Swan, Report of Ahmad Nordin Zakarian on BMF, issues on ISA (internal Security Act) and OSA (Official Secret Act 1972, changes in the Industrial Coordination Act 1975, the formation of two 'mosquito' parties; NASMA (Nationalist Party of Malaysia) formed by a Malay-dominated group, and the Malaysian Unity Movement by a Chinese group.

<sup>110</sup> Suhaini Aznam reports 'Godfather party runs short of Islamic plums,' *Far Eastern Economic Review*, January 2, 1986, p.25.

<sup>111</sup> Suhaini Aznam, "Mahathir may opt for an early election," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, February 6, 1985, pp.14-15.

satisfied because they wish to topple the government or for some other purpose [to sabotage him]"

Mahathir had to gain public support through his second public rally strategy, which began during the climax of the constitutional crisis in 1983. Though he knew his popularity was eroded, he still had many ideas to implement, and he needed more time in the party and government. Furthermore, he had to groom his successor in the light of his rift with Musa Hitam. He thus wanted to tacitly exert his authority, as a clear warning to Musa Hitam's camp who wished to hasten the process of the logical succession.<sup>112</sup>

The 'liberal' policy of the 2M's administration concerning publications generated a growth of magazines, tabloids and books on politics. However, the political situation also contributed to the rapid publication of literature on Mahathir, Musa Hitam and Tengku Razaleigh. Publication of books by anonymous writers or 'missionary writers' became widespread, although it had been a Malay custom not to criticise their leader openly in public. If in 1969, the Tunku Abdul Rahman was facing problems with letters from Dr Mahathir, Raja Mokhtaruddin Daim and a few others, during Mahathir's days, he and other UMNO leaders<sup>113</sup> have retaliated with as many poison-pen letters. Though it was perceived as a negative and immoral activity, it seemed that the Malays began to believe that the poison-pen letters represented true facts about their leaders. So the growth of these negative activities worsened the situation -and the crisis of leadership in the party, coincided with the question of the 'Malay Millionaires'.<sup>114</sup> At the same time, UMNO leaders at state and divisional levels were always looking for a political patron to help them survive. Dr Mahathir himself was not very confident that 'money politics' in UMNO would

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<sup>112</sup> Suhaini Aznam, "Challenge in Kedah," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, February 20, 1986, p.24.

<sup>113</sup> According to Ruhani Haji Ahmad 1987, *Musa Hitam*, p.81, "Dato' Musa looked happy and calm. In his living room, there was a pile of poison-pen letters about him, sent to him by his friends who were not in politics. He was sad about the whole thing."

<sup>114</sup> Suhaini Aznam, "Challenge in Kedah," *Far Eastern economic Review*, February 20, 1986, p.24. Daim Zainuddin, the party treasurer, hinted indirectly at the 2M's faction in UMNO being renamed as 'Malay Millionaires.'

vanish without the support of the party members. The way UMNO leaders at all party levels generated and maintained their political power suggested that 'money politics' had become rooted as a new form of patron-client relationship and was the basis of political power in UMNO.

It can be concluded that the factions in UMNO had developed rapidly since the 1981 party election. There were at least four major camps, Mahathir's, Musa Hitam's, Tengku Razaleigh's, and that of Harun Idris. The 2M's administration was ruined when *Hasad Dengki* (jealousy), and *fitnah* (deliberate slander) dominated leadership thinking in their power struggle. The press and senior government officers were involved in sharpening the crisis of leadership in UMNO, which was worsened by the role of business circles which funded the political warfare in UMNO in order to continue their 'affluent life'.

Dr Mahathir, a modernizer, who was full of ideas to change the attitude of the Malays, to create a new image of Malaysia, as the second *Abdullah Munshi*<sup>115</sup> -who demonstrated a vision of the future, incongruent with the slow thinking of the Malays. Mahathirism was challenged when the Malays were caught between the desire to maintain tradition and the application of modern political concepts and strategies. Paradoxically, the Malays in UMNO used their traditional strategies of *hasad dengki* and *fitnah* in their political struggles, in a way which contradicted Islamic teaching, 'Machiavellian' tactics being practised significantly during the Mahathir administration. Musa Hitam's resignation in 1986 was a major factor that changed UMNO, and incongruity in leadership styles and approaches were among the main factors in the conflict. Dr Mahathir became a target of dissatisfaction among UMNO leaders when he took decisions in a presidential style, causing him to be labelled as dictatorial. Musa Hitam felt he was excluded by Mahathir's inner circle at the time that Mahathir was convinced that he was designing a silent political coup d'etat. To

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<sup>115</sup> Abdullah Munshi, was a Malay of Indian and Arab descent (1795-1854) who always criticised the Malay way of life as being traditional, conservative and resistant to change in a modern society. He blamed the Malay traditional elite. Dr Mahathir appeared to be the mobilizing agent for changing Malay attitudes in the late 20th century.

secure his power, and to change the nation, Dr Mahathir applied divide and rule tactics, and a checks and balances strategy in the party and the government. He coopted Anwar Ibrahim to hamper his opponents' movement and strengthen his position, before he launched a surprise attack on them. He retained Tengku Razaleigh as a check on Musa Hitam's influence, loyalty being a prerequisite in his leadership style. Indeed, the concept of loyalty during Mahathir's administration was connected to 'money politics' and the patron client relationship. In his style of leadership, Dr Mahathir was often seen as using 'authoritarian' or 'instrumental' leadership. On the other hand, Musa Hitam seemed to apply a participatory style, but he failed in manoeuvring Mahathir's 'tactical withdrawal' because he enjoyed less sympathy, and UMNO leaders avoided an open political challenge to Dr Mahathir. Indeed, Dr Mahathir was not a man who was likely to easily submit to any pressure to resign.

Mahathirism has been one of the main influences that has shaped the crisis in UMNO. For Mahathir, he reaffirmed that he had done what he had to do and had no regrets about this; it was his way of doing things and he had no apologies.<sup>116</sup> The party General Assembly in 1986 reflected intraparty conflict, which developed into a *manifest conflict* between the factions in the party. There were factions which aimed to change the top leadership, and other factions tried to defend the existing position. Therefore, the party crisis was inevitable, the General Assembly of 1987 becoming the most crucial in the history of Malay politics. *Perceived conflict* occurred at the end of Hussein Onn's leadership and developed into *felt conflict* from 1981 until 1986. By 1987, UMNO consisted of factions that were ready to mobilise their forces to the battlefield, and this came to a head in the General Assembly of 1987 which will be discussed in the next chapter.

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<sup>116</sup> Ismail Kassim, *Straits Times* (Weekly overseas edition), February 9, 1991, p.13.



## Chapter Six

### *The 1987 Grand Finale : From Faction to Fraction.*

The previous chapters have underlined the main factors that developed factions and conflict in UMNO. Changes in values among UMNO leaders had created a culture of money and power politics. UMNO never solely relied on its Malay nationalist ideology, but was a political party which benefited greatly from personal and patron-client relationships; however, Mahathirism broke this equilibrium in Malay politics. While Mahathirism was attacked heavily by PAS, factions became a significant element in intra-UMNO conflict. Eventually, this conflict of interests, ideology and leadership, developed into a catastrophic crisis which changed UMNO significantly. This chapter will discuss developments between 1986 and 1988 during which the UMNO leadership was fractured into two political entities -*UMNO Baru* (The New UMNO) and *Semangat 46* (the Spirit of 1946). This division was a turning point in the history of Malay politics.

Musa Hitam's resignation in March 1986 represented a watershed in the history of UMNO. Loyalty, trust and sacrifice were the main issues. Dr Mahathir questioned Musa's loyalty while Musa Hitam himself claimed that his withdrawal was a personal sacrifice for the sake of party unity. Musa Hitam's decision was a double-edged tactic; on the one hand, it seemed to be a form of conflict avoidance, on the other hand it undermined the credibility of Dr Mahathir.

#### *The 'Unblessing' Mission (Utusan Yang Tidak Direstui).*

For UMNO's Supreme Council members, Musa Hitam was still needed in the party. In an attempt to contain party conflict, some of them flew to London to persuade him to withdraw his resignation.<sup>1</sup> This delegation consisted of four Menteri Besars: -Wan Mokhtar Ahmad of Trengganu, who was also a Vice President of the

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<sup>1</sup> It was said that Dr Mahathir tried to convince the Supreme Council not to persuade Musa Hitam to withdraw his resignation. He noted that Musa Hitam had already threatened to leave the cabinet and the leadership of the party over the appointment of Tengku Razaleigh following the 1984 party election.

party; Abdul Ajib Ahmad of Johor; Ramli Ngah Talib of Perak, and Najib Tun Razak of Pahang. They were also accompanied by UMNO's Permanent Chairman, Sulaiman Ninam Shah.

Dr Mahathir adopted a 'wait and see' approach. He had basic ideas in mind; firstly, he told journalists on March 1, 1986 that he would still cooperate with Musa if he withdrew his resignation, and he denied that Musa Hitam was involved in a conspiracy to topple him.<sup>2</sup> Next, on March 11, he was convinced that the resignation of a political leader should not become a big issue, claiming that leaders come and go. The absence of Musa Hitam would not jeopardise the government's credibility since the government did not rely on him alone, but rather the whole state administration. He also reaffirmed that UMNO was still united despite Musa's resignation. However, by then, a copy of Musa Hitam's July 1984 letter to Dr Mahathir had been widely circulated. This was followed by the distribution of an anonymous letter aimed at destroying Musa Hitam's credibility.<sup>3</sup> Thus Dr Mahathir did not seem enthusiastic about the London mission.

Finally, Musa Hitam agreed to hold the post of party Deputy President on the basis that it was an elected party post. However, he firmly refused to work in Mahathir's cabinet.

#### *Anaesthetic Treatment.*

Dr Mahathir then performed a series of political 'surgical' operations in the party and government. Initially, he injected a so-called 'anaesthetic' in order to damage Musa Hitam's strength in the cabinet. First came the question of the appointment of a Deputy Prime Minister, secondly, the repositioning of those ministers who were identified as Musa Hitam's supporters to uninfluence ministries.

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<sup>2</sup> See Chamil Wariya, *UMNO Era Mahathir*, (Petalang Jaya: Fajar Bakti, 1988), p.104.

<sup>3</sup> This 28 page letter was written in English and defended Dr Mahathir whilst blaming Musa Hitam. It also expressed sympathy with Tengku Razaleigh.

To weaken Musa Hitam's influence, Dr Mahathir chose Ghafar Baba as Deputy Prime Minister. Abdullah Badawi was portrayed by Dr Mahathir's clique as a Musa Hitam man and, though he was the most educated Vice President and experienced administrator, he was not appointed as Deputy Prime Minister due to this. Moreover, Wan Mokhtar Ahmad, a graduate from the Islamic university in Cairo, was also not considered because of his indispensable services in Trengganu. The appointment of Ghafar Baba, the longest serving Vice President in UMNO, to be the new Deputy Prime Minister, represented an advantage to Mahathir's political strategy.<sup>4</sup>

Musa's resignation gave Dr Mahathir the opportunity to change his strategy in facing the General Election in August 1986 and the party General Assembly, both of which could jeopardise his power. Firstly, he drastically applied what the Malays called '*politik cantas*' (literally meaning 'chopping-off' politics). Dr Mahathir retained a number of Musa Hitam's and Tengku Razaleigh's people in the General Election of August 1986. However, he repositioned his men in the influential ministries, 'chopping off' his opponents from main stream party influence. In a mid year cabinet reshuffle in 1986,<sup>5</sup> Ghaffar Baba was appointed Deputy Prime Minister, and Minister of National and Rural Development, while Sanusi Junid was transferred to the Agriculture Ministry. Anwar Ibrahim was elevated to the Ministry of Education, while the then Minister of Education, Abdullah Badawi, was transferred to the Defence Ministry. Dr Mahathir himself took over the Home Affairs Ministry and also the Justice Ministry. He replaced the Deputy Minister of Home Affairs with his loyal Political Secretary, Megat Joned Ayob. Meanwhile Musa Hitam's supporters in the

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<sup>4</sup> Some political authors noted that Ghaffar Baba was chosen as a stop-gap measure while Mahathir was grooming his real successor - Anwar Ibrahim. Some disagreed with Ghaffar Baba's willingness to serve Mahathir for the sake of party unity. They thought that Ghaffar Baba accepted the appointment as an escape from his business difficulties and legal action that might have been taken against him by banks and financial institutions. His position as Deputy Prime Minister at least would protect him from any embarrassment from these institutions, and also gave him more time to settle his financial problems. By 1989, according to some sources, Ghaffar managed to settle his financial problems which enabled him to concentrate on his political career.

<sup>5</sup> The Star, August 12, 1986.

cabinet were transferred to politically less influential ministries. The removal of Abdullah Badawi from the Education ministry was considered as a demotion and blocked his accessibility to his ground base -the Malay teachers- since the Armed Forces never contributed to the party power struggle. Rais Yatim's transfer from the Information to the External Affairs Ministry prevented him from controlling vital information mechanisms, the special information officers who served as informers and propagandists for the government and the party, being replaced by Tengku Ahmad Rithauddeen. Shahril Samad, the Minister of the Federal Territory, who had been a 'Musa boy', was also transferred to the junior Ministry of Welfare. Also certain Deputy Ministers who had been associated with Musa Hitam were transferred to other less influential ministries. Among them was Radzi Sheikh Ahmad who was transferred from Home Affairs to the Primary Industry Ministry. With the cabinet reshuffle prior to the Party Assembly at the end of the year, Dr Mahathir strengthened his offensive position in the government and party. However, his moves were seen as an indicator of his authoritarian style of leadership in confronting party conflict.

Musa Hitam's Malay style of 'withdrawal' was ineffective since patron-client relationships were now so deeply rooted in UMNO. All clients would work hard to ensure the survival of their patron in order to protect their own interest. Moreover, Mahathir and his camp controlled the mainstream media ensuring that Musa Hitam's manoeuvres had very little impact among party members. While Daim Zainuddin and Anwar Ibrahim controlled the managing and editorial personalities in the *New Straits Times*, *Berita Harian* and the *TV 3*, Ghaffar Baba had a considerable influence in the *Utusan Melayu* press group. The government machines in the Information, Agriculture, and the Prime Minister's Departments, also penetrated the grassroots in their effort to sustain Dr Mahathir's leadership. In the 1986 General Election, Dr Mahathir and his new deputy, Ghaffar Baba managed to reduce the number of PAS seats in Parliament from six to one. This result gave evidence of the Malay priority to

safe guard their party's general position. Nevertheless, the internal problems in UMNO were ready to explode.

It is common in Malay culture that status and power are the prerequisites for respect and reputation. In Musa Hitam's case, it was apparent that the post of Deputy Prime Minister had been far more important than that of UMNO Deputy President. After his resignation, he lost his influence in the national mainstream media, being portrayed as a '*penderhaka*' (traitor), Musa Hitam then expressed his frustration with his 'nominal' title of Deputy President.<sup>6</sup>

#### *Tightening Control.*

In the General election of 1986, Dr Mahathir decided to build a strong base at state and divisional level. He swapped a few UMNO personalities from state to federal level, and vice versa, and at the same time dropped problematic incumbent Members of Parliament, picking new candidates, most of whom were UMNO Youth leaders. He swapped two Federal Deputy Ministers, Muhyiddin Yassin and Khalil Yaacob, both of whom were 'soft' (*lembut*) politicians', and made them Menteri Besars of Johor and Pahang respectively. Meanwhile the former Menteri Besars, Abdul Ajib Ahmad of Johor and Najib Tun Razak of Pahang, both of whom had been associated with Musa Hitam's camp, were brought into the Federal cabinet as ministers. Adib Adam, the Minister of Land and Regional Development was dropped, and Tamrin Ghaffar, the son of the new Deputy Prime Minister was put in his place. Another prominent personality, Abdul Rahim Bakar, the Deputy Minister of Energy, Telecommunications and Posts, was also dropped, and replaced by his relative, Adam Abdul Kadir, who was later appointed the Parliamentary Secretary to the Land and Regional Development Ministry. Zainal Abidin Zain, another of Musa's men, was transferred from The Ministry of Works to take over Abdul Rahim Bakar's former position.

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<sup>6</sup> Roger Kershaw 1989, "Within the Family", p.131.

Tengku Razaleigh had been retained in the August 1986 cabinet reshuffle, but he lost his only remaining loyal supporter in the government, when Zakaria Abdul Rahman of Trengganu, the Deputy Minister of Labour, was dropped from the Federal Cabinet.<sup>7</sup> For that reason, Tengku Razaleigh's days in the cabinet were numbered, having also lost his position in the party, as Treasurer and Chairman of Kelantan State UMNO Liaison Committee. Nevertheless, he was always confident that he would still hold no less than 500 votes in the General Assembly. His supporters also assumed that Musa Hitam could retain his loyal support of around 200-300 votes. 800 votes was the cut off point that was needed to overthrow Dr Mahathir, for certain, since the total number of votes in the General Assembly was 1474 votes.

*Team A and B: The Line of Departure.*

The situation became more delicate when Musa Hitam and Tengku Razaleigh met in Switzerland in January 1987, achieving there an unexpected political reconciliation, threatening Dr Mahathir's leadership and his camp in the party.<sup>8</sup> The alliance between Musa Hitam and Tengku Razaleigh clearly a temporary marriage of convenience led to the emergence of a new force in UMNO, identifying themselves as 'Team B', that of Mahathir-Ghaffar being called 'Team A'. The team B began their attack by attempting to destroy Dr Mahathir's credibility as leader of the Malays. Both teams had less than four months to build up their strength among the party divisional leaders who formed the delegations to the General Assembly. 24th April 1987 was the 'H' hour for both teams to use their 'political weapons' to capture the delegations. Both camps had set up their tactical headquarters in Kuala Lumpur; Team B chose the Merlin Hotel, to monitor every moment of the latest developments,

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<sup>7</sup> Previously, in the 1984 cabinet reshuffle, Tengku Razaleigh had lost Abdul Manan Othman, the Minister of Agriculture, who was also from Trengganu.

<sup>8</sup> Hambali Abdul Latiff, *UMNO Baru Milik Siapa?*, (Kuala Lumpur: Penerbitan Pena, 1988), p.95. In *Utusan Malaysia*, January 20, 1987 Tengku Razaleigh denied that any plans for a coalition had been made with Musa Hitam. However, Musa Hitam announced his decision to defend his party post which prompted the press later to speculate that Tengku Razaleigh would confront Dr Mahathir.

before moving to the battlefield at the UMNO building complex at Jalan Tun Dr Ismail.

*Nomination patterns.*

Both teams garnered support from the Divisional Delegation meetings prior to the General Assembly, these meetings being vital so as to give the impression of grass roots support.<sup>9</sup> Both teams had to use various tactics in persuading the delegations to nominate their team for the election of members of the UMNO Supreme Council.

Team A was led by Dr Mahathir, the incumbent party President. Ghaffar Baba was seeking from him the post of Deputy President by virtue of the 'tradition' that the Deputy Prime Minister had always served as the party Deputy President. In this team, two members were attempting to contest the Vice Presidency: Anwar Ibrahim, the Head of UMNO Youth and also the Minister of Education, and Sanusi Junid, the party Secretary General and also the Minister of Agriculture. Most of the Menteri Besar and Federal Deputy Ministers were in this team, being in the race to be ordinary members of the Supreme Council. Megat Joned Ayub, Deputy Minister of Home Affairs and Khalid Yunus, Deputy Minister of Land and Regional Development were among the 'heavy armour' of the Team A support group in attacking the opponent's team. Team A had penetrated at least three party Divisions in Johor state, Batu Pahat and Pulai which were headed by Abdul Jalal Abu Bakar and Mohamad Rahmat respectively, both of whom had been sidelined by Musa Hitam's political decisions after the 1982 General Election. The other Divisions were Sri Gading and Kluang, which remained neutral by deciding not to nominate any candidates. However, the Sri Gading Divisional Head, Mustafa Mohamad, the Ministry of Works Deputy Minister, was influenced to give his support to Dr Mahathir's team, while Kluang's Division under its leader, Syed Zain Al-Sahab, seemed to be in confusion. Muhyiddin Yassin, the Menteri Besar, failed to gain

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<sup>9</sup>. See the full list of nomination from 133 UMNO Divisions in *Dewan Masyarakat*, May 1987, p.11.

enough support to have Dr Mahathir and Ghaffar Baba nominated for the top posts by his Pagoh Division.

Team A had a strong hold in Perlis, Kedah, Perak, Selangor, Negeri Sembilan, and the Federal territory. Perak UMNO, was captured when Ramli Ngah Talib, the Menteri Besar, who was also the State Liaison Committee Chairman, was convinced by Anwar Ibrahim to team-up for the Vice-Presidency race. However, Anwar Ibrahim and Ramli Ngah Talib left the choice of third candidates to a party decision. In the Perak UMNO, Ramli Ngah Talib was portrayed as a replacement for Abdullah Badawi, but for Anwar Ibrahim, Perak UMNO's support represented a vital force to ensure his success in the party election. Permatang Pauh Division nominated Anwar Ibrahim, Wan Mokhtar Ahmad of Trengganu, and Ramli Ngah Talib of Perak; moreover, this division did not nominate Sanusi Junid, the party Secretary General who was Anwar Ibrahim's political rival. The Pasir Salak Division put forward only two names: Ramli and Anwar. This was another tactic to take support away from Sanusi's followers and the old guard who tended to favour Wan Mokhtar. For that reason, those divisions that had been under the influence of the MAYC, and the KEMAS, nominated Sanusi Junid, who received 13 nominations, whereas Anwar Ibrahim secured 17. All UMNO divisions in Perak backed Ramli for the Vice President's post while others chose neutral candidates such as Wan Mokhtar and Abu Hassan Omar. At least six divisions in Perak nominated Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, the Team B candidate, alongside Ramli Ngah Talib and Anwar Ibrahim. Ramli Ngah Talib's advisers felt that the chances to win were great if he joined forces with Anwar, since Ramli's political survival depended on Dr Mahathir's patronage. If he had chosen to cross to Team B, Megat Joned, his Deputy in Pasir Salak Division could at any time have excluded him from power.

Negeri Sembilan UMNO was divided in their nominations. Isa Abdul Samad, the Menteri Besar and the Head of the State UMNO, managed to get seven divisions to nominate Dr Mahathir and Ghaffar Baba, who happened to be his uncle, for the top



posts. However, he failed to exercise complete control, since Rais Yatim of Team B managed to garner support in the Negeri Sembilan party structure. The same pattern also occurred in Melaka UMNO, where candidates from both teams were nominated.

On the East Coast, seven Pahang UMNO divisions voted for Dr Mahathir as the party President, but only three divisions selected Ghaffar Baba to contest for Deputy President, while in seven other divisions Musa Hitam was picked as their choice. For the Vice Presidentship, Khalil Yaacob, the Menteri Besar and the Head of Pahang UMNO, was nominated by all ten divisions, with Abdullah Ahmad Badawi and Anwar Ibrahim as their favourite candidates.<sup>10</sup> The Trengganu UMNO also divided and both teams receiving equal support. The southern region nominated Mahathir and Ghaffar Baba, while the northern part nominated Tengku Razaleigh and Musa Hitam. Wan Mokhtar Ahmad, the Menteri Besar and the Chairman of the Trengganu UMNO Liaison Committee was nominated by all divisions, along with Anwar Ibrahim and Abdullah Ahmad Badawi for the Vice Presidentship. Team A's support in Kelantan was limited since it was a Team B stronghold, with Tengku Razaleigh wielding much influence. However, the nominations for the three Vice Presidents' posts turned out to be Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, along with Anwar Ibrahim and Sanusi Junid of Team A.

Team B was confident of their ability to unseat Dr Mahathir. Tengku Razaleigh's loyal support remained unchanged and he only needed an additional 300 votes from Musa Hitam's supporters to make his position secure. If Tengku Razaleigh could get 800 votes from the delegations of 133 UMNO Divisions with a total vote of 1463, then he would have a majority of 69. Even if Tengku Razaleigh could get only 500 votes, it would mean that he already had one-third of the total delegation.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Yahya Ismail, *Siapa Presiden UMNO 1987: Mahathir - Tengku Razaleigh?*, (Kuala Lumpur: Dinamika Kreatif, 1987), pp.50-51.

*Table IV*  
**Percentage of Nomination for three Top Posts.**

Posts	Nominations	(%)
	Team A	Team B
<b><i>President</i></b>		
Dr Mahathir	66.9%	
T.Razaleigh		27.8%
<b><i>Deputy President</i></b>		
Musa Hitam		38.3%
Ghafar Baba	58.6%	
<b><i>Vice Presidents</i></b>		
Wan Mokhtar Ahmad	39.8%	
Abdullah Badawi		54.8%
Anwar Ibrahim	56.3%	
Sanusi Joned	29.3%	
Ramli Ngah Talib	30.0%	
Rais Yatim		11.2%
Harun Idris		7.5%

Source: Based on the list of nomination in *Dewan Masyarakat*, May 1987, p.11.

Both teams were deploying the same tactics to garner support from Divisional leaders. Dr Mahathir and Ghaffar Baba convinced their constituencies, in Kubang Pasu and Alor Gajah respectively, not to propose any candidate for the Vice Presidents' posts. Tengku Razaleigh's base in Gua Musang also nominated himself and Musa Hitam for the two top posts. However, Musa Hitam made a tactical move, by nominating Ghaffar Baba, Abdullah Badawi and Wan Mokhtar as the candidates for the three Vice President posts, at the same time confirming himself and Tengku Razaleigh in the confrontation with Dr Mahathir. In Team A, Dr Mahathir and Ghaffar Baba, presented Anwar Ibrahim, Ramli Ngah Talib, and Sanusi Junid as their partners in the shadow cabinet. However, Sanusi Junid gave way to Wan Mokhtar to strengthen support from the East Coast and also to ensure no split vote occurred between him and Anwar Ibrahim.<sup>12</sup> The latter was considered 'the bridge' that team B would like to destroy in their attempt to cut off Mahathir's strength.

The nomination from all the 133 UMNO divisions was a vital element in political calculations. The pattern of nomination for the three top posts, President, Deputy President, and Vice President indicated the possible trend of voting behaviour in the party election in 1987.

#### *Tactical Operations.*

Team B launched a heavy attack on Team A with Dr Mahathir as their main target. They wished to oust Dr Mahathir from the party, pointing to his autocratic style of leadership and his risky decisions as the main reasons for the nation and party's instability.

Both camps carefully studied the pattern of their support. The breakdown of delegates in Team A's list was thought to be as follows: businessmen and civil servants, about 48 per cent, teachers 19 per cent, MPs and State Assemblymen 19 percent, KEMAS officers 5 per cent and others nine per cent. In the case of the

<sup>12</sup> Pemerhati, 'Percaturan Kerusi Naib Presiden', *Dewan Masyarakat*, May 1987, p.13.

Table V

***The Percentage of Delegates and Support Perceived  
by A and B Teams***

Delegates by Occupations.	Team A	Team B
1. Businessmen	25%	30%
2. Civil servants	23%	25%
3. MPs and State Assemblymen	19%	20%
4. Teachers	19%	20%
5. KEMAS officera	5%	6%
6. Professionals, Penghulu and others	9%	1%

Source. The Sunday Star, March 29, 1987.

patterns of support for Team B it was thought to be roughly as follows: 18 percent of the delegates were teachers, 30 per cent businessmen, MPs and State Assemblymen 20 per cent, Civil servants 25 percent, KEMAS officers 6 per cent, and professional and others only 1 per cent.<sup>13</sup>

The Operation Rooms of both camps worked round the clock to gather all sorts of information and analyses before special tasks were given to their 'ground commanders', to 'patrol and search' for their enemy's key positions. At the same time, some of their support groups were placed in defensive positions to stop their loyalist voters from crossing the floor. The situation in the Operation Room has been sketched as follows:<sup>14</sup>

" In this leg of the run-up to the election, the list becomes the focus of attention in the operations room of each potential candidate.

It is being studied closely to identify supporters of various leaders, their occupations and ages.

Amid the ringing telephones and computers, huge charts have gone up, dotted with numerous pins of different colours depending on whether a division is considered safe (green), committed to the other side (red) or 50-50 (grey).."

Both teams acknowledged a big shift in representation from teachers. These had represented 40 per cent of the delegates in 1981, 32 per cent in 1984, but now, in 1987 only between 18 to 19 per cent. However, Team A was confident that they could get at least 70 per cent of the teachers' vote, since Anwar Ibrahim had held the Education Ministry for almost two years. Also: "Anwar's green pins' were likely to come from the MPs and State Assemblymen, since it was said that he had a hand in the choice of a number of them."<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>13</sup>. See an investigative article by Maria Samad, *The Sunday Star*, March 29, 1987.

<sup>14</sup>. Ibid.

<sup>15</sup>. Ibid. Yahya Ismail claims that 41 of the 83 UMNO MPs were UMNO Youth leaders who were among the MPs and State Assemblymen chosen by Anwar Ibrahim as Ketua Pemuda, (*Siapa Presiden UMNO 1987*, p.119.)

*Deceptive tactics.*

Among the tactics adopted by Team B was to show their solidarity and united force through what was known as the 'Segamat-Gua Musang Pact'. Segamat and Gua Musang were Musa Hitam's and Tengku Razaleigh's political bases respectively. At the Segamat Divisional Conference of Delegations, Tengku Razaleigh was invited to officiate over the conference. Musa Hitam in his welcoming speech expressed his willingness to support Tengku Razaleigh if the latter were to be elected as the party President and become Prime Minister. Tengku Razaleigh denied an allegation from Team A concerning the relationship between Musa and himself. For him, Musa Hitam was, indeed, his closest natural ally. Therefore, he refuted the argument that he had been drawn into a trap by Musa Hitam.

On April 16, 1987 Tengku Razaleigh made public his justification for challenging Dr Mahathir who was considered to be taking the country off course in terms of economic policies and leadership style. This was characterized by Tengku Razaleigh as '*kemungkaran ekonomi dan politik*'<sup>16</sup> or economic and political deviation from the needs of the rakyat) in his attempt to discredit Dr Mahathir. He accused Dr Mahathir of refusing to listen to the ideas of the intellectuals and professionals whether from the public or private sectors. These intellectuals were frustrated since their professional views and ideas did not get any attention from the ruling political elite.<sup>17</sup> He also blamed Dr Mahathir for the country's economic problems such as the accumulation of the national debt caused by the introduction of prestigious projects such as HICOM (Heavy Industrial Corporation of Malaysia), the 'Malaysian national car'-Proton Saga, Penang Bridge, and the Daya Bumi building complex in Kuala Lumpur. Dr Mahathir was also blamed for the prevalence of prejudice, distrust, and suspicion among UMNO members. For Tengku Razaleigh,

<sup>16</sup>.See Abdul Rahim Kassim, *Mengapa Saya Tentang Mahathir: Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah*, (Petaling Jaya: AZ Distributor, 1989), pp.1-44.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., p.18 19.

UMNO's top leaders were no longer considered to be wise father figures.<sup>18</sup> The family spirit and intimate inter-relationship among the Malays, which had been culturally inherited, was being jeopardized, a situation threatening the solidity of Malay political power.

Tengku Razaleigh capitalized on the sentiment of the people when he condemned Dr Mahathir's prestigious projects, which were considered against the spirit of the New Economic Policy:

" The gigantic and prestigious projects are meaningless if the Malays are only shameful audiences of the projects which benefited the foreigners that had been given all sorts of privileges and facilities. In these melancholy circumstances, the destiny of the Malay is just as described by the Malay proverb: *ibarat memagar kelapa condong, pohonnya tumbuh di kebun kita, buahnya jatuh ke kebun orang lain.*' [a futile effort]."<sup>19</sup>

He attacked Dr Mahathir's world tour as representing eagerness to visit big firms and factories throughout the world as his priority, rather than to look into the problems of poor peasants in rural areas. Malays were accused of being a subsidised people, while in reality, much subsidy had been borne by the country, the tax payers and the rakyat, to finance gigantic and prestigious development projects, the effort to eradicate poverty in rural areas no longer being a priority. The top UMNO leaders seemed to be involved in a dream of heavy industry for profit, giving priority to the urban population.

For these reasons, Tengku Razaleigh with Musa Hitam and their team urged the UMNO delegation to make a change in the party leadership. Meanwhile, Musa Hitam also put forward his justification for his own incumbency, using Harun Idris's idea of 1984 and defending the doctrine that 'the party controls the government'. Musa Hitam wanted to continue the position of separating the Deputy Presidency

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., p.37.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., p.31.

from the Deputy Premiership.<sup>20</sup> This idea was mooted to discredit "Dr Mahathir's habit of promoting his young nominees into government posts without a long party apprenticeship."<sup>21</sup> However, indirectly Musa Hitam indicated his willingness to accept Ghafar Baba's continuation as the party Vice President and the Deputy Prime Minister, since Musa Hitam did not expect to be reappointed as Deputy Prime Minister. Meanwhile, Dr Mahathir endorsed Ghafar Baba to contest for Deputy President, when on April 11, 1987, Tengku Razaleigh confirmed the rumour that he would contest for the Presidency.<sup>22</sup> At the same time, Hussein Onn, the former Prime Minister, called on the media to give equal coverage to both sides because the party members were deciding who should be the national leaders and this was a very heavy responsibility.<sup>23</sup> Nevertheless, Team A never entertained such advice from those that they considered political opponents; therefore, Team B began their campaign throughout the country by producing and distributing video cassettes, which were called 'TV4'.<sup>24</sup>

Team B also tried to hold public rallies throughout the states but the only big gatherings were in Trengganu on March 19, followed by the one in Kelantan at the opening ceremony of Gua Musang UMNO's Divisional conference on the next day.

In Trengganu, the rally was known as '*Forum Perpaduan Trengganu*' (The Unity Forum of Trengganu) which in fact was a gathering of almost all Dr Mahathir's opponents. Musa Hitam denounced Dr Mahathir's style of leadership which, he claimed, accepted only 'yes men' and refused to accept argument and criticism. He also claimed he had used the Malay style of criticizing leaders within 'four walls' and

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<sup>20</sup> See the statement of Musa Hitam in *Utusan Malaysia*, February 12, 1987. Previously, that same statement had been made by Shahrir Abdul Samad in *Utusan Malaysia* on January 26, 1987. Radzi Sheikh Ahmad supported the idea as quoted in *The Straits Times*, March 3, 1987.

<sup>21</sup> Roger Kershaw 1989, 'Within the Family,' p.132.

<sup>22</sup> see *Mingguan Malaysia*, April 12, 1987.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, p.143.

<sup>24</sup> Kershaw 1989, 'Within the Family,' pp.125-193. His article was based on the set of five video-tapes which were known as 'Channel Four' as well as information provided by the local mainstream press, *Watan* and the *Straits Times* of Singapore.



'four eyes', and he had not criticized publicly, but despite this then he was blacklisted as not being loyal to the leader.

Thus, Musa Hitam concentrated blame on Dr Mahathir's autocratic style. Harun Idris urged Dr Mahathir to be replaced in an attempt to brighten up Malaysia's investment scene, and Marina Yusof blamed Dr Mahathir for the economic slowdown.<sup>25</sup> She also urged the supporters of Team B to boycott TV and UMNO's control of the print media which blacked out news on Team B. Thus, during the campaign various tactics were adopted, but due to the enforcement of the *Akta Rahsia Rasmi* (the Official Secrets Act) all attempts to uncover and to expose abuses had to go underground through *surat layang*. It was thought by some people that *the surat layang* gave more correct news than the national press.<sup>26</sup>

Musa Hitam, thus, staged his firm stand in disagreeing with the way Dr Mahathir planned and implemented economic and financial policies. Dr Mahathir's 'Look East policy' he claimed had brought no compensating benefits but on the contrary had given Japanese firms the chance to bleed Malaysia.<sup>27</sup> Musa Hitam also made clear his disagreement with the practice of mixing-up business and politics. He proposed an open tender system in awarding government contracts rather than the present system that was subject to abuse. He also mentioned Dr Mahathir's and Daim Zainuddin's conspiracy in what he called the great scandal of the United Malayan Banking Affair 'with a reputed Japanese loan to PERNAS to enable it to clear its losses on the shares bought from the Finance Minister.'<sup>28</sup> For Musa Hitam, these systems needed to be checked, and he put himself forward as a man of principle, not a power-mad eccentric, in offering alternative leadership to UMNO and the country.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> Watan, April 14-17, 1987.

<sup>26</sup> Yahya Ismail, *Siapa Presiden UMNO 1987*, p.133.

<sup>27</sup> Kershaw, *Within the Family*, p.143.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> Chamil Wariya 1988, *UMNO Era Mahathir*, p.141.

Besides Daim Zainuddin, Anwar Ibrahim also became a major target in the Team B campaign. Anwar and his ABIM crew were considered new comers who articulated a '*holier than thou*' attitude which implied that other UMNO members were *kurang Islam* (less Islamic).<sup>30</sup> To a certain extent this was referred to by the Team B as an exploitation of religion. Team B also claimed that ABIM was pro-Iranian. Anwar Ibrahim was accused not only of sending his representatives to 'visit' Iran immediately after the Iranian Islamic revolution, but he was also suspected of having his men undergo guerilla warfare training in Libya. Anwar Ibrahim denied these allegations and considered them to be *fitnah* designed to destroy the confidence of UMNO members toward him.

Team B's constant criticism of the personality cult also came from Rais Yatim, the then Foreign Minister. He accused Dr Mahathir's leadership of 'abrasive excursions into foreign policy'<sup>31</sup> which he said was the immediate factor for him to join the Team B.<sup>32</sup> For his part, Abdullah Badawi denied that Anwar Ibrahim was the main factor for his joining the opposition group but put more emphasis on the economic problems and leadership style of Dr Mahathir.<sup>33</sup> In fact, national salvation was the main theme of Team B's campaign.

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<sup>30</sup> See also the comment on Daim and Anwar in *Watan*, April 14-17, 1987.

<sup>31</sup> Kershaw 1989, 'Within the Family', p.176 ff 81.

<sup>32</sup> See the interview with Rais Yatim in "Rais 'Membakar Jambatan' untuk bersama Razaleigh-Musa", *ERA*, III (2), 1987, pp 34-37.

<sup>33</sup> Chamil Wariya 1988, *UMNO Era Mahathir*, pp 114-117. The coopting of Anwar Ibrahim who was also from Pulau Pinang changed the relationship between Abdullah Badawi and Dr Mahathir. Anwar managed 'to control' Dr Mahathir and to tailor him to his political strategy. Although Abdullah Badawi had a strong religious background, Anwar's rhetorical speeches were needed to boost government programmes aimed at promoting Islam. Abdullah Badawi's political future faded with the coming of Anwar, who was always 'sponsored' by Dr Mahathir, while the former had always been associated with Musa Hitam. By 1986, Anwar managed to oust Abdullah from the Ministry of Education, a move which has been considered as a key point in the power struggle. Nevertheless, Abdullah joined Team B because of the prolonged economic depression the country was experiencing. This phenomenon caused unemployment, an increase in the national debt while foreign investment was not as high as anticipated. The income of the rakyat decreased when the value of the Malaysia Ringgit went down. As a result, Abdullah Badawi was able to use the fact that public opinion questioned gigantic government projects and the management of the country's economy. Public opinion also believed that there were elements of power corruption and conflicts of interests. It seemed that public opinion helped precipitate the erosion of confidence towards the country's leadership.

Generally, Team B underlined their dissatisfaction with Dr Mahathir who had offended party norms, traditions and the practice of democracy, by:<sup>34</sup>

1. The insertion of an alien element into the higher echelons, or ABIMization.
2. Turning UMNO into a replica of PAS where religion had been manipulated for political ends, and contempt shown for the opinion of UMNO ulamas.
3. Causing bitter divisions in UMNO when Dr Mahathir ensured his supporters' control of the party at all levels.
4. Awarding contracts to his colleagues and foreign associates.
5. Blacklisting of independent-minded ministers and party colleagues as traitors.
6. Reducing team B's public influence through the 'power' and 'machinery' of government.

In the campaign, *Watan* was among the 'mosquito press' that was willing to cover and publish the activities and opinions of Team B. Also the English paper *The Star* made an attempt to cover both teams intensively. On the other hand, the Malay language dailies such as *Utusan Melayu*, *Utusan Malaysia*, and *Berita Harian*, influenced the rural Malays who formed UMNO's base, and these papers carried replies to accusations made by Team B.

#### *Team A's Counter-Attack*

Although Team A was in a defensive position, nevertheless they controlled certain lines of communication which gave them an advantage. The national dailies operated as the heavy 'artillery' that bombarded Team B from a distance, while poison pen letters and books functioned as 'political mortar' to harass the opponents' positions and confuse UMNO members at large. Also Team A was making use of the state UMNO Convention as one of the best locations to counter attack against their opponents.

<sup>34</sup> See Kershaw 1989, 'Within the Family', p.144.

Anwar Ibrahim had a 'special support weapon' in his 'Think-Tank regiment' which was led by Dr. Syed Hussein Al Attas, who since March had already established an offensive position by readying his 'fire power'<sup>35</sup> in support of Anwar Ibrahim. Al Attas argued that Dr Mahathir was attempting to infuse Malay society with Islamic values so as to reinstate a Malay civilization 'which had lost touch with its roots'.<sup>36</sup> Syed Hussein Al Attas, under the cover of being a 'reputable academician' was using his position as a columnist in *The Fleet* group print media, and also in the monthly journal published by Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, to express his ideas. In reward for his ideas and services, Syed Hussein was chosen by Anwar Ibrahim, the then Minister of Education, to be the Vice Chancellor of the University of Malaya.<sup>37</sup>

Religious sentiment was used to discredit the abilities and capabilities of the leaders of Team B. Dr Mahathir suggested indirectly to the public that strong leaders who were uncorrupt, and not addicted to alcohol or drugs, were needed by the country.<sup>38</sup> Surprisingly Anwar Ibrahim, in supporting Dr Mahathir, played on Malay sentiments, advocating the need for leaders who would not shrink back and subordinate Malay interests to non-Malays.<sup>39</sup> Team A then developed another tactic, associating Team B with 'Zionism' which was said to be attempting ultimately to destroy the Malays, while Dr Mahathir was portrayed as having an anti-Zionist posture.<sup>40</sup> Indirectly Team B was portrayed as being bribed by foreign interests,

<sup>35</sup> See his articles in *Berita Minggu*, UMNO, Islam dan Nasionalisme,' (March 8, 1987) and 'Pandang ke Timur untuk ubah fikiran,' in *Berita Harian*, March 9, 1987.

<sup>36</sup> Kershaw 1989, 'Within the Family', p.152.

<sup>37</sup> The appointment of Dr Syed Hussein Al Attas as the Vice Chancellor caused much political controversy. Not only was he appointed by Anwar Ibrahim, but the latter claimed that this had been agreed by the Prime Minister. Syed Hussein himself was involved in other controversial statements such as comments on Musa Hitam, and his decision on the appointments of senior positions in the university which were considered to show anti-Malay attitudes. Some of the academic staff through ASA (the Academic Staff Association) who were against Syed Hussein's leadership style and decisions, made efforts to unseat him. Some political observers, viewed Dr. Syed Hussein as 'Anwar Ibrahim's proxy' as well as his 'political tutor'.

<sup>38</sup> Kershaw 1989, 'Within the family', p.138 the author quoted *The Straits Times*, April 14, 1987.

<sup>39</sup> *Berita Minggu*, April 19, 1987.

<sup>40</sup> See the Editorial of *Utusan Malaysia*, April 13, 1987. The press also published an advertisement which highlighted Dr Mahathir's action made to defend the Malays against the attempts of Zionists to divide and weaken them. Kershaw 1989, 'Within the family', p.138. The advertisement was published on March 31, 1987.

particularly Zionism. Although Team B could deny this, Team A was in this way, able to undermine Team B's religious credentials.

To dismantle public confidence toward their rivals, Team A stigmatized Musa Hitam and Tengku Razaleigh as being devoid of Islamic principles (*fikrah*), power-seeking and dividing the Malays.<sup>41</sup>

Musa Hitam's justification of his incumbency was rejected totally by Team A. Rafidah Aziz, the Head of Wanita UMNO and Megat Joned, Deputy Minister of Home Affairs, highlighted the need for the Deputy President to be appointed Deputy Prime Minister. In this way, the idea of separation of the two posts was strongly condemned. Indeed Team A had a different perspective on the definition and approach to the notion that 'the party controls the government.' Constitutionally, the function and role of Deputy President was not that important; the party constitution spelt it out as being to assist the President, and to preside in meetings of the Supreme Council in the absence of the President.<sup>42</sup> However, the position of the Deputy President was important, since traditionally, he would be appointed Deputy Prime Minister, the route to becoming the party President and Prime Minister:

"Finally Dr Mahathir spelt out openly that coterminacy was not an absolute virtue: he reserved the right to perpetuate the situation prevailing since the year before, and work with a Deputy Premier whom he could trust rather than accept a party nominee whom he could not."<sup>43</sup>

In his counter argument, Dr Mahathir defended his own idea of how the party controls the government by planning to keep Ghafar Baba as his deputy in the government even if Ghafar were to lose in the 1987 party election.

Ghaffar Baba adopted a low-profile tactic and emphasised party loyalty in a way that was in line with UMNO tradition. Even though he had been out of the Cabinet during Hussein Onn's administration (1976-1981), his loyalty was proven

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<sup>41</sup> See Rosli bin Isa, 'UMNO Schingga 24hb April 1987,' pp.78-79 and its appendix 19.

<sup>42</sup> *Perlembagaan UMNO 1985*, Pasal 9.9 (b), (i) and (ii).

<sup>43</sup> Kershaw 1989, 'Within the Family,' p.134. The author quoted *The Sunday Times and Mingguan Malaysia*, April 5, 1987.

when he came back to the Cabinet for the sake of the party's interest.<sup>44</sup> Although his academic qualification and international standing was questioned,<sup>45</sup> Ghaffar had special reasons for standing for the Deputy Presidency, since his service as Deputy Premier was much needed by Dr Mahathir.<sup>46</sup> Therefore, Ghafar Baba underlined the principle that the Deputy President should be a paragon of loyalty.<sup>47</sup>

This position effectively won the sympathy of UMNO delegations, most of whom championed the Malay value of loyalty to a leader, the important myth of *Hang Tuah*,<sup>48</sup> the Malay hero, being uppermost in Malay minds.<sup>49</sup> Moreover, *Berita Harian* and *Utusan Malaysia*, launched propaganda designed to create doubt among the delegations concerning Musa Hitam and Tengku Razaleigh, using the concept of 'Derhaka' (treason) and the analogy of the character of *Hang Jebat* to attack Musa Hitam. *Berita Harian* used a letter from a 'reader' to ridicule Musa by comparing him with Hang Jebat, who had dared to confront his 'sultan', but used his friends as a shield in order to save his image.<sup>50</sup> Thus, Musa Hitam was identified by a writer as a 'two-faced' politician.<sup>51</sup> Moreover, *Berita Harian*, tried to convince the public that Musa Hitam alone was responsible for the Memali incident.<sup>52</sup> The press also pretended to endorse Tengku Razaleigh's decision to contest because he was asked by his supporters, but the press condemned Musa Hitam who, they said, only wanted to

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<sup>44</sup> His opponents claimed that Ghafar Baba had accepted his appointment as Deputy Prime Minister to avoid bankruptcy proceedings, *Asiaweek*, March 15, 1987.

<sup>45</sup> A publication that supported Team B as an alternative leadership mentioned that academically, Ghafar could not compete with Musa Hitam. Thus, this situation arose: if the rakyat wished to survive in politics, Musa but not Ghafar should be elected. If UMNO members were looking for a leader who was willing to criticise the leadership for the sake of democracy, they should elect Musa as Deputy President for another term. see Yahya Ismail, *Siapa Presiden UMNO 1987*, p.71.

<sup>46</sup> *Watan*, April 25-27, 1987, and *Utusan Malaysia*, April 4, 1987.

<sup>47</sup> See Kershaw 1989, 'Within the Family,' pp.134-135.

<sup>48</sup> See Kassim Ahmad, *Hikayat Hang Tuah*, (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1964).

<sup>49</sup> Shahanuddin Maarof 1984, *The Concept of a Hero in Malay Society*, (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press). The personality of Hang Tuah, the Malay hero of the golden age of the Melaka Empire in the 15th century, in fact represents the philosophy and ethics used by the Malay elite in relation to the masses.

<sup>50</sup> *Berita Harian*, April 22 1987.

<sup>51</sup> See an article by Jaafar Hamid, 'Datuk Musa sanjung kepimpinan Dr Mahathir,' *Utusan Malaysia*, April 14, 1987.

<sup>52</sup> See the editorial 'Memali: Apakah muslihat Datuk Musa?', *Berita Harian*, April 18, 1987.

challenge and aim at capsizing Dr Mahathir. *Berita Harian* and *Berita Minggu* condemned Musa Hitam as a 'traitor' who was dissatisfied with Dr Mahathir's decision to retain Tengku Razaleigh in the Cabinet in 1984.<sup>53</sup> *Utusan Malaysia* portrayed Musa Hitam's coalition with Tengku Razaleigh as a political gamble,<sup>54</sup> and on the eve of the party election, Dr Mahathir himself, made a heavy attack by reaffirming that those who tried to split the UMNO were traitors to the Malays.<sup>55</sup>

Team A also used other justifications as to why Dr Mahathir should be reelected, such as the unnecessary change that would interrupt development,<sup>56</sup> weaken the country and affect foreign investment. Moreover, the change would not be at the right moment since it was a time of economic crisis<sup>57</sup>. *Berita Harian* also published an article written by the Team A political machine which quoted a Hadith to justify Dr Mahathir and his team's incumbency by relating an axiom of Caliph Umar Al-Khattab, that challenging a chosen leader was only justifiable for reasons such as breaches of faith or physical unfitness.<sup>58</sup>

Corrupt practices in Mahathir's administration were highlighted in Team B's theme of 'it's time for a change'. However, Team A seized the advantage when the press released news that 'Musa received \$1million for UMNO'.<sup>59</sup> If the source was reliable, it was Mohamad Rahmat who was a witness of the actual time the cheque

<sup>53</sup> A.Nazri Abdullah, 'Bolehkah perpaduan UMNO dipertahankan', *Berita Minggu*, April 19, 1987.

<sup>54</sup> *Utusan Malaysia*, March 25, 1987.

<sup>55</sup> *Utusan Malaysia*, April 22, 1987.

<sup>56</sup> *The Straits Times*, March 14, 1987.

<sup>57</sup> Kershaw 1989, 'Within the Family', p.138.

<sup>58</sup> Wan Zahidi Wan Teh, 'Falsafah kepimpinan menurut Islam', *Berita Harian*, April 24, 1987. The writer served in the Prime Minister's Department as Special Officer to the Deputy Prime Minister, and was formerly a lecturer at the Faculty of Islamic Studies of the Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia.

<sup>59</sup> *The Star*, August 25, 1986.see also *Far Eastern Economic Review*, April 2, 1987, pp.23-24 and S.H.Alattas 1987, *Challenger*, pp.183-209 for the details of the case.

was handed over.<sup>60</sup> Syed Hussein Alattas, the freelance writer, exposed what was referred to as the *Musa Connection*, i.e. corruption and abuse of power.<sup>61</sup>

Team A also questioned Musa Hitam's and Tengku Razaleigh's credibility as sincere leaders. This character assassination was not only pursued during party gatherings, but also in the form of *surat layang*. It was assumed Team A who distributed an anonymous letter entitled '*Musa Perangkap Tengku Razaleigh*' (Musa traps Tengku Razaleigh).<sup>62</sup>

Dr Mahathir also applied new tactics to destroy his opponents by allowing the distribution of Musa Hitam's confidential letters of 1984 that insisted Dr Mahathir should not reappoint Tengku Razaleigh to any ministerial post. In the final analysis, the coalition of Musa Hitam and Tengku Razaleigh was labelled as a marriage of convenience that would eventually destroy party unity. Although *Berita Harian* tried to erode Kelantanese loyalty towards Tengku Razaleigh, Team A was only able to influence the Tanah Merah and Rantau Panjang UMNO Divisions. Regional sentiment dominated the issue since the cliques from Kelantan wished to make history by having a Kelantanese as Prime Minister.<sup>63</sup> To them, this Kelantanese prince was the real leader and "all wrong originated from Dr Mahathir and Daim Zainuddin."<sup>64</sup> In short, Team A's tactics did not damage Tengku Razaleigh's reputation in Kelantan.

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<sup>60</sup> S.H.Alattas 1987, *Challenger*, p.185. Mohamad Rahmat was the Head of Pulau UMNO Division in Johor, and also a Musa Hitam political antagonist when the former was dropped from the cabinet after the 1982 election. He served as Ambassador to Indonesia and was then recalled to hold his former ministry (Information) after the General election of 1986, in order to fill-up the Johor representatives in Federal government. It seemed that he was chosen by Dr Mahathir to replace Musa Hitam. He and Mustafa Mohamad, another Johorian Deputy Minister were loyal towards Dr Mahathir. Their support was necessary in order to break the solid influence of Musa Hitam in Johor. Their services were rewarded in 1987 when Dr Mahathir reappointed and promoted both in the cabinet line-up. Syed Hussein, the author was sued by Musa Hitam in a libel case which lasted until August 1990, when Musa Hitam won the case and was awarded compensation. *The New Straits Times*, August 23, 1990).

<sup>61</sup> S.H.Alattas 1987, *Challenger*, pp.201-203.

<sup>62</sup> See a copy of the letter in Rosli Bin Isa, 'UMNO Schingga 24hb April 1987', Appendix 19. This ten-page letter convinced some UMNO members of the negative traits in Musa's and Tengku Razaleigh's personalities. The letter then urged the delegation not to vote for Musa and Tengku Razaleigh for the sake of UMNO. Musa Hitam, who was still the Deputy President, was branded a traitor to Malay society. Sanusi Junid was reported had read the two letters Musa Hitam wrote to Mahathir in a meeting with the Kelantan UMNO delegation, the audience being convinced that Musa Hitam was prejudiced against Tengku Razaleigh, see *Berita Harian*, April 8, 1987.

<sup>63</sup> S.H.Alattas 1987, *Challenger*, p.47.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*



Dr Mahathir also tried to retaliate against accusations of his 'dictatorial' leadership<sup>65</sup> and 'mismanagement' when his ministers and deputy ministers, who were campaigning for Team B, questioned his sincerity in awarding tenders for gigantic projects such as the Penang Bridge, Daya Bumi complex, PERWAJA, and the national car project. Dr Mahathir's apparent nepotism, favouritism and corrupt practices<sup>66</sup> were given publicity.

In reply, on April 13, 1987 Dr Mahathir held a press conference to clear the air by giving an assurance that 'secret documents' could be declassified under the Official Secrets Act (Amendment) 1986 in the public interest.<sup>67</sup> He expressed his willingness to open up the files on several controversial projects to quell public speculation that the government had acted improperly.<sup>68</sup> Dr Mahathir affirmed that all the decisions made in connection with these projects were collectively taken by the cabinet.<sup>69</sup> He also made a final trip to Kelantan in order to officiate over the opening ceremony of the State UMNO Headquarters. In his speech, he warned his opponents, in this case Tengku Razaleigh, that although he believed in the Malay proverb of '*air dicincang tak kan putus*' (waters should never be separated i.e. brothers should remain so), if he were pushed too far he would react.<sup>70</sup> The campaign became tense as tactics began to change from indirect attacks to direct targeting. Team A spearheaded their attacks through its print and electronic media, while the Team B received good coverage from *The Star* and *Watan*.

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<sup>65</sup> See *Malayan Business*, April 1987, pp. 9, 12-13 for a statement from Abdullah Badawi and Marina Yusof.

<sup>66</sup> *Far Eastern Economic Review*, April 2, 1987, p.17. "Critics of the Mahathir administration habitually alleged that corruption and unwillingness to expose unethical practices pervade every aspect of his government. Anonymous so-called 'flying letters' alluded to nepotism and favouritism of political allies in awarding government contracts. Others painted a picture of a concerted effort by a loose - but far-reaching - alliance of political and business interests to siphon off both national wealth and the savings of unsuspecting investors."

<sup>67</sup> The press highlighted Dr Mahathir's press conference the next day (14 April).

<sup>68</sup> *Far Eastern Economic Review*, April 2, 1987, p.17.

<sup>69</sup> See Dr Mahathir's statement in Hambali Abdul Latiff, *UMNO Baru Milik Siapa?*, Appendix II, pp.198-177.

<sup>70</sup> A.B.Shamsul 1988, "The Battle Royal" p.178.

To weaken Musa Hitam's support in Johor, Mohamad Rahmat<sup>71</sup> and Mustafa Mohamad declared their support for Mahathir's team which was trying hard to penetrate 'enemy' territory. Besides getting support from his own Melaka state, Ghafar Baba also had strong backing from the Federal Territory UMNO, Negeri Sembilan and Selangor; but for the rest he had to rely on support from Dr Mahathir. Although Dr Mahathir received support from all Menteri Besar who were also on the State UMNO Liaison Committees, up to April 11 when all nominations were received by the party Headquarters, both factions were worrying about the number of uncommitted delegates expected to be about 20 -25 per cent out of the total 1,479 votes.<sup>72</sup>

Dr Mahathir monitored intelligence reports from various sources, shifting his 'soft' (lembut) stand to 'harsh' (kasar) and issuing ultimatums to delegates. On March 22, Dr Mahathir announced that Ghafar would stand for the Deputy Presidency, the latter claiming that service to the party was more important than victory.<sup>73</sup> However, by mid April, he saw a trend giving Musa more support, and thus, Dr Mahathir cautioned that Ghafar Baba would still be a Deputy Prime Minister even if the latter lost in the party election.<sup>74</sup> Dr Mahathir came under pressure when former Prime Ministers, Tunku Abdul Rahman and Hussein Onn appearing to disapprove of Dr Mahathir's handling of the party and government,<sup>75</sup> indirectly suggested their support for the Team B. This was another indicator that Dr Mahathir was not receiving solid support and he felt that the pressure to oust him was coming from all corners of the

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<sup>71</sup> For a brief note on his political ideas see the exclusive interview with him in Chamil Wariya, 'Mohamed Rahmat setelah dapat nyawa politik baru,' *Utusan Malaysia*, November 14 and 15, 1989. For a special comment on his 'grand political design', see Shahrir Samad, 'UMNO Johor: Politik Proxy dan 'mission impossible',' *Watan*, September 26, 1989.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid., p.179. of the total 1479 votes, 1,434 were from 133 UMNO Divisions, 35 were Supreme Council members, and there were five from each of the Women's and Youth Movements. The total number of divisional delegates to the Assembly had also increased from 1,158 in 1981 to 1,244 in 1984, and to 1,479 in 1987 as a result of the amendment of parliamentary constituency boundaries before the 1982 and 1986 general election.

<sup>73</sup> *Mingguan Malaysia*, February 22, 1987 and *Utusan Malaysia*, February 23, 1987, and also *Berita Harian*, April 16, 1987.

<sup>74</sup> *Far Eastern Economic Review*, April 23, 1987, p.16.

<sup>75</sup> *Straits Times*, February 28, 1987.

party and government. He then fiercely announced on the eve of the party election that he would be the Prime Minister even if he won by only one vote. At this point, Dr Mahathir was no longer holding to the principle of quitting his post when he became unpopular, which he had preached in the 1984 party Assembly.<sup>76</sup> He justified any refusal to resign under pressure from his opponent by claiming that he represented something good for the party and nation. He then highlighted the need to preserve party tradition and Malay cultural values, claiming he was deeply hurt with the way his opponents were trying to remove him from power. To undermine what was seen as Team B's attitude of '*tidak mengenang budi*' (not to repay an obligation), Dr Mahathir's teammates Daim Zainuddin<sup>77</sup> and Ghafar Baba<sup>78</sup> especially capitalised on the doctrine of collective responsibility or 'cabinet ethics'. The latter insisted that his opponents resign from the Cabinet rather than 'hang on for the love of benefits'.<sup>79</sup>

To avoid a split vote in Team A's candidature for the Vice Presidency, Sanusi Junid was dropped from the competition. Team A had calculated that Wan Mokhtar would receive support from both teams, while the position of Anwar Ibrahim and Ramli Ngah Talib would depend on solid votes from Team A. The Press did not elaborate on the reasons for Sanusi's withdrawal, but *Mingguan Malaysia* mentioned that Dr Mahathir had denied a rumour that he was preparing Anwar as his successor, instead pointing out that it was the General Assembly that decided the UMNO succession.<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>76</sup> See *New Straits Times*, May 26, 1984 which included the following statement 'As long as I have life and means, and as long as I am required, I will serve the party and nation. I only pray to God that when my service is no longer required, I will become aware of it and recognise the signs and retire with all sincerity.'

<sup>77</sup> *Utusan Malaysia*, March 21, 1987.

<sup>78</sup> *Berita Harian*, April 16, 1987.

<sup>79</sup> See *Utusan Malaysia*, March 25, 1987, and also *Straits Times*, March 23, 1987.

<sup>80</sup> *Mingguan Malaysia*, April 12, 1987.

A few days before April 24, both teams prepared for D-day and executed various tactics to capture more support, their loyal supporters being given special treatment during their stay in Kuala Lumpur. A political analyst observed that:<sup>81</sup>

"Delegates had been arriving in Kuala Lumpur since 20 April together with 13,500 official observers from all UMNO branches and divisions and many local and foreign media representatives. Altogether they occupied no less than 5,000 hotel rooms, from the five-star to the starless ones, costing UMNO millions of ringgit, excluding the 150,000 ringgit bill to feed all those present for the four day historic occasion at the UMNO-owned Putra World Trade Centre. The venue of the meeting was sealed off from the public by no less than 5000 uniformed and plain-clothes security personnel, mainly from the police."

In Kuala Lumpur, last minute campaigning from both factions was non-stop. "It was estimated that among the delegates, hardcore supporters comprised only about 20%, followers of state liaison chiefs and division heads comprised 35%, and 'mercenaries' seeking the best payoff comprised 45%".<sup>82</sup>

An outright power struggle was a new phenomenon in UMNO culture, and the leadership conflict and factional in-fighting of 1987 was the most expensive and heated campaign in the history of Malay politics. Therefore, the service of the old guard and former Supreme Council members to supervise this fierce election was much needed. The so-called *Jawatankuasa Etika Pemilihan Pemimpin UMNO* <sup>83</sup> (the UMNO Leadership Election's Ethic Committee) was formed to play an ombudsman role. This was chaired by Tan Sri Mohd Khir Johari,<sup>84</sup> but the code of behaviour formulated by the Supreme Council was breached by both teams whose leaders were also Council members. The agreed norms included prohibitions

<sup>81</sup> Ibid., p.180.

<sup>82</sup> See Diane K. Mauzy, 'Malaysia in 1987: Decline of "The Malay Way"', *Asian Survey*, Vol XXVIII (2), February 1988, p.213. The author quoted *The Straits Times*, March 19, April 1, 1987 and *The Malay Mail*, April 25, 1987.

<sup>83</sup> See Halim Mahmood, *Senario Pemilihan UMNO: Siapa Singkir Siapa Rebut Kerusi Majlis Tertinggi Parti*, (Semenyeh, Selangor: Marwilis, December 1986), pp.103-110, Rustam A.Sani, 'Mengapa UMNO perlukan Etika pemilihan pemimpin,' *Utusan Malaysia*, December 18, 1986; Samad Mahadi, 'Etika UMNO: antara realiti dan keunggulan', *Utusan Malaysia*, December 22, 1986.

<sup>84</sup> Its members were Tan Sri Datin Paduka Hajjah Aishah Ghani (Former Minister of Welfare Services and Head of Wanita), Tan Sri Abdul Samad Idris (Former Minister of Youth, Culture and Sports), Tan Sri Hamzah Datuk Abu Samah (Former Minister of Information), and Datuk Mustaffa Haji Abdul Jabar (Former Deputy Minister and UMNO Secretary General).

concerning the use of money,<sup>85</sup> using influence in the government,<sup>86</sup> publication of pamphlets,<sup>87</sup> and forming team cliques.<sup>88</sup> The committee members functioned as observers who were to ensure all the regulations were fully enforced and to report to the party Disciplinary Committee<sup>89</sup> which would take action against those who violated the rules.<sup>90</sup> The formation of this committee reflected the turbulent situation in UMNO.

It is significant to mention here that there was an article in *Watan*,<sup>91</sup> twenty days from the 'H Hour', that caught public attention.<sup>92</sup> The article used a theory based on the name related to Allah, *Ar-Rahman*, to justify a natural succession among UMNO's leaders. The writer suggested that personalities whose name did not begin with A or N were not qualified to succeed Mahathir. This view, indirectly disqualified Tengku Razaleigh and Musa Hitam from winning the party's election, while it suggested Abdul Ghafar Baba, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, Anwar Ibrahim, and Najib Tun Razak as representing the possible line up for future UMNO President. Whether the delegates were influenced by this article is an open question.

Musa Hitam had his last opportunity to influence the delegates when he gave an opening speech officiating over the Wanita and Pemuda UMNO conference on

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<sup>85</sup> Candidates and their supporters were not allowed to give money or materials or other facilities to the delegates to directly influence them.

<sup>86</sup> Those who had responsibilities in government and statutory bodies could not use their subordinate officers or the institutional facilities for their own campaigns or those of their supporters.

<sup>87</sup> The pamphlets which explained the progress of a particular ministry, department, or statutory body could not be distributed to the party members or the delegations until three months before the date of the elections.

<sup>88</sup> It was against election ethics to form alliances between states in support of each other, or create a block within the divisions or branches to support a candidate or a group of candidates, and have any form of accord to support any one or a group of candidates.

<sup>89</sup> The Chair of the committee was normally held by the party Deputy President, but after Musa resigned from the Cabinet the chairmanship was given to Ghafar Baba, the party's Vice President who was also the Deputy Prime Minister.

<sup>90</sup> Halim Mahmood 1986, *Senario Pemilihan UMNO*, p.104.

<sup>91</sup> Iqbal Abdullah, 'Tokoh2 bukan huruf 'A', 'N' tidak layak ganti Mahathir?' *Watan*, April 4-6, 1987.

<sup>92</sup> *Berita Minggu*, January 28, 1990. A statement was given by Ghafar Baba which stated that the question of who should succeed Mahathir was not important, but that ensuring the future of the rakyat should be taken care of by the ruling leadership. Until 1991, Ghafar Baba had always denied he was a stop gap leader while Dr Mahathir was grooming Anwar Ibrahim, as 'Prime Ministerial material'.

April 23. Dr Mahathir on the other hand had the same opportunity when he delivered his 'Presidential speech' to the delegates on April 24. It was the usual practice of UMNO that keynote addresses by the President and his Deputy were the only centre of attraction if the Assembly was not holding an election. But in the 1987 Assembly, the speeches were full of 'messages' and 'missions' for the delegates to decide on continuity or change in the party leadership.

*'H-Hour': the voting session*

Immediately after Dr Mahathir delivered his keynote address on Friday, April 24, H Hour began, the delegates being in battle mood as they cast their votes. From that moment on, it was expected that 10% would be the approximate number of uncommitted delegates, Najib's influence being considered the vital factor that would shape the result.<sup>93</sup> The Friday prayer break was also important in influencing the delegates' views. The result was anxiously awaited by those who attended the Assembly as well as the general public. At midnight, the ballot was still being counted. It was the longest time taken in the history of UMNO elections.

When the results were announced, Dr Mahathir had won the Presidency by a majority of 43 votes, and Musa Hitam was defeated by Ghafar Baba in the Deputy Presidency race by a majority of 40 votes: "the results clearly indicated that Mahathir's popularity had been drastically reduced, his image dented, his authority eroded, his 'cleanliness' questioned, his 'efficiency' doubted' and his 'trustworthiness' under suspicion. In short, the Mahathir - Ghafar combination had won the battle but not the war".<sup>94</sup> The result of the contest for the three top posts was as in the Table VI.

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<sup>93</sup> It was said that Najib and his supporters from Pahang swung to Team A which contributed to a majority of 43 in Dr Mahathir's favour, but some UMNO Supreme Council members claimed that most of the council members voted for Dr Mahathir.

<sup>94</sup> A.B.Shamsul 1988, "The Battle Royal", p.181.

Table VI

*Margins of Victory in the 1987  
Election of UMNO Top leadership.*

Candidates	Votes	Percentage
<b><i>President.</i></b>		
Dr Mahathir Mohamed	761	51.45%
Tengku Razaleigh	718	48.54%
Total votes cast	1,476	100%
Majority	43	
<b><i>Deputy President.</i></b>		
Abdul Ghafar Baba	739	49.96%
Musa Hitam	699	47.26%
Total votes cast	1479	100%
Spoilt votes	41	2.7%
Majority	40	
<b><i>Vice-Presidents</i> (3 posts)</b>		
Wan Mokhtar Ahmad	935	21.15%
Abdullah Badawi	879	19.89
Anwar Ibrahim	850	19.23
Rais Yatim	690	15.61%
Ramli Ngah Talib	667	15.09%
Harun Idris	398	9.00%
Total votes	4,419	100%
Spoilt votes	16	0.36%

*Source:* Berita Harian and Utusan Malaysia 25 April 1987.

The results showed that the delegates still wanted personalities from both teams in control of the party. Nevertheless, Team A won the majority by winning all three top posts, Team B winning only one Vice Presidential seat. As shown in Table VII from 69 contestants<sup>95</sup> who competed for the 25 seats on the Supreme Council, only 8 came from Team B. Including other appointed members, Team A had retained a strong influence in the party structure.

*All-round Defence: political containment.*

Dr Mahathir could not ignore how his leadership had barely survived the strong challenge, and Team A's strongest supporters wanted Team B to be treated as their 'Prisoners of War', who would be politically disarmed and stripped of their position. The *Malay way*<sup>96</sup> of conflict avoidance and reconciliation no longer worked when emotion and power took over. Closing the Assembly Dr Mahathir left the delegates with the warning that :<sup>97</sup>

"We must be aware that if we win, we get something and that if we lose, we will not get it...

I myself realised that fairly early and I accepted the fact that in the event that I lost, it would be impossible for me to continue living in Sri Perdana [his official residence] and remain as Prime Minister."

He then questioned the loyalty of some of his cabinet members whom he accused of breaching their oath of maintaining cabinet secrecy and loyalty to the

<sup>95</sup> Among those not elected were Napsiah Omar MP (644 votes), Adib Adam (644), Syed Hamid Albar (643), Suhaimi Kamaruddin MP(633), Kassim Ahmed MP (626), Kamarudin Mat Isa (614), Mohamad Rahmat MP (614), Mustafa Mohamad MP (550), Ibrahim Ali MP (545), Aziz Shamsuddin (533),Malik Ahmad SA (503), Ibrahim Hassan MP (502), Syed Nahar (499), Sharifah Dora (442), Daud Taha MP (436), Dasuki Ahmad MP (432) Othman Saad (423), Zakaria Abd.Rahman MP (415), Abdullah Ahmad MP (412), Awang Jabar MP (407), Zainol Abidin Johari SA (376), Alias Ali MP (370), Nawawi Mat Awin (363), Tajuddin Abdul Rahman (351), Nik Hussein Abdul Rahman (255), Engku Muhsein Abd.Kadir (252), Ahmad Shahbuddin SA (245), Abu Bakar Daud SA (221), Yahya Shafie MP (215), Hisan Ibrahim (202), Sulaiman Palastine (189), Zain Ibrahim (186), Abu Bakar Rautin MP (154), Tawfik Ismail MP (146), Abu Bakar Shaari (140), Syed Hassan Alattas (137), Nordin Selat (100), Shariff Omar (91), Razak Abu Samah (76), Kamarulzaman Bahadon (71), Hang Tuah Arshad (53), Ahmad Mustafa (25), Idris Rauf (20), and Ahmad Manaf (19).

<sup>96</sup> Diane K.Mauzy 1988, 'Malaysia in 1987',p.213. The author underlines 'the Malay way' as a method of problem-solving and conflict-avoidance which helped cool political tempers. "It emphasizes traditional courtesy and good manners, wide consultation, compromise, avoidance of direct confrontation when possible (but leaving a role for innuendo), and striving for consensus rather than imposing the will of a (sometimes narrow) majority. If possible, critics are wooed rather than repressed and defeated opponents are not pounded into complete submission, but openings are left for future reconciliation."

<sup>97</sup> Far Eastern Economic Review, May 7, 1987, p.12, Utusan Malaysia, April 27, 1987.



Table VII

***The Result of The Election of UMNO Supreme Council  
Members 1987-1990.***

Team A		Team B	
Dr Yusof Noor	1,030	Kadir S.Fadzir	760
Muhyiddin Yassin	990	Rahmah Osman	746
Khalil Yaakob	903	Shahrir Samad	718
Tengku.A.Rithauddeen	875	Zainal A.Zin	717
Mohamad Yaacob	849	Radzi Sh.Ahmad	704
Sabaruddin Cik	829	Marina Yusof	702
Tajol Rosli Ghazali	796	Abd.Rahim Bakar	687
Abu Hassan Omar	780	Abd.Ajib Ahmad	660
Dr Siti Zaharah	762		
Mohd Isa Samad	746		
Osman Aroff	719		
Dr A.Hamid Pawanteh	718		
Khalid Yunus	683		
Megat Junid Megat Ayob	648		
Wan Abu Bakar	647		

*Source: Berita Harian and Utusan Malaysia 25 April 1967*

country and constitution. Dr Mahathir's closing speech underlined his 'future plan of action', and by 24 April, he had completed his 'enemy surrounding' operation.

*Reorganise.*

On April 28, Tengku Razaleigh, the Minister of Trade and Industry, and Rais Yatim, the Foreign Minister, resigned from the Cabinet. In his strategy for his opponents' demise, Dr Mahathir did not immediately accept the [resignation] offer, which could have triggered further resignations from other members of the cabinet, save from one or two of the less strident critics.<sup>98</sup> Meanwhile, Tengku Razaleigh said he would not rejoin the government if invited to, "unless the prime minister changes his ways."<sup>99</sup>

As his colleagues expected, Dr Mahathir not only accepted the resignation of his two hard core rival ministers, he also sacked Ministers and Deputy Ministers who had turned against him in the party election. Among those sacked were Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, Minister of Defence; Shahril Abdul Samad, Minister of Social Welfare; Abdul Ajib Ahmad, Minister in the Prime Minister's Department; Deputy Minister of Primary Industries, Radzi Sheikh Ahmad; Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdul Kadir Sheikh Fadzir; Deputy Minister of Transport, Rahmah Othman; and Deputy Minister of Energy, Telecommunications and Posts, Zainal Abidin Zin.

However, Dr Mahathir did not reshuffle his Cabinet, instead assigning existing ministers to cover the 'vacant' ministerial posts temporarily. Ghafar Baba was assigned to cover the function of the Defence Minister, Tengku Ahmad Rithauddeen, Information Minister took care of the Foreign Affairs portfolio, the Agriculture Minister looked after the Trade and Industry Ministry, Federal Territory Minister Abu Hassan Omar was assigned to the Welfare Services Ministry; meanwhile Kasitah

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<sup>98</sup> Ibid., p.12.

<sup>99</sup> Far Eastern Economic Review, May 14, 1987, p.14.

Gadam, Minister in the Prime Minister's Department covered functions and tasks left by Abdul Ajib Ahmad. Dr Mahathir seemed to be waiting for further political developments before announcing his new cabinet line-up.

Musa Hitam, in his last speech to the General Assembly, expected Dr Mahathir to take immediate revenge on his 'enemy', and he reminded UMNO members 'to take good care of UMNO' (*Jagalah UMNO ini baik-baik*). He proposed forgiving and forgetting on the part of both teams.

However, Dr Mahathir expressed his resentment by quoting 'menang jadi abu, kalah jadi arang' (ash if you lose, charcoal if you win). Malay disunity was political ash and charcoal, but the winner would at least gain a better control over UMNO and the government.

*Table VIII*

*The Distribution of UMNO's Leaders according to the states in the Cabinet Reshuffle in May 1987.*

State	Minister	Deputy Minister	Parliamentary Secretary.
Kedah	3	1	1
Penang	1	1	
Perak	1	3	2
Selangor	1	1	
Negri	1	1	
Melaka	1		
Johor	2	1	
Pahang	2	2	
Trengganu	1	1	1
Kelantan	1	2	1
Kuala Lumpur FT.		1	

Dr Mahathir was seen to be running the party like a corporate enterprise, where the majority shareholder gets his way. He also wanted a cabinet that had

confidence in him and vice versa.<sup>100</sup> For Mahathir, a 'political cancer' must be cut out in order that the party survive. Therefore, on May 19, 1987, he announced his new line-up in a cabinet reshuffle which reflected his views. While retaining his close-aides, such as Daim Zainuddin, Anwar Ibrahim and Sanusi Junid, he promoted some UMNO Deputy ministers to become full ministers, two loyal Parliamentary Secretaries to Deputy Minister, and some UMNO MPs to the posts of Parliamentary Secretaries and Deputy Ministers.<sup>101</sup>

*Retaliation and Surprise Attack.*

Teams B's hope that Dr Mahathir would 'forgive' them in peaceful Malay fashion did not materialise. After the cabinet reshuffle, both factions retaliated in their own way at the expense of UMNO. While the Team A was celebrating their victory, Team B leaders were planning a surprise attack that would shock UMNO. On June 25, 1987, 11 dissident party members filed a suit against the UMNO Secretary General Sanusi Junid and seven party divisional secretaries.<sup>102</sup> They alleged that the April 1987 election was invalid because delegates from 30

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<sup>100</sup> Ibid.

<sup>101</sup> His Deputy Minister Dr Yusof Nor of Trengganu, was promoted to full minister in the Prime Minister's Department. Deputy Minister of Finance, Sabaruddin Chik of Pahang, was given the newly created Ministry of Culture and Tourism, Napsiah Omar of Negeri Sembilan, another Deputy Minister was promoted to lead the Ministry of Public Enterprise. Zaleha Ismail of Selangor, former Parliamentary Secretary of the Ministry of Welfare was promoted to Deputy Minister of Transport. Other Parliamentary Secretaries promoted were Tajol Rosli of Perak, to Deputy Minister of National and Rural Development, and Raja Ariffin of Kedah, as Deputy Minister in the Prime Minister Department, who assisted Dr Yusof Nor in supervising the Public Service Department and the Biro Tata Negara. UMNO MP's promoted to Deputy Minister were Dr Siti Zaharah Sulaiman of Pahang and Drs Sulaimen Mohamad of Kuala Lumpur Territory, both worked in the Prime Minister Department, the latter being given special functions concerning the affairs of the Federal Territory, the former in the Women's development. From Johor, Mohamad Rahmat former Minister was reinstated to his position in the Ministry of Information, his colleague Deputy Minister of Works, Mustafa Mohamad, was promoted to the Ministry of Welfare. MP Ghani Othman of Johor, who was also the 'economic expert' of the UMNO Youth wing was appointed Deputy Minister of Energy, Telecommunication and Post. MP Khalid Yunus of Negri Sembilan, former Chairman of MARA was appointed Deputy Minister of Land and Regional Development. Two MPs from Perak and one from Kedah were given the task of Parliamentary Secretaries to the Ministry of Rural Development, Ministry of Culture and Tourism, and the Prime Minister Department respectively. Dr Mahathir also attended to the task of Minister of Justice which had been left vacant since 1986. The Minister of Public Enterprise, Rafidah Aziz, the Head of the UMNO Wanita Movement was also sent to a senior ministry, Trade and Industry. While Najib Tun Razak, the acting Head of Pemuda UMNO who was the Minister of Culture, Youth and Sports, switched into Team A before the H hour but seemed to be downgraded by being retained in the same ministry. However the ministry was compressed into Youth and Sports only, while culture was pulled out to form the Ministry of Culture and Tourism which was led by a Mahathir loyalist from Pahang, Sabaruddin Cik.

<sup>102</sup> Far Eastern Economic Review, February 18, 1987, p.13.

unregistered branches, and illegal members at Women and Youth meetings, had helped select the Divisional delegates to the April 1987 General Assembly.<sup>103</sup>

Team A blamed Team B's leaders for inciting the 11 UMNO branch leaders to file the case in the High Court. While the court proceeded, the Supreme Council set up a special committee to negotiate with the 11 branch leaders since the court gave UMNO six months to settle the case outside of court. The Committee tried to persuade the 11 leaders to withdraw their suit, but the latter claimed that they were extremely upset after being considered and labelled as traitors to the Malays. They, however, were accused of refusing to accept the outcome of the party election that had been carried out democratically.<sup>104</sup> Moreover, the negotiations failed<sup>105</sup> when it was said that the 11 wanted Dr Mahathir to step down.<sup>106</sup> After that, both parties relied on their lawyers to fight out their differences in court, a new battlefield, in a prolonged war between the two factions.<sup>107</sup> However, during the final High Court hearing, the plaintiffs' counsel, Raja Aziz Addruse, made it clear he only wanted the UMNO election declared void, and not the whole party to be deemed illegal.

The period between 1985 and 1987 was the most crucial for Dr Mahathir, being a time of national crisis which jeopardised his political career.. Not only had he had to face a slow-down in the economy and a divided UMNO, especially since the 1987 party election, he also was confronted with conflicts in Barisan Nasional. Moreover, the new leadership of the MCA, GRM and MIC had become more vocal in

<sup>103</sup> Ibid., they alleged that the April election was invalid because delegates from 30 unregistered branches - as well as under age women at the women's wing meeting and overaged men at the youth wing meeting - helped select divisional delegates for the April general assembly

<sup>104</sup> See the Team A's anonymous pamphlet which claimed that in 1984, there were 5,000 unregistered branches. However, at that time, the party's principles, objectives and loyalties had been the guiding principle of the members, and they had not brought this matter to the attention of the courts. See a copy of the pamphlet in Rosli bin Isa, 'UMNO sehingga 24hb April 1987,' appendix 22.

<sup>105</sup> Asiaweek, February 26, 1988.

<sup>106</sup> See Ahmad Mokhtar, 'Siapa Pengkhianat Bangsa Melayu,' (unpublished pamphlet, 1988), p.10 and Rosli Bin Isa, 'UMNO sehingga 24hb April 1987,' pp. 95-96. and see also Ahmad Mokhtar Mohamad, UMNO 1946: Siapa Belot?, (n.p., 1988), pp.7-8.

<sup>107</sup> Ibid.

voicing their resentment toward the Government led by Dr Mahathir. MCA leaders openly opposed government decisions on the administration of Chinese Primary schools, the GRM questioned the implementation of many government policies, while MIC had begun to highlight Indian fears of discrimination. DAP, always critical toward UMNO leaders,<sup>108</sup> continually challenged government policies and practices, on the basis of what they claimed to be human rights, equality, democracy and justice. To a certain extent, the non-Malay political parties, especially MCA and DAP, had begun to challenge the bumiputera status of the Malays.<sup>109</sup> Also PAS was very vocal in its attempt to establish an Islamic state while influencing Malays to reject the so-called 'secular' government led by UMNO. Therefore, this general situation led to racial tensions likened to the pre-May 13, 1969 incident. The situation became even more tense when UMNO Youth organised a mammoth protest rally in Kuala Lumpur, as a reaction to the statement by the MCA leader, Lim Kim Sai, openly questioning the Malays status as Bumiputera. Dr Mahathir, reluctant to declare a state of emergency, which could have suggested a weakness in his leadership and destroyed public confidence, instead used *ISA* (the Internal Security Act) to ease the situation. Dr Mahathir avoided accusations of partisanship by detaining 93 people from all the communities under the *ISA* between the pre-dawn hours of 27 October and 4 November 1987, this operation being known as '*Operasi Lalang*'. Among those arrested were 16 political leaders from Barisan Nasional, 16 DAP, 9 PAS, 1 PSRM, 12 public interest group leaders, 3 Chinese educationists, 5 Christian leaders and 2 Muslim teachers. It is significant that the three of the UMNO Youth leaders who were arrested were actually vital supporters of Team B; they were Ibrahim Ali of Kelantan, Fahmi Ibrahim of Selangor and Tajuddin Rahman of Perak. Najib Tun Razak, the acting Head of UMNO Youth, who organised the rally and was a member

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<sup>108</sup> See Lim Kit Siang, *Prelude To Operation Lalang* (Petaling Jaya: DAP, 1990), *passim*.

<sup>109</sup> See *Far Eastern Economic Review*, November 5, 1987, p.26, Kua Kia Soong, *Malaysian Political Realities* (Petaling Jaya: Orienggroup, 1992), pp.1-10, and also Lee Kok Wah, *The Politics of Chinese Unity in Malaysia* (Singapore: Maruzen Asia 1982), Appendix 2, pp.86-93..

of Team A, was not arrested; neither was Lim Kim Sai, the key figure criticizing the status of Bumiputera at that time. However, the Head of the MCA Youth was also arrested. Dr Mahathir himself ordered the UMNO to cancel their biggest public rally which was scheduled for November 1987. Nevertheless, with these political actions Dr Mahathir regained a grip on political events, and indirectly Malay dominance was also restored.<sup>110</sup>

*The Kris that Turned Against its Master.*

On February 4, 1988, Harun Hashim, the judge who was presiding over the UMNO dispute, declared UMNO an unlawful society. In his seventeen page written judgement, Justice Harun Hashim mentioned:<sup>111</sup>

"In my judgement UMNO was an unlawful society at the material time, persons who took part in the elections in 1987 at Branch, Division and the General Assembly levels committed an offence (section 43 of the Act) and therefore the elections were null and void and the office-bearers elected at all levels were not office-bearers at all. The entire series of elections were a nullity all the way. It follows that the office-bearers elected at the 37th General Assembly in 1984 continue to be the lawful office-bearers of UMNO."

He revealed that it had been a hard decision to make. He described the case as 'keris makan tuan' (the Kris turning against its master) because the amended law [the societies Act] was made in Parliament when UMNO was in the majority. It was Dr Mahathir who had curbed the opposition by proposing this most recent amendment, which demanded that each of an organisation's branches had to register separately with the registrar.<sup>112</sup> With the verdict, the Registrar of Societies sent a letter to the UMNO's Secretary General, Sanusi Junid, asking for any reason to be stated in a letter why the UMNO should not be deregistered. In fact, the letter was a formality, because the Registrar had no other choice but to cancel the party's registration. The party Secretary General replied to the letter, on April 12, and officially the Registrar

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<sup>110</sup> Far Eastern Economic Review, November 12, 1987, p.14.

<sup>111</sup> See Justice Harun Hashim's Judgement in the High Court of Malaya at Kuala Lumpur, Civil Suit No: R8-22-28-1988

<sup>112</sup> Far Eastern Economic Review, February 18, 1988, p.13.

of Societies issued a letter for UMNO's deregistration. This was an historic date in the history of UMNO.

*Salvage and Splinter.*

Team B saw the court's decision as another possible way of toppling Dr Mahathir. To them it seemed that Dr Mahathir had lost power and position when UMNO was declared illegal. Team B supporters and sympathisers flooded the book market with their publications<sup>113</sup> that defended their actions, whilst, at the same time, trying to blame Dr Mahathir and his faction for destroying the party. But Team A still had a strong position for counter-attacking Team B through its mainstream print media, Radio and Televisyen Malaysia (RTM) and TV3. To PAS, and those who disagreed with UMNO, the deregistration was an act of God who had punished UMNO leaders for denying the word of Allah, upholding the secular law (taghut), being stubborn and arrogant, and adopting other negative attitudes which were not congruent with Islamic teaching.<sup>114</sup>

About the same time as all this was happening, the Group of 11 submitted their appeal to the Court. On Monday, 8 February 1988, at no 16, Jalan Tunku Abdul Rahman, Pulau Pinang, Team B's leaders made a new move when they attended a gathering to celebrate the Tunku's 85th anniversary. Among those who attended were Tengku Razaleigh, Zainal Abidin Zin, Ibrahim Ali, Illani Ishak, Rais Yatim, Marina Yusof, Abdul Manan Othman, and Haji Suhaimi Kamaruddin. In his speech the Tunku Abdul Rahman, revealed that Tengku Razaleigh had asked him as 'the Father of Malaysia' to lead an attempt to revive the party and to unite UMNO members, the Malays and the rakyat as a whole.<sup>115</sup> It was believed that Tengku Razaleigh had

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<sup>113</sup> Among the books were Ahmad Mokhtar Mohamad 1988, *UMNO 1946: Siapa Belot?*, Yahya Ismail, *Dilemma Mahathir*, (Kuala Lumpur: Dinamika Kreatif, 1988), Kamarazaman Yacob, *Mahathir Menuju Diktator?*, (Kuala Lumpur: Media Jaya, 1988), and Abd.Rahim Kassim, *Siapa Hancurkan UMNO???*, (Petaling Jaya: AZ Distributor, 1988), and also Kamarazaman Yacob, *Politik Malaysia: Rumusan*, (Kuala Lumpur: Media Jaya, 1988).

<sup>114</sup> See Adnan Iman, 'Mahadar Kutty', pp. x-xi, 37-38 in which they considered UMNO's political culture as against the word of Allah as given in the Quran, surats An-nisa 60 61, Al-maidah verses 38, 42, 50, 62, and 63, Al-An'am 49.

<sup>115</sup> See the text of Tunku's speech in Ahmad Mokhtar Mohamad, *UMNO 1946: Siapa Belot?*, pp.154-157.



orchestrated the meeting which resulted in the formation of an organization called 'UMNO Malaysia'. The pro-tem committee was as follows;<sup>116</sup>

Table IX  
*The Pertubuhan Kebangsaan Melayu Bersatu (UMNO Malaysia) Pro-tem  
Committee 8 February 1988.*

*President:* Tunku Abdul Rahman  
*Deputy President:* Tun Hussein Onn  
*Vice President and Secretary General :* Rais Yatim MP  
*Information Chief:* Zainal Abidin Zin MP  
*Treasurer:* Abdul Manan Othman  
*Committee Members:* Haji Suhaimi Kamarudin MP  
Radzi Sheikh Ahmad MP  
Marina Yusof  
Illani Ishak  
Ibrahim Azmi Hassan MP  
Kamaruddin Awang Teh  
Abdul Kahar Ahmad  
*Permanent Chairman:* Yusof Latif.  
*Deputy Permanent Chairman:* Rahmah Othman MP.

The Tunku, a former Premier and UMNO's President, did not wish to regain power himself but only wanted to initiate the re-registering of UMNO. He called on the Malays to avoid enmity with one another and not to engage in vendettas. Nevertheless, he challenged Dr Mahathir to step down,<sup>117</sup> but on February 12, 1988 the Tunku invited Dr Mahathir and Ghafar Baba, and other UMNO leaders, to join the pro-tem committee in an attempt to revive UMNO. On February 16, Dr Mahathir replied that he had already formed a new party called *Pertubuhan Kebangsaan Melayu Bersatu (Baru)* [the New UMNO].<sup>118</sup>

When UMNO was officially de-registered on 12 February, Dr Mahathir had already spelt out his plan to restore the organization. Thus, he convinced UMNO members through the states' UMNO Liaison Committee to unite behind him. The Menteri Besar representing State UMNOs pledged their loyalty to Mahathir, since

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<sup>116</sup> Utusan Malaysia, February 10, 1988.

<sup>117</sup> Ibid, p.156 and Far Eastern Economic Review, February 18, 1987, p.12.

<sup>118</sup> See the invitation letter sent to Dr Mahathir and Ghafar Baba and Dr Mahathir's reply in Marina Yusoff, *Masa Untuk Perubahan*, (Kuala Lumpur: The Champ, n.d.), pp.47-49.

they knew Dr Mahathir had submitted the registration of a new political party. Dr Mahathir appeared to the public to be moving slowly but in reality he was well prepared. On 9 February, he submitted an application for the registration of a society called 'UMNO 88'. However, the Registrar of Societies made a dramatic decision when the application from both UMNO Malaysia and UMNO 88 were rejected. She gave the reason that UMNO had still not been deregistered. Thus, using the same name -UMNO, -was not approved since UMNO as an organization was still in existence.<sup>119</sup>

When Team B highlighted the uncertainty of Dr Mahathir's position as Prime Minister without a party, Mahathir quickly made a distinction between the government and the party, assuring the nation that the government would continue to run the country.<sup>120</sup> His position was clear as member of the Barisan Nasional. On 12 February, Musa Hitam also insisted that UMNO members support the current leadership. To him, the party's survival was more important than the survival of an individual. To a certain extent, the Yang Di Pertuan Agong (the King), Sultan Iskandar of Johor, also expressed his support and urged the people to offer their backing to the Prime Minister he had chosen.<sup>121</sup> On February 14, Dr Mahathir attended a meeting at the Parliament building of 600 members of Parliament and the State Assembly to pledge loyalty to himself.<sup>122</sup>

<sup>119</sup> See *Warta Kerajaan Persekutuan* (The Federal Government Gazette), 11 February 1988, p.1038, UMNO Malaysia Bil.P.P.M/WP.2/4/88 dated 10 February 1988; UMNO (88) Bil.P.P.M/WP 2/5/88 dated 10 February 1988. According to one source, the Registrar of Societies, Zakiah Hashim, was 'hijacked' by certain UMNO members to stop her from meeting Team B leaders who tried to get clarification on the registration of UMNO Malaysia, and gain more time for UMNO to submit a fresh application to revive the old UMNO under a new name Pertubuhan Kebangsaan Melayu Bersatu Baru (UMNO).

<sup>120</sup> *Far Eastern Economic Review*, February 18, 1988, p.13..

<sup>121</sup> *Utusan Malaysia*, February 15, 1988.

<sup>122</sup> Only three Malay MPs did not attend, Tengku Razaleigh, Shahrir Abdul Samad, and Zakaria Abdul Rahman. Tengku Razaleigh claimed that he had encouraged his Team B MP's to attend the meeting. To Mahathir's opponents their attendance was important for the sake of Malay Unity; and to Mahathir himself the pledge of support made him more confident. see *Far Eastern Economic Review*, February 25, 1988, p.12, and Ahmad Atory Hussein, 'Kepemimpinan UMNO Antara Tradisi dan Demokrasi: satu Analisis,' (unpublished manuscript), p.324-326.

On 15 February, Tengku Razaleigh, who had not attended the meeting at Parliament, urged the Prime Minister, who was also the Minister of Home Affairs, to consider amending the Societies Act in order to restore UMNO and its members' inherent rights.<sup>123</sup> Tengku Razaleigh presumably knew that Dr Mahathir preferred to form a new party in which he could exclude those who were disloyal to him, among whom Tengku Razaleigh and his faction would be included.

Dr Mahathir submitted an application to register a new party on 13 February, as soon as UMNO was formally deregistered.<sup>124</sup> This move to reregister UMNO was done secretly. The mass media were only informed when the new UMNO was officially registered. The new party was known as *Pertubuhan Kebangsaan Melayu Bersatu (Baru)*, its English translation being the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO). However, the press called it UMNO Baru or New UMNO. Dr Mahathir, Ghafar Baba, Daim Zainuddin and Mohamad Rahmat were the important personalities among the pro-tem committee, and the formation of the new UMNO was formally announced by Dr Mahathir on 16 February. He wanted the new party to be clearly identified with the old one. This new party was officially accepted as the 13th component member of the Barisan Nasional. Dr Mahathir again gained the right to lead Barisan Nasional and his Deputy, Ghafar Baba remained Barisan Nasional's Secretary General.

At that time, Tengku Razaleigh was in a dilemma, as Musa Hitam and Abdullah Badawi had publicly called on UMNO members to support UMNO Baru. The line-up of the UMNO Baru pro-tem Supreme Council members was only known when the council held its first meeting on the 21 February at Sri Perdana. Almost all of them were from Team A members who had been elected on 24 April 1987, except

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<sup>123</sup> *Far Eastern Economic Review*, February 25, 1988, p.13.

<sup>124</sup> *Utusan Malaysia*, February 15, 1988.

for a few 'new faces'. Abdullah Badawi<sup>125</sup> was the only former Team B member who was accepted by Dr Mahathir. The line up was as follows:

Table X

*UMNO Baru Protem Supreme Council Members on February 21, 1988.*

**President:** Dr Mahathir Mohamad.(Prime Minister)

**Deputy President:** Ghafar Baba (Deputy Prime Minister)

**Secretary General:** Mohamad Rahmat.(Minister of Information)

**Treasurer:** Daim Zainuddin (Minister of Finance).

**Members:**

*A..All Menteri Besars [ Chief Ministers]:*

- 1.Dr Hamid Pawanteh (Perlis)
- 2.Osman Aroff (Kedah)
- 3.Ramli Ngah Talib (Perak)
- 4.Mohamad Haji Taib (Selangor)
- 5.Isa Abd Samad (Negri Sembilan).
- 6.Haji Muhyiddin Yassin (Johor)
- 7.Khalil Yaacob (Pahang)
- 8.Wan Mokhtar Ahmad (Trengganu).
- 9.Mohammad Yaacob (kelantan).
- 10.Rahim Tamby Chik (Melaka).

*B. Those elected in the 24 April 1987:*

- 1.Abdullah Ahmad Badawi (former Vice President)
- 2.Sanusi Junid (Minister of Agriculture and former Secretary General)
- 3.Anwar Ibrahim ( Minister of Education and former Vice President)
- 4.Tengku Ahmad Rithauddeen (Minister of Defence).
- 5.Dr Yusof Nor (Minister at the Prime Minister's Department)
- 6.Sabaruddin Cik (Minister of Culture and Tourism).
- 7.Napsiah Omar (Minister of Public Enterprise)
- 8.Tajol Rosli Ghazali (Deputy Minister of Rural

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<sup>125</sup> Luckily for Abdullah Badawi he was at a gathering with Team A friends when the news that UMNO had been declared illegal reached them. UMNO leaders including Abdullah Badawi who attended the gathering then went to Dr Mahathir's Residence. An observer saw how Dr Mahathir treated Abdullah Badawi. Being a loner from the former Team B, Abdullah felt excluded, but he was not an alien among the UMNO circles since he was the party Vice President. Abdullah Badawi asked Dr Mahathir about his position after UMNO had 'died'. Dr Mahathir replied, in short, 'tengoklah macam mana' (let's see first). Most of those who attended the meeting at the Residence then became the pro-tem committee of UMNO Baru. Abdullah Badawi felt belittled when certain UMNO leaders did not give him the same respect due to an ex-Vice President as given to Anwar Ibrahim and Wan Mokhtar. In the first meeting of the pro-tem committee, the seating arrangements were changed, Abdullah Badawi was not seated in the same line with other former Vice Presidents. Instead he was put at the end of the Supreme Council members' table. However, he was repositioned when Dr Mahathir named him as one of the Vice Presidents in the Pro-tem committee.

Development).

9..Megat Junid Ayob (Deputy Minister of Home Affairs).

10.Khalid Yunus (Deputy Minister of Land and Regional Development).

11.Wan Abu Bakar (Deputy Minister of Finance).

12.Dr Siti Zahrah Sulaiman (Deputy Minister at the Prime Minister's Department).

*C.Others:*

1.Khalid Abdullah (Executive Chairman of Utusan Groups and Head of Alor Star UMNO Division).

2.Shamsuri Salleh (Former MP and Deputy Chairman Penang UMNO liasion committee).

3.Mohd Nor Mohd Dom ( Johor State Assemblyman).

4.Ahmad Shahbuddin ( Kelantan State EXCO and Secretary of Kelantan State UMNO Liasion Committee).

5.Hussein Ahmad (Former UMNO Information Chief and Head of Rantau Panjang UMNO Division).

6.Najib Tun Razak ( former acting Head of Youth and Minister of Youth and Sports).

7.Rafidah Aziz (former Head of Wanita and Minister of Trade and Industry).

The national press then played a key role in propagating UMNO Baru. *Berita Harian*<sup>126</sup> and *Utusan Malaysia* portrayed the party as a continuation of the old UMNO and also the best solution to the problem after the old UMNO had been declared illegal.

However, UMNO Baru faced legal pressures from Team B which continued its assault on Mahathir, the latter having expressed his intention "to remain at the helm for a long time, beyond the next general election,"<sup>127</sup> First, Tengku Razaleigh financed the cost of the appeal of the 11 plaintiffs.<sup>128</sup> Next, Tunku Abdul Rahman, Hussein Onn and Abdul Manan Othman, who were the pro-tem committee of UMNO Malaysia, filed suits and asked the High Court to issue a court order to prevent UMNO Baru from distributing membership forms. Finally, Rais Yatim filed an appeal to the Supreme Court challenging the Registrar of Societies who had rejected the application of UMNO Malaysia, and requesting that the registration of UMNO

<sup>126</sup> See the editorial of *Berita Harian*, February 17, 1988.

<sup>127</sup> *Far Eastern Economic Review*, March 3, 1988, p.15.

<sup>128</sup> *Ibid.*, the 'gang of 11' or the plaintiffs only paid m\$1 (39 US cents) each in legal fees. The rest came from subsidies given by Tengku Razaleigh. He had wide support in the Kelantan Malay community, and with the wealth generated by his family group of companies and real estate, he was able to offer patronage to his supporters.

Baru be cancelled. The Court was used as a battleground by Tengku Razaleigh's group to confine UMNO Baru's activities, and indeed, if they failed to prevent UMNO's membership drive, then they would follow another plan of seeking an injunction preventing UMNO Baru from taking over the old UMNO's extensive business empire.<sup>129</sup>

However, UMNO Baru spread instantly through the old UMNO branch, division and state levels. All Menteri Besar and Chief Minister were appointed as chairmen of UMNO State Liaison Committees respectively, while Ghafar Baba led the Federal Territory UMNO and Anwar Ibrahim took over the Pulau Pinang UMNO Liaison Committee. To revitalise the UMNO Youth and Wanita wings, Dr Mahathir announced the appointment of Najib Tun Razak and Rafidah Aziz as the Heads of the respective party wings.

UMNO Baru then began their assault to capture former UMNO members while recruiting new membership at all party levels, Team B being identified as '*Kumpulan Serpihan*' or the splinter group. UMNO Baru's Secretary General, Mohammad Rahmat, initiated a series of public rallies known as *SEMARAK* -an acronym of *Setia Bersama Rakyat* or 'Loyalty with the people', in order to convince the Malays to support UMNO Baru's leadership.

The first SEMARAK was held in Lubuk Jong in Kelantan on March 6, 1988 where Mahathir was given a pledge of support and loyalty by the Kelantan Menteri Besar on behalf of the Kelantan people, asserting that the rakyat were with UMNO Baru. SEMARAK was then extended to other states where Dr Mahathir had further opportunities to clarify issues raised by his political opponents, while asking the Malays to join UMNO Baru. SEMARAK, an historical event for UMNO Baru, ended with the celebration of the UMNO anniversary in May 11, 1989.<sup>130</sup>

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<sup>129</sup> *Far Eastern Economic Review*, March 10, 1988, p.19. Megat Junid Ayob, Deputy Minister of Home Affairs tabled amendments to the Societies Act "which could allow the smooth transfer of assets from the old party to the newly reconstituted UMNO Baru. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, March 24, 1988, p.12

<sup>130</sup> See *UMNO: Untuk Menjamin Masa Depan Kita Semenjak 11hb Mei 1946*, (a souvenir programme). A central Committee for the UMNO Anniversary Celebration was formed led by Ghafar Baba (Deputy President). The celebration

*Waterlilies and Malay Unity.*

By June 11, 1988, the 'splinter' group was forming *the Jawatankuasa Penyelaras Pemulihan UMNO 1946* (the 1946 UMNO Revival Coordination Committee) which was based on the judgment of Justice Harun Hashim that 'the office bearers elected at the 37th General Assembly in 1984 would continue to be the lawful office bearers of UMNO'<sup>131</sup> The group questioned the integrity of the Registrar of Societies in rejecting the registration of UMNO Malaysia.<sup>132</sup> The meeting marked the forming of a new party that aimed to inherit the spirit of old UMNO -the 1946 UMNO, which later became known as Parti Semangat 46 or the Spirit of 46 Party.<sup>133</sup>

At the same time, UMNO Baru was holding its Extra-ordinary General Assembly meeting on 28 October 1988 to endorse its Constitution. Hence, UMNO was already divided into two: UMNO Baru formed by Team A, and the other new organization initiated by Team B. Both claimed to be inheritors of the original UMNO which was formed in 1946.

It could be concluded that Malay unity was now only a political myth that was used to legitimise continuing Malay power and status. UMNO culture had changed

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began in Sultan Sulaiman Kelab Kampung Bharu, Kuala Lumpur on April 27, to commemorate the National Malay Congress in which the idea of UMNO was first put forward and proposed. The climax of the celebration was in Johor Bahru where the old UMNO was officially formed at the Istana Besar. The Sultan of Johor attended the ceremony to symbolise the monarchy's support for New UMNO and the Malays.

<sup>131</sup> Cited from a speech of Ibrahim Ali MP 'Era Perpaduan bangsa Melayu', dated 11 June 1988.

<sup>132</sup> This letter was published in jawi script and was distributed in rural areas with the title 'Surat Terbuka kepada rakyat: UMNO Baru menuju ke arah pemerintahan Republik' (An Open letter to the people: UMNO Baru moving towards republican rule), n.d. They expressed their suspicions based on the process of registration of UMNO Baru as follows:

4 February 1988; UMNO was declared an illegal society.

8 February; Tunku Abd Rahman submitted an application to register UMNO Malaysia.

8 February; Show cause letter sent to the Secretary General UMNO.

10 February; The Registrar rejected the registration of UMNO Malaysia and UMNO 88.

12 February UMNO was deregistered.

13 February, Application to form UMNO Baru was submitted.

14 February, UMNO Baru was registered.

15 February, Deregistration of UMNO and registration of UMNO Baru was gazetted.

<sup>133</sup> The pro-tem committee consisted of: *President*: Tengku Razaleigh (MP Gua Musang); *Secretary General*: Rais Yatim (MP Jelebu); *Head of Pemuda*: Haji Suhaimi Kamaruddin (MP Sepang); and *Head of Wanita*: Rahmah Osman (MP Shah Alam). Chamil Wariya, *UMNO (Baru): Kelahiran dan Perkembangan Awalnya*, (Kuala Lumpur: K Publishing, 1988), p.147. According to Ahmad Atory Hussein in his field report 'The split in UMNO politics' (unpublished manuscript, 1989), p.36. The pro tem committee consisted of Tengku Razaleigh (President), Rais Yatim (Deputy), Zainal Abidin Zin MP (Secretary General), and Abdul Manan Othman (Treasurer).

explicitly since the election of 1981, and this continued in 1984. Slander and jealousy, wealth and power, and the loss of party spirit to self interest, had created factions and fractions in the old UMNO. The belief that open contests in UMNO would cause disunity among members had proven true.<sup>134</sup> The Malay proverb of 'Bidok lalu kiambang bertaut' (like waterlilies closing together after the passing of a boat) proved inappropriate. The rivalries of Dr Mahathir, Musa Hitam, and Tengku Razaleigh now shaped Malay politics. Dr Mahathir had broken tradition by allowing UMNO delegates to choose a Deputy President before appointing a Deputy Prime Minister in 1981. However, the great irony was that Dr Mahathir had originally wanted Musa Hitam to be chosen. The system of cliques, regional sentiment and greed for power had become obvious since the 1981 party election. It was Dr Mahathir who had orchestrated political manoeuvres in the name of democracy in the party. After being defeated in the 1981 party election, Tengku Razaleigh made another attempt to challenge Musa Hitam for the second time in 1984, and factions in UMNO were clearly identified by then, Dr Mahathir being seen by other UMNO leaders as autocratic. When the latter was surrounded by his close associates, a feeling of dissatisfaction developed in the party and Cabinet. Musa Hitam, who felt insecure as long as Tengku Razaleigh was still in the party and government, threatened to resign one year before he quitted in 1986. When Musa Hitam joined forces with Tengku Razaleigh in 1987, Dr Mahathir himself felt that his position was being questioned by UMNO leaders. However, Dr Mahathir developed his own strategy and tactics by using Ghafar Baba to protect his forward defence. The 1987 internal election became a 'crisis' that caused UMNO to be destroyed legally. Nevertheless, both factions made attempts to salvage the party. These circumstances brought both factions to another round of political crusading for power.

The battle ground in UMNO's political warfare moved from the 'Putra World Centre' to the Courts and Parliament. The political crisis in UMNO, indeed,

<sup>134</sup> Musa Hitam said that such a belief was false, *New Straits Times*, March 16, 1987.



paralleled the conflict among ruling elites in Malay feudal times. Thus, history seemed to repeat itself.

Dr Mahathir shrewdly removed Team B's faction from the party, when he formed UMNO Baru. The new party had used the original name and constitution with a few significant amendments. Team B took along with them the whole content of the old UMNO constitution and the 'spirit' of the party, but not the UMNO emblem when they formed Semangat 46 (The Spirit of 46 party). Semangat 46 then challenged UMNO Baru in a General Election contributing to change further the face of Malaysian politics.

## Chapter Seven.

### *The General Election in 1990: Malay Political Warfare.*

The consequence of the UMNO crisis can be better understood through an examination of the result of the 1990 election, as it illustrates the strength of the competing factions. In accordance with this, chapter VII examines the formation of Semangat 46, UMNO's main rival in the 1990's, their main political differences, the reaction of UMNO towards Semangat 46, and the result of the General Election of 1990.

For the Malays, 1990 was a very significant year in their modern political history. After UMNO had divided into two main factions, both groups tried to woo the Malays into supporting their respective parties as the sole organisation representing the Malays. Both factions also claimed that their respective parties represented either a continuation or revival of the old UMNO. The crisis in UMNO had developed into a full scale political war in which the courts were used as a battleground. The conflict had also extended into by-elections. The 1990 General Election represented the climax of the UMNO crisis, and it was not only unconventional in terms of the tactics and strategy used, but it was also unprecedented in Malaysia's political development.

#### *The Formation of Semangat 46.*

The Semangat 46 party was formed by a splinter group in UMNO, initially known as Team B.<sup>1</sup> They then described themselves as the 'Spirit of 1946' UMNO group. Their exclusion from joining UMNO Baru led ten members of this group to file an application to form a new party called 'UMNO 46' on 30 September 1988.<sup>2</sup> The pro-tem chairman included Osman Akhir, a driver, while Abdul Wahab Abdul Razak, the 4B Youth Movement Executive Secretary, was one of the committee

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<sup>1</sup>.See Chapter VI.

<sup>2</sup> Far Eastern Economic Review, October 13, 1988, p.14.

members. Until May 1989, Team B's top leaders always denied their involvement in forming a new political party.<sup>3</sup> However, in early May 1989, the press uncovered the moves which had been taken to register the new political party called *Semangat 46*. Initially, its registration was rejected by the Registrar of Societies because the party's symbol was similar to that of UMNO Baru's,<sup>4</sup> but it was later approved officially on 5th May, 1989.<sup>5</sup> At the same time, the Secretary of the Election Commission confirmed that the Commission had also received the registration of Semangat 46's election symbol.

While denying their involvement in the formation of the new party, some of the Team B leaders had gratefully welcomed the new party which adopted the old UMNO's constitution in its entirety. It was hoped that the new party would act as a launching pad in an attempt to revive the 'original' UMNO.<sup>6</sup> It was Ibrahim Ali who first indicated that his group was willing to lead Semangat 46, if the party could be used as a starting point for reviving the old UMNO.<sup>7</sup> Between May and October 1989, UMNO 46 leaders spent months organising membership drives in order to consolidate their political strength among the Malay masses.

On October 11, Semangat 46 held its first General Assembly at Kuala Lumpur's Federal Hotel. The main item on the agenda was the election of the party's Supreme Council. The meeting was officially opened by Tunku Abdul Rahman, the party's adviser.<sup>8</sup> A strong delegation of 475 members of Semangat 46, from 130

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<sup>3</sup> *Star*, June 5, 1989. It was believed that the move to register Semangat 46 was initiated by lawyers who were also B team leaders, including Haji Suhaimi Kamaruddin. This was proved by the involvement of Abdul Razak Abdul Wahab who was the secretary of the 4B Youth, in which Haji Suhaimi was the President. Haji Suhaimi was later appointed Secretary General of Semangat 46.

<sup>4</sup> *Berita Harian*, May 1, 1989.

<sup>5</sup> *Utusan Malaysia*, June 4, 1989. The certificate serial number was 4512/89, and the registered party address was No.2 Jalan 10E, Lembah Jaya Selatan, 68000, Ampang, Selangor.

<sup>6</sup> See the statement from Ibrahim Ali who became the Semangat 46 Youth leader, in *Utusan Malaysia*, June 7, 1989.

<sup>7</sup> *Utusan Malaysia*, June 7, 1989.

<sup>8</sup> Among the special guests were DAP Secretary General, Lim Kit Siang, his Deputy, Lee Lam Thye, DAP Vice President Ahmad Nor, PAS President Fadhil Nor, PAS Information Chief Subky Latiff, and others included leaders of the Parti Rakyat Malaya, the Malaysian Chinese Solidarity Party, HAMIM, Berjasa, and representatives of foreign envoys. *Utusan Malaysia*, October 13, 1989.

Divisions throughout the Malay Peninsula, attended the meeting and voted in the party election.

In the election, two top posts, the President and the Deputy President, were uncontested. As a result, Tengku Razaleigh was elected unopposed as President, and Rais Yatim as Deputy President, after Harun Idris withdrew his candidacy. The list of the elected party officials is shown in Table XI.

The formation of Semangat 46 marked a new era in the history of Malay politics. With its own legal entity, it could therefore compete with UMNO Baru by offering itself as an alternative party for the Malays. Haji Suhaimi, the Secretary General claimed that their struggle resembled the struggle of the Prophet Muhammad in upholding Islam and justice against *kemungkaran* (deviation). He likened the conflict between UMNO and Semangat 46 to that between the prophet Muhammad and Abu Sufyan, who were from the same Quraisy group. To him, Semangat 46 had to migrate (*berhijrah*) and befriend the PAS, Berjasa and HAMIM which were considered as a group of *Muhajirin*. He also drew parallels between the Tambatan by-election and the battle of *Uhud*,<sup>9</sup> and compared the by-election in Telok Pasu to the battle of *Badr*.<sup>10</sup> The coming General Election was considered a great battle, which was likened to the historic capturing of the city of Mecca;<sup>11</sup> at the time, he declared "we are confident that the 'city of Mecca' will be captured"<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> See page 280. The battle of Uhud took place on March 23, 625 A.D. Neglect of the Prophet's orders changed the victory into defeat and it was a very hard time for the Muslims. They were out flanked by the enemy, and many were killed. The Prophet was surrounded by the enemy, who spread rumours that he had died. Most of the sahabahs (companions) lost their sanity on hearing this, the main cause of their confusion. The battle was also a spiritual defeat. See W.Montgomery Watt, *Muhammad: Prophet and Statesman* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 135-148; Maulana Muhammad Ali, *Muhammad The Prophet* (Lahore: Ahmadiyya Anjuman, 1933), pp.130-141; and William Muir, *The Life of Mohammad: From the Original Sources* (Edinburgh: John Grant, 1923), pp. 253-274.)

<sup>10</sup> See page 289. In the Battle of Badr (March 15, 625 A.D.) the Muslim army, being smaller in number, defeated the Quraish army which was three time its size. This is seen by Muslims as the most striking example in the annals of warfare of spiritual forces overcoming earthly power. (See M.M.Ali 1933, *Muhammad*, pp. 118-129; M.W.Watt 1961, *Muhammad*, pp.119-126; and W.Muir 1923, *The Life of Mohammad*, pp.214-237.)

<sup>11</sup> See page 301-327. Mecca was captured by the Muslim army in January 638 A.D.or in Ramadhan A.H.8. The Prophet Mohammad led the Muslim army into the city and entered the Ka'aba destroying 360 idols. W.Muir 1923, *The Life of Mohammad*, pp.400-413, M.W.Watt 1961, *Muhammad*, pp.281-211, and M.M.Ali 1933, *Muhammad*, pp. 190-199.

<sup>12</sup> *Utusan Malaysia*, October 13, 1989.

Table XI

*The Results of the Election of the first Semangat 46's Supreme Council Members*

<i>Permanent Chairman</i>	number of votes.
Haji Ibrahim Ahmad	363
<i>Deputy Permanent Chairman</i>	
Abu Bakar Shaari	313
<i>President</i>	
Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah(Kelantan)	unopposed
<i>Deputy President</i>	
Rais Yatim (Negri Sembilan)	unopposed
<i>Vice-Presidents.</i>	
Haji Ibrahim Azmi Hassan (Trengganu)	349
Hajjah Marina Yusof (Kuala Lumpur FT)	278
Abdul Malik Ahmad (Perak)	236
<i>Members of the Supreme Council</i>	
Jaafar Onn (Johor)	415
Zainol Abidin Johari (Kedah)	407
Ahmad Nordin (Melaka)	395
Radzi Sheik Ahmad (Perlis)	383
Zakaria Abdul Rahman (Trengganu)	382
Tengku Sri Paduka Raja (Trengganu)	374
Rozali Isohak (Kelantan)	371
Haji Sulaiman Palastine (P.Pinang)	357
Saidin Mat Piah (Perak)	354
Hajjah Ilani Isahak (Kelantan)	329
Haji Suhaimi Kamaruddin (Selangor)	325
Sanad Said (selangor)	324
Osman Saad (johor)	282
Ahmad Mokhtar Mohamad (Pahang)	262
Rahmah Osman (Selangor)	260
Syed Nahar Shahbudin (Kedah)	259
Manan Osman (Trengganu)	256
Haji Kahar Ahmad (Johor)	250
Yusuf Latif (P.Pinang)	238
Khalid Nasir (Perak)	217

Source: Utusan Malaysia, Oct.13, 1989.

*Test of Strength:* battle procedure.

The Semangat 46 leaders posed a strong challenge to UMNO Baru's leadership. They challenged the legitimacy of UMNO Baru and repeatedly tried to undermine its leadership by condemning the UMNO Baru leaders, Dr Mahathir in particular. The principle aim of Semangat 46 was to topple the UMNO Baru government. In doing so, they hoped it would transform itself into the role of bearer of the spirit of the original UMNO while at the same time retaining the support of the people. Even before they had a legal party, leaders of Semangat 46 had planned to weaken UMNO: firstly, by crossing-over to the opposition benches as Independent Members of Parliament; secondly, through opposing UMNO Baru or Barisan Nasional in by-elections; and thirdly, by cooperating with other opposition parties in order to thwart UMNO Baru's expanding influence.

*Independent MPs:* a liberated force.

In an attempt to incapacitate UMNO Baru, between June and October 1988, Team B leaders in the House of Representatives declared that they were members of the old UMNO,<sup>13</sup> to which they had been elected in the General Election of 1986. Since the party was now defunct, they, therefore, declared themselves to be Independent Members of Parliament. Then, they began to play a role in opposition. Among these were Tengku Razaleigh (MP for Gua Musang), Rais Yatim (Jejebu), Ibrahim Azmi Hassan (Kuala Nerus), Zakaria Abdul Rahman (Besut), Ibrahim Ali (Pasir Mas), Rahmah Osman (Shah Alam), Kamaruzaman Ahmad (Tanjung Karang), Zainal Abidin Zin (Bagan Serai), Radzi Sheikh Ahmad (Kangar), Zainol Abidin Johari (Sik), and Mohamad Haji Ali (Nilam Puri). They were followed by Musa Hitam<sup>14</sup> (Mersing), Abdul Ajib Ahmad (Kota Tinggi), Shahril Abdul Samad (Johor

<sup>13</sup> In fact, on September 19, Dr Mahathir had said that without being member of UMNO Baru, his rivals could not be members of the ruling Barisan Nasional. The independents members were seated in the opposition benches from October 10. According to the plan seven former UMNO assemblymen from the state legislature of Negeri Sembilan, Selangor and Perak also declared themselves as independent. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, September 29, 1988, p 18

<sup>14</sup> He declared himself an independent member of Parliament on October 2, 1988. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, October 13, 1988, p.14.

Bahru),<sup>15</sup> and Tawfik Ismail (Sungai Benut).<sup>16</sup> All of these Independent Members of Parliament remained united until January 1989. This group criticized UMNO Baru's constitution which they believed differed from that of the old UMNO, because it contained so-called 'undemocratic elements'.<sup>17</sup>

***By-elections: testing combat power.***

Before the 1990 General Election, Malay leaders of Team A and Team B relentlessly sought the support of members of the old UMNO. The first test of intra-UMNO conflict was the by-election for the Tanjung Puteri Johor State Assembly seat on March 5, 1988.<sup>18</sup> The crisis in UMNO had some impact on the election result. Although the UMNO candidate retained the Tanjung Puteri seat, the margin of victory was drastically reduced to 31 votes from the previous 506 votes majority obtained in 1986.

Shahril Samad, the party Election Director and Head of Johor Bahru UMNO Division, was blamed, because he had been very critical of Dr Mahathir and Mohamad Rahmat, the party President and Secretary General respectively. Consequently, his loyalty was questioned, and he was subsequently dismissed from office and the UMNO Baru membership list. In late June 1988 Shahril reacted by announcing he was leaving UMNO Baru, subsequently declaring himself to be an Independent MP.<sup>19</sup> In fact, on June 2, his political mentor, Musa Hitam, also resigned from chairmanship of the pro-tem committee of UMNO Baru Segamat

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<sup>15</sup> See page 282-285 on the Johor Bahru Parliamentary by-election on August 25, 1988 and how Shahril Samad became an independent MP.

<sup>16</sup> The last four MPs, who were from Johor did not join Semangat 46 in May 1989. Instead they sought to register themselves as UMNO Baru members. Until their membership was officially accepted, they continuously supported the struggle of Semangat 46 which sought to discredit the UMNO Baru leadership and its closed-door policy.

<sup>17</sup> There are two particular features in UMNO Baru's 1988 constitution which have been considered as undemocratic. Firstly, section 7.3. where candidates for the posts of President and Deputy President are given 10 bonus votes for every nomination they win at Divisional meetings, this bonus then being incorporated into the total number of votes in the party election. Secondly, provision 7.8.1.2. in the constitution gives the President power to *appoint* Ketua Pemuda and Ketua Wanita unlike the previous constitution which provided a clause for the *election* of the two Ketua.

<sup>18</sup> This by-election was held after the High Court declared the 1986 election void following a petition by the candidate from the Parti Sosialis Rakyat Malaysia, Abdul Razak Ahmad, who lost to UMNO candidate Mohamad Yunus Sulaiman by a majority of 506 votes.

<sup>19</sup> Gordon P. Means 1991, *Malaysian Politics*, p.244.

Division, and stayed out of UMNO Baru. When the mass media disputed the legitimacy of Independent MPs,<sup>20</sup> Shahril Samad responded by resigning from his post as MP of Johor Baru, thus forcing a by-election. The by-election was an attempt to deny the legitimacy of UMNO Baru and the leadership of Mahathir, and also to keep alive the struggle to revive the old UMNO.<sup>21</sup>

The by-elections of Johor Bahru and Ampang Jaya Parliamentary constituencies, and three other state constituencies, Parit Raja, Tambatan and Kijal were to become testing grounds for both factions as they sought to legitimise themselves as the sole representative of the Malays.

#### *The Johor Bahru Campaign :*

Johor Bahru became a political battlefield. Victory was crucial as it might boost the morale of either side. Furthermore, it was the first direct confrontation between Team A and Team B. However, Shahril Samad, who contested as an Independent candidate, managed to attract wide support from Team B's followers as well as other opposition parties, such as PAS and DAP. After the nomination day on August 11, Tunku Abdul Rahman campaigned for Shahril. Team B intensively attacked Dr Mahathir's style of leadership. The case of Lord President Tun Salleh Abbas's<sup>22</sup> suspension from service was another issue widely exploited to undermine Dr Mahathir. The Johor Bahru constituency comprised an electorate of 60,292 voters which closely represented the overall racial distribution -48.4 per cent Malays, 40.1 percent Chinese, 8.5 per cent Indians, and 3 per cent others.

Up until polling day on August 25, both groups used special political ammunition in attacking each other. Shahril used his 'three keys' election symbols (which symbolically meant racial unity) to woo support from the voters. Old UMNO

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<sup>20</sup> The editorial of *Utusan Malaysia*, May 23, 1988.

<sup>21</sup> See the article by Hari Singh and Suresh Narayanan, 'Changing dimensions in Malaysian politics,' *Asian Survey*, 29 (5), May 1989, pp.514-529.

<sup>22</sup> See Chapter VI on the conflict between Dr Mahathir and the Judges.



flags and posters of former Prime Ministers were used. His campaign was fought on issues appealing to the voters' emotions and sense of nostalgia.

Musa Hitam also introduced new campaign tactics, including video tape messages criticising Dr Mahathir's dictatorial style. They even twisted the meaning of UMNO to '*Under Mahathir No Opposition.*' It was seen as a choice between dictatorship and democracy. Corruption, abuse of power and certainly Mahathir's leadership style were among the main points of focus in Team B's door-to-door campaign. In its defence, UMNO Baru announced a strategy to attract the support of the Chinese and other voters. Barisan Nasional promised a M\$300 million grant to fund the expansion of the Johor Baru-Singapore causeway; gave in to Chinese educationalists' demands for permission to set-up Chinese-medium junior colleges, and pledged M\$35 million in funds for public amenities.<sup>23</sup>

However, Barisan Nasional, led by UMNO Baru, was demoralised, and not only by poor public support. Their campaign workers insisted that Dr Mahathir should not join the campaign as it could worsen the already unfavourable situation.<sup>24</sup> Dr Mahathir refused this advice, and, subsequently, reaffirmed his intention to continue using his original style and plans.<sup>25</sup>

Finally, Shahril Samad won the election with a landslide victory. From a total number of votes of 36,809, Shahril Samad polled 23,581, Mas'ud Abdul Rahman of UMNO Baru secured 10,968 votes, and Abdul Razak of PSRM lost his deposit when he only polled 2,260. In the 1986 General election, Shahril who then contested it on the old UMNO ticket had secured 19,349 votes while Abdul Razak polled 17,114 votes.

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<sup>23</sup> Stephen Chee, 'Malaysia in 1988: A Fractured Polity', *Southeast Asian Affairs 1989*, (Singapore: ISEAS, 1989), p.215.

<sup>24</sup> See the short article by Ahmad Shabery Check, 'Johor Bahru bukan pengukur sokongan Melayu pada UMNO', *Utusan Malaysia*, August 30, 1988. Dr Mahathir was not featured on any of the election posters. UMNO only used Barisan Nasional posters. There were some who considered that the fact that Dr Mahathir delivered a televised speech in person to a gathering at the Menteri Besar's residence on August 22, 1988 was a blunder in the Barisan Nasional election strategy.

<sup>25</sup> *Star*, August 23, 1988.

The by-election had proved the popularity of Shahril and the prejudice of the voters against Mahathir's style. It was also a blow to Barisan Nasional. Barisan Nasional leaders who had formerly insisted Team B MPs and State Assemblymen should resign because they were elected on UMNO's ticket, changed their stance, as they anticipated additional by-elections forced by other members of that group. As a result, they began to condemn such by-elections as a waste of public funds.<sup>26</sup>

Dr Mahathir commented that the failure of UMNO Baru in Johor Bahru was proof that he was not a dictator, and he asserted that the members of the opposition party were liars, trying to cheat the electorate for their own selfish interests.<sup>27</sup>

#### *The Battle of Parit Raja*

Nevertheless UMNO Baru faced another by-election prompted by the death of Syed Zain Sahab, the Johor State Assemblyman for Parit Raja. This time, Mohamad Rahmat, the Secretary General of UMNO Baru and Mustafa Mohamad the Head of Sri Gading UMNO Baru Division were commanding the UMNO Baru forces. Mohamad Yassin Kamari, a local candidate and former Political Secretary to Dr Mahathir at the Ministry of Justice, was named as the UMNO Baru candidate, while the UMNO 46 group chose Hamdan Yahya, a businessman and former Youth Head of the Sri Gading's old UMNO Division, as the Independent candidate.

The Parit Raja by-election was an actual intra-Malay contest as the voters were 80 percent Malays of Javanese origin. The UMNO Baru campaign played on Javanese sentiment. They formed PAJAR (Persatuan Anak Jawa Johor) or The Javanese Association of Johor<sup>28</sup> to enhance the Javanese voters' support. The independent candidate was supported by the UMNO 46 group who were still exploiting the question of Dr Mahathir's leadership as the main issue. Two former

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<sup>26</sup> *Star*, May 25, and September 17, 1988.

<sup>27</sup> *New Straits Times*, August 29, 1988.

<sup>28</sup> See *Watan*, June 5, 1990, a letter from a reader. Also the comment of Sharil Samad on PAJAR in *Watan*, August 11, 1990.

Prime Ministers, Tunku Abdul Rahman and Hussein Onn, also supported the independent candidate, Hamdan Yahaya.

Polling day was on October 20, after a tense campaign by both groups. Hamdan Yahaya lost by 413 votes, he secured 6,849 votes while the UMNO Baru candidate polled 7,262. In this political war, there was a draw: Team B had won the Johor Bahru seat and UMNO Baru had taken Parit Raja. Both groups had reasons for their respective victory and loss in the Parit Raja by-election.<sup>29</sup> The defeat of Team B in the election marked the departure of Musa Hitam's clique from the team, after they were blamed for the party's defeat in the election, ineffective management and divisions among the team being seen as the main weaknesses.

Not only did the poor performance in the election make Musa Hitam change his mind. Musa Hitam realized he could not hope to control the UMNO 46 group in Johor, since Osman Saad had a strong influence in northern Johor. Musa Hitam recognized UMNO Baru's strength throughout the Malay Peninsula, realized that he had never gained a strong position in 'Team B', but was confident that he could still retain a strong measure of influence and leadership in the Johor state UMNO Baru. From this cynical perspective, he carefully designed a plan to make a come back to UMNO Baru in January 1989.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> There were at least five factors which contributed to the loss of the election by the UMNO 46 candidate. First, the arrogance of Shahril Samad, who initially refused to take the oath as an MP before the Speaker of Dewan Rakyat, exploited by UMNO Baru supporters, as wasted since Shahril could not functioned as MP until he was sworn in.. Secondly, Musa Hitam's statement in Hong Kong which negatively commented on the Malaysia economic situation was exploited by the mainstream papers as treasonable. Thirdly, in the last days of the election, UMNO Baru changed its approach toward UMNO 46 and the Malays, by announcing an open door policy to UMNO 46, and its willingness to reinstate UMNO 46 leaders who won the UMNO election of 1987, in the UMNO Baru Supreme Council. Tengku Razaleigh and Musa Hitam were also invited to take part in negotiations with the top two UMNO Baru leaders. on October 15, in a softening of his previous hardline stand against his political enemies, Dr Mahathir invited them to apply for membership of UMNO Baru. For the Malay village, Razaleigh's adamant refusal to entertain the conciliatory gesture and Musa's reticence on the subject were unacceptable. Fourthly, the UMNO 46 group also failed in their bid to use of the 'Three Keys' election symbol which was believed to be lucky. In the Parit Raja by election, Hamdan Yahya was given a less appealing symbol - a fish. Fifthly, while UMNO Baru was talking about Malay unity, a pamphlet on 'DAP-UMNO 46 shadow cabinet', that implied DAP cooperation with UMNO 46, was distributed, as another attempt to influence voters to reject UMNO 46 candidates. See also Stephen Chee, 'Malaysia in 1988,' pp.216-217, G.P.Means 1991, *Malaysian Politics*, p.246; *Far Eastern Economic Review*, November 3, 1988, pp.15-16; and *The Sunday Star*, October 30, 1988,

<sup>30</sup> See page 292-294 on how Musa Hitam orchestrated the Johor Malay Assembly to justify his return to UMNO Baru.

Nevertheless it was probably UMNO Baru's pamphlet on the Tengku Razaleigh-Lim Kit Siang 'shadow cabinet', portraying the Chinese dominating UMNO 46, which had the greatest impact in changing last minute voting patterns.

*Extended Battlegrounds.*

UMNO Baru's legitimacy was again questioned in the course of the Ampang Jaya by-election. In a constituency comprising a mix of Malays (67%); Chinese (27%); and Indians (5%), UMNO 46 presented Harun Idris as its candidate. Barisan Nasional, with the support of UMNO Baru, put forward Ong Tee Kiat, a Political Secretary to the MCA Deputy President Lee Kim Sai. In a campaign which ended with a poll held on January 28, 1989, Barisan Nasional condemned the UMNO 46 group as 'obstructionist' and an instrument of the opposition, trying to prolong disunity and petty factionalism among the Malays.<sup>31</sup> The opposition made severe attacks on Barisan Nasional and UMNO Baru in particular. The main issues raised here were abuse of power, namely; the politically motivated expulsion of the Lord President and Federal Judges; the improper awarding of tenders concerning the construction of PLUS (The North-South Motorway Project); the exploitation of the Internal Security Act; and the victimisation of UMNO 46 leaders in their business affairs. On the other hand, at that time Dr Mahathir was perceived to be making a genuine effort to create Malay unity, as he had prolonged UMNO Baru's open-door membership policy. Furthermore, a few days prior to election, the Supreme Council of UMNO Baru accepted the resolution for Malay unity forwarded by the Johor Malay Forum,<sup>32</sup>

The result of the Ampang Jaya by-election confirmed that UMNO 46 had managed to secure about 45 per cent of the vote, when Harun Idris only polled 19,409 votes, against Ong Tee Kiat who secured 23, 719 or 54 per cent of the total votes.

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<sup>31</sup> G.P.Means 1991, *Malaysian Politics*, p.247.

<sup>32</sup> *New Straits Times*, January 14, 1989.

There had been speculation that Harun Idris might amass 55 per cent of the Malay vote,<sup>33</sup> and reduce the Barisan majority from 30,721 in 1986 to 4,250 votes. UMNO Baru was now challenged to hold an early General Election to allow people to judge the dispute.<sup>34</sup> To some observers, the by-elections had worsened the position of the Malay leadership.<sup>35</sup>

After Semangat 46 officially registered as a political party in May 1989, it had another opportunity to challenge UMNO Baru in the July by-election of the Johor state constituency for Tambatan, which was declared vacant following the death of its incumbent. Semangat 46 nominated Jaafar Onn, a retired Army General and son of the first UMNO President, to contest against Abdul Kadir Annuar, who represented UMNO Baru for the Barisan Nasional. UMNO Baru highlighted its success in uniting the Johor Malays by announcing the acceptance of Sharil Samad's membership; this was part of the strategy to ensure Malay support.<sup>36</sup> The distribution of the different ethnic groups in Tambatan was as follows; Malay 58.4 percent; Chinese 35 percent; and Indian 6.3 percent. The result shows that Jaafar Onn polled 45.74 per cent of the votes while UMNO Baru candidate secured 53.27 per cent of the votes. Jaafar Onn reduced UMNO Baru votes from a majority of 3,140 in 1986 to 1,075 in 1989, when he polled 6,523 votes, and UMNO Baru secured 7,598 votes. It was this by-election on August 5, 1989 which was the

<sup>33</sup> *Star*, February 5, 1989, see Datuk Mohamed Sopice's column.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>35</sup> A.R. Kamaluddin, 'Cukuplah tiga kali pilihanraya kecil,' *Berita Harian*, February 2, 1989. Some observers assumed the opposition had spent no less than MS6 million in endeavouring to unseat Barisan Nasional candidates in the three by-elections. The results of the election campaigns effectively implied that the Malays had no more clean, sincere and trusted leaders, who could be relied on to strive for the interests of the Malays and the nation.

<sup>36</sup> See an exclusive interview with Shahrir Samad in *Watan*, June 1, 1989.

first in which the Semangat 46 election symbol was used.<sup>37</sup> Commenting on the election result, PAS considered the loss in Tambatan was still a moral victory.<sup>38</sup>

*APU* : a joint combat force

With a series of by-elections, Semangat 46 was confident that it could attract at least 45 per cent of public support with the cooperation of other opposition parties, in particular PAS and DAP. Semangat 46, PAS, Berjasa and Hamim joined forces in June 1989 in a new coalition called *Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah* (APU) or the Community Solidarity Movement. At the same time Semangat 46 had joined hands unofficially with DAP. Therefore, APU was seen as an attempt to offer an alternative ruling party for the Malays.

Within two months of the formation of Semangat 46, the party claimed to have 300,000 registered members, a figure which had increased to 500,000 by the end of the year. It was felt that if these figures were correct, the 700,000 additional votes supporting PAS would enable APU to equal the votes gained by UMNO in the 1986 General Election.<sup>39</sup>

APU then involved itself in other by-elections. PAS contested Pantai Merdeka of Kedah and Teluk Pasu of Trengganu in by-elections. PAS won the latter by a majority of 141 votes.<sup>40</sup> Kijal, a Trengganu State Assembly by-election, was a reluctant battle ground for Semangat 46 owing to the belief that the General Election was fast-approaching and furthermore, it was allocated to PAS for the coming general election. However, PAS allowed Semangat 46 to test the water. Ahmad Shabery

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<sup>37</sup> On its defeat, Semangat 46 blamed UMNO Baru, which they accused of exploiting governmental machinery as well as using gangster (samsing) tactics persuading people not to support them. The MCA was accused of confusing the Chinese voters by twisting historical facts when they linked Jaafar Onn, as the son of Onn Jaafar, to the policy of opposition to the Malayan Union, which had made it difficult for the Chinese to be granted citizenship. See *Harakah*, August 11, 1989 see the column on 'MCA guna taktik menakut-nakutkan pengundi.'

<sup>38</sup> See the editorial of *Harakah*, August 11, 1989 which analyses the result of the Tambatan by-election.

<sup>39</sup> Ahmad Shabery Chik, 'Isu perpaduan Melayu: ole-ole politik untuk perwakilan?', *Watan*, November 21, 1989.

<sup>40</sup> *Watan*, June 10, 1989.

Cheek<sup>41</sup> of Semangat 46 gained 1,969, while UMNO Baru's candidate Ahmad Said won the election with a big majority of 1,689 when he polled 3,658 votes.<sup>42</sup>

Therefore, with all their experience in by-elections, the APU was already prepared to strike UMNO Baru strongholds in the coming General Election, under the command of Tengku Razaleigh and Fadzil Nor of PAS. Tunku Abdul Rahman, the adviser of Semangat 46 called on the party, PAS, and other opposition parties to unite in toppling Mahathir's government and UMNO Baru, which he called as 'parti dajal' (the party of liars).<sup>43</sup> Tengku Razaleigh announced later that his party had already reached an understanding with other opposition political parties such as DAP, PRM, AMIPF, MCSP and other groups reflecting the aspirations of the non-Malays in Sabah and Sarawak.<sup>44</sup> Semangat 46 also drafted an election manifesto which pledged the party to justice, freedom and development in all areas.<sup>45</sup> These trends shown that the APU and DAP were promoting the idea of a two party system. Tengku Razaleigh at one time speculated<sup>46</sup> that Semangat 46 could win 32 seats, PAS 25, and DAP 30 seats in the House of Representatives (*Dewan Rakyat*), a total of 87 in all. A political observer predicted that Semangat 46 could seriously challenge UMNO Baru in Kelantan, Trengganu, Perak and Pulau Pinang.<sup>47</sup>

#### *The Reaction of UMNO Baru: Counter attacks.*

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<sup>41</sup> *Watan*, July 19, 1990.

<sup>42</sup> Shabery Cheek commented on his loss by confessing that the message of Semangat 46's had not been understood by the people, and accused UMNO Baru of using appalling tactics, for example: obstructing voters from obtaining information from Semangat 46; importing of gangsters to intimidate voters; the distribution of 'pocket money' to members of the electorate; approving land titles and so on. In the minds of the members of Semangat 46, such tactics had influenced the decision. In reality, however, a lack of organisation within the party was the main factor in the defeat. To UMNO Baru leaders, the result of the election demonstrated that the Malays felt that there was no real alternative to UMNO Baru, the party which had dominated the ruling government and had fulfilled the wishes of the rakyat regarding the need to have a strong government to protect them. See *Watan*, August 4, 1990.

<sup>43</sup> *Utusan Malaysia*, May 19, 1990.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>46</sup> *Watan*, December 2, 1989.

<sup>47</sup> A.Ghanu Ismail, 'Peranan Tunku dalam perpaduan UMNO,' *Watan*, December 2, 1989.

The UMNO Baru leaders realized that Semangat 46 would win some seats in the General Election, and that in cooperating successfully with DAP and PAS, the opposition hoped to gain more than half the number of seats in the house and thus form a government.<sup>48</sup>

UMNO Baru had been trying to convince the voters that the party and the government were fair and democratic.<sup>49</sup> When they saw the so-called marriage of convenience between Semangat 46 and PAS become a reality, they tried to destroy public confidence in their opponents. They denounced PAS aspirations to establish an Islamic state as impractical in a multi-racial society.<sup>50</sup> Various attempts were made to frighten voters with the diabolical and dreadful statements of PAS, such as, the refusal of PAS members to perform their hajj through Tabung Haji (the government Pilgrimage Fund), and their reluctance to drive the *Proton Saga* (the national car) because it was manufactured by infidels (*kafir*).<sup>51</sup>

*'Malay unity'*- a common weapon.

Malay unity has been a vital rhetorical weapon in Malay politics, Dr Mahathir, Musa Hitam and Tengku Razaleigh all using this idea in their attempts to convince the Malays of their sincerity. Dr Mahathir used the idea of Malay unity to distance the Musa Hitam faction<sup>52</sup> from Tengku Razaleigh's. He preferred to encourage the Johor Malays, who had been an UMNO stronghold since 1946, to follow his party

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<sup>48</sup> *Harakah*, August 25, 1989.

<sup>49</sup> *Utusan Malaysia*, June 12, 1990.

<sup>50</sup> Editorial of *Mingguan Malaysia*, November 25, 1990.

<sup>51</sup> *Harakah*, October 12, 1990.

<sup>52</sup> Dr Mahathir could see Musa Hitam's influence was strong in Johor and that Mohamad Rahmat, the UMNO Baru Secretary General had failed in his attempt to gain control in the area following his appointment in 1988. When Mohamad Rahmat launched the Persatuan Anak Jawa Johor, or PAJAR, it was countered by Musa Hitam's group which had the support of Hussein Onn and other Malay intellectuals who organised the Malay Johor Assembly. The assembly adopted resolutions which enabled Musa Hitam's group to return to UMNO. *Watan* reported a statement made by Shahril Samad on the failure of Mohamad Rahmat (September 26, 1989), but *Berita Harian* had previously questioned Musa Hitam's sincerity by reporting that he indirectly indicated his group's intention to take over the Johor government in the then imminent General Election or any by-election. To *Berita Harian* (November 11, 1988), Musa Hitam always seemed to be giving contradictory statements. On one hand, he stressed the importance of 'gentle' (*lemah lembut*) attitudes, while on the other hand, he called his supporters to 'react' to their opponents.



rather than the Kelantanese. Dr Mahathir used the Malay way, by providing a forum for unity talks. *Utusan Malaysia's* editorial commented that it was a duty for UMNO Baru to bring more Malays together in the party, especially former UMNO members who formed Semangat 46.<sup>53</sup>

The New Straits Times highlighted this feeling of the need for Malay unity, including PAS.<sup>54</sup> Accordingly, Dr Mahathir surprised the UMNO Baru General Assembly in October 1988 by making an offer to Musa Hitam and Tengku Razaleigh to join his cabinet as 'Ministers without portfolio,' which represented a sacrifice on part of Dr Mahathir for the sake of Malay unity. Even Musa Hitam's and Tengku Razaleigh's factions were asked to return to UMNO and to strengthen the party position before offering friendship to other parties.<sup>55</sup> At that time, Musa Hitam emphasised the importance of the UMNO Baru leadership following tradition of Malay political culture,<sup>56</sup> which gives priority to unity and peace.

*Reconciliation: a tactical withdrawal.*

Musa Hitam had always been a political manipulator, and he knew that UMNO Baru needed his presence within the party in helping to solve political problems. The party in Johor was divided when Musa Hitam withdrew from UMNO Baru and relinquished the post of pro-tem committee chairman of Segamat UMNO division.<sup>57</sup> In October 1988, while he rejected the offer of a cabinet post,<sup>58</sup> Musa

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<sup>53</sup> The Editorial of *Utusan Malaysia*, 'UMNO benar-benar pulih', November 20, 1989. This paper reported on the situation in the UMNO General Assembly in which the need to open UMNO doors to all Malays was recognised. Subsequently Dr Mahathir was given a mandate and blessing to meet Tengku Razaleigh.

<sup>54</sup> *New Straits Times*, September 21, 1988.

<sup>55</sup> *Berita Minggu*, November 8, 1988.

<sup>56</sup> *Berita Harian*, November 10, 1988. See the column entitled 'Musa rancang ambil alih Johor' (Musa plan to take over Johor).

<sup>57</sup> *New Straits Times*, August 4, 1988. See comments made by Abdullah Ahmad Badawi (former Minister of Defence and the party Vice President), Muhyiddin Yassin (Chairman of Johor UMNO State Liaison Committee), and Dr Hamid Pawanteh and Isa Samad of Perlis and Negeri Sembilan, respectively.

<sup>58</sup> *New Straits Times*, November 11, 1988. Those who joined him were Shahril Samad, Rahmah Othman, Marina Yusuf, Zainal Abidin Zin and Radzi Sheikh Ahmad, who all refused an offer of reinstatement to the UMNO Supreme Council as a result of their victory in the 1987 election, provided they registered as UMNO members. In the eyes of Dr Mahathir the offer made to Musa Hitam and Tengku Razaleigh would remain open. See also *Berita Harian*, December 3, 1988.

Hitam made a new move to return to UMNO Baru, at the same time suggesting a change in Dr Mahathir's approach to reuniting the Malays. He pressured UMNO Baru to amend its constitution so as to be the same as the old UMNO constitution.<sup>59</sup>

Musa Hitam orchestrated the *Perhimpunan Melayu Johor* (The Johor Malay Assembly) which was held on December 18, 1988. The Assembly proposed resolutions for Malay unity through UMNO:<sup>60</sup>

Firstly, former UMNO members in Johor must be accepted, given membership and registered automatically as UMNO Baru members.

Secondly, to record the acceptance of the UMNO leadership at national level as it was democratically elected on 24 April 1987.

Thirdly, the same principle also should be applied to return the leadership of UMNO at divisional and branch levels as it was in 1987 whereby those involved should be consulted until the election is held.

Fourthly, positive action should be taken to reinstall the constitution of the original UMNO in concordance with the present UMNO constitution as the basis of membership and leadership legality in the party structures.

Fifthly, all administrative and legal attempts should be made to ensure that UMNO should be the only UMNO organization in Malaysia.

Sixthly, to create a situation leading to unity, solidarity and friendship and avoiding of any sanction caused by the political crisis."

The UMNO Baru had accepted the resolutions with a proviso that they applied to the Malays in Johor only, and were not to extend to other states where they had not had any problems.<sup>61</sup> Therefore, UMNO Baru was instrumental in slimming down

<sup>59</sup> In fact before the Johor Malay assembly in December, Musa Hitam's negotiations with Muhyiddin Yassin, the Menteri Besar and the chairman of the state UMNO Liaison Committee, took place with the aim of finding a formula enabling other Malays to join UMNO Baru. He managed to convince the Liaison Committee to press the UMNO Baru General Assembly on 28 October 1988 to accept all Malays as UMNO Baru members without restriction. Johor UMNO also proposed that the UMNO Baru constitution should be reviewed, particularly those areas concerning the '10 bonus votes' for those nominated for the post of President and Deputy President of the party, and the appointment of the Heads of the Youth and Women wings. *Utusan Malaysia*, October 14, 1988.

<sup>60</sup> *Utusan Malaysia*, December 19, 1988. See the column entitled 'Himpunan Melayu Johor lahirkan 6 resolusi' [The Johor Malay gathering forwarded 6 resolutions]. In fact, the gathering, sponsored by Johor Malay intellectuals, was supported by the state government, Malay politicians and government servants, forty Malay associations in Johor attending. It was reported that 200 participants and 200 observers were involved in drafting the resolutions in the assembly on the theme 'Kesesinambungan Perjuangan Bermartabat' [The continuity of an honourable struggle]. The chairman of the organising committee was Abdul Jalil Hassan, former state Mufti. The assembly discussed 3 working papers. At night, a 'Jamuan Perdana' (grand dinner) was held, catering for 15,000 Malays.

<sup>61</sup> *The Star*, January 14, 1989, which quoted Dr Mahathir.

support of Johor Malays for Semangat 46, while containing its impact in other states.<sup>62</sup>

After the Johor resolution was accepted, Musa Hitam and Dr Mahathir had already apparently begun to resume their old relationship -a new indicator for party unity.

By January 1989, Musa Hitam led his political retainers from Johor to officially return to UMNO Baru. Among them were Adam Hamid (State Assemblyman of Bandar Tenggara), Kadri Sabran (of Endau), Parliamentarian for Sungai Benut, Tawfik Dr Ismail, and former Independent candidate for Parit Raja by-election Hamdan Yahya. They joined UMNO under the spirit of the Johor Malay assembly of December 1988.<sup>63</sup> This was followed later by Musa Hitam supporters from Perak and Negeri Sembilan.

To present UMNO Baru as a democratic party and having a reasonable leadership, the party Assembly in 1989 passed a motion which stipulated that their President should refer to the Assembly if his negotiations with other parties involved changes of the constitution or policy. The Assembly warned that UMNO was not Dr Mahathir's party or a party that practised dictatorship; UMNO must not mean '*U Must Not Oppose*.'<sup>64</sup>

<sup>62</sup> Before this, Dr Mahathir, Ghafar Baba, Musa Hitam and Tengku Razaleigh received a memorandum from the so-called 'Klang valley Malay intellectuals' on October 15, 1988. This was concerned with the crisis of the Malay leaders and proposed that the old UMNO constitution should be revived; the present UMNO should open its membership to all Malays; and that the re-election of all party officials should be undertaken. *Berita Harian*, October 25, 1988. and *Utusan Malaysia*, October 26, 1988. PAS condemned the memorandum (*Harakah*, November 11, 1988), while *Berita Harian*, questioned the importance of the signatories which did not include ABIM and personalities from the Fleet Group and other institutions.

<sup>63</sup> See the editorial of *Berita Harian*, 'Giliran Datuk Musa buktikan keikhlasan' (Musa Hitam's turn to prove his sincerity), February 1, 1989. However, Shahril Samad's membership remained unsettled until July, 1989, probably because Mohamad Rahmat and Dr Mahathir and their men in the party were quite reluctant to accept the outspoken MP. Shahril Samad had always attacked UMNO, Dr Mahathir and Mohamad Rahmat, through his column in *Watan*, an Independent tabloid. Musa Hitam was reinstated as the Head of Segamat UMNO division, while Shahril Samad struggled against the obstacle of the chairman of the pro-tem Johor Bahru UMNO division, Yunus Sulaiman (State Assemblyman for Tanjung Puteri and the Secretary of Johor UMNO State Liaison Committee) who refused to accept Shahril's membership. Problems prompted by the division meant that Johor Bahru was unable to hold its General Meeting before the General Assembly in November 1989. However, Shahril Samad succeeded in making a comeback to lead Johor Bahru UMNO.

<sup>64</sup> *Berita Harian*, November 19, 1989.

UMNO Baru was lucky when Tunku Abdul Rahman, the Adviser of Semangat 46 changed his mind. While on October 12, 1989 he had called on Malays to disband UMNO and replace it with Semangat 46, after a meeting with an UMNO Baru Youth delegation on October 26, he agreed that UMNO Baru and Semangat 46 should have a round table meeting. The Tunku even agreed to be the guest of honour at the UMNO General Assembly meeting on November 17.<sup>65</sup> In the eyes of the Tunku it was important to settle differences in a friendly and democratic way. He noted "we want to avoid spending millions fighting each other in the coming election."<sup>66</sup>

Unity talks were favoured by UMNO members, since Dr Mahathir's 'soft approach'<sup>67</sup> could eventually bear fruit in uniting the Malays under UMNO.

The meeting of Tunku Abdul Rahman and Dr Mahathir on November 11 made room for talks between Dr Mahathir and Tengku Razaleigh of Semangat 46 later on. This was considered as a 'cooling-off period',<sup>68</sup> and the year 1989 as a period where unity was to be the priority.<sup>69</sup>

However, Hussein Onn, whilst urging Semangat 46 to cooperate with UMNO Baru, speculated that Malay unity could possibly be sought only after the General Election when Semangat 46 had tested its own influence.<sup>70</sup> PAS was also commenting on the Tunku-Mahathir meeting as mere political manoeuvring by Mahathir.<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>65</sup> *Utusan Malaysia*, November 9, 1989.

<sup>66</sup> *The Star*, November 11, 1989.

<sup>67</sup> *The Star*, November 18, 1989.

<sup>68</sup> *New Straits Times*, November 19, 1989.

<sup>69</sup> *The Star*, November 18, 1989. See the full text of Dr Mahathir's speech on page 16-18. In the UMNO General Assembly of 1988, Dr Mahathir offered ministerial posts to both Musa Hitam and Tengku Razaleigh. In the 1989 assembly Dr Mahathir was willing that talks with Tengku Razaleigh should take place. Johor's UMNO spokesman in the assembly had given full backing Dr Mahathir's peace move, which indicated Musa Hitam was playing for time before rejoining UMNO Baru..

<sup>70</sup> *Utusan Malaysia*, November 18, 1989,

<sup>71</sup> See *Harakah*, November 17, 1989. A PAS columnist Subky Latif put forward the view that Mahathir needed the Tunku's influence to retain power, since Dr Mahathir had failed to manage political conflict and was unable to unite the Malays.

Nevertheless, two days before the meeting, Tengku Razaleigh indicated that he was reluctant to join UMNO Baru.<sup>72</sup> The meeting on December 12, 1989.<sup>73</sup> failed when both leaders were unwilling to accommodate each other. Tengku Razaleigh wanted Dr Mahathir to use UMNO's majority in Parliament to revitalise the old UMNO which had been deregistered. However, Dr Mahathir declined to use his power to nullify the Court orders. Instead he proposed Tengku Razaleigh should simply bring his supporters together to join UMNO Baru.<sup>74</sup> However, Tengku Razaleigh was not receptive to this suggestion and deferred his response, stating he needed a mandate from his party in order to proceed in such a move.<sup>75</sup>

In preparation for the second-round meeting, Semangat 46 organised a special delegates' meeting which passed a motion to form a joint Committee of members from UMNO Baru and Semangat 46 whose role would be to look into means of reviving the UMNO that had been banned by the Court. Semangat 46 also proposed that UMNO Baru and Semangat 46 should be dissolved, to give way to the formation of a new party made up of UMNO Baru, Semangat 46 and other Malay political parties in APU. It proposed a return to the status quo of UMNO as on April 24, 1987.<sup>76</sup> It also suggested that UMNO Baru and Semangat 46 be combined and reorganised into the old UMNO structure.<sup>77</sup>

UMNO Baru leaders rejected such ideas, considering them to be nonsensical, irrational, and illogical.<sup>78</sup> UMNO Baru by this time had given up any hope of

<sup>72</sup> *Mingguan Malaysia*, December 10, 1989.

<sup>73</sup> *Utusan Malaysia*, December 13, 1989. The meeting started at 15.35 and ending at 16.20 hrs. The general secretaries for both parties, Mohamad Rahmat (UMNO Baru) and Haji Suhaimi Kamaruddin (Semangat 46) also attended the meeting accompanying their respective leaders.

<sup>74</sup> *Utusan Malaysia*, December 13, 1989.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>76</sup> This caption was translated from *Utusan Malaysia*, December 17, 1989 p.1. which stated: "Jadi apa salahnya kedua-dua pihak kembali ke pangkuan UMNO lama dan dalam hubungan ini apa yang kita maksudkan ialah bermula dari tarikh UMNO diharamkan iaitu mengekalkan Majlis Tertinggi selesainya Perhimpunan Agung UMNO pada 24 April 1987."

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, p.2.

<sup>78</sup> *Utusan Malaysia*, December 18, 1989. See the front page entitled 'Bubar parti tak munasabah (Irrational to dissolve the party)

reconciliation with Semangat 46 and, therefore, considered Semangat 46 leaders to be '*melutut*' or 'kowtowing' to the opposition solely in order to rebel against the current leadership.<sup>79</sup> Finally, Dr Mahathir assumed that the only solution to the issue of Malay Unity would be a General Election.<sup>80</sup>

In order to legitimize UMNO Baru as a continuation of the old UMNO and also to eliminate confusion among the Malays toward the party, Dr Mahathir cleared the air by asking the mass media to drop the word '*Baru*' or 'New' when reporting on his party. This was because the party has been registered as *Pertubuhan Kebangsaan Melayu Bersatu (Baru)* but not UMNO (United Malay National Organisation) Baru. Since then, UMNO Baru has generally been referred as UMNO. This clarification seemed to boost the idea that the party was the same as the original UMNO.<sup>81</sup>

*'Soft but firm'* (Lembut tetapi tegas): a resupply of firing power.

Musa Hitam convinced the public that Dr Mahathir's leadership had changed, that it was 'soft but yet firm' (lembut tetapi tegas). He declared that the conflict of opinion between him and the government had been settled, and that he was ready to perform duties entrusted to him in the interest of the Malays and the nation as a whole.<sup>82</sup> He explained that he had never been a Semangat 46 member and was always ready to return to UMNO even though it was not 100 per cent the same as it had been before. He indirectly confirmed his influence in Johor when he announced that the UMNO membership in the state at the time of his return was 215,000 compared to 60,000 when UMNO Baru was formed.<sup>83</sup> Dr Mahathir impressed the public with his 'soft' attitude, and his reacceptance of those who had opposed him, by

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<sup>79</sup> *Utusan Malaysia*, December 18, 1989. The paper quoted Anwar Ibrahim's speech made at the Islamic Unity gathering in Shah Alam on Sunday December 17, in which Anwar Ibrahim accused Semangat 46's cooperation with DAP as being a ploy to disadvantage the Malays.

<sup>80</sup> *Utusan Malaysia*, December 13, 1989, p.2.

<sup>81</sup> See the comment of the party constitution by the columnist Mohd Sopiee in *The Star*, September 18, 1988.

<sup>82</sup> *Berita Harian*, January 22, 1990.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, see column entitled 'Dr Mahathir lembut tetapi tegas: Musa'.

appointing Musa Hitam as Malaysian Special Envoy to the United Nations in January 1990. To Musa Hitam, this post gave him a new 'life' in UMNO.<sup>84</sup>

Dr Mahathir still left the public puzzled as to the identity of his successor on his departure.<sup>85</sup> In January 1990, in an interview with the local press, this confusion was cleared up when he reiterated and confirmed that Ghafar Baba would be his successor.<sup>86</sup> This was in accordance with the UMNO tradition of leadership choice.<sup>87</sup> Defending Dr Mahathir's endorsement, Ghafar Baba stated that it was not a tradition in UMNO to compete for the post of Prime Minister.<sup>88</sup> At the same time, the main stream media exploited Tengku Razaleigh's statement that he had been offered a ministerial post which he had subsequently rejected, and that he may be offered other posts in the future including the post of Prime Minister.<sup>89</sup> The mainstream media distorted Tengku Razaleigh's statement by interpreting it as if he wanted to be Prime Minister if he was to rejoin UMNO.

To counter Semangat 46's allegations on the country's development under his leadership, Dr Mahathir, in his New Year speech at the launching of 'Visit Malaysia Year', recalled to the people the success and glory that was attributed to the Barisan Nasional government, including CHOGM (the Commonwealth Head of Government

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<sup>84</sup> *Utusan Malaysia*, January 22, 1990.

<sup>85</sup> See Chapter VIII which illustrates the politicking in UMNO up until the party election in 1990. When Dr Mahathir was admitted for heart surgery on the eve of the Ampang Jaya by-election, it coincided with the readmission of Musa Hitam to UMNO, and the media focus on Anwar Ibrahim which presented him as Dr Mahathir's successor.

<sup>86</sup> *Utusan Malaysia*, January 1, 1990 'Ghafar mahu Mahathir terus jadi PM'.

<sup>87</sup> *Berita Harian*, December 31, 1989. See the column 'Komentari hujung minggu' (Week End commentary) by the Editor in Chief, Ahmad Nazri Abdullah, under the title 'Siapa selepas Ghafar' (who's next after Ghafar). *Berita Harian* suggested that Anwar Ibrahim should be Prime Minister after Ghafar. The writer also implied, on the basis of Ghafar's age and his capability at international level, that Ghafar should be ready to follow Indonesia's President Soeharto in concentrating more on domestic affairs leaving foreign affairs to be managed by his Minister. *Berita Harian* implied that, in the event of Musa Hitam returning to UMNO's top post, Anwar Ibrahim would join forces with him. However, *Watan* (January 6, 1990) quoted a former UMNO leader speculating about the destruction of UMNO after Dr Mahathir, Ghafar Baba, Musa Hitam and Tengku Razaleigh had left, especially when the party were being led by the younger generation which knew little of UMNO's struggle, and used religion for their own political ends.

<sup>88</sup> *Berita Harian*, January 22, 1990. See the statement of Ghafar Baba in the column titled 'UMNO tidak amal sikap berebut'.

<sup>89</sup> *Utusan Malaysia*, January 22, 1990. See the column titled 'Razaleigh keliru dengan kenyataan Musa' (Razaleigh confuses with Musa's statement).

Meeting), SEA Games, the role of Malaysia in the Security Council, political stability, excellent cultural programmes, and promotion of the nation's identity.<sup>90</sup>

*The line was drawn.*

By early January 1990, Semangat 46 announced that they were confident that they could form a new coalition government with other opposition parties. APU was expected to win over 47 of the 84 Parliamentary seats held by UMNO, and DAP was expected to increase its number of seats.<sup>91</sup> In fact, the battle between Semangat 46 and UMNO had long since begun, both parties testing their tactics in minor scuffles, starting at Johor Bahru and ending at Kijal in Trengganu. And so by 1990, Semangat 46 and UMNO had mobilised their 'political troops' to the front line in readiness for the grand battle, the General Election.

Semangat 46 was leading two groups in opposition; the Islamic oriented and non-Malay dominated groups. The former was known as *APU*, the latter was known then as *Gagasan Rakyat*.

Tengku Razaleigh confidently declared "if we said that we can capture all Parliamentary and State Assembly seats in Kelantan, they [UMNO] would say we were over confident."<sup>92</sup> Semangat 46 spelt out its plan to capture seven of the eight Parliamentary seats and half of the 32 State Assembly seats in Trengganu. They were also confident of APU capturing 40 seats from the 50 in the northern Peninsula. They pledged that they would present a strong challenge to UMNO.<sup>93</sup> Semangat 46 also planned a combined strategy for the election with DAP, including distribution of seats and joint election campaigning throughout the country.<sup>94</sup>

<sup>90</sup> *Utusan Malaysia*, January 1, 1990 'Semua diseru jangan laka'.

<sup>91</sup> *Watan*, January 6, 1990.

<sup>92</sup> *Watan*, January 9, 1990.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>94</sup> *Utusan Malaysia*, January 29, 1990. DAP and Semangat were planning their second meeting for February 5th. The first meeting was held two weeks before.



The relationship between *Parti Bersatu Sabah* (PBS) (which had been ruling the Sabah state government) and the Federal government came under strain by 1990. The Federal government rejected the state government proposal's for increased oil royalties, a state television station and a university for Sabah.<sup>95</sup> At the same time, the Federal government accused PBS of toying with anti-Federal sentiments and threatening to pull out of the federation.<sup>96</sup> This situation gave Semangat 46 an opportunity to gain additional forces for its future election plan.

By early January 1990, UMNO was ready for the General Election.<sup>97</sup> UMNO planned to counter propaganda and slanders from the opposition parties, and concentrated on states where Malays were in the majority.<sup>98</sup> There were four factors which might enable UMNO and Barisan Nasional to win the coming election. These included ensuring UMNO was united and strong, that the economy was stable, that they played an active part in the registration of electoral rolls, and the absence of controversial national issues.<sup>99</sup> UMNO also realised that from 1.3 million party members, only one million were qualified to vote.

By June 1990, UMNO felt the challenge from Semangat and APU, and also the DAP. Dr Mahathir had been campaigning in his nation-wide tour to convince voters of the need to retain the Barisan Nasional government. He shrewdly convinced the people that Barisan Nasional had not used politics for personal gain but rather sought to serve the people. "For that reason the rakyat had given Barisan Nasional the mandate in the last election. We are confident that the rakyat will continuously give their support to us with whom they know their future is

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<sup>95</sup> Far Eastern Economic Review, October 25, 1990, p.10.

<sup>96</sup> Utusan Malaysia, January 29, 1990.

<sup>97</sup> Utusan Malaysia, January 8, 1990. See the column titled 'UMNO sudah masuki era pilihanraya- Hussein.'

<sup>98</sup> See the column entitled, 'UMNO akan tentang dakwah parti lawan cara besar2an', Utusan Malaysia, January 13, 1990.

<sup>99</sup> Utusan Malaysia, January 29, 1990 '4 fakta penting ke arah pastikan BN berjaya- Najib'.

guaranteed under the leadership of Barisan Nasional."<sup>100</sup> To him, supporting opposition parties or 'the imitation Barisan' (*Barisan Tiruan*) was risky and would end up with the destruction of happiness, tranquillity, and harmony, and the rakyat would suffer.<sup>101</sup>

### *The October General Election: Malay warfare.*

Since 1989, both ruling and opposition parties had been securing their bases on which essential political 'installations' were built, and both were ready for an aggressive operation. In the 1990 General Election, Semangat 46 was a new force leading the opposition front.

#### *Nomination.*

UMNO, as the major partner of Barisan Nasional, had maintained the same number of seats it contested in the 1986 General Election. From 180 parliamentary constituencies, there was a Malay majority in 92 electoral areas.<sup>102</sup> However, UMNO only nominated candidates for 84 constituencies, the rest were given to either MCA, MIC or Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (GRM). This was the result of political deals among the Barisan Nasional's partners in the Malay Peninsula.

In 1990, UMNO had put forward candidates in Kelantan, Trengganu and Perlis for Barisan Nasional. In Johor, Melaka, Selangor, Negeri Sembilan and Pahang, half of the Barisan Nasional candidates had been fielded by UMNO. However, in Perak, Pulau Pinang and the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur UMNO had nominated few candidates compared to those nominated by MCA, MIC and GRM. In Perak, UMNO passed over two Malay majority constituencies to MIC, namely,

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<sup>100</sup> A caption of Dr Mahathir's speech in the opening ceremony of the Gerakan Delegation Meeting at Merlin Hotel, Kuala Lumpur on June 9, 1990. See *Berita Harian*, June 10, 1990 'Pengertian Politik Barisan Nasional'.

<sup>101</sup> Dr Mahathir suggested that, if the 'Imitation Barisan' were to gain power Malays would suffer as people of China and Romania had suffered under Mao Tse Tung and Ceaucescu, and the Russians under Stalin. He also condemned the political situation in Kelantan where PAS and Semangat 46 were projecting their influence in what Barisan Nasional interpreted as 'threatening politics'. This caused government servants in the state to be reluctant to have contact with UMNO leaders. Kelantan state UMNO leaders implicitly felt that they were facing a vote of no confidence from the rakyat.

<sup>102</sup> Khong Kim Hoong, *Malaysia's General Election 1990*, p.47. However, UMNO claimed there were 96 Malay majority constituencies; see Dr Mahathir's speech at the 1990 UMNO General Assembly in *Utusan Malaysia*, December 1, 1990.

Sungai Siput and Tapah. In the Federal Territory, Malays had only two majority areas, Lembah Pantai and Titiwangsa, where UMNO fielded candidates. The other five constituencies were shared by MCA and GRM. Pulau Pinang had 11 seats, and UMNO nominated candidates, three in the mainland, and one in the Island, another seven seats being shared by GRM and MCA.

In APU, it seemed that Semangat 46 had a larger share in the distribution of parliamentary candidates. Semangat 46 fielded 61 candidates, most of them in Johor, Kedah, Perak, Selangor, Negeri Sembilan, Trengganu and Kelantan. PAS only nominated 30 candidates concentrating on Kelantan, Trengganu and Kedah. The party decided not to nominate candidates for Parliamentary seats in the Federal territory, Johor and Negeri Sembilan. DAP fielded its candidates in urban areas in Perak, Pulau Pinang, Kuala Lumpur Federal Territory and in Johor. DAP nominated its candidates against other parties in Sabah and Sarawak.<sup>103</sup> Semangat 46 managed to cooperate with PAS in allocating candidates to confront UMNO. However in Padang Serai in Kedah, Padang Garung in Kelantan state and Kuala Trengganu, both PAS and DAP nominated their candidates against Barisan Nasional. The state of Barisan Nasional and of the opposition parties on the nomination day is shown in Table XII.<sup>104</sup>

In the State Assembly constituencies, all seats were contested. Barisan Nasional fielded candidates in all 351 seats, UMNO nominating 246 candidates, MCA 69, MIC 13, and GRM 21.

In APU, there was a general understanding that in the event of them winning, first of all Semangat 46 would lead the Federal Government if their alliance was successful; Secondly, that Semangat 46 would lead in the following state

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<sup>103</sup> In Sabah, DAP had fielded 9 candidates, and 8 in Sarawak. Barisan Nasional in Sarawak allocated seats among its component members as follows: PBB 10, SUPP 8 SNAP 5, and PBDS 4. However, Barisan Nasional in Sabah agreed to divide the seats among USNO and PBS, 6 to the former and 14 to the latter, which withdrew from Barisan Nasional before polling day.

<sup>104</sup> Adapted from *New Straits Times*, October 23, 1990.

Table XII

*State of Parties on Oct 11, 1990 (Parliamentary seats)*

(No of seats)	Distribution of Candidacies by party and Alliance.					
	<i>Barisan Nasional</i>				Opposition	
State (seats)	UMNO	MCA	MIC	GRM	S46	PAS DAP
Perlis (2)	2				1	1
Kedah (14)	12	2			8	6 1
P.Pinang (11)	4	3		4	1	2* 7
Perak (23)	11	7	2	3	8	4 11
Selangor (14)	7	5	2		7	2 5
N.Sembilan (7)	4	2	1		4	3
Melaka (5)	3	2			3	1 1
Johor (18)	12	5	1		11	-* 6
Pahang (10)	7	3			5	3 2
Terengganu (8)	8				4	4
Kelantan (13)	13				7	6
Federal Terr.(8)	3	3		2	2	* 4
Total	86	32	6	9	61	30 40

\* PSRM had nominated 1 candidate in each states.

*Source:* Adapted from *New Straits Times*, October 23, 1990.

governments: Johor, Negeri Sembilan, Selangor, Perak and Pahang; and thirdly, PAS would lead the state governments in the northern Malay states such as in Kelantan, Trengganu, Kedah and Perlis. DAP with its 'Tanjung Dua' plan had nominated 20 candidates in Pulau Pinang, 17 in Perak, 13 in Selangor, 10 in Johor and Negri Sembilan. For October 22, 1990 the parties' candidatures is shown in Table XIII.

Table XIII

*State of Parties on Oct 22, 1990 (State Assemblies seats)*

State (Seats)	UMNO	MCA	MIC	GRM	S46	PAS	DAP
Perlis (14)	12	2			6	7	
Kedah (28)	23	3	1	1	10	16	2
P.Pinang (33)	12	9	1	11	7	5	20
Perak (46)	27	12	2	5	19	11	17
Selangor (42)	26	11	3	2	23	6	15
N. Sembilan (28)	18	7	2	1	16	4	10
Melaka (20)	12	6	1	1	9	6	6
Johor (36)	22	11	2	1	21	3	10
Pahang (33)	25	6	1	1	14	12	7
Terengganu (32)	31	1			13	20	1
Kelantan (39)	38	1			14	24	1
Total (351)	246	69	13	21	152	114	87

Source: *New Straits Times*, Oct.23, 1990.

From the number of candidates that had been nominated for State Assembly seats, UMNO nominated 70 per cent of them; Semangat 46, 43 per cent; PAS 25 per cent; DAP 24 per cent; MCA 19 per cent; GRM 6 per cent; and MIC almost 4 per

cent. In the Parliamentary constituencies, UMNO forwarded 47 per cent of the total candidates; Semangat 46 42 per cent; DAP 22 per cent for the Malay Peninsular seats, and PAS selectively nominated only 16 per cent of the total nomination.<sup>105</sup>

*Campaign: The Strike Operation.*

In early 1990, election fever was already rising, even before the election had actually been called. Dr Mahathir himself had been leading Barisan Nasional in a pre-polls tour throughout the country since April 1990. The first stop was Kelantan where UMNO was thought to face a strong challenge from PAS and Semangat 46. Other states that were given priority were Trengganu, Pahang and Perak.<sup>106</sup> While UMNO was concentrating its efforts in rural areas, where Malay opposition was strong, the party were also equally concerned about urban areas, in order to ensure overall victory for Barisan Nasional.

APU used Kelantan as their base. The coalition of PAS and Semangat 46 and also Berjasa and Hamim seemed to be very effective in storming UMNO political strongholds in that state. APU concentrated in rural areas, Gagasan Rakyat- a coalition of Semangat 46, DAP, AMIPF, PRM- was in high spirits when PBS under the leadership of Pairin Kitingan withdrew from the Barisan Nasional to join Gagasan; this happened on 15 October, six days before the poll.<sup>107</sup> PBS had given Gagasan Rakyat a ready made state government in Sabah and 14 Parliamentary seats from the state. The PBS decision contributed to a high state of morale in the opposition parties. Therefore, the DAP was geared to getting through its political scheme 'Tanjung Dua', which aimed to wrest control of the Pulau Pinang State

<sup>105</sup> Other Barisan Nasional components fielded their candidates as follow MCA 17 %, GRM 5 %, MIC 3%, In Sarawak, PBB 5 %, SUPP 4%, SNAP 2%, and PBDS 2%., while in Sabah USNO fielded 3% of the total nomination.

<sup>106</sup> The Sunday Star, April 8, 1990.

<sup>107</sup> Far Eastern Economic Review, October 25, 1990, p.10. The defection caused the UMNO Supreme Council to call an emergency meeting on 16 October which decided to set up UMNO in Sabah that 'very night'.

Government from Barisan Nasional, while APU was confident of forming the next state government in Kelantan.

### *Issues and Manifestos.*

By April 1990, Barisan Nasional was already preparing its manifesto emphasizing development.<sup>108</sup> The party's manifesto was later publicly distributed; its main theme was 'ke arah keamanan, kestabilan dan Kemakmuran Malaysia' (or 'toward the peace, stability and prosperity of Malaysia').<sup>109</sup>

Barisan Nasional's manifesto contained four important points for the voters; it was not easy to govern Malaysia which is a multi-racial society, with many different religions, languages and cultures. While claiming success in governing the country, Barisan Nasional reminded the electorate that they should vote for the party in the name of the continuity of peace, stability and prosperity and should not risk their future by voting for the opposition parties.<sup>110</sup>

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<sup>108</sup> *Utusan Melayu*, April 14, 1990 'Manifesto BN tumpu usaha pembangunan.'

<sup>109</sup> In the manifesto, Barisan Nasional tried to convince voters of its good track record as the ruling party for 33 years. Improvements in living standards, and the ability of the government to develop the country, enabling Malaysia to become one of the top 5 significant countries out of 135 developing countries in the world, through the stability and peaceful environment cultivated under Barisan Nasional. There were 14 salient points in the manifesto: 1) *Politics*, it is only Barisan Nasional which can guarantee peace and stability in a multi-racial society through its moderate views and strategy to develop the nation, to inculcate the belief that all conflicts can be solved through sincere consultation, giving priority to the national interest, and ensuring the aim of winning the election for the sake of serving the people; 2) *Democracy*, Barisan Nasional will uphold democracy through such means as freedom and just elections, freedom of speech and press, also through a democratic, efficient, responsible and just administration; 3) On *economic development* Barisan promised to continue the liberal economic growth policy for the coming decade, ensuring the ability to cope with future economic recession, and to attract more foreign investment; 4) Greater *employment opportunities* were promised with the development of new industrial firms, the promotion of tourism, encouragement and support for small businesses, and strict control on illegal immigrants; 5) *Fiscal policy*, here they promised a reasonable and competitive level of the Malaysian currency, foreign investment and tourism; 6) *Agriculture*, this sector would continue to play a vital role in economic development and produce more of what the nation needed through modernization, and technological and administrative development; 7) *Rural Development*, this was described as the most successful in the world and would be continued including the development of Rubber Estates (Indian) and New Village (Chinese settlement) areas, public utilities, and opportunities in education at local and foreign universities. Barisan Nasional would also guarantee an interesting and better life in rural areas; 8) On *social development*, the manifesto aimed to increase the quality of life of the people with a more conducive and impressive environment; 9) For Barisan Nasional, *education*, skills and positive values of the people were a pre-condition for future development; 10) on *Health*, the manifesto upheld the principle that prevention is better than cure; therefore, Barisan Nasional promised to provide more district hospitals, rural health centres, special treatment, and to wage a war against drugs; 11) *Freedom of religion* would be enhanced by the government; 12) they also agreed to prioritise *national unity and national integration*; 13) Barisan Nasional would also deliver quality services in the administrative machinery; and 14) in *Foreign Affairs*, Barisan Nasional promises to carry out its duties for the benefit of the people, while enhancing pride, friendship, and strengthening the independence and freedom of the country.

<sup>110</sup> The Barisan Nasional Manifesto 1990. See the conclusion page, and special issue of *Utusan Malaysia*, October 19, 1990.

Semangat 46 published a letter of appeal on behalf of the political parties opposing the Barisan Nasional with the theme 'Save Malaysia'<sup>111</sup>; they claimed that they could govern the country with their political and administrative experience. Barisan Nasional was accused of starting a campaign of fear, threatening instability because of their fear of losing power:<sup>112</sup>

The basic choice is simple, involving government leadership. You have seen how power has corrupted the BN. Stop the rot. Prevent absolute power before it corrupts absolutely. We want better policies and laws to ensure justice, freedom, progress and an end to money politics, corruption and waste.

In combating abuse of power, use of corruption, and waste of public funds, the oppositions pledged to deliver 10 vital points to the voters: i) to separate politics from business; ii) to guarantee freedom of the press; iii) to repeal any unjust laws; iv) to ensure an independent judiciary; vi) to eliminate poverty by the year 2000; vii) to guarantee a minimum wage and to increase civil service allowances; viii) to scrap tolls, road tax, and TV licence fees; ix) to repeal the Industrial Coordination Act; and x) to introduce a monthly social benefit allowance of \$100 for those over 55 years old. Semangat 46 also inserted the idea of the reestablishment the old UMNO as a main attraction for Malay voters. The letter, which could be seen as a common manifesto, also regarded the General Election of 1990 as time for change in order to discard money politics and corruption,<sup>113</sup> to strengthen checks and balances through

<sup>111</sup> See the opposition's manifesto in *Watan*, October 18, 1990.

<sup>112</sup> The manifesto highlighted Barisan Nasional's scandals and abuse of power which betrayed the people's trust. Among the scandals were: 1) the BMF scandal, costing the public over 2.5 billion ringgit as well as a loss of Petronas' funds; 2) the Maminco-Makuwasa scandal, costing the public approximately one billion ringgit; 3) the UMBC scandal, this clearly demonstrated the abuse of power by the UMNO Baru Finance Minister; 4) the deposit-taking cooperatives scandal and sale of Multi-Purpose Holding Berhad under dubious circumstances, both involving MCA leaders; 5) the UEM North-South Highway contract scandal, which gave a company controlled by UMNO Baru leaders a contract worth tens of billions of ringgit; 6) the privatisation of Bumiputera trust agencies, i.e. FIMA and Paremba, to Mahathir - Daim cronies at very cheap prices; 7) The 'Lallang operation' of October 1987 in which one hundred people from various walks of life were arrested and detained without trial, plus the closure of four newspapers; 8) the desperate legal deregistration of the original UMNO in February 1988 after cheating at the party elections of April 1987 in a bid to retain power; 9) the dismissal of the Supreme Court Lord President, Tun Salleh Abbas, and other independent judges; 10) the blue video tape scandal, which BN leaders covered up; and 11) the blatant intimidation and humiliation of former Lord President, Tun Mohamad Suffian, former Auditor-General, Tan Sri Ahmad Nordin and others, (who did not belong to any political party), who tried to form an independent Election Watch to ensure a fair and clean General Election.

<sup>113</sup> "...the law will be amended to make the Anti Corruption Agency truly independent and accountable only to the people through parliament ..



constitutional reforms,<sup>114</sup> to generate greater economic dynamism, to create a more caring society, to introduce more benefits for workers' families, to create genuine national unity,<sup>115</sup> to improve education for all, and to introduce a liberal foreign policy by which was meant a less 'confrontational' and 'anti-western' stance than that taken by Dr Mahathir.

The Barisan Nasional, through UMNO, questioned Semangat 46's attempt to change the government when that ruling government had been practising a compromising, accommodating and moderate style of politics based on consultation. So UMNO attacked the pledges of the opposition as containing many empty promises.<sup>116</sup>

UMNO and its allies characterized the opposition's coalition as *Barisan Celup* (a remould front) and questioned the ability of the opposition to govern the country based on five points: i) 33 years experience in governing the country and its capabilities in delivering national policies compared to the opposition; ii) Barisan Nasional claimed that there was no crisis of ideology within its component members since its ideology was 'National Development': in comparison, PAS subscribed to Islamic ideology, the DAP promoted secularism, and Semangat 46's ideology was not much different from UMNO. Parti Rakyat Malaya had dropped its 'socialist' image since the latest world developments had eroded the appeal of socialism as a political ideology, while AMIPF did not have any clear stand. For these reasons, Barisan Nasional argued that the country would be in chaos, the people would suffer a great loss and would witness a crisis of ideologies if the opposition were to win; iii) Barisan Nasional also tried to give proof of the country's economic performance, especially its

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...we also propose to amend the law to prohibit political donations, and also business investment by political parties. A law will be introduced to finance electoral campaigns with government funds to ensure that those who come to power in future do not 'buy' voters or become tools of particular business interests." 'Save Malaysia', *Watan*, October 18, 1990.

<sup>114</sup> " ...to ensure that parliament is really the highest legislative and political body on the land." Ibid.

<sup>115</sup> This includes the restoration of the rights and privileges promised to the people of Sabah and Sarawak, by reviewing federal state relations, and the rights and interests of the Orang Asli and indigenous communities of Sabah and Sarawak, Ibid.

<sup>116</sup> See the election pamphlet 'Semangat 46, DAP-PAS lawan Barisan Nasional' (n.d., n.p.), which was distributed to voters in the campaign. Hereafter this document is known as 'Semangat lawan Barisan'.

success in recovering from the great recession of 1985 and 1986; iv) Barisan Nasional also doubted the opposition's pledge for racial harmony in comparison with the efforts of Barisan Nasional; and v) on Federalism, Barisan Nasional claimed the success of its components in promoting good federal-state relationships, as compared with the opposition's political experiment. PAS had established an Islamic state in Kelantan, DAP had a secular government in Pulau Pinang, and Johor would have a socialist government if PRM were to get control of the state. Barisan Nasional then denounced the allied opposition as *perzinaan politik* (political prostitution)<sup>117</sup>

The opposition failed to resolve their differences in opposing Barisan Nasional. For example, PAS published its own manifesto '*Membangun Bersama Islam*' (Developing with Islam).<sup>118</sup> Due to the constraints of time, APU leaders, did not popularise the APU symbols, hence they agreed to use their own respective parties' symbols in the General Election. PAS and DAP admitted they could not work together on the issue of an Islamic state and *the hudud* law (Islamic Penal law) even after the election. They even confronted each other in some states.

UMNO and its allies in Barisan Nasional, as the ruling party, had more advantages in combating opposition. The party controlled almost all mainstream media and sources of information. UMNO local leaders and members had been playing the role of people at the grass-roots who were able to assault the opposition through their political actions such as campaign talks, whispering, propagating and disseminating rumours etc. This UMNO 'election army' had its formation in every village and district. In every UMNO Branch, an election operations room had been set up to monitor information concerning the voters. The 'ten houses' committee

<sup>117</sup> Dr Mahathir assumed co-operation among opposition parties to be an unholy and insincere alliance. PAS wanted to form an Islamic state, while Semangat 46 was against Islamic elements in government; both groups were led by political desperadoes. He called this alliance 'Barisan Tiruan' (the Imitation Front) and to him this was a hotch-potch of political opportunists sharing a common bed without even the formality of a political marriage. They 'smelt of adultery.' *Berita Harian*, June 10, 1990 'Pengertian Barisan Nasional' (The meaning of Barisan Nasional).

<sup>118</sup> See *Harakah*, October 12, 1990. The 34 page manifesto delivered to voters the concept of integrated development between moral and material developments. The PAS manifesto criticized Barisan Nasional's concept of development as separating out the moral aspects, which was seen as the root of severe competition, corruption, the misuse of power, and suppression. To PAS, this development gave priority to the ruling and rich groups, thus ignoring the poor.

functioned as an informant providing news on the latest trends in the areas under their charge. They also organised series of talks (*ceramah*), briefings, unity talks (*ceramah perpaduan*), and counter talks (*ceramah membasuh*). Organised official ceremonies such as 'gotong royong', opening ceremonies in community halls, and the ceremony of handing over of land titles or other created public functions, were other tactics used to disseminate information and to win over the voters.

Knowing their short comings in manipulating the mass media and in finance, Semangat 46 and its allies were relying on the voters to be attracted to their manifesto and their message on the need for reform and change.<sup>119</sup>

*Tukar* (to change) and *kesinambungan* (continuity) were the two options for voters. All parties launched their election machines to propagate and influence the voters through their own political skills, strategies and tactics.

The scenario of the 1990 election was different from the 1986 election<sup>120</sup> in two salient features; first of all, none of the parties could claim any electoral area as a 'safe constituency', and secondly, it seemed all the parties had committed supporters.

For UMNO, the 1990 election would decide the future of the Malays. The voters were reminded about the danger which arose in the 1969 election, when Perak and Selangor states nearly fell into the hands of the opposition. Malay voters were also reminded on the possible repercussions if present Malay power were to be lost to the opposition.<sup>121</sup> The fall of Melaka in 1511 caused by the crisis of Malay leadership and disunity in the community was also invoked in defence of UMNO power.<sup>122</sup> However, Semangat 46 refuted UMNO's political calculations by arguing that in the Malay Peninsula there were 132 Parliamentary seats, of which the Malays

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<sup>119</sup> See the letter to the voters from Tengku Razaleigh, President of Semangat 46 on behalf of the political parties opposing Barisan Nasional, entitled 'Mengenang Jasa Rakyat Malaysia'.

<sup>120</sup> See the investigative article 'Perpecahan Orang Melayu yang untung orang lain', *Dewan Masyarakat*, October 1989 p.9.

<sup>121</sup> See the statement of Megat Junid, UMNO Supreme Council member and the Home Affairs Deputy Minister, in *Watan*, May 5, 1990.

<sup>122</sup> *Watan*, July 14, 1990 quoting the speech of Ismail Said MP for Kemaman in an Eid-Adha gathering at Seri Bandi Primary School, Kemaman. He insisted Malays should learn from history and the collapse of the Malay empire. He accused the oppositions [especially Semangat 46] of being desperadoes struggling for their own interest whilst condemning others.

had 92 majority areas, the Chinese 42 (33 in the Peninsular, 3 in Sabah and 6 in Sarawak). Semangat 46 and PAS would only stand in the Malay majority areas. Therefore, "if UMNO lost in the coming General Election, it will not be the Malays who will lose power as feared by UMNO, but the UMNO leaders."<sup>123</sup> Semangat 46 considered the UMNO campaign tactics as a deception designed to corrupt the Malay mind.

To Semangat 46, if the General Election was delayed the party could increase its majority,<sup>124</sup> by ensuring that the election machinery was running smoothly. APU had already organised a gathering of party workers called 'Gerakerja Pilihanraya' (the election Operation) at Jerteh, Trengganu, which was launched by Tengku Razaleigh. It was reported that 14,000 Semangat 46, PAS, Berjasa and Hamim election workers attended the gathering.<sup>125</sup>

Parliament was officially dissolved on October 5, the nominations were fixed for October 11, and polling day was set for October 21. Time was very short, 'the shortest time for an election campaign in the history of General Elections in Malaysia'<sup>126</sup> However, undeclared political battles had already been going on for more than a year. UMNO was trapped by the opposition's tactics and strategy, which always questioned the ruling government's honesty in handling the election.<sup>127</sup> Dr Mahathir had invited a team of election observers which had been arranged by the Commonwealth Secretariat in London, after rejecting the formation of the so-called independent election watchdog led by former Lord President Sufian Hashim.

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<sup>123</sup> *Harakah*, January 26, 1990 which reported Tengku Razaleigh's campaign at Bintong, Perlis.

<sup>124</sup> *Watan*, May 17, 1990.

<sup>125</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>126</sup> *Berita Harian*, October 5, 1990. It was believed that the election was the first which had been held during the school term, as vacations began on October 26. Polling day had been traditionally held on Saturday, but was held on a Sunday in 1990.

<sup>127</sup> For example see *Watan*, June 2 and 5, 1990 which reported a case of a loss of electoral registration forms in Trengganu. In fact, the opposition parties supported the idea of forming an independent election watchdog led by former Lord President Tun Sufian Hashim and assisted by a few personalities that were critical of Dr Mahathir's governing style.

To reduce political casualties, candidates were carefully selected. UMNO Headquarters directed its States' Liaison Chairmen to submit their list of candidates to be considered by the party's top leaders. The final list of candidates was announced a day before nomination day. In all these preparations, strategies and tactics, UMNO and Semangat 46 led their allies.

On October 11, UMNO and Semangat 46 and their allies were preparing to envelop their target areas. October 21 was 'D day' for the occupation and capture of 'the hearts of the voters'. In drawing parallels between the election and warfare, the victory would be decided using five principles of war;<sup>128</sup> i) morale, ii) the climate [situation], iii) the terrain [location or ground], iv) the command [leadership], and v) organisation and discipline.

In terms of issues, Malay unity,<sup>129</sup> and racial and religious<sup>130</sup> overtones, intruded into the campaign. Even in the northern Malay states 10 months before the election the political situation was described as follows:<sup>131</sup>

"The atmosphere in the north eastern state of Kelantan is electric, crackling with political energy. Standout evidence: the banners and posters plastered along the main trunk road from Gua Musang all the way north to Kota Baru, 'You are now in the territory of Semangat 46,' asserts onesolemnly. Barisan Nasional (BN) emblems jostle uncomfortably alongside the sombre green tones of Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS). It is as if an election was just around the corner."

Leaders of APU were confident of winning at least 33 state seats out of 39 there, which would allow them to form a new government in Kelantan.<sup>132</sup> Going by

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<sup>128</sup> Sun Tzu (Trans), *The Art of War: A treatise on Chinese Military, Science compiled about 500 B.C.* (Singapore: Graham Brash, 1982), pp. 9 -10.

<sup>129</sup> Out of 7,086,737 registered voters there were 700,000 new voters, who had the potential to change the voting patterns and political power. Previously, the question of Malay unity had never been so important, but this election exposed it as a crucial issue in the nation's political future. Dewan Masyarakat highlighted six significant possible outcomes which might occur if the Malays were disunited: i) Malay power would be challenged; ii) Barisan Nasional could lose its two-thirds majority; iii) at least three states would be captured by the opposition; iv) DAP would capture another four additional constituencies; v) The Chinese vote would be a deciding factor that may give MCA and Gerakan the trump-card to demand more from UMNO; and vi) PAS would strengthen credibility, while the victory of Semangat 46 could worsen the present situation. *Dewan Masyarakat*, October 1989, p.8.

<sup>130</sup> See the comment of Ismail Kassim, 'Racial, religious overtones enter poll campaigns,' *The Straits Times Weekly Overseas Edition*, October 20, 1990, p.11.

<sup>131</sup> A report by S.Jayasankaran, 'Reading the signs' in *Malaysian Business*, January 16-31, 1990, p.9.

<sup>132</sup> Saiful Azhar Abdullah, 'Pact and Power Play,' *Malaysian Business*, January 16 31, 1990, p.16.

crowd size and noise generated, one could be tempted to conclude that APU would do well in the elections.<sup>133</sup> At the same time, the Kelantan state UMNO leaders also confirmed that "if we hold the general election this month [October] we'll lose Kelantan."<sup>134</sup> Dr Mahathir saw a delicate task for UMNO in trying to retain power in Kelantan. The unfavorable relationship between UMNO leaders and the Sultan of Kelantan was not to UMNO's advantage. Dr Mahathir had also felt a cold response from the Kelantanese when he visited the state, and he admitted the influence of Tengku Razaleigh there.<sup>135</sup> With good coverage from mainstream media, Dr Mahathir tried to cover-up the reality of the deteriorating situation in Kelantan. He attempted to convince voters that UMNO had sorted out its problems with the palace, so that the question of the palace affecting Barisan Nasional would not arise.<sup>136</sup>

Barisan Nasional, led by UMNO, had seen how aggressive the opposition's alliance could be in trying to wrest power from them. Based on reports from the door-to-door campaign, it seemed the voters were attracted to the opposition. Semangat 46's confidence could be seen from their pamphlet named '*Siapa Kata Barisan Nasional Tidak boleh kalah*' (Who Said That The National Front Cannot be defeated?). DAP in its campaign for Pulau Pinang used a psychological appeal, in which the theme was '500 is enough'.<sup>137</sup>

Dr Mahathir's personality was still the main issue in the opposition's campaign. He was blamed for any weaknesses and abuses in party and government. However, the mass media disseminated a positive image of Dr Mahathir as an administrator, world leader and visionary for the country's future.

<sup>133</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>134</sup> See a report 'In victory, new tests,' in *Asiaweek*, November 2, 1990, p.20.

<sup>135</sup> *Utusan Malaysia*, July 13, 1990. "Tiada lagi masalah dengan istana." [No more problems with the palace]

<sup>136</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>137</sup> It was implied that a mere five hundred vote swing to the opposition was needed in order to enable them to form the state government. See *Watan*, 10 July, 1990.

At the same time, the opposition parties offered Tengku Razaleigh as a credible alternative to lead the country. Lim Kit Siang, the DAP leader, asked voters for a 12% swing, which would cause Dr Mahathir to lose his two-thirds majority in Parliament. He claimed, should this happen, " the National Front has to accommodate, Mahathir has to bargain. Once he loses his two-thirds, he will have to come to terms with a pluralistic society, and therefore be more conciliatory."<sup>138</sup>

On the whole, all the manifestos delivered by Barisan Nasional and opposition parties were not particularly convincing. They failed to present a clear vision of the future of the nation. Barisan Nasional only emphasised the need for political continuity for the sake of peace, stability and prosperity, while the opposition delivered vague rhetoric and slogans of justice and freedom. While Gagasan manifestos promised a list of practical benefits and administrative improvement, PAS's manifesto 'Membangun Bersama Islam' [Developing with Islam] generally had the same idea but with the additional dimension of incorporating Islamic elements into certain sectors of the administration.<sup>139</sup>

However, Semangat 46 became a real challenge to UMNO. UMNO Vice President, Abdullah Badawi, said that for the first time in Malaysian history a group in opposition could be a successful united front in confronting the ruling party whose support was also fairly substantial.<sup>140</sup> The opposition was confident that Barisan Nasional would lose its two thirds majority, which had been unheard of since 1969.

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<sup>138</sup> Far Eastern Economic Review, October 4, 1990, p.12. In a printed pamphlet distributed to the public during the campaign, *Suara Belia Islam* showed itself to be more sympathetic to UMNO and the Malays, and quoted this statement as Lim Kit Siang's warning, which implied that whoever would be appointed Prime Minister, either Mahathir or Razaleigh, without a two-thirds majority, would have to submit to the Chinese demands. The pamphlet called for the Malays to be cautious of the DAP's long term plan to wrest power from the Malays. In fact, DAP was seen by the rural Malays and Malay leadership as the main vital political enemy.

<sup>139</sup> See the election report by Rustam A.Sani and Mustafa Mohamed Najimuddin, *Pilihanraya UMUM 1990: Mandat Baru Cabaran Baru*, in *Dewan Masyarakat*, November 1990, pp.24-37. PAS had changed its election strategy from 'storms to breezes', their previously hard-hitting, fundamentalist tactics having scared the electorate. When referring to the situation in Kedah in particular, the PAS leader said the change was "aimed at ensuring that PAS would secure more seats in the state assembly and at least some in Parliament." See Syed Abu Bakar, 'An uneasy alliance: APU members struggle to resolve some internal problems,' *Malaysian Business*, January 16-31, 1990, p.20.

<sup>140</sup> S.Jayasankaran, *Reading the signs*, p.10.

Table XIV  
*Semangat 46 Battle Grounds in the 1990 Election.*

States	Parliamentary	State Assembly
Perlis	1 [2]	6 [14]
Kedah	6** [14]	10 [28]
Kelantan	7 [13]	14** [39]
Trengganu	4 [8]	13 [32]
Pulau Pinang	1 [11]	7 [33]
Perak	8 [23]	19 [46]
Pahang	5 [10]	14* [33]
Selangor	7 [14]	23* [42]
Negri Sembilan	4 [7]	16* [28]
Federal Territory	2 [7]	
Melaka	4 [5]	9 [20]
Johor	12 [18]	21* [36]
Total	61 [132 ]	152 [351]

\* one seat contested by a candidate from AMIPF

\*\* one of the seats contested by Hamim's candidate.

[ ] The number of constituency.

Semangat 46 challenged UMNO in 61 parliamentary constituencies. In all, UMNO stood in 86 constituencies in a straight fight with Semangat 46 or PAS. Other Barisan Nasional components had to face DAP. In view of the above situation, the real battle was for the Malay heartland.<sup>141</sup> By nomination day, Semangat 46 had

<sup>141</sup> Far Eastern Economic Review, March 29, 1990. p.16. In 1986, out of 132 parliamentary seats in the Malay Peninsula, 92 were Malay-majority areas, 26 were predominantly Chinese, while 14 were mixed seats, with ethnic Indians holding the balance there. The number of registered voters had grown from 6.96 million in 1986 to 7.67 million in 1990. Semangat 46 aimed to wrest 33 seats in toppling Dr Mahathir's administration. Kelantan and Trengganu are the most Malay in character, more than 93 per cent of the registered voters being Malays, when compared with Perlis (82 per cent), Kedah (74 per cent), Pahang (64 per cent), and all other states, having less than 55 per cent, Khong Kim Iloong, *Malaysia's General Election*, p 27.



identified 61 parliamentary seats and 140 state assembly constituencies as their battlefields (Table XIV).

Because UMNO leaders also anticipated unfavourable developments, they prompted the tabling of two amendments to the constitution which had the potential of strengthening the government's position. On 14 March, 1990, the Dewan Rakyat passed an amendment barring MPs who resigned their seats from recontesting the same constituency within five years. On March 15, Parliament amended the Election Act to allow votes to be counted at each polling station instead of at district counting centres, as had been the case in the past.<sup>142</sup> These amendments along with the decision to invite 'election observers' from the Commonwealth Secretariat were part of a response designed to undermine the opposition's allegations concerning the honesty of the ruling government and were a move to safeguard public interests and a just election.

The question of Malay sovereignty and the Islamic religion have always been sensitive issues among Malays. When PBS announced its crossover to the opposition, in a move to attract more votes for the opposition, UMNO promptly manipulated the issue, reminding Malay voters of the threat to them.<sup>143</sup> UMNO also capitalized on the picture of Tengku Razaleigh wearing Kadazan traditional headgear, which sported a design that resembled a Christian cross on it, as proof that in his bid for power, Tengku Razaleigh had sold out the interests of Islam and its community.<sup>144</sup> Semangat 46 tried to counter these tactics by distributing a picture of Dr Mahathir

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<sup>142</sup> *Far Eastern Economic Review*, March 29, 1990, p.15. "The advantage is that this would reduce the chances of ballot boxes being tampered with. On the other hand, the voting record of every village could be easily identified. Given previous allegations of 'favouritism' - more development funds going to pro-government areas - opposition parties now fear that rural supporters would either abstain from voting or be victimised."

<sup>143</sup> There was a copy of a translated flying letter that was distributed in Sabah and the Malay Peninsula, which aroused religious sentiment. This letter influenced the minds of Malay voters in the Peninsula. It claimed to be from Pope John Paul II and was addressed to Pairin Kitingan, the PBS leader and Chief Minister of Sabah, and contained 13 points that would jeopardise the Muslim's position. The contents of this letter provided an effective weapon for the UMNO election machinery in rural areas.

<sup>144</sup> *Utusan Malaysia*, October 19, 1990. While the mainstream media splashed the picture of Tengku Razaleigh, RTM was broadcasting a special programme, 'RTM dan Anda' at 2045, October 18, 1990 as its latest weapon aiming to discredit Tengku Razaleigh.

himself wearing a similar one. However, the damage was done and caused 10 per cent swing vote to UMNO.<sup>145</sup> Therefore, PBS's defection on 15 October changed the pattern of Malay votes in favour of UMNO, except in Kelantan.<sup>146</sup> To worsen the situation, the mass media revealed Tengku Razaleigh's involvement in the BMF scandal, which ended with the assassination of a Bank Bumiputera officer, Jalil Ibrahim, who had investigated the case. Although his involvement was denied, and Tengku Razaleigh called these revelations part of a 'sinister conspiracy',<sup>147</sup> it still damaged his image as a potential Prime Minister of a future government.

Semangat 46 claimed that it had a 350,000 membership, while UMNO Baru claimed its own registered members had reached 1.3 million. However, the numbers were small compared to 10.4 million Malays of whom 51 per cent were eligible to vote, with only 31 per cent of the Malays generally voting. As a result, there was still an approximately 69 per cent residue which could be a deciding factor. Among them 20 per cent were new voters, 25 per cent of those were from the upper class, upper middle class or those who would not vote on the day; and another 25 per cent were undecided. From this distribution, it could be assumed that only 30 per cent of Malay voters had actually decided which party they would vote for before polling day.<sup>148</sup> Based on the patterns of Malay voting behaviour<sup>149</sup> in the last seven general elections and voting trends in previous by-elections<sup>150</sup>, this could indicate a threat to

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<sup>145</sup> *Far Eastern Economic Review*, November 1, 1990, p. 11.

<sup>146</sup> *Mingguan Politik*, November 16 - 30, 1990, and see also Khong Kim Hoong, *Malaysia's General Election 1990*, p.6. In an interview with Rais Yatim, I was informed that Pairin Kitingan had made the blunder; he should have declared that the PBS had deserted Barisan Nasional on October 19, two days before polling day. Rais Yatim was confident Semangat 46 would have gained more seats if Pairin Kitingan had stuck to this plan.

<sup>147</sup> *Far Eastern Economic Review*, October 25, 1990, p.11.

<sup>148</sup> *Ibid.*, p.10.

<sup>149</sup> *Ibid.*, The trend showed that : 1) the percentage of Urban Malays actually using their votes was still very small; 2) those in DAP stronghold constituencies, became reluctant voters, even though their votes might change the result of the election; 3) in general, the Malays did not support DAP ; and 4) in constituencies where both UMNO and PAS were strong, the 20 per cent of on-the-fence voters were a deciding factor.

<sup>150</sup> *Ibid.*, The proportion of Malays votes declined. This was said to be the main factor influencing Semangat 46's defeat in the Ampang Jaya by-election. In the areas where, traditionally, UMNO was strong, such as Parit Raja, the Malay voters were divided. In those constituencies where the Chinese were in the majority, such as in Bentung, their votes were the deciding factor, and generally Malay voters supported Barisan Nasional or independent candidates. In the areas where the Malay

UMNO. The internal problems of UMNO and the intense campaign to show the equal strength of UMNO and Semangat 46 in Kelantan<sup>151</sup> and Johor<sup>152</sup> made these two states together with Kedah and Perlis, the main battlefields between UMNO and Semangat 46 and PAS, in the battle of 'the myth of Malay unity'.<sup>153</sup>

### *The results: Victory and Defeats.*

In the end, it was clear that the voters had consistently given a two-thirds majority to Barisan Nasional. However, there was an indicator that the Malays in Kelantan and Trengganu in particular preferred to have a strong opposition in order to check the ruling government

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and Chinese voters were more or less equally distributed (such as Teruntum which consisted of 46.9% Malays and 46.5% Chinese) the character and personality of the candidate could influence the pattern of voting. With the exception of Bentong and Teruntum, the percentage of Barisan's votes declined by between 1 per cent (in Tanjung Puteri) and 28 per cent (in Ampang Jaya).

<sup>151</sup> The situation in Kelantan had changed. There had been internal squabbles in UMNO and strained relations between the Menteri Besar and the Sultan, the influence of Tengku Razaleigh was felt, as was the fact that Kelantan was a PAS stronghold. Therefore, the state was unstable. In July 1990, the opposition attacked UMNO, capitalising on the disloyalty of the Menteri Besar towards the Sultan as their 'capital' to cause UMNO to be rejected by the voters. They also tried to convince voters that they could secure 95 Parliamentary seats, and form a federal government and at the very least that they could control 6 states, Kelantan, Trengganu, Pulau Pinang, Perak, Kedah and Pahang (*Watan*, July 21, 1990, p.3). The opposition had given people the idea that they supported and were very loyal to the Sultan. They implied that the attitude of the Menteri Besar and a few UMNO State Assemblymen who were absent from the official ceremony to celebrate the Sultan's birthday, was directed against the Sultan (*Harakah*, August 3, 1990). The mainstream press portrayed the relationship between the state UMNO and the Sultan as recovering. Since July 1990, *Harakah* undermined UMNO with the allegation that UMNO was manipulating Electoral Registration lists enabling them to import voters from outside to cast votes in certain constituencies or by removing voters names to reduce the numbers and deny people the right to vote on polling day. PAS also alleged that there were syndicates which issued National Registration Identity Cards in order to ensure the opposition would be out-voted. (*Harakah*, August 1990). This became an open secret when the state UMNO came into conflict over choosing candidates for the party. There were two lists provided by the Menteri Besar and Hussein Ahmad, central UMNO Information Chief, respectively. Furthermore, the decline in the Menteri Besar's leadership invited another conflict when certain Kelantan UMNO leaders promoted themselves to be future Menteri Besar. Until polling day, the Menteri Besar was still confident that Kelantan voters would reject APU since they still needed Barisan's development projects and had experienced the failure of the PAS government to eradicate poverty. He denied APU was getting support from the Kelantanese stating that this was the propaganda of 'coffee-shop talk' (*Warisan Nasional*, October 15-17, 1990.)

<sup>152</sup> In Johor, UMNO had two factions, Musa Hitam's and Mohamad Rahmat's and also Semangat 46 led by Osman Saat and his loyalists. Thus Johor's political scenario concentrated on the competition between the three leaders as they attempted to retain and extend their influence, more than on the competition between UMNO-Semangat 46. It was only possible for Semangat 46 to reduce UMNO votes if the unity of Johor Malays was still unresolved.

<sup>153</sup> For the trend and pattern among Malay voters see Chapter VIII.

Table XV

*Total votes at 1990 Polls for the Malay political parties in the Malay Peninsula.*

Party	Total votes polled		% of votes		swing
	1986	1990	1986	1990	
UMNO	1,471,798	1,692,824	35.46	34.23	-1.12
S46	-	835,215	-	16.94	
PAS	710,545	374,050	17.12	7.59	-9.53
Hamim	29,943	---	0.72		
PRM	59,156	56,462	1.43	1.15	-0.2

Source: *Dewan Masyarakat*, November 1990, p.29.

On the whole, the opposition reduced the Barisan Nasional share of the parliamentary popular votes from 57 per cent in the 1986 polls to 52 per cent in 1990. In the Malay Peninsula, UMNO secured 29.6 per cent of the total votes, Semangat 46 amassed 14.39 per cent, PAS 6.5%, and PRM polled 0.99 per cent of the total parliamentary votes.<sup>154</sup>

UMNO suffered total defeat in Kelantan, losing all the 27 seats which it won in the 1986 election. All Parliamentary and state seats were lost to PAS<sup>155</sup> and Semangat 46. In Trengganu, two Parliamentary seats were lost to PAS and Semangat 46, but UMNO retained 22 out of 31 state seats. The party also lost one of the state seats in Johor, Selangor and Pahang to Semangat 46 .

Generally, Semangat 46 not only failed to deny Dr Mahathir power, it was also rejected by the Malays in states other than Kelantan and Trengganu. Except for Tengku Razaleigh, the President, who retained his Gua Musang Parliamentary seat,

<sup>154</sup> *New Straits Times*, October 23, 1990.

<sup>155</sup> PAS had secured all 24 state seats, and six parliamentary seats. The party also wrested the Marang constituency from UMNO which enabled them to send Haji Hadi Awang, the party vice-president, to Parliament for the first time and at the same time to lead PAS in the Trengganu State Assembly. Berjasa, a splinter of the PAS won a Kelantan state seat, and with another 14 seats won by Semangat 46, PAS formed a coalition state government.

Ibrahim Ali, the Youth leader, who retained his Pasir Mas seat, and Manan Othman, the Trengganu state leader who had wrested Kuala Trengganu Parliamentary seat from UMNO, all other leaders of Semangat 46 lost in the battle for seats. Rais Yatim lost to a newcomer, Ibrahim Sareh in the Parliamentary constituency of Jelebu by 395 votes. In Batu Kikir state seat Rais Yatim was rejected by the voters when he only managed to poll half of the number of votes polled by the UMNO candidate. Ibrahim Azmi Hassan, the Vice President failed to retain his seat of Kuala Nerus which he had previously won with a majority of 7,296. Vice President and also Perak state party leader, Abdul Malik Ahmad, lost to his former political adversary, Hamdi Abu Bakar of UMNO in Pengkalan Baru state seat, the latter securing a majority of 2,409 votes. Hisan Ibrahim, the Party Deputy state leader in Perak also lost to Zainab Ibrahim of UMNO who won with a majority of 2,583 votes. Yet another Semangat 46 leader who failed to retain his seat was Zakaria Abdul Rahman of Besut, Trengganu. He was defeated by Dr Yusof Nor, a Minister in the Prime Minister's Department who had been transferred from his safe seat in Setiu<sup>156</sup> in order to destroy one of Semangat 46's strongholds in Trengganu.<sup>157</sup>

In Selangor and Kuala Lumpur Federal Territory, Semangat 46 was not able to get even a single seat, apart from the state seat of Telok Panglima Garang in Selangor, which was taken from MCA. The party Secretary General, Haji Suhaimi Kamaruddin, lost to his former private secretary, who stood on the UMNO ticket, by a majority of 9,363 votes. Rahmah Othman, the party's Women's leader, failed in a defense of her parliamentary seat of Shah Alam, when she only polled 25,129 votes compared to 41,767 votes secured by the UMNO candidate. Harun Idris not only lost

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<sup>156</sup> In 1986, he contested the Setiu seat and won with a majority of 5,872, polling 14,714, as against his opponent from PAS who received 8,842 votes. In the 1990 election, the Setiu seat was given to Tengku Mahmud Mansor who was transferred from the state seat of Permaisura in the Setiu Parliamentary constituency, who then was appointed Federal Deputy Minister of Primary Industry.

<sup>157</sup> Zakaria Abdul Rahman won the Besut Parliamentary seat in 1986 on the UMNO ticket. He polled 15,240 votes, the PAS candidate securing 10,287 votes, a majority of 4,953. In the 1990 election, he was beaten by Dr Yusof Nor by a majority of 994 votes. (He lost with 15,154 votes and Dr Yusof Nor won with 16,148 votes.) Zakaria Abdul Rahman claimed that Dr Yusof Nor won through the postal votes.

the battle for the state Morib seat in Selangor but also lost in his bid for Titiwangsa parliamentary seat. His son, Mazlan Harun, failed to retain his stronghold, the Lindungan seat. Fahmi Ibrahim, another Harun Idris loyalist, lost in the UMNO stronghold of Ulu Kelang. Nevertheless, despite the general overall defeat, Semangat 46 had shown that it could win half of the votes polled in the main battlegrounds.

In the 1990 election, the Malays of the east coast put a stop to UMNO's tradition of giving safe seats to MCA in the capitals of Kelantan and Trengganu. Padang Garung in Kelantan was won by Berjasa, while PAS took over the seat of Bandar in Trengganu. It was the same story for the state seat of Pulau Tawar in Pahang, where the Malay voters decided to accept Semangat 46, instead of Barisan Nasional, which was represented by the MCA. All these three state seats had more than 55% Malay voters, while the Telok Panglima Garang state seat of Selangor had 60% Malay voters.

Though Semangat 46 performed well, the party nevertheless failed to win enough votes to be translated into seats. Instead, the result prompted questions concerning its future durability.<sup>158</sup> *Utusan Melayu* commented that Tengku Razaleigh's victory and that of seven other members had come from parochial regionalistic sentiment. The election gave a clear indication that Tengku Razaleigh's influence was regionally confined, and it also confirmed that the present UMNO was the only UMNO to be accepted by the Malays generally.<sup>159</sup> APU and Gagasan Rakyat as an alternative government had been rejected by the people.<sup>160</sup> Generally, it seemed the electorate voted for stability, peace and prosperity.

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<sup>158</sup> Khong Kim Hoong, *Malaysia's General Election 1990*, p.41.

<sup>159</sup> See a review 'Masa depan Tengku Razaleigh telah jelas,' *Utusan Malaysia*, October 23, 1990, p.2.

<sup>160</sup> The Editorial of *Utusan Malaysia*, October 23, 1990.

Table XVI  
*The Political Parties in the Dewan Rakyat in 1986 and 1990.*

Party	1986 Election	1990 Election	add (+) less (-)
UMNO	73	71	-2
MCA	17	18	+1
MIC	6	6	
Gerakan (GRM)	5	5	
USNO	5	6	+1
PBB	8	10	+2
PBDS	4	4	
SUPP	4	4	
SNAP	5	3	-2
DAP	24	20	-4
PBS	10	14	+4
Semangat 46	12*	8	-4
PAS	1	7	+6
Independent	3	4	+1

\*Defected from UMNO after the formation of UMNO Baru in 1988.

The New Straits Times, commenting on the victory of PAS and Semangat 46 in Kelantan, reflected on how alive democracy was in Malaysia. PAS was clearly able to capitalise on chinks in UMNO's armour. While commenting that parochial politics was still strong in Sabah, it added that the loss of Kelantan to PAS and

Semangat 46 came as a surprise only to those not familiar with the mind of the local electorate.<sup>161</sup>

Watan commented that PAS's and Semangat 46's victory in Kelantan was due more to a protest by local UMNO members than a love of the PAS. The attitude of UMNO's leaders was blamed for the loss. To a certain extent, this was due to their complacency, over-confidence and deprecation of the importance of several issues which highlighted their arrogance."<sup>162</sup> While rejecting regionalism as a factor in UMNO's loss in Kelantan, Watan believed the main reason to be the failure of the local UMNO leaders to respond to the sensitivities of the Kelantanese.<sup>163</sup> Nevertheless, in terms of leadership, there was no alternative to Tengku Razaleigh in the Kelantan UMNO. UMNO had no leader who could stand up to PAS, Tengku Razaleigh alone could get along with the palace and unite the Kelantanese.<sup>164</sup>

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<sup>161</sup> See the supplement of the *New Straits Times*, 'General Election '90 results,' October 23, 1990, p.1.

<sup>162</sup> See a review article by Fahim Haji Yaacob, 'Minda Kelantan sukar dibaca,' [The Kelantanese Mind is difficult to read] *Watan*, October 30, 1990, p.4. The article presented an analysis of political trends, based on the history of elections in Kelantan. The writer rejected the idea of regionalism as the cause of the Barisan Nasional defeat in the state. It had often been the case that the political parties fielding non-Kelantanese candidates had won the election. In the 1955 election Khalid Awang Osman of Kedah won the election on the UMNO ticket. In 1959, PAS had imported its leaders Zulkifli Mohamad of Perak, Raja Hanifah of Negri Sembilan, Osman Abdullah of Perak, and Abu Bakar Hamzah of Perlis to represent Kelantan in Parliament. PAS controlled Kelantan from 1959 to 1978 but was rejected by the voters from 1978 to 1990.

<sup>163</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>164</sup> *Far Eastern Economic Review*, October 11, 1990, p.13.



Table XVII

*The Result of the 1990 Election for Parliamentary seats in Kelantan*

Constituency	BN majority in 1986	APU Majority in 1990	Swing votes From UMNO to PAS/46
P 17 Tumpat	1,710	11,662	9,992
P 18 Pengk. Chepa	4,175	17,447	13,272
P 19 Kota Baru	5,033	15,460	10,427
P.20 Pasir Mas	3,808	9,290	5,482
P.21 Rantau P'jang	1412	6,777	5,365
P.22 Nilam Puri	552	8,139	7,587
P.23 Bachok	270	12,524	12,254
P.24 Pasir Putih	2,769	7,702	4,933
P.25 Kok Lanas	3,124	19,203	16,079
P.26 Tanah Merah	3,547	9,525	5,978
P.27 Machang	1,397	7,738	6,347
P.28 Kuala Krai	1,910	9,895	7,985
P.29 Gua Musang	7,319	13,249	5,930

*The voting Patterns and Regionalism.*

There are 92 out of the 132 Parliamentary constituencies in the Malay Peninsula which have Malay majorities. However, UMNO contested in 86 constituencies in which it was challenged by Semangat 46 and PAS (Table XII). The results of the Kelantan, Trengganu, Kedah, Johor and Perlis elections showed the voters' behaviour, but it is necessary to view the voting patterns.

There are many factors influencing voting patterns, such as; region, age, sex, policies and issues, and 'image'. Except Kelantan, in all other states, Malay voters still stayed loyal to UMNO. These were the 'deferential voters' who deferred to traditional authority, believing that UMNO leaders had superior qualities. There were some so-called 'secular' voters, who voted UMNO when they judged this party to be more successful in bringing about benefits in their daily life. Most of these were rural voters who feared a change in government. In urban areas, Malay voters were divided; in Malay majority areas such as Titiwangsa and Pantai in Kuala Lumpur Territory, they supported UMNO; in other areas they were not bound so much to party loyalty as personalities.

Most of the deferential voters were women who became the target of 'perayu undi' and 'Jawatankuasa 10 buah Rumah'. But in Kelantan, women voters swung to the opposition because of the changing environment in that state, including the fact that UMNO was associated with Dr Mahathir's image, the influence of Tengku Razaleigh, and PAS. However, regional sentiment played important roles in Kelantan, not only because they wanted to lead the voting trend, but also because they wanted to have Tengku Razaleigh, their 'favourite son' as the new government leader.

Compared to voters in the west coast, Malay voters on the East coast, especially the Kelantanese, seemed to be 'floating voters' who were not committed to a particular party, and who therefore could change their party allegiance in any particular General Election. However, they could be considered as sophisticated political participants who knew how to use their votes. The Kelantan voters had already experienced changes in government, and they had voted PAS in the 1959 election as a sign of their displeasure with UMNO's compromises over the independence negotiations, later again changing their voting behaviour in the 1982 General Election to support UMNO.

Religion played an important role in Kelantan, Trengganu and Kedah which still have the traditional Islamic education institutions called 'Pondok' or Madrasah.

These institutions and their surrounding areas became strongholds of PAS. These areas were called 'black areas' for UMNO, with PAS manipulating the religious issue to convince voters. However, UMNO also used religion to destroy Semangat 46 after PBS deserted Barisan Nasional before polling day; they suggested that the pact between Semangat 46 and PBS jeopardized Islam and Malay power.

Malay voters were also influenced by fear of their future when UMNO convinced them that APU and Gagasan Rakyat would not be capable of forming a stable government, owing to their differences in ideology and main objectives. Generally, however, the non-Malay voters tended to vote for the opposition.

The Malay elites who were in the urban areas seemed to have contributed to the increase of the non-voting rate. UMNO leaders expressed their worries about the attitude of this elite who formed part of Malay middle class. It was not quite clear whether this indicated a protest against UMNO or the political system as a whole.

Another new pattern which appeared in this election was the attitude of young voters, in both urban or rural areas. Even some UMNO leaders were prepared to admit that there was a trend indicating that many young and new voters were increasingly siding with the opposition.<sup>165</sup>

It could be concluded that Malaysian politics is fundamentally the politics of the rural grassroots, UMNO still holding the support of the rural voters. These latter were reluctant to change to a new government of which they were unsure.

Semangat 46 failed, except in Kelantan, to effect a swing of support of between 10 and 25 percent of UMNO's votes, since the Malay voters still held to their loyalty to party more than to personalities. This factor contributed to the victory of other parties in Barisan Nasional. Nevertheless, Semangat 46's top leaders who contested seats in Jelebu, Bagan Serai, Lembah Pantai and Shah Alam managed to effect a small swing away from UMNO, but it was not enough to ensure their victory.

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<sup>165</sup> See *The New Straits Times*, the column entitled 'Little support from young voters,' October 23, 1990, p.3, which quoted a statement given by Dr Hamid Pawan The, Menteri Besar of Perlis in a press conference after the election.

The victory of Barisan Nasional, particularly of UMNO, was accomplished by gaining the confidence of the people through its simple ideology of developmentalism. Though this ideology seemed to be conservative in nature, it accorded with the attitude of the Malays who were reluctant to face a total, or revolutionary change. However, the opposition charged Barisan Nasional with exploiting religion, rousing communal emotions, raising fears with threats of national disasters, race riots and economic strife and influencing voters with money politics.<sup>166</sup>

However, there was a noticeable trend, where urban voters seemed to be inclined to opposition parties, while rural voters, except in Kelantan tended to support Barisan Nasional. It was therefore possible that Barisan Nasional would have a tough time in future not only in winning the hearts and minds of the urban voters, who rejected them though they had benefited from development, but at the same time UMNO would have to continue to give thought to development for the rural voters as a reward for their loyalty. It was clear from the election that the voters wanted *wakil rakyat* to work in their interests. To some extent, the time when a *wakil rakyat* could win a seat, easily, had gone.<sup>167</sup> Internal problems in UMNO and Barisan Nasional component members<sup>168</sup> were among the main factors reducing the Barisan Nasional majority. These developments shaped the pattern of the General Election.

The crisis in UMNO had divided the Malays; with the re-creation of UMNO and the formation of Semangat 46, the political battleground had changed from Court to by-elections, and had finally progressed to a bigger 'battlefield' -the General Election. It also meant a bitter and heated campaign that had gone on for more than a year before the dissolution of Parliament on October 5, 1990. Malay unity had become but a political myth deployed by both UMNO and Semangat 46. While

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<sup>166</sup> Far Eastern Economic Review, November 1, 1990 which quoted Tengku Razaleigh's statement.

<sup>167</sup> See the commentary article by Rosnah Majid, 'UMNO kekal parti no.1,' *Utusan Malaysia*, October 23, 1990, p.2.

<sup>168</sup> See Far Eastern Economic Review, October 18, 1990, pp.12-13.

UMNO claimed it was the party that replaced the original UMNO, Semangat 46 still believed that, if the Malays needed the old-style UMNO, it was the Semangat 46 they should support. However, the Malays continued to give support to UMNO, which showed their preference for unity under an UMNO using the original UMNO motto, emblem, and constitution, although this had been slightly amended. In fact, UMNO and Semangat 46 inherited the old UMNO's culture; but with all its experience, strength and facilities as the ruling party, UMNO Baru took an advantage in deploying its election-winning strategy and tactics. They managed to push Semangat 46 into political obscurity, from a national party to a merely regional party. Nevertheless, the war between UMNO and Semangat 46 did not cease. Dr Mahathir launched yet another attack after the election on what he saw as intervention from the Kelantan palace,<sup>169</sup> one of the main factors for UMNO's setback in that state.<sup>170</sup> This was a major issue discussed in the UMNO General Assembly in November 1990.<sup>171</sup> For their part, Semangat 46 and PAS condemned UMNO's attempt to belittle the Sultan, which could lead to negative sentiment towards the whole monarchical system.

UMNO used tactical slogans such as Malay unity, security and development as election weapons which were accepted as part of the UMNO political myth. With its supremacy as a ruling party, UMNO influenced Malay minds to be 'grateful' (bersyukur and mengenang budi) to them for providing development and security and,

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<sup>169</sup> He commented that he believed it was the action of certain people which contributed to the severe defeat of Barisan Nasional in Kelantan. Other factors were partisan attitudes of some government officers, and a strong sense of regionalism among the Kelantanese with the aim of overthrowing Barisan Nasional [UMNO]. *Utusan Malaysia*, October 23, 1990. p.1.

<sup>170</sup> UMNO claimed the sultan's car had been used for political campaigning, spreading the word that the Sultan had ordered voters to lend support for a certain party (Semangat 46), and that the party's flags flew in the Kelantan royalty's residences. See a statement given by Farid Ariffin, a Deputy Minister, in response to Tengku Razaleigh's statement in *Watan*, *Utusan Malaysia*, November 28, 1990, p.2.

<sup>171</sup> The UMNO General Assembly approved a resolution on the Rulers and the Constitution which appealed to the monarchs to uphold the Federal and State Constitutions in order to guarantee the integrity, sovereignty and survival of these institutions. The resolution also urged monarchs to ensure all Federal and state institutions under their jurisdiction were not abused for political purposes. It also urged rulers to be sensitive to the fact that in a parliamentary democracy, political leaders are given a mandate by the people through a general election. See *New Straits Times*, December 3, 1990.

not least, Malay dominance. However, this supremacy was challenged when Chinese and Indian votes determined the result in mixed and marginal seats.

The 1990 election was a vital factor for UMNO in regaining its reputation and legitimacy as the representative of the Malays and as leader of Barisan Nasional. To Mahathir, victory in the General Election along with the party election a month later, confirmed that his leadership was still needed by the Malays. The election gave him a strong hand to mould the party the way he wanted. Moreover by the time he took his oath as Prime Minister, he had been in government office for ten years. Therefore, Dr Mahathir was steadily building an image of statesmanship and vision before he decided to leave government and politics. He put forward the idea of 'wawasan 2020' (the 2020 vision) through which he hoped Malaysia would achieve 'developed nation' status.<sup>172</sup> He himself tabled in Parliament the National Economic Policy and the sixth Malaysia Development Plan. In the party, Dr Mahathir had changed his style in consolidating and uniting the Malays. He also provided an endorsement of the extension of UMNO into Sabah, which had been planned for sometime, now considered timely and appropriate; because of the uncordial State-Federal relationship, USNO had also become a declining organization which was willing to transform into itself Sabah UMNO in order to regain political power in that state..

The UMNO Election in November 1990 had another vital implication. Although Dr Mahathir did not give any sign of withdrawing from the party or government, the election of the party Vice Presidents reflected the line up of UMNO successors when Dr Mahathir would decide 'voluntarily' to hand over the party leadership. At the same time, the 1990 General Election promised to be a watershed in political development. As a result, the 1993 UMNO General Assembly and 1995 General Election will be further significant events for UMNO which will contribute to further development in Malay political culture, and Malaysian politics in general.

<sup>172</sup> For a brief discussion on the 2020 Vision see Chapter 8 and the Conclusion.

## Chapter Eight

### *The Malay Political Culture: Present and Future in UMNO.*

Malaysian politics has been characterized by a confrontation of incompatible cultures;<sup>1</sup> Malay and Chinese. This chapter will examine Malay political culture<sup>2</sup> as practised in UMNO. This study will analyse some of the personality traits of the UMNO leaders, and the political orientation of its members. In addition, I will also examine its leader-grassroots relations, and the pattern of the future development of the party, based on party traditions and current political trends. UMNO and PAS have inherited the traditions of Malay culture, the difference being that PAS has relied more on its image as an Islamic fundamentalist and revivalist organization as its main means of gaining power and uniting the Malays. On the other hand, UMNO has emphasised Malay nationalism, and relied on its flexibility to accommodate itself to a changing environment.

As was mentioned in chapter one, pervasive patron-client relationships<sup>3</sup> are the basis of the Malay social structure. The Malay system of values and behavioural norms has its own peculiarity. The sources of power and politics are derived from traditional ideas based on status, hierarchy and the ritualistic pattern of deference,<sup>4</sup> and also from Islamic sources. Nevertheless, UMNO is an institution constantly shaping and being shaped by forces from within and without itself. There were changes in the elements of Malay political culture after Dr Mahathir became Prime Minister, arising from his view that a national political leader should play a major role

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<sup>1</sup> See Lucian W. Pye, *Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority* (Cambridge, Mass: The Belnap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985), pp.248 - 255.

<sup>2</sup> See the Introductory Chapter for the definitions and concepts of Political Culture that are referred to in this Chapter.

<sup>3</sup> A theoretical critique of the patron client relationship, with special reference to Malay peasant society, was put forward by Shamsul Amri Baharuddin in 'Patron Client relationships in peasant society: a theoretical critique and a revaluation of its application to Malay society,' *Akademika*, 17, July 1980, pp. 79-98.

<sup>4</sup> Lucian W. Pye 1985, *Asian Power and Politics*, pp. 248-55. Pye mentions that Malaysia has two dominant political cultures, Malay and Chinese which are constantly adjusting to each other in forming a united Malaysian political culture. Pye's views on political culture in Malaysia are mentioned in G.P. Means 1990, *Malaysian Politics*, pp.288-291.

in creating and shaping a new political culture.<sup>5</sup> To some of his cabinet members, Dr Mahathir himself is regarded as a store of ideas.<sup>6</sup>

The UMNO leadership question has been a source of controversy and crisis, in which power, wealth, and status have been the main factors. Political illiteracy, dependency on the ruling elite, a strong preference for development, and increasing materialism have been the main traits of UMNO members, the leaders' and members' needs being channelled through political communication in a continuum of patron-client relationships.<sup>7</sup>

*UMNO Members: Retainers or Followers.*

The attitudes and beliefs which moulded Malay political thought originated from the people's traditions and environments which contributed to their particular sentiments. These attitudes, beliefs and sentiments give order and meaning to the political process that governs behaviour and are core components in examining the orientations toward different elements in the political order.<sup>8</sup>

There are three basic types of orientation: orientations toward governmental structure; orientations toward others in the political system; and orientations toward one's own political activity.

*Orientations toward Governmental structures:*

The majority of UMNO members believe that the party controls the government, and the Barisan Nasional government, led by UMNO, has been accepted as the protector of the Malays. This regime orientation has been a feature of the older

<sup>5</sup> G.P.Means, *ibid*, p.292.

<sup>6</sup> An interview with Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, Minister of Foreign Affairs and UMNO Vice President, at York House, London, October 8, 1991.

<sup>7</sup> The patron-client relationship is characterised by: i) a face to face dyadic vertical relationship, in which actors have unequal status, political power, and economic resources; ii). an asymmetric reciprocity and mutuality, where the patron provides material goods, while the client in return delivers his support; iii). 'actors' trying to maintain harmonious relationships in order to continue to enjoy benefits accruing from such relationships. See James C.Scott, 'Patron-client politics and political change in Southeast Asia,' *American Political Science Review*, 66 (1), 1972, pp.92-95. and Shamsul Amri Baharuddin, 'Patron-client relationship,' pp. 82-83.

<sup>8</sup> See Walter A.Rosenbaum 1975, *Political Culture*, p.6.



generation of Malays in the rural areas, who remember the struggle for independence, and their previous backwardness in economic and political development. This is the Malay generation, which is more inclined toward maintaining Malay solidarity and protecting Malay power. Even the new Malay intellectuals, although they have become more open-minded, have learnt lessons from the political experiences of the Malayan emergency of 1948, the Hartal of 1949, the May 13 incident of 1969 and other challenges from the Chinese community, and realized the need for strong Malay personalities to direct the party and the nation. Nearly 80 per cent of Malay intellectuals hold the view that the relationship between Parliamentary democracy and pre-parliamentary institutions or local traditions is compatible.<sup>9</sup> However, the younger Malay generation who received their education during the period of the New Economic Policy, and who received their tertiary education abroad, have different views concerning regime orientation. Those who were influenced by the western ideas on freedom, justice and equality, have disassociated themselves from Malay identity, criticizing the existence of the special privileges for the Malays and the New Economic Policy, which they have viewed as unjust and racist. Those who were influenced by Islamic revivalists in the United Kingdom, the United States of America and some of the so-called Islamic countries, that have propagated universalism, have rejected Malay privileges, the New Economic Policy, and have also refused to be identified as Malays but as belonging to the Muslim *ummah* (community).<sup>10</sup> The 1990 General Election showed that there existed a trend among the new Malay voters towards supporting the opposition. Nevertheless, UMNO has shown that it is still 'the number one political party'<sup>11</sup>. To the Malays, the election confirmed that UMNO, now led by Dr Mahathir, was generally acceptable. Indeed, UMNO now dominates 71 out of 86 Malay majority constituencies. The Malay

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<sup>9</sup> Daniel Regan, 'Intellectuals, Religion, and Politics in a Divided Society: Malaysia.' (Unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Yale University, 1977), p.163

<sup>10</sup> See Chapter III and IV.

<sup>11</sup> Rosnah Majid, 'UMNO Kekal Parti No.1,' *Utusan Malaysia*, Tuesday, October 23, 1990 p.6.

voters still want UMNO but, at the same time, they would like UMNO leaders to be more 'accommodating' in handling Malay affairs and their future.

However, the Malays in urban areas seem to be divided as a result of the UMNO conflict. For example, in Johor Bahru, Jaafar Onn of Semangat 46 polled 16,814 votes and the UMNO candidate received 24,980 votes to win the election. In Lembah Pantai, UMNO won by securing 25,643 votes, while its opponent from Semangat 46, Marina Yusof, polled 18,309. Mazlan Harun of Semangat 46, who failed to retain his Lindungan Selangor State seat, managed to collect only 9,383 votes, while his opponent polled 14,913 votes. Rahmah Othman, Semangat 46 Wanita Chief, lost her seat when she polled only 28,129 votes compared with her former colleague from UMNO who received 41,767. To a certain extent, the urban Malays seem to have become more individualistic and reluctant to support or to be patronised by UMNO. These trends have worried UMNO leaders, who have emphasised the contribution of the organization to the well-being of the Malays.<sup>12</sup>

Turning to the rural areas, for example in Bagan Serai, Zainal Abidin Zin, Semangat 46 Information Chief, was defeated by a newcomer from UMNO, securing only 11,822 votes to his opponent's 14,824 votes. Rais Yatim, the Semangat 46 Deputy President was defeated by a few hundred votes by another newcomer. In Trengganu, Haji Ibrahim Azmi, one of the Semangat 46 Vice Presidents lost his seat in Kuala Nerus by 3,000 votes; and the most unlucky person was Semangat 46 Supreme Council member, Zakaria Abdul Rahman of Besut, who lost to Dr Yusof Nor by just 900 votes, after he had represented the constituency for two terms, while Tengku Seri Paduka Raja Tengku Ibrahim of Semangat 46 was particularly lucky, winning a state seat in Trengganu by a very slim majority of 16 votes. These were cases that manifested divisions among the Malays. However, the Malay custom of

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<sup>12</sup> See *New Straits Times*, September 18, 1991, p.2 for the statement of Dr Ibrahim Saad, Deputy Chief Minister and also Deputy Chairman of state UMNO of Pulau Pinang.

rejecting radical change continued to help the maintenance of the status quo. These attitudes worked to the advantage of UMNO.

Concerning the constitution, the Malay masses, and UMNO members at branch level especially, are not fully aware of the implications of bills that are passed by Parliament. They simplistically believe that the government is always benevolent toward the *rakyat*. Debates in Parliament do not attract the attention of the majority of the people, only a few interested groups scrutinize closely the legislative process. Even among Malay intellectuals, 68.7 per cent believe the Parliament was not too slow in making decisions.<sup>13</sup>

The belief that UMNO leaders in government have always protected the interests of the people has been part of Malay culture. However, evidence from personal observation suggests that some poor Malays in Kelantan, especially the trishaw operators, are generally of the opinion that there would be basically no difference between a government run by the Malay opposition or by UMNO, and there would be no change in their life. They were only drawn to constitutional issues when this became public after the mass media had blown issues out of proportion, as happened in the 1983 Constitutional crisis. Because of their traditions and the choice of giving their loyalty, to either the UMNO leaders or their Sultan, the Malays found themselves in a dilemma.

In viewing the patterns of support shown during the constitutional crisis at 1983, it seems that the monarchical system in Malaysia is coming increasingly under challenge from the Malay political elite. Recently, PAS and Semangat 46 exploited the issue by giving support to the monarchy, and at the same time, they blamed UMNO for provoking challenges from its members to traditional institutions. In fact, most of the monarchs support UMNO, and only a few Sultans, prominent among them the Sultan of Kelantan, have been against Dr Mahathir's position since the constitutional crisis in 1983.

<sup>13</sup> Daniel Regan 1977, 'Intellectuals, Religion, and Politics', p.162.

The ruling monarchs have taken account of the erosion of their influence in the Malay community. Thus they are now preparing their heirs through educational, administrative and business experiences for a changing role. In the climax of the New Economic Policy, Malay politicians and bureaucrats expressed their concern when their Sultans were manipulated by Chinese businessmen, and those who were associated with the Rulers, in competing for tin mining and timber logging concessions, land titles for housing and township development, contracts and also other business opportunities.<sup>14</sup> At that time, some urban and educated Malays began to imply that the monarchical system was a liability to the Malays. However, despite criticism of the Rulers' personalities, the institution still continues to endure for the time being, because Malays feel that the system is still compatible with Malaysia's political system as a whole. Even UMNO's constitution itself agrees to uphold and to defend the constitutional monarchy. Realizing the sensitivity of the Malay masses on this issue, Dr Mahathir convinced the people that open debate on this question was not intended to change the monarchical system or foment a revolution, but rather to save the system itself.<sup>15</sup>

The Malays generally concede that the Rulers have considerable influence, and that there will always be people who want to exploit such influence for economic and political reasons. The UMNO leaders have tried to avoid this competition of influence, since they feel that they should be the real ruling elite. Therefore, they feel that the support of the people to subordinate the monarchy as the ruling government is needed.<sup>16</sup>

Until 1991, the debate on the Rulers was still a burning issue in the UMNO General Assembly, involvement of some members of royalty in business and

<sup>14</sup> See the translation of the speech by Dr Mahathir made at the 1991 UMNO General Assembly in *New Straits Times*, Saturday, November 9, 1991, pp.8-10.

<sup>15</sup> *New Straits Times*, December 3, 1990, p.1.

<sup>16</sup> *New Straits Times*, December 3, 1990, p.2 'Dr M speaks on Rulers and the Constitution.'

interference in government administration being particularly controversial. The Assembly exposed the Sultan of Selangor, who was involved in business, by producing a list of properties and projects allocated to or obtained for himself and his associates.<sup>17</sup> It was believed that the Selangor UMNO was chosen by the top UMNO leaders to be the vanguard of a renewed attempt to rein in erring Rulers, because their state monarch was one of the culprits.<sup>18</sup> The Assembly then asked for a clear demarcation between the special privileges of the Rulers, and areas in which the people or Bumiputeras should be free to participate, without unfair competition.<sup>19</sup> It was even proposed that elections where there was evident monarchical involvement should be nullified.<sup>20</sup> Thus, the traditional relationship between Malays and their Rulers, and changes in the institution of monarchy will depend on the type of personality that will emerge from within both UMNO and the monarchy itself.

Most Malays, especially UMNO members, are proud of their leader, Dr Mahathir, who frequently speaks out on behalf of the Third World Countries at international forums. Dr Mahathir is seen as a figure who is brave enough to express his ideas on the role of the superpowers and the rights of small countries, the United Nations, cooperation among the developing countries etc. At first he shocked the nation with his idea of the 'Look East Policy', 'Buy British Last', 'the South-South dialogue' and G15, his stand on the Commonwealth, and his ideas on AEAG. Recently for example, in September 1991, he criticized western-style Democracy<sup>21</sup> and the tendency of the superpowers to dictate to small countries; and also he called

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<sup>17</sup> *New Straits Times*, November 11, 1991, p.1. Rafidah Aziz, the UMNO Wanita Chief, disclosed her experience when she was approached by members of the various royal families who wanted 10 to 15 permits to import new and secondhand cars (p.5).

<sup>18</sup> *The Straits Times weekly Overseas Edition*, November 16, 1991, p.10.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p.5.

<sup>20</sup> See *Utusan Malaysia*, October 90, p.5 for Nazri Tan Sri Aziz Yob's speech in the general assembly.

<sup>21</sup> In his speech at the United Nations on September 24, 1991 he said "if democracy means the right to carry guns, to flaunt homosexuality, to disregard the institution of marriage, to disrupt and damage the well being of the community in the name of individual rights, to destroy a particular faith, to have privileged institutions which are sacrosanct even if they indulge in lies and instigations which undermine social, economic and international relations, to permit foreigners to breach international law, then can not the new converts opt to reject them." *Far Eastern Economic Review*, October 31, 1991.

for the democratization of the United Nations to allow all members of the body to participate in the shaping of the new world order.<sup>22</sup> The government Back Benchers Club and Federal Cabinet Ministers took great pride in the appointment of Dr Mahathir as Chairman of the Commonwealth Group of Eleven on South Africa, which was seen as 'a continued recognition of the Prime Minister as a world leader,<sup>23</sup>-championing the cause of the weak and small nations.<sup>24</sup>

Generally, the majority of the Malays are proud of their political system, social legislation and international prestige, and also the economic system. Also they have pride in their history, and in their characteristics of deference, accommodation, cleanliness, and moderation. However, Dr Mahathir wanted them to be more hardworking, systematic and proactive in facing a new world political and economic order. Japanese and Korean characteristics were signalled as a model to make the Malays more economically dynamic.

In Malay society, especially in rural areas, from which UMNO derives most of its support, the idea that the government should define decisions and policy for the *rakyat* is readily accepted. The election result could be interpreted as the Malay masses' satisfaction with governmental policy, particularly concerning socio-economic development. Even now, rural development is the top priority and in UMNO Branch meetings, the main concern is focussed on providing more public utilities, such as water supply, electricity, road and telephone lines into *kampung*. In Annual General Meetings at branch level, resolutions or proposals urging new school buildings, new mosques, new community halls and replacement of old bridges and boat piers, are among the standard items proposed by UMNO members. At Divisional level, they urge the government to allocate boarding schools, and government institutions to be developed in their district. Only at this level of meeting

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<sup>22</sup> *New Straits Times*, September 24, 1991, p.1.

<sup>23</sup> *New Straits Times*, October 25, 1991, p.2.

<sup>24</sup> Mentioned in a speech by Ghafar Baba, UMNO Deputy President, at the party's Youth and Wanita assemblies, on November 7, 1990, see *New Straits Times*, November 8, 1991, p.8.

are political issues normally considered and forwarded by the Divisional Committee, who normally consists of those who are knowledgeable about wider political issues or have access to certain sources of information. The agenda of resolutions, proposals or requests for village development projects are normally accepted without debate and are referred to the District Office.

At national level, the resolutions or proposals from Divisional level throughout the country are processed by a committee consisting of some UMNO Supreme Council members. This is known as the Resolutions Selection Committee (Jawatankuasa Penapis Usul).<sup>25</sup> In 1984, there were 820 motions or proposals accepted to be referred to the authority concerned; of these 124 were accepted without debate, and 16 were rejected.<sup>26</sup> In 1991, there were 548 resolutions accepted to be referred to various government agencies; of these 213 resolutions were accepted without debate, and 58 resolutions were rejected.<sup>27</sup> Most of the resolutions in 1991 related to the '2020 Vision,' as this was given full coverage by the mass media during that year.

On the whole, proposals can be classified into four main groups, namely;<sup>28</sup> resolutions concerning the national interest, Malay special rights, UMNO political interests,<sup>29</sup> and lastly the interests of its leaders and activists. Most of the resolutions submitted to the UMNO

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<sup>25</sup> Under UMNO Baru, all resolutions from Divisions were processed by the Supreme Council's Management Committee headed by Ghafar Baba, UMNO Deputy President.

<sup>26</sup> Hussain Mohamed, 'Orang lain peduli apa...!: suatu interpretasi kedudukan dan peranan UMNO,' *Man and Society*, (The journal of the Department of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur), Vol.6 (New series), 1985, p.7.

<sup>27</sup> See UMNO, *Usul-Usul UMNO Bahagian bagi Perhimpunan Agung UMNO Tahun 1991*, 8hb hingga 10hb November 1991, Kuala Lumpur.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.7 -16.

<sup>29</sup> Arau Division, for example, passed a resolution appealing to all UMNO members and the people to appreciate all the benefits they enjoyed as the result of the struggle made by the party, *New Straits Times*, November 20, 1990, p.2..

General Assembly concern UMNO local interests which involve development projects<sup>30</sup> relating to education, health, welfare, agriculture, and other public facilities.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that ignorance also abounds among UMNO local members, especially about government policies. Generally, resolutions are poorly structured, out of date, and show an ignorance of the facts.<sup>31</sup> Therefore, resolutions proposed by the Divisional committees are normally debated at Divisional Representative Meetings and forwarded to the UMNO Headquarters.

Developmentalism has been an UMNO instrument in maintaining support from the Malays from rural and suburban areas. Under UMNO centralised power, it is the Prime Minister, who is also the UMNO President, who is armed with extraordinary powers and has to process the demands on, and execute the actions of the government. Because of this, statements from the Prime Minister are eagerly anticipated by UMNO leaders at national, state, district, and even at village level, especially when the press gives big coverage to certain policies or decisions taken by Dr. Mahathir. At ministerial level, important statements of policy will normally be announced by Dr Mahathir himself.

The latest issue in 1991, for example, concerned the '2020 vision', which attracted great public attention with the press giving it much publicity.<sup>32</sup> Except for a few educated Malays and some politicians, most of the UMNO leaders and members gave more attention to the rhetoric than the substance. This could clearly be seen in 1991, when the government put forward the Sixth Malaysia Development Plan in Parliament, and before that, when Dr Mahathir presented its preamble called *OPP II*

<sup>30</sup> For example, the State Government was urged to pay greater attention to the difficulties and hardships of villagers. More funds, it was said, should be channelled into rural development, even if that meant capping the allocation for urban development. *New Straits Times*, Tuesday, November 20, 1990, p.2.

<sup>31</sup> Kangar and Arau UMNO divisions received a total of 273 resolutions, 152 for Kangar and 121 for Arau. Arau rejected 35 of them, but 81 were accepted without debate, and 5 were debated by the delegates. Kangar UMNO debated seven resolutions, rejected 15 and accepted the rest without any discussion. *New Straits Times*, November 20, 1990, p.2.

<sup>32</sup> In contrast, the PAS newspaper totally rejected any ideas from UMNO. They cynically referred to the 2020 vision as 'waswas 2 0, 2 0,' which means a doubtful and rhetorical statement that would lead to nothing.



(The Outline Perspective Plan). It seemed that the economic development plan was not examined in any depth by UMNO members, but they were apparently more attracted to the '2020 vision', which was not debated in Parliament but emerged in a speech delivered by Dr Mahathir during the launching of the Malaysia Business Council. This situation was a reflection of UMNO members' satisfaction with governmental policy, and the belief in the effectiveness of policy inputs and outputs.

During the UMNO Crisis, there was an attempt to question the loyalty of certain Malay Army Generals toward Dr Mahathir. Rumours were widely circulated that Army Generals who came from Kelantan were more inclined to support Tengku Razaleigh and some of them had been bestowed by the Sultan of Kelantan with state awards for gallantry. Rumours of the possibility that the military might take over the government were also rampant. Although the possibility of coup d'etat was quickly denied by the authorities, there were also some people who were quick to express their willingness to be ruled by a military government, if the civilian government was no longer effective in protecting the people, especially the Malays. The opposition parties also accused the Barisan Nasional government of planning to declare a state of emergency if the party was defeated in the elections.<sup>33</sup> Indeed, when the nation's security and public order are threatened, the possibility of a military seizure of power to reestablish order is ever present.<sup>34</sup> The number of retired military personnel contesting on Semangat 46's ticket was bigger than those contesting under UMNO.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> The opposition parties took the National Operations Council [the Emergency government (1969-71)] as their political model. Viewing Malaysian Politics from the communal angle, one foreign paper doubted the ability of the Malaysian Army to restore order without racial favoritism; see Peter Simms, 'A quite coup in K.L.,' *Life* (Asia Edition), XLVII, No.2 (July 21, 1969), p.7-9; and also the special study by Felix V.Gagliano, *Communal Violence in Malaysia in 1969: The Political Aftermath* (Ohio: The Center for International Studies, Ohio University, 1970), pp.31,38-39.

<sup>34</sup> Felix V.Gagliano 1970, *Communal Violence*, p.39.

<sup>35</sup> Capt (R) Mohd Nor Ahmad won the Kelantan state seat of Pulau Chondong, Capt (R) Zawawi Abdul Ghani lost the Jerangau, Trengganu State seat. In Perak, Major (R) Arifen Isa challenged the Menteri Besar, Ramli Ngah Talib and lost; and former Naval officer, Commander (R) Abu Hassan Usop contested in Pangkor, but was defeated. In Selangor, ex-top Police officer, Commissioner (R) Haji Mohamad Shahir Abdul Majid lost to MIC in the Seri Cahaya seat. In Negeri Sembilan, Major (R) Mokhtar Haji Shariad contested as an Independent candidate for the Repah seat, a Chinese majority area, and secured only 372 votes. In Johor Baru, Lt.Gen.(R) Jaafar Onn lost to a young lawyer who contested on the UMNO (Barisan Nasional) ticket. UMNO put forward Capt (R) Zahar Hashim who defeated the incumbent Mazlan Harun for Lindungan, a Selangor state seat. Another example was Lt.Col (R) Ibrahim Sareh who defeated Rais Yatim (S46 Deputy President) in his political stronghold of Jelebu, Negeri Sembilan.

However, it was very early to conclude that this was a manifestation of discontent toward Dr Mahathir himself, or an undercurrent of political feeling among the Army Generals toward governmental policies or decisions regarding the national interest. One of the UMNO leaders who was discontented with overall trends was Ramli Ngah Talib, Perak State UMNO leader and Menteri Besar. After the General Election of 1990, the relationship between the Menteri Besar and the Perak State Ex-Servicemen's Association deteriorated when the association was accused of losing control over its members, who supported neither UMNO nor the ruling government.<sup>36</sup>

#### ***Orientation Toward Others in the Political System.***

There are three main items to be taken into consideration in examining UMNO members' orientation toward others in the political system, namely; political identification, political trust, and 'rules of the game'.

##### *i).Political identification.*

UMNO members normally identify strongly with their particular state, every UMNO Division having a certain degree of loyalty to their own state. However, Kelantan's UMNO seems to be the most regionalistic in outlook compared to the other states. On the other hand, Perak, having a bigger representation in the UMNO General Assembly, is divided and shows less loyalty or regionalistic feeling. But this divided loyalty to the state UMNO leaders derives from parochialism, Perak consisting of Malays from various neighbouring areas: Patani Malays from Southern Thailand, and those of Banjar, Mandeling, Rawa, Aceh, Bugis and so forth, in Indonesia, along with those who claim to be pure Perak Malays. Perak Malays are also divided by differences in dialect. The most important result of these divisions was that, after 1959, the state did not have a leader who could unite all the Malays. At certain times 'upstream' leaders from Perak River and the north, representing

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<sup>36</sup> Ramli Ngah Talib polled 11,578 votes (82.2.%), Major (R) Ariffen Esa secured only 1,792.

Malays originating from Southern Thailand have controlled the state government and UMNO, but at present it is the turn of UMNO leaders from the river's down stream and the south who control the party and state government. This is shown by the concentration and distribution of development projects in the state, and the distribution of the State Executive Council members. At the Divisional level, the same pattern of divisions has occurred based on group sentiments such as profession, and geographical areas - *kiri* (left) and *kanan* (right) of river banks, *hulu* (upstream) and *hilir* (down stream) of river areas, *darat* (inland areas) and *baruh* (riverside or coastal areas), *jalan baru* (new road) and *jalan lama* (old road), town and village areas, and their origins -such as Banjarese, Javanese, Rawa and Mendeling, Achenese, and local Malays. During the Parit Raja by-election in 1988, the manipulation of Javanese sentiment formed a major part of the UMNO Baru campaign strategy.

At the national level, it has been a tradition that the UMNO top leadership be made up of UMNO leaders from the three states of Kedah, Pahang and Johor. During Tun Razak's presidency, though he himself was from Pahang, his Deputy, Tun Dr Ismail, was from Johor. Moreover the Vice Presidents were Ghafar Baba of Melaka, Sardon Jubir of Johor, and Hussein Onn of Johor, i.e. all were from the Southern Malay Peninsula. When Hussein Onn took over UMNO, his Deputy was from Kedah, and the three Vice Presidents were from Melaka, Kelantan, and Johor. Selangor, Trengganu and Pulau Pinang UMNO leaders were included in the Vice Presidency before 1988. But after 1990, there was a dramatic change, when the UMNO leadership was in its 'anti-thesis' stage, the President, Dr Mahathir came from Kedah, while the Deputy President, Ghafar Baba, claimed to be a Melakan. The three Vice Presidents were all from the north; Anwar Ibrahim and Abdullah Badawi are from Pulau Pinang, which was formerly part of Kedah territory up to 1786; while Sanusi Junid came from Kedah. These appointments implied that the UMNO leadership is no longer based on established UMNO tradition but on 'personalities' who party members think can best lead the party. Nevertheless, the UMNO Youth Chief came

from Pahang, while the Wanita Chief came from Perak. Kedah and Johor are two Malay states which were exposed to political modernization earlier,<sup>37</sup> and therefore are able to provide leadership for the Malays. In the 21st century, UMNO leadership, based on popular votes, will probably come from the northern states. Johor has been trying to promote Mahyuddin Yassin as a potential UMNO national leader, while Pahang has already prepared Najib Tun Razak for such a role. Perak, however, is still divided about promoting a single personality for the top UMNO leadership. Nevertheless, a new order in UMNO will appear when Dr Mahathir steps down from the leadership. The 21st century promises change in UMNO in which personality and leadership skills may become the main factors in the election of party leaders, rather than regional sentiment.

For UMNO members, being Malay is fundamental to political identity. However, they accept the Orang Asli (the aboriginals), the Tamil speaking Indian Muslims of Pulau Pinang, and even the non-Muslim community of Thai origin in Kedah, as UMNO members. But they are sensitive concerning the inclusion of Christians and Chinese *bumiputera* from Sabah as party members. To calm the situation, Dr Mahathir has argued for the inclusion of non-Muslim bumiputera in UMNO, pointing out that they accept UMNO objectives.<sup>38</sup> While UMNO leaders plan to win control of Sabah in the next Sabah election, at the same time delegations from 20 Divisions of Sabah UMNO will be a decisive factor for the UMNO Election in 1993..

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<sup>37</sup> For details on the socio-political development of the Malays in Kedah, see Sharom Ahmat, *Kedah: Tradition and Change in A Malay State: A Study of the Economic and Political Development 1878-1923*, (Monograph No.12 MBRAS, 1984), and for the Johor Malays, see Ahmad Fawzi Basri, *Johor 1855-1917: Pentadbiran dan Perkembangannya*. (Petaling Jaya: Fajar Bakti, 1988).

<sup>38</sup> *Mingguan Malaysia*, November 3, 1991, p.1.

Table XVIII  
UMNO Members at November 1991.

State	Members
Johor	271, 781
Selangor	190,582
Perak	190,454
Kedah	171,859
Kelantan	141,800
Sabah	140,365*
Pahang	133,232
Trengganu	114,039
Negri Sembilan	87,042
Pulau Pinang	80,365
Melaka	62,452
Federal Territory	62,188
Perlis	34,414

\*In January 1992, Sabah UMNO had 194,500 members from 2,945 branches.(NST Jan. 14, 1991, p.9)

Source: Utusan Melayu, November 11, 1991, p.1.

*ii) Political Trust.*

The Malays have a tradition of trusting the government and this can be seen from the percentage of popular votes given to Barisan Nasional in the three latest General Elections.<sup>39</sup> In the 1982 Parliamentary election, Barisan Nasional polled

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<sup>39</sup> See the figures for 1982 and 1986 in NSTP 1990, *Elections in Malaysia: Facts and Figures*, p.29; and for 1990 *The New Straits Times*, October 22, 1990, p.1.

60.54% of the popular vote, in 1986 57.28%, and in 1990 52%, when the opposition increased their percentage of votes to 42%. Most Barisan Nasional votes came from UMNO bases in rural areas but the percentage was diminished due to the conflict in UMNO which caused them to lose all *the Dewan Rakyat's* and *Dewan Undangan Negeri's* seats in Kelantan, and also some seats in other states. UMNO secured 29.5 per cent of the popular vote in the 1990 General Election, Semangat 46 14.39%, and PAS 6.57%. The change had begun in the 1987 UMNO election, when Dr Mahathir polled 51% of the total votes, and Tengku Razaleigh, who was later to lead Semangat 46, secured 49%.

In some areas in the northern Malay states, particularly in Kelantan, Trengganu, and also Kedah, UMNO and PAS members have a general distrust of each other. This situation has led to the emergence of *kafir-mengkafir* conflicts, two imams and two cemetery areas. In Trengganu in mid-1991, UMNO members lodged a police report, in which PAS members were accused of hijacking an Imam who was leading a group of *makmum* during their maghrib prayer, and replacing him with a PAS leader. There have also been a few reported occurrences of discouraging intermarriage between the families of UMNO and PAS members, because of differences in political faith. It seems that religion has been used by the opposition to cause Malays to withdraw support from UMNO, which has been branded as an 'unIslamic' party and the champion of secularism.

It is clear that in Malay villages today, the Malays are divided by partisan politics. Their loyalty to their village, interdependence, and friendly attitudes have been eroded. Therefore, the tradition of *gotong royong*<sup>40</sup> has also changed. Mutual

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<sup>40</sup> A traditional way of undertaking any job, project or activity is for villagers to do it voluntarily, based on the spirit of neighbourliness, cooperation and understanding. This 'gotong royong' (self-help) tradition can be observed during *kenduri kendara* (reception parties), in ceremonies such as those marking marriages, births and deaths, in constructing public facilities such as school fields, school temporary buildings, and community halls. In the tradition of gotong royong, the village folk (*orang kampung*) also contributed money for certain activities. This situation has now changed as the *orang kampung* became dependent on government for community development projects. In some *kampung*, they could not perform the gotong royong because of shortage of manpower, since the younger generations have migrated to urban areas, or because of different political faiths. The Ketua Kampung (Village Head) had to find some fund from *Wakil Rakyat* or the District Office for this activity.

distrust can be seen from the resolutions forwarded by UMNO divisions to the General Assembly. These can be summed up in the following examples:<sup>41</sup>

- a. Agreed to urge the government to ensure that all the Village Development and Security Committee members (JKK) throughout the country be appointed from UMNO's members, *based on the concept that the party controls the government*.
- b. To urge the government, particularly the Ministry of Land and Regional Development, to appoint the Vice Chairman in every FELDA land scheme from UMNO's strong supporters of the scheme, in order to maintain the party's integrity.

UMNO Headquarters also received a motion calling for the government to give UMNO Branch committee members exemption from hospital fees and to give them second class ward beds when hospitalised. Although these resolutions were rejected by the General Assembly, they nevertheless reflected the attitude and their confusion in interpreting the meaning of 'the party controls the government' (*Parti menguasai kerajaan*).

The *politik habuan* (the politics of reward) has obviously affected UMNO's idealism. Some UMNO leaders have expressed their concern that the Malays have developed a 'subsidy mentality', and traditional bonds of affiliation have declined due to the party being used by certain groups for personal interests. Some members have joined UMNO for the purposes of getting land titles, hoping to be selected for government land schemes or securing scholarships for their children. Since the introduction of the government practice of giving an annual bounty to *Ketua Kampung*, who are normally appointed Chairman of *JKKK*, UMNO members are keen to contest for the position of UMNO Branch Head, a position which goes with the post of *Ketua Kampung*. At Divisional level, some committee members have aimed for appointment as members of local District Councils. The competition in getting these appointments has also led to frustration among committee members and dissatisfaction toward the Heads of Divisions.

<sup>41</sup> Hussain Mohamed 1985, 'Orang lain peduli apa..', p.16.

After UMNO split into UMNO and Semangat 46, another factor became crucial. UMNO leaders at branch and divisional levels were reluctant to accept former UMNO members who reapplied to return to UMNO. Thus, the UMNO Supreme Council had to consider and approve the membership of those who had been turned down at branch and divisional levels. In the interests of the party, the Supreme Council then proposed to amend the party constitution to give the Council power to consider appeals from those being rejected lower down,<sup>42</sup> the party Assembly in 1991 endorsing the proposal.

The split in UMNO also caused splits in a national youth voluntary association. The 4B Youth Movement led by Haji Suhaimi Kamaruddin of Semangat 46, saw moves to dethrone him by UMNO supporters in the movement. Firstly, UMNO supporters, led by Sharif Jajang MP who was also Head of the UMNO Division of Sepang, tried to unseat Haji Suhaimi from the leadership of the Selangor State 4B Movement, and finally, UMNO supporters in the 4B Movement promoted Tajul Rosli Ghazali MP, Deputy Minister of Energy, Posts and Telecommunication, who is also Deputy President of 4B, to challenge Haji Suhaimi as the National President of 4B. This challenge consequently split the 4B into two camps, each having its own Annual General Meeting and electing its own President of the association.<sup>43</sup> Although originally the idea of overthrowing Haji Suhaimi was a specifically 4B leadership problem, in reality both camps deployed their strength based on political loyalty.

### iii) *'Rules of the Game.'*

<sup>42</sup> *Mingguan Malaysia*, August 30, 1991, p.4.

<sup>43</sup> See *Utusan Malaysia*, 'Sidang Belia 4B Kecoh', November 7, 1991, pp.1-2. Haji Suhaimi has been leading 4B since 1970, when he became Selangor State Assemblyman. The association declined in popularity in the 1980's particularly after the split in UMNO. Since then, 4B branches throughout the Malay Peninsula have become paralysed. In November 6, 1991, its Annual General Meeting at Perlis became chaotic when two groups held separate meetings to choose their own office bearers. Each group elected their own President, Haji Suhaimi and Tajul Rosli, but both meetings chose the same people for the posts of Vice Presidents. Until the early part of 1992, Haji Suhaimi still claimed that he had been legally elected and would therefore continue to perform his duties until 1994. However, he was also willing to seek reelection for the post of the 4B President on condition that only Tajul Rosli contested against him. *Utusan Malaysia*, January 10, 1992, p.3



Deference, courtesy (*budi-bahasa*), and moderation are still rooted in Malay culture. Traditionally, deference underpinned the hierarchy and the status of those who were high up the social ladder by virtue of their power, wealth, and education, resulting in a general acceptance of the rights of the upper classes to run political affairs. Recent developments indicate that those who have acquired wealth (money and property) or *the orang kaya baru* (the new rich) receive increased respect and support. These 'orang kaya baru' who are the product of the New Economic Policy, along with those who have qualified for high positions through educational achievement, exploit this 'deference' in national politics. Indeed, there are arguments put forward that politicians today should be from those who are already rich in order to ensure their sincerity. Nevertheless, UMNO is in an ambiguous position, whether corruption and abuses occur or not. Theoretically, integrity, sincerity, qualifications, experience and community consciousness are the basic criteria for service in UMNO. However, these traits must be accompanied by an ability to influence voters, for which invective and sometimes slander are increasingly necessary strategies.<sup>44</sup> There is, it seems, a growing tendency to politics without traditional restraint in UMNO.

The era of the Malay teacher's influence, which had lasted since the emergence of modern Malay politics, came to an end in this materialistic epoch. The legacy of an administrative state relying on a bureaucratic elite has gone. During Dr Mahathir's era, a new business elite has taken over the role that previously had been played by the PTD officers since independence. For Dr Mahathir, the country's socio-economic foundation and infrastructure had already been laid over the previous years; therefore 'the private sector must now be the engine for economic growth.'<sup>45</sup>

In the 1990 General Election, in which about 75 per cent of Malays voted, UMNO received about 1.7 million votes from all the communities. Of 1.5 million

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<sup>44</sup> Political Observer, 'Trend Politik UMNO: Politik wang, kuasa dan kejujuran,' *Pembina Generasi*, April 85, p.28.

<sup>45</sup> *New Straits Times*, July 11, 1991, p.1.

UMNO members, less than 20 per cent attended political meetings, not more than 5 per cent were involved in campaigns with about 50 per cent appearing to be only nominal party members. There has been a tradition in the Malay community that those who were elected to any committee or organization were obliged to serve the organization. Members expected leaders to anticipate the wishes of their members, and a sense of deference also made UMNO members feel less willing to participate. It was also generally believed that the government paid little attention to public opinion directly and, in general, the voice of the rakyat or ordinary UMNO members was conveyed by the media through the wakil rakyat -the politicians.

*Budi bahasa* (courtesy) has been important in controlling members' behaviour and norms, the party expecting members to voice their opinions through the proper channels. Criticism of the party leader has never been publicised by the mainstream media, but rather by other papers that were more inclined to support the opposition.<sup>46</sup> The growing crisis of confidence in the press is serious to the extent that the public are now more inclined to listen to rumours, which then influence their attitudes and opinions.<sup>47</sup> It is known that some UMNO leaders or candidates for UMNO elections have engaged writers or a group of writers to produce and circulate *surat layang*<sup>48</sup> to discredit their opponents.<sup>49</sup> Indeed, spreading rumours has now become accepted as part of the political game. At national level, the period before the party elections has become heated through the publishing of political books which either promote or

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<sup>46</sup> Political reporting is tightly screened by the government-controlled media to the extent that political squabbling in the opposition is highlighted but not conflict within the ruling coalition. The press often subscribes to the principle that anything which comes from authority is true and factual, while that which comes from the opposition is false and nonsensical. Actions are taken to ensure that the opposition information does not reach the masses. See Kamarudin Musa, 'Akhbar: peranan dan implikasinya dalam pertarungan ideologi politik,' *Dewan Budaya*, March 1991, p.58.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid*, p.57.

<sup>48</sup> see *Mingguan Kota*, November 18, 1990, p.9. In the column 'Amat Arif', the journalist claimed that he knew who the writer was and who was directing the plan.

<sup>49</sup> The writer (or a group of writers) are professional, free-lance, and according to my sources, some of those involved are academic staff who have sympathised with or worked for certain candidates.

damage the competing personalities.<sup>50</sup> A classic example occurred during the 1990 UMNO Election, when a book written by Mohd.Sayuti Omar, *Anwar Ibrahim-Mimpi dan Realiti*, caused great controversy. Anwar Ibrahim's faction implied that Sanusi Junid was behind the publication and the distribution of the book. However, Sanusi Junid publicly denied this before the delegates in the General Assembly.<sup>51</sup> His denial led to speculation in the Assembly that it had been a trick of Sanusi Junid's opponents to involve him in rumours concerning the book. Ironically, after the election, the book suddenly disappeared from the market raising the question of who had bought out the whole stock!

By the end of 1980's, *surat layang* were accepted as a major element of the political culture of UMNO. Unofficial information was disseminated, part of which comprised rumours. For example, in the middle of the UMNO election campaign of 1990, numerous books, poison-pen letters, pamphlets, and cassettes accusing Ghaffar Baba, the Party Deputy President, of supporting a certain candidate in the contest for the Vice-Presidency<sup>52</sup> were circulated. While this practice might represent a modern trend, it must not be forgotten that, traditionally, the Malay community did not have direct communication between leader and members or indeed, among members of the community. Instead, there had long existed the phenomenon of *kiasan* (innuendo) and *bidalan* (proverbs). Therefore, the syndrome of *surat layang* represents a continuity in the Malay tendency to avoid direct communication between opponents.

It is often said that the practice of Surat Layang originates from the tradition of *bisik* (the culture of gossip). It was not the job of the leader to write the surat

<sup>50</sup> Among the more famous writers was the free lance, Syed Hussein Al Attas who published 18 political books. However, according to some sources, the book entitled *The Challenger*, was in fact written by somebody else. Alattas was accused of receiving money from Ahmad Sebi of the Fleet Group for writing certain books. S.H.Alattas was also accused of meeting Tengku Razaleigh, of asking for money to attack Musa Hitam, and also asking UMNO Baru's leader to pay him to publish books attacking Tengku Razaleigh. See Ahmad Mokhtar Haji Mohamad, *People Power: From People to People* (Petaling Jaya: Penerbitan Dinamik, 1990), p.122.

<sup>51</sup> According to one source, the book was written as a protest by the writer against Anwar Ibrahim's treatment of himself. Anwar's political secretary, Sarit Jusoh, refused to help the writer when he asked for a favour for the son of his relative being enrolled in a boarding school in Kelantan. See Daud Ibrahim, *UMNO PAS: Realiti dan Maruah Wartawan Politik* (Kuala Lumpur: Daud Ibrahim, 1991), p.50.

<sup>52</sup> *New Sunday Times*, November 18, 1990, p.1.

layang, but that of his supporters, stemming from their loyal promotion of their leader. This process has caused members to become retainers or followers of a particular leader, whose groups or factions have become small kingdoms in UMNO. The leader is like a monarch, his strong men becoming heralds or lieutenants, and his supporters playing the role of faithful retainers who only take orders from their own leader.

It used to be very rare that the younger members challenged elders in UMNO Branch meetings, since most of them were relatives. Nevertheless, there have been cases where a group of UMNO youth executed a strategy to takeover the leadership of an UMNO Branch, the key to controlling a Divisional leadership. Moreover, it is the Divisional delegation that casts votes in the election of the UMNO Supreme Council members. In some cases, it has seemed as if the Pemuda have wanted to take control of UMNO Divisions.<sup>53</sup> However, at Divisional and National levels party elections have become a paradox; on the one hand UMNO leaders have demonstrated their traditional trait of *budi bahasa*, on the other hand, they have practised Machiavellianism-the end justifying the means. So the process of voting has been influenced by a changing environment within UMNO. Money politics, politics of reward, political bribery, factions and political promises have been among the effective means used, accompanied by slander, rumour and character assassination. Therefore, traditional mores are no longer dominating features of Malay politics.<sup>54</sup>

Another new trend in UMNO has been the ending of the practice of guaranteeing that *wakil rakyat* (MPs and State Assemblymen) are automatically elected as the Divisional delegates to the party General Assembly, as a mark of

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<sup>53</sup> See the article by Pemerhati Politik, 'Visi Perjuangan Pemuda UMNO: Benarkah terlalu ghairah?' in *Watan*, Saturday, November 18, 1989. The writer reported a few cases: in Teluk Intan, the Ketua Pemuda, Idris Hashim, challenged Arshad Abdullah, the state EXCO and Head of Division; in Bagan Datoh, Zahid Hamidi confronted his Divisional Head, Mohamad Jamrah, who was also Federal Parliamentary Secretary in the Ministry of Rural Development. When Zahid Hamidi was appointed Senator, and rumours spread that Zahid Hamidi would be appointed Deputy Minister, this showed that Mohamad Jamrah's future was far from certain.

<sup>54</sup> Siddiq Fadil, *Mengangkat Martabat Umat*, (A keynote address of the President of ABIM at the 17th ABIM Annual General Meeting, 3-4 December 1988.), p.4.

respect.<sup>55</sup> It seems UMNO members have become more independent in choosing their delegates, and a number of wakil rakyat have not been chosen to represent an UMNO Division, a tendency which is increasing. Thus, social deference toward the 'wakil rakyat' has declined, and this also can be seen as UMNO members begin to realise their electoral rights in the party.

Moderation in national leadership styles is due to a continuity of traditional Malay traits of leadership along with modern political strategies. In Malaysian politics, the monarchical system has become more fragile, with an increase in government power and Parliamentary authority.<sup>56</sup> However, to some extent, it seems that the ruling political leaders have transformed themselves into a new kind of aristocratic or feudalistic leadership.

### *Orientation Toward Individualism.*

In examining this orientation, there are two important questions to be noted: political competence and political efficacy.

In measuring UMNO members' political competence, we can look at their socialization processes in civic life. Before 1980, 'coffee shop' politics had been a common phenomenon in village life, but with the development in communications such as roads and bridges, radio and television and other channels of information, this has been declining. However, it seems that 'coffee house talk' in the city and urban areas is becoming a new feature in UMNO itself.

Persatuan Ibu Bapa dan Guru (The Parent-Teachers Association), RISDA Small Holder Development Centres, RELA (The Vigilant Volunteer Force), and The Mosque Management Committees, represent contexts in which UMNO members receive their training in leadership, and where they sharpen their knowledge of civic affairs. Being appointed to the school board of governors is also considered very

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<sup>55</sup> Mahathir Khir, 'UMNO 1991: Imej dan Kekuatan', *Dewan Masyarakat*, Disember 1991, p.12.

<sup>56</sup> Walter A. Rosenbaum 1972, *Political Culture*, p.72.

prestigious for some UMNO members, and involvement in these civic activities carries weight in the party.

The rapid growth of publishing in the 1980's has contributed to civic consciousness among readers. Malays now enjoy a wide choice of papers and magazines to read. Political tabloids such as *Watan*, *Harakah*, *Mingguan Politik*, *Mingguan Kota*, and *Nusantara* flood the market, helping generate concern about politics among Malays. The New Straits Times, Berita Harian, Utusan Melayu, and Utusan Malaysia are the main daily papers that are widely circulated, and which have become the main source of information for UMNO members. Radio and Television has also influenced the Malay mentality, concerning progress and development under the UMNO regime. The party have also organised talks, briefing sessions and other form of civic gatherings to disseminate government policies etc.

UMNO members also expect the *wakil rakyat* to visit them and engage in dialogue with them, being proud if a minister or his deputy officiate in their meetings. In such meetings, villagers will voice their problems, and note will be taken of them. The leaders will normally promise to look into their problems and will frequently ask the villagers to be patient while the matter is being attended to by the authorities. On the other hand, *Wakil Rakyat* who never visit their constituencies may be rejected by the voters, except in cases where their Branch committee members are able to convince the voters of the need to continue to support him. However, the tendency in General Elections has been that UMNO members vote for the party, not for the personality.

The Wakil Rakyat or Heads of Divisions and Branches were traditionally concerned with the party membership. When UMNO Baru was formed, a membership drive was carried out by the protem committee. The Heads of Divisions had to pay the membership subscriptions of some branches in order to strengthen their power, and some members were not even filling in their membership forms. Thus, in the case of the 1990 General Election in Kelantan, many people did not realise their

names were listed as UMNO members. These 'UMNO members', were easily persuaded to go over to the opposition parties.<sup>57</sup>

Since 1988, the election of Branch Committee members has taken place every two years, with Divisional Committees and the Supreme Council being elected once every three years. However, the Supreme Council has the right to postpone meetings at Divisional and Branch level. For example, in order to reduce politicking in UMNO, all Divisional Delegate Conferences which were scheduled for 1992 have been postponed to 1993.

The mass media is an effective instrument for sharpening UMNO members' knowledge of political events, and guiding public opinion. For example, in 1991, although Dr Mahathir tabled two main agenda items on national development in Parliament, i.e. the *Second Outline Perspective Plan II* (1991-2000) on June 17, and the *Sixth Malaysia Plan* (1991-1995) on July 10, the mass media drew more attention to the Vision 2020 speech delivered by Dr Mahathir earlier, on February 28, 1991.

Generally, UMNO members strongly believe that their leaders will bring about changes in their kampung, district or state. The Malays, especially UMNO members, believe that under Dr Mahathir's leadership, political change and economic development have been very tangible, and they look forward to the realization of Dr Mahathir's 2020 Vision.<sup>58</sup>

The main objectives of the 'vision' are to develop Malaysia into an industrialised country and become a developed country by the year 2020. This development will occur not only in the economic sense, but over all areas: economic, political, social, psychological, and cultural. In order to achieve these objectives all Malaysians need to overcome nine central strategic challenges that have confronted them since becoming an independent nation. Among these challenges are : to

<sup>57</sup> See *Mingguan Waktu*, December 1, 1992, p.7 which quoted a statement of Ibrahim Ali MP.

<sup>58</sup> See the text of Dr Mahathir's working paper at the inaugural meeting of the Malaysian Business Council on February 28, 1991 in *The Star*, March 2, 1991.

establish a united Malaysian nation with a sense of common and shared destiny; to create a psychologically liberated, secure and developed Malaysian society with faith and confidence in itself, subservient to none, and respected by the people of other nations; to develop and foster a mature democratic society, practicing a form of mature consensual, community-oriented Malaysian democracy that can be a model for many developing countries; to establish a fully moral and ethical society; to establish a mature, liberal and tolerant society; to establish a scientific and progressive society; to establish a fully caring society and a caring culture; to ensure an economically just society; and to establish a prosperous society, with an economy that is fully competitive, dynamic, robust and resilient.

*New Traditions and Power.*

When there was a dispute over the Supreme Council's decision to disqualify category A or Division One government officers from holding any UMNO Executive Committee post, some of the press viewed this as a Ghafar Baba plot to reduce Anwar Ibrahim's support. Some UMNO members backed the decision, saying that it was in line with the General Order- the 'bible' of the Civil Service.<sup>59</sup> . However, there were also those who believed that the decision would be a disadvantage to UMNO, because without this so-called Malay intelligentsia, UMNO at branch and divisional levels would be left in the hands of those who are insensitive to the long-term impact of government policies.<sup>60</sup>

In elections to the UMNO Supreme Council, Divisional delegates have always surprised the party. In 1987, Dr Mahathir and Ghafar Baba were nominated by more than 70 per cent of UMNO's Divisions, but in the election, they only secured 53 per cent of the total votes. To put an end to such anomalies, the new UMNO constitution

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<sup>59</sup> The Government General Order of 1990 Chapter 'D' prohibited Government officers from supporting any political party. Before 1990, there were officers who had held political posts at Division and Branch levels, including the post of Divisional Permanent Chairman, who is required to chair annual meetings.

<sup>60</sup> Osman Id Isa, 'Dilema kumpulan A,' *Watan*, September 26, 1989, p.26.



contains a provision giving candidates for the Presidency and Deputy Presidency 10 extra votes for being nominated at the Divisional Delegation Meeting. Dr Mahathir did not deny that this represented vote buying in UMNO, since the actual votes did not reflect the nomination at the divisional meetings. Thus, the 10 vote 'bonus' was introduced in UMNO for the two top posts only.<sup>61</sup> This 'bonus system' did not extend

Table XIX

*The Nomination from Divisions and Total Votes Secured by the Candidates for the Vice Presidency in the UMNO Election of 1990.*<sup>62</sup>

Candidates	Nomination from Divs*	Expected votes	Actual votes.*
Anwar Ibrahim	108	1080	1067
Muhyiddin Yassin	48	480	582
Sanusi Junid	44	440	750
Wan Mokhtar Ahmad	35	350	735
Abdullah Badawi	25	250	953
Rahim Tamby Chik	10	100	452

Source: *New Straits Times*, Nov.23, 1990.

to other posts such as the Vice Presidency, which is also very important. Indeed, the delegates have continued their old ways of voting in the election for the post of Vice President, and other positions in the Supreme Council.

In the case of the nominations from UMNO Divisions, some leaders put forward names just to please (*mengambil hati*) the UMNO state leaders.<sup>63</sup> For

<sup>61</sup> *Berita Harian*, November 26, 1990, p.2.

<sup>62</sup> This figure is quoted from *New Straits Times*, Nov.23. and December 1,1990, The Assembly was comprised of 1,518 delegates.

<sup>63</sup> *Watan*, November 27, 1990, p.17. See the interview with Muhamad Mohd.Taib, Selangor's Menteri Besar and the State Liaison Committee chairman. He later withdrew from the contest for the Vice Presidency under the pretext of submitting to the wishes of the party President in the name of party unity.

example, in the 1990 party Vice Presidential election, all UMNO divisions in Selangor nominated their Menteri Besar, Muhammad Mohd.Taib. Following him, for second choice, votes were divided between Anwar Ibrahim and Sanusi Junid; and for the third place the UMNO divisions were more varied in their choice, Mohamad Mohd Taib having withdrawn from the contest. This element of 'pleasing' the leader has been part of UMNO culture in general and UMNO leaders have accepted that mere nomination will not guarantee them votes.<sup>64</sup>

### *UMNO Leaders: The Power Elite.*

The UMNO practice of taking decisions at the top, and the top leaders' inclination to be authoritarian, is a continuation of traditional culture and political values. However, the UMNO leadership has experienced a process of change since its formation, and the deregistration of UMNO in 1988. In Mahathir's era, the politicians have become an example of the kind of ruling elite which Laswell and Kaplan described as the key political, economic and social decision-makers.<sup>65</sup> In the UMNO tradition, hierarchy and status are the main characteristics of its authority and power. Those who become President must have progressed through various stages, such as first being a member of the Supreme Council, then one of the Vice Presidents, and finally Deputy President, and ultimately, the President.

### *The Heir to the Throne: UMNO Election of 1990.*

Delegates to the 1990 UMNO General Assembly were reminded that the contest for the three Vice-Presidents' posts was important because it might determine the individual who would eventually succeed as the party President and Deputy President. Because of that, the party's election in 1990 was crucial, not only for UMNO but also for the whole nation.

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<sup>64</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>65</sup> Harold D.Laswell and Abraham Kaplan, *Power and Society* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), p.219.

Although *Berita Harian* and the *New Straits Times*, *Utusan Malaysia* and *Utusan Melayu*, are arms of UMNO, they differ over the leadership of the party and the country. *Berita Harian* and the *New Straits Times*, which are controlled by the Fleet Group Holding, gave their support to Anwar Ibrahim, while the *Utusan Melayu* Group were more inclined to support the other candidates. The editorial staff of *Berita Harian* and the *New Straits Times* were of the opinion that the *Utusan* group was under Ghafar Baba's influence. Those who were not in Anwar Ibrahim's camp, were assumed to be with Ghafar's group.

Dr Mahathir perceived what would be the critical focus of this campaign. He directed all UMNO Divisions not to ask any national leaders to officiate in the opening ceremonies of the Divisional Delegation Conferences. He assumed that this would lessen the negative effect of the competition for party posts. Therefore, the Heads of Divisions themselves had to officiate over their respective meetings, without the usual grand opening ceremony. Dr Mahathir also advised candidates not to organise grand dinners or form any 'camp' to gain support. Every body should contest individually, and leave the delegates to choose the candidates themselves, based on their own judgment.

However, Dr Mahathir's advice was not strictly followed. Instead, money politics, misuse of the government machinery, and mass party (*kenduri*) meetings were rampant as usual. One of the candidates for Vice Presidency was of the opinion that candidates should be given an opportunity to introduce themselves on various occasions before their fate was decided by the delegates; thus, small gatherings and 'get to know' meetings with delegates were the only channel for candidates to introduce themselves, he argued. While he agreed with the advice of party President to reduce the campaigning, he reaffirmed that if the campaign was properly run with proper discipline, there was no reason why such meetings and lunch or dinner parties could not be held.<sup>66</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> the statement of Muhyiddin Yassin, the Johor UMNO Liaison Committee Chairman in *Watan*, November 27, 1990, p.2.

Berita Harian reported<sup>67</sup> that there were those who were granting licences and permits, planning thereby to 'lock up' delegates in order to ensure their victory. The *orang lama* (long-time members) slogan was also revived as a tactic to discredit Anwar Ibrahim, a newcomer in UMNO.

Another issue was parochialism. Anwar Ibrahim rejected Abdullah Badawi as his partner, because he believed that UMNO delegates were very regionalistic, and would normally take only one candidate from each state. This meant UMNO delegates would either vote for Abdullah Badawi or for Anwar Ibrahim since both came from Pulau Pinang. Until the 1990 election UMNO leaders still tended to think along regionalistic lines. Cynically, one newspaper observed that if delegates just supported candidates from their own state, then candidates from small states, like Ghafar Baba from Melaka, would never be elected.<sup>68</sup>

The New Straits Times published a special feature story in order to destroy Abdullah Badawi, whose loyalty to Dr Mahathir was questioned. It was alleged by one source that Abdullah Badawi had refused to accept Mahathir's idea of appointing him as the Chairman of HICOM.<sup>69</sup> When Abdullah's name was not included in the new Cabinet of 1990, this was read as meaning that Dr. Mahathir still questioned Abdullah Badawi's loyalty. Abdullah Badawi found it hard to campaign since the press still associated him with Musa Hitam. The Fleets Group's media were, however, of the view that Abdullah Badawi and Sanusi Junid were supported by Ghafar Baba.<sup>70</sup> However, nobody could deny that being Dr Mahathir's strong man, and having successfully placed a number of his allies as MPs and State Assemblymen in the 1990 General Election, Anwar was powerful enough to win the party

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<sup>67</sup> See the column by Kunta Kinte of Biar Putih Tulang, 'Pilihlah yang boleh berbakui kepada UMNO', *Berita Harian*, November 26, 1990, p.10.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid., the original phrase reads 'Kalau orang Kedah pilih orang Kedah, orang Kelantan pilih Kelantan, dan orang Johor pilih Johor, macam mana Encik Ghafar boleh menang dari awal lagi? Kalau harap orang Melaka saja, sampai tua tak menang, Melaka kecil, tak ramai perwakilan.'

<sup>69</sup> See 'Profiles of candidates for vice-presidency,' *New Straits Times*, November 27, 1990, p.2.

<sup>70</sup> S.Jayasankaran, 'A battle in UMNO: the race for VP goes down to the line,' *Malaysian Business*, November 16-30, 1990, pp.8-9.

election.<sup>71</sup> Anwar Ibrahim had used Ramli Ngah Talib for his victory in 1987; in 1990 he tried to neutralise Musa Hitam's influence in Johor by giving support to Muhyiddin Yassin, Johor's Menteri Besar. It could not be denied that there were two factions within UMNO, one clique led by Anwar Ibrahim who claimed to be in Mahathir's camp, and another one led by Ghafar Baba, which was supported by Abdullah Badawi and Sanusi Junid.<sup>72</sup>

In a *Berita Harian* article supporting Anwar Ibrahim, four guidelines in selecting the Vice President were mentioned. These included the 'echelon' factor; ability to enhance Dr Mahathir's 'vision'; ability and integrity; past contributions and failures of the candidates; and the readiness of a potential Vice President to live and die with the President and vice versa.<sup>73</sup>

Prior to the party election, Dr Mahathir met all the delegates in a closed door meeting to deliver a few reminders to ensure that the UMNO Assembly would proceed in an orderly manner. He called for healthy competition that would not jeopardise the integrity and stability of UMNO, reiterating his neutral stand in the contest. He also mentioned that "those who have not held any posts in government could still win in the party election".<sup>74</sup> To some observers, this remark contributed to Abdullah Badawi's victory.

On polling day itself, November 30, 1990, the mass media made a final attempt to influence the 1,531 delegates who held the mandate of 1.4 million members from 133 divisions, and representatives of Pemuda, Wanita and the Supreme Council members. The *Berita Harian* tried to convince the delegates to reject

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
<sup>71</sup> Ibid., p.9

<sup>72</sup> Zakry Abadi, *Kualiti Kepimpinan Selepas Dr Mahathir and Ghafar Baba: Suatu Perspektif Dalam Ketokohan*, (Kuala Lumpur: Sarjana Enterprise, 1991), pp.66-67.

<sup>73</sup> The writer was Abu Hassan Adam, Anwar Ibrahim's Special Assistant in the Ministry of Education. He had travelled around the country to meet with teachers in order to persuade them to support Anwar Ibrahim, who would be UMNO leader after Mahathir or Ghafar Baba. It was argued that only Anwar Ibrahim should receive the baton of power in the UMNO political relay race. Abu Hassan Adam later took the post of Principal Assistant Director (Training Division) of Biro Tata Negara, which came under the influence of Anwar Ibrahim.

<sup>74</sup> See the feature by Chamil Wariya, 'Apakah perwakilan akan mengekalkan status quo?', *Utusan Malaysia*, November 29, 1990, p.6.

Fig.8



Source: Based on *Penyata Tahunan UMNO Malaysia 1991*, and *Berita Harian, Utusan Malaysia and New Straits Times* 23, 24 and 25 November 1990.

'chameleon' politicians (*politikus mengkarung*)<sup>75</sup> who were branded as *petualang* (opportunist).

In justifying their role, the press claimed that the *rakyat* generally were not active members of political parties. Hence, it was the duty of the press to observe the actions and behaviour of the political parties. A day earlier, *Utusan Malaysia* had speculated on the outcome of the election for the three Vice Presidency posts. They would either be filled by two ministers and one Menteri Besar, or another group consisting of a cabinet minister, a Menteri Besar and a Vice President who was not holding any post in the government.<sup>76</sup> A political columnist of *Berita Harian* made use of the tabloid, *Mingguan Kota*, to campaign for Anwar Ibrahim, making negative remarks about other candidates, especially Abdullah Badawi and Sanusi Junid.<sup>77</sup>

Finally, the General Assembly of 1990 decided to set aside their regionalism, instead giving priority to leadership capabilities. Anwar Ibrahim, Abdullah Badawi and Sanusi Junid were chosen as the Vice Presidents, heirs to the UMNO throne. The press guided public opinion to believe that one of the three elected Vice Presidents would eventually be the future President of UMNO and Prime Minister of Malaysia. However, Dr Mahathir gave UMNO a reminder that even those who were

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<sup>75</sup> The Editorial of *Berita Harian*, November 30, 1990, p.10. The editorial used these terms to refer to those who defended their political position and influence by any means, the politicians in this category always changing their stand when faced with a different political audience. The press added that the chameleon politician had no respect for moral and ethical aspects, and moreover, was willing to persuade, threaten, and bribe the voters to convince them to support their political position. To make matters worse, the chameleon politician did not hesitate to disseminate slanders in the form of *surat layang*, books, and corrupt overseas tours. The press left delegates to interpret and to identify the 'chameleon' candidates who were bidding for the party's Supreme Council.

<sup>76</sup> Chamil Awriya, 'Apakah perwakilan akan mengekalkan status quo?' *Utusan Malaysia*, November 29, 1990, p.6.

<sup>77</sup> Dr.Izzat Khalis (pseudonym), 'Naib Presiden UMNO- Persaingan paling sengit dalam sejarah parti,' *Mingguan Kota*, November 25, 1990, p.26. A few questions were put to the delegates: 'Apakah perangai mereka ini baik? Apakah mereka ini kuat bekerja untuk parti dan kerajaan? Apakah mereka ini sebenarnya lebih merupakan 'tukang jerit' atau 'tukang salak' sahaja dan bukan serius tetapi lebih merupakan pelawak (joker)? Apakah mereka ini cerdik (shrewd) dalam politik tetapi 'shrewd' dengan cara kotor dan jahat seperti mengambil 'orang jahat' dan 'nakal' menjadi penasihat dan pembantunya untuk berkempen ke sana sini. Apakah mereka ini banyak menggunakan jentera kerajaan ke tahap paling maksima seperti Biro Tata Negara (BTN) dalam awal tahun 1980-an dahulu? atau apakah mereka ini apabila gagal menggunakan jentera kerajaan kerana jentera itu tidak menguntungkannya lalu menghabiskan duit kerajaan dengan menubuhkan jentera lain semata-mata untuk kepentingan diri (seperti Institut Sedar di Kementerian Pembangunan Luar bandar suatu ketika dulu...). The writer clearly hinted Abdullah Badawi and Sanusi Junid who were implied in the above questions .

elected in that party election, could also lose in UMNO elections in the next three years.<sup>78</sup>

However, the election of the 25 Supreme Council members showed a new voting pattern, parochial regionalism apparently having been eroded. Perak broke the tradition by having five representatives in the council; Kedah now had five, while Johor managed to send only two representatives. Now all states were represented on the Supreme Council.

Table XX  
*The Nomination and the result of the UMNO Supreme Council Members Election in 1990.*

Candidates	State	Votes
1. Mohd. Yusof Nor	Trengganu	1,279 [117]
2. Muhammad Mohd.Taib	Selangor	1,259 [93]
3. Ramli Ngah Talib	Perak	1,251 [93]
4. Mohd.Khalil Yaakob	Pahang	1,232 [104]
5. Syed Hamid Albar	K.L/Johor	1,223 [109]
6. Tajol Rosli Ghazali	Perak	1,185 [102]
7. Osman Aroff	Kedah	1,171 [108]
8. Abdul Kadir S.Fadzir	Kedah	1,167 [111]
9. Siti Zahrah Sulaiman	Pahang	1,113 [94]
10. Annuar Haji Musa	Kelantan	1,107 [104]
11. Abu Hassan Omar	Selangor	1,095 [97]
12.Sabbaruddin Chik	Pahang	1,083 [106]
13.Mohd Isa Abd.Samad	N.Sembilan	1,077 [109]
14.Abd Hamid Pawanteh	Perlis	1,044 [106]
15.Abdul Ghani Othman	Johor	996 [88]

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<sup>78</sup> *Berita Harian*, November 26, 1990, p.2.



16.Megat Junid M.Ayob	Perak	994 [99]
17.Mohd.Khalid Yunus	N.Sembilan	986 [76]
18.Suleiman Mohamed	K.Lumpur	977 [71]
19.Raja Ariffin R.S.	Kedah	900 [63]
20.Abdullah Fadzil C.W.	Perak	846 [46]
21.Napsiah Omar	N.Sembilan	796 [90]
22.Zaleha Ismail	Selangor	792 [62]
23.M.Nazri Aziz Yeop	Perak	777 [48]
24.Abdul Rahim A.Bakar	Pahang	737 [24]
25.Ibrahim Saad	P.Pinang	724 [60]

Source: *Utusan Malaysia*, Wed. December 5, 1991, p.6. [in brackets is the number of nominations received by the candidates]. The figures are adapted from the *New Straits Times* Friday, Nov.23, 1990, p.2]

#### *Political Recruitment.*

The 1991-1993 Supreme Council membership, contained those who had professional, teaching and administrative experience. Among these were 3 medical practitioners, 5 former school teachers, 5 former PTD officers, 5 former university lecturers, 1 accountant, 1 bank executive, 5 from the legal profession and business, and two former journalists of the Utusan Melayu Group. Others were former administrative officers or professionals in the State civil service, State Development Corporation and Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka (The Government Literary Agency). Among them three held PhD degrees, 5 Masters degrees, most of the rest having at least a first degree. Only three members, Ghafar Baba (Deputy President), Hussein Ahmad (the Party Information Chief) and Tun Mustafa Datu Harun (newly appointed a Council member) had no university education; however, these three had a great accumulation of political experience. Most of the council members were between 40 and 50 years old, and only five of them did not hold any governmental posts.

Among the 25 elected Supreme Council members, only two were not in a ministerial position. There were four members who had also inherited the traditional aristocratic title of 'Orang Besar' in their own states. The rest were from the new Malay middle class by virtue of their qualifications. At least three members held degrees in Islamic studies, and had been brought up by their families in a religious atmosphere. Two members had gone through from Malay medium education up to the tertiary level. Out of 41 members of the Supreme Council, 24 were locally trained and 17 trained overseas in professional studies. Except for two members and also Ghafar Baba himself, the Supreme Council members consisted of those who also were Heads of UMNO Divisions. Therefore, political leadership was not exercised by men of high birth and breeding, but by a new breed of middle class individuals. Some of them were recruited into the party structure in the mid 1970's, but most of the Menteri Besars and the Chief Minister of Melaka, were selected in the elections of 1982 and 1986.

The press commented that the result of the UMNO Election produced a balanced team, and a profile of future leaders. Anwar Ibrahim made clear that he would work as a team player.<sup>79</sup> When the cabinet reshuffle was announced after the 1990 General Election, it seemed very clear that Anwar Ibrahim would be the future UMNO President. However, a few months later, when Abdullah Badawi was called back to the Cabinet as Foreign Minister, the situation changed. Thus Dr Mahathir had balanced Anwar Ibrahim's influence. It will be very dramatic if Sanusi Junid takes over the Ministry of Education in any future cabinet reshuffle before the 1993 party election, as this will be seen a sign of escalating competition between Anwar Ibrahim and Abdullah Badawi or Sanusi Junid.

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<sup>79</sup> *Utusan Malaysia*, December 1, 1990, p.1.

### Malay Ruling Elite Culture and Personality.<sup>80</sup>

The Political culture of the UMNO elite can be perceived through their personalities, socio-economic perspectives and their political beliefs.

In a survey on Malaysian intellectuals, Regan found that 'most Malays favor an authoritarian leader<sup>81</sup>, [and] more Malays than non-Malays would choose a moral prophet.'<sup>82</sup> Moreover, while the members submitted to authority, UMNO leaders used authoritarian aggression against outgroups. This tendency includes condemning, rejecting, and punishing those who violate the predominant values. Indeed, as politicians, UMNO leaders have tended to emphasize power and identify themselves as power figures who assert strength and toughness.<sup>83</sup>

A closed belief system is the main characteristic of an authoritarian regime, and those beliefs will only change when the authorities are responsive to the advocacy of policies or perceptions which are different from their own.<sup>84</sup> However, despite being dogmatic, UMNO leaders consider their orientation as 'authoritarian democracy', which means that although they believe in democracy as the highest form of government, they govern ideally through the 'strong intelligent leader,' and reject

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<sup>80</sup> Most of the points made on this topic are based on my survey of UMNO Heads of Divisions. Of the 132 UMNO Divisions in the Malay Peninsula, I interviewed about 20 of them and other UMNO leaders at Divisional and branch levels. I also used the 'participant observer' method as I have been involved in UMNO since 1976 at branch and divisional levels, as well as attending UMNO National Youth Delegation meetings as a Divisional Delegate, and the UMNO General Assembly as an observer. Most of the ideas used in discussing this subject are based on a study by Phong Phaew Pomsark, 'The Political Culture and Personality of the Laotian Political-Bureaucratic Elite'. (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, The University of Oklahoma, 1976).

<sup>81</sup> There are three styles of behaviour which may characterize the leader-follower relationship: authoritarian, laissez-faire, and democratic. 'Authoritarian' describes a relationship where all policies are determined by the leader; steps in activities are dictated one by one so that future steps are uncertain, and the leader dictates tasks to be carried out by the workers. The leader praises and criticises members but remains aloof from active group participation. R.K.White and R.Lippitt, *Autocracy and Democracy: An Experimental Study* (New York: Harper & Row, 1960), pp.26-27.

<sup>82</sup> Daniel Regan 1977, 'Intellectuals, Religion and Politics', p.218.

<sup>83</sup> See Rizal Rahman 1985, *Perebutan Kuasa Politik dan Kesombongan UMNO*, pp.100-111. The writer describes how UMNO leaders at branch and divisional levels have changed from being idealistic leaders to autocratic leaders, to retain their power and influence. These leaders submit to the top leaders in order to gain wealth and facilities. However, while becoming 'yes men', they are also 'political brokers' who have great influence in promoting and demoting top leaders. They eliminate any elements which do not fit in with their plans, opposition in the party being considered deviant. Party dissenters receive sanctions from the ruling body in various forms, such as boycotting and the denial of opportunities in the party and government.

<sup>84</sup> Roger Brown, *Social Psychology* (New York: The Free Press, 1965), pp.541-543.

the idea that the masses are able to take wise decisions on behalf of the country. Generally UMNO leaders harbour secret ambitions to be 'great men', and although they seem to be open to new ideas, they prefer to endorse new ideas imposed by top leaders. Thus, from the time-perspective dimension, the UMNO leaders have tended to be mostly oriented to the present and only slightly oriented to the future. In Malaysia, it is not only the bureaucratic elite who are able to adjust to new situations so that beliefs and behaviour 'fit in' with any new social environment;<sup>85</sup> this 'role adaptability' is also a characteristic of the political elite in UMNO.

Most of the UMNO elite hold conflicting views as regards 'faith-in-the people'. While they admit most people are inclined to help others, they also express a mistrust toward others whom they allege will take advantage of any situation. Leaders who are no longer in power in the Cabinet or party structure, or who have been 'blacklisted' by the party, generally receive a cold response from members, until their power is restored by the top leader. To some extent, members will also avoid seeing or being seen to have communicated with those leaders who are rejected because they are suspected of conspiring against those in power.

Most UMNO leaders adopt an orientation which assumes a fixed scarcity of desired material goods, or what Scott labels as *constant-pie orientation*.<sup>86</sup> They tend to join any faction in the party that will offer them economic and status benefits. Ministerial portfolios such as Finance, Trade and Industry are considered important posts that can deliver the 'economic pie'. However, as Muslims, the UMNO elite disagrees with the idea that rapid growth of the population represents a great danger in that there will be a shortage of wealth to go around. Therefore, they support Dr Mahathir's idea of the country having a population of 70 million by the year of 2100. Dr Mahathir has reaffirmed the notion that Malaysia is rich in resources and there is enough for everyone to gain from the process of population growth and

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<sup>85</sup> James C. Scott 1968, *Political Ideology in Malaysia*, p.144.

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, p.94.

development.<sup>87</sup> Moreover, the Mahathir-Daim market-oriented structural adjustment since 1984 has significantly affected UMNO. A split in the party began when some of its politicians were given advantages through new opportunities available with increased privatization and the contracting out of government services; however, many others have felt marginalized'.<sup>88</sup> At one time those who had the opportunity to monopolize most of these development projects have had a connection with Dr Mahathir-Daim, and are known as the *Kedah Mafia*.<sup>89</sup>

Developments after 1970 have coloured the UMNO elite's attitude toward economic affairs and they have become keen supporters of private enterprise. Moreover, 80 per cent of them disagreed with the idea that seniority should be given greater weight than merit in gaining promotion.<sup>90</sup>

### *Political Beliefs.*<sup>91</sup>

In 1968, James C.Scott published in his book *Political Ideology* the results of a survey that he had conducted among Malaysian bureaucratic elite. 54 per cent of his respondents supported the need for cruelty or even ruthlessness in pursuit of necessary political change. On the other hand, only 21 per cent supported the idea that "it is all right to get around the law if you do not actually break it," and most of the bureaucratic elite had an optimist view of the political understanding of the voters and their ability to comprehend what it is their own best interest.

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<sup>87</sup> Far Eastern Economic Review, June 27, 1991, p.16.

<sup>88</sup> K.S.Jomo, 'Whither Malaysia's New Economic Policy', *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 63, No. 4, (Winter 1990-1991), pp. 478-479. See also Yahya Ismail, *Krisis UMNO: Dilema Mahathir* (Kuala Lumpur: Dinamika Kreatif, 1986), p.23. The author mentions that Musa Hitam's group spread the story of how Mahathir's men became rich and 'overnight millionaires'.

<sup>89</sup> Yahya Ismail 1986, *Krisis UMNO*, pp.88-89.

<sup>90</sup> This was proven by the implementation of the New Salary and promotion scheme for civil servants which known as *Skim Saraan Baru* (SSB) which was enforced on 1 January 1992.

<sup>91</sup> For the purposes of the discussion, I have referred to McClosky's 'central political belief scale' which has seven dimensions including: rules of the game, free speech and opinion, specific application of free speech and procedural rights, political equality, economic equality, cynicism toward politics, and political futility. See Herbert McClosky, 'Consensus and Ideology in American Politics.' *American Political Science Review*, 58 (June, 1964), pp.361-382.

On the basis of a straw poll that I conducted<sup>92</sup>, it would seem that the Malay political elite of today have a very different attitude. Most of them rejected the notion that harsh measures are justifiable in order to achieve desirable political change. However, almost all the UMNO leaders I talked to agreed that "it is all right to get around the law if you do not actually break it." Moreover, a large majority of them agreed that the rakyat rarely know what is best for them, and therefore require a few strong and capable people to run the party and the country. They tended to have a low opinion of the political understanding of most of the voters, and they felt that few of the latter really know what was in their own best interest in the long run. This would indicate a general modern tendency to "benevolent paternalism."

On economic equality, almost all of the UMNO elite agreed that it is the government's responsibility to ensure the people a good standard of living, but they were divided on the question of whether the people would have to get used to the fact that there will always be some poverty. Among UMNO leaders, there is a split opinion on the responsibility of the government to provide public housing. UMNO leaders have recently changed their attitude toward the 'subsidy' element in Malay politics. Since the introduction of rural development plans, dependency on government has become part of Malay culture, but now their leaders discourage this. In fact, they do not wish the Malays to be identified as a 'subsidy community'.

Concerning political cynicism,<sup>93</sup> UMNO leaders interviewed were very defensive, disagreeing with the suggestion that there is 'no connection' between what a politician might say and what he will do once he gets elected'. UMNO leaders have a high degree of confidence in the role of government, and only 20 per cent of them agreed that most politicians don't seem to really mean what they say. They agree with the general view that 'no matter what the people think, a few people will always run

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<sup>92</sup> I visited Kedah, Perak, Selangor, Johor and Kelantan between May and July 1991 and interviewed UMNO leaders at Divisional and Branch levels (see footnote 80).

<sup>93</sup> See Edgar Litt, 'Political Cynicism and Political Futility,' *Journal of Politics*, 2 (May, 1963), pp.312-323.

things anyway.'. They also agree that most politicians can be trusted to do what they think is best for the country,<sup>94</sup> these elites perceiving themselves therefore to be the vital group in the state. The UMNO elite expressed their support for the democratic values of economic equality, which is congruent with the present political environment in Malaysia. They viewed the New Economic Policy as necessary policy of positive discrimination which had the aim of attaining economic equality.

#### *The Future in UMNO.*

Compared to his predecessors, Dr Mahathir represents a model of leadership skill in managing the party and country. The New Straits Times and Berita Harian have been delivering the message to UMNO members that only Anwar Ibrahim has Dr Mahathir's qualities, referring to the former as 'pewaris' (the heir). In 1989, it seemed that Anwar Ibrahim was the President-in-the-making. However, he may have to follow Ghafar Baba who is a natural successor by virtue of already being Deputy President. Hence 1993 will be another important year in Malaysian politics.

Ghafar Baba, the UMNO Deputy President is, in fact, 10 months older than Dr Mahathir. His age, if not his health or education, have generated the idea that he will only enjoy a short stay as party President if Dr Mahathir gives way in 1993. However, if Dr Mahathir continues as President for another term, this can be taken as indicating that Dr Mahathir intends to pass the UMNO leadership on to a younger leader, not Ghafar, who by then will probably be too old to undertake the heavy tasks of leading the party and country.

In the 1987 party election, Anwar Ibrahim claimed there existed competition between those who wanted more Islamisation and those who wanted more Malay nationalism. To some degree, Anwar Ibrahim represents the 'Islamic', and Abdullah Badawi 'the Malay' trend in UMNO. In the 1993 UMNO election, there will be 'a

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<sup>94</sup> Scott's survey of civil servants, which was done before 1970 shows that only 49 per cent of the bureaucratic elite agreed with this cynical attitude. After 1980, more than half of the Malay MPs had tertiary education qualifications. By 1991, excepting Ghafar Baba, the Deputy Prime Minister, all UMNO Cabinet members had university qualifications. Mustafa Mohamad was the last non-graduate minister to be dropped after the 1990 General Election. He was subsequently appointed to the position of Malaysian High Commissioner to Negara Brunei Darussalam.

great tussle' for the Vice Presidency posts in which the issues of 'Islam' and Malay nationalism will be paramount. Ironically, Abdullah Badawi's Islamic education is far more profound and deep-rooted than that of Anwar Ibrahim. Anwar Ibrahim will aim to maintain his position as the Vice President with the highest vote, while Abdullah Badawi and Sanusi Junid will hope to improve their respective votes.

The mainstream media has been trying to throw light on the 'strange' relationship between Anwar Ibrahim and Ghafar Baba. In the 1990 General Assembly, Ghafar Baba denied he belonged to any camp, while Anwar Ibrahim, who presented himself as a strong supporter of Dr Mahathir, condemned those who had formed alliances in the party elections.<sup>95</sup> At the same time, Anwar Ibrahim's supporters associated Sanusi Junid and Abdullah Badawi with Ghafar Baba's camp.

Since the end of 1989, *Berita Harian* has expressed the hope that Ghafar Baba will appoint Anwar Ibrahim as his acting UMNO Deputy President and Deputy Prime Minister, as and when he takes over the leadership.<sup>96</sup> Ghafar Baba has been advised to concentrate more on domestic affairs, while his deputy would take care of international relations. The press pointed to the fact that among the three Vice Presidents [at that time Anwar, Abdullah Badawi and Wan Mokhtar], Anwar Ibrahim enjoyed an international reputation, an important attribute for a Deputy Prime Minister.

However, this issue died down when Abdullah Badawi was reappointed to the Cabinet as Minister of Foreign Affairs on 11 February 1991, following his 'unexpected' reelection as UMNO Vice President in 1990. Furthermore, since his appointment, Abdullah Badawi has fully demonstrated his capability as a Foreign Minister.

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<sup>95</sup> *Watan*, Tuesday, November 27, 1990, p.1. Anwar Ibrahim denied he was forming an alliance with Muhammad Taib and Mahyuddin Yassin despite being old friends and meeting each other. He blamed those who were making use of the leader's name to get support from delegates, and expressed the need to offer the delegates a free choice.

<sup>96</sup> See A.Nazri Abdullah, 'Siapa selepas Ghafar,' *Berita Minggu*, December 31, 1989.



Berita Harian and the New Straits Times speculated about the presence of Musa Hitam in UMNO, and the question of whether Musa Hitam would contest for a Vice Presidency post in the 1990 election. However, Musa Hitam reaffirmed his political retirement, thereby raising the question among some UMNO leaders as to whether and how he might return to the UMNO structure and government later on. Knowing the possibility of his return and Musa Hitam's political skill, Berita Harian then portrayed both he and Anwar Ibrahim as enjoying a good political relationship. It was understood that recently both leaders had had several meetings in Paris.<sup>97</sup> Nevertheless, Musa Hitam has since expressed his support for Ghafar Baba to lead UMNO.

In early 1990, *Watan* carried a special headline speculating that UMNO might break-up after the Mahathir-Ghafar era. It quoted a former UMNO leader, who was reported to have said that UMNO would lose its original character if it were led by the younger generation who have no experience or understanding of the historical struggle of UMNO. There was also speculation that this younger group, who were using Islam for their own political interests, would challenge Ghafar Baba in the 1993 election for the party Deputy Presidency.<sup>98</sup> However, Anwar Ibrahim would be unlikely to go 'for a head-long confrontation against his older rival, as the odds would be against him,'<sup>99</sup> unless he was really supported by Dr Mahathir and a group of young UMNO politicians. Besides realising that he has a lot of political enemies in UMNO, he also knew that Ghafar Baba was the natural successor. Therefore, on the eve of the 1990 party election, to neutralise the situation, Anwar Ibrahim stated that

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<sup>97</sup> Ibid.

<sup>98</sup> See the report by Shahbudin Haji Husin, 'Selepas Mahathir-Ghafar: UMNO diramal hancur,' *Watan*, Saturday, January 6, 1990, p.1. This report presented the clear view that Anwar Ibrahim's group would challenge Ghafar Baba, and were willing to act as a Malay opposition party if they could not control UMNO in the future. Thus Semangat 46 members should return to UMNO in order to curtail Anwar's ambitions to take over the top post.

<sup>99</sup> *The Straits Times Weekly Overseas Edition*, October 19, 1991, p.10.

the question of who would eventually succeed the present UMNO leadership should be left to the wisdom of the party's top leaders and the delegates.<sup>100</sup>

*Mahathir the political surgeon.*

Dr Mahathir broke his silence in 1990 when he saw increasing politicking going on around him. The party Supreme Council decided to postpone till 1993 the party divisional elections which had originally been scheduled for 1992.<sup>101</sup> Therefore the election of party officials at divisional levels will be held a few months before the election of the party Supreme Council members. Since his 1990 attempt to stabilise the party, Dr Mahathir has directed UMNO Divisions to hold only low key opening ceremonies of Divisional Delegation Meetings, in which Heads of Division would officiate. However, in 1991, UMNO Divisions were inviting Supreme Council members to officiate at the opening ceremonies. Dr Mahathir has had to accept that politicking in UMNO is unavoidable. He has however warned UMNO members that corruption in whatever form must be stopped, and that a new culture based on strong discipline, efficiency and sincerity must be developed.<sup>102</sup> In Mahathir's own words, 'we have no time to be involved in seeking positions for ourselves. We need not ask who is about to replace who. We have no need for cliques and teams. We need not waste our time with numerous speculations.'<sup>103</sup> However, UMNO has another year before staging its 'drama of party elections in Kuala Lumpur', and all the 'actors and actresses' are now rehearsing<sup>104</sup> before the grand finale in 1993.

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<sup>100</sup> New Straits Times, Wednesday, November 21, 1990, p.2.

<sup>101</sup> See *Mingguan Malaysia*, Sunday, October 13, 1991, p.1 & 15.

<sup>102</sup> See the translated speech of Dr Mahathir at the UMNO General Assembly, on November 8, 1991, in *New Straits Times*, Saturday, November 9, 1991, pp.8-9 and 11.

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*, p.11.

<sup>104</sup> Anwar Ibrahim announced that there was no difference between him and Ghafar Baba. He blamed the so-called 'discordant voices' for creating strains between himself and other party leaders (*New Straits Times*, October 28, 1991, p.2). Previously, *Utusan Melayu* had published a denial from Ghafar Baba of his intention to resign, and earlier on, Ghafar Baba had denied allegations that he was a stop-gap Deputy Prime Minister.

The expansion of UMNO into Sabah will create another element of change in the party, since Sabah delegates will be a deciding factor in the party elections in the future. This will be advantageous for Ghafar Baba, who leads Sabah UMNO, and voting there will be very vital from now on. The problem will be to pass on the UMNO traditions to Sabah members, the Sabah UMNO members being comparatively less politically aware than those of the Malay Peninsula. However, since the late 1960's they have already been exposed to 'money politics'. Indeed, this has become a tradition in Sabah politics.

In youth politics, Sabah and Sarawak's youth representatives have been a determining factor concerning who leads the youth in the Malaysian Youth Council since 1972. Coincidentally, certain individuals who had been involved in the national youth movements<sup>105</sup> are now in UMNO; such as Anwar Ibrahim of ABIM, Sanusi Junid of MAYC, Abdullah Badawi of GPMS, (who was the Director of Youth), and Zulkifli Hamid of the Sabah National Youth Association and former Deputy Minister of Defence. They have all moved up from the youth arena in the 1970's to the UMNO circuit during the decade of the 80's. In fact, in the 1970's, the Malaysian Youth Council<sup>106</sup> was in turmoil because of constant politicking. Will history repeat itself, this time in the arena of major political power?

For certain, UMNO will face an intense struggle in which Dr Mahathir's influence will be a pivotal factor. So far, he has succeeded in 'transplanting' a new heart into the party, and has managed to neutralize dissenters. Thereafter, the lifespan of UMNO will depend on the continued healthy condition of the party.

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<sup>105</sup> Between 1970-1978, Abdullah Badawi was the founder Director of the Youth Division at the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sport which monitors all youth organisations in Malaysia. One of his officers became an ex-officio member of the Malaysia Youth Council (*Majlis Belia Malaysia*). Anwar Ibrahim was former President of the Malaysian Youth Council (MBM) and ABIM's President. At that time, Sanusi Junid, as the president of MAYC, criticised government handling of the youth crisis between 1974-1976. He then decided to pull MAYC out of the MBM. Zulkifli Hamid, former Federal Deputy Minister of Defence and former President of the Sabah National Youth Association (SANYA), was the man who influenced SANYA to support Anwar Ibrahim in a tussle with Haji Suhaimi Kamaruddin (4B) in 1972, when Anwar won the MBM Presidency prior to his arrest under the Internal Security Act in 1974.

<sup>106</sup> See M.A.Fawzi Basri 1980, *Pergerakan Belia di Malaysia*, passim.

Those who take over UMNO from Dr Mahathir will continue to emphasise Malay unity. Ghafar Baba will leave UMNO with his particular contribution of bringing back former UMNO members from Semangat 46. Anwar Ibrahim will probably continue to emphasise his objective of creating a Muslim ummah or Islamic community. Indeed, he knows that he has been an uneasy bedfellow in UMNO and Barisan Nasional. For that matter, knowing his lack of experience as a government administrator or professional, experience that befits the image of Malaysian Prime Minister, he has planted his supporters in key positions in the party and government to ensure that he will be in the lead when the time comes. Abdullah Badawi, with his 'gentle' and 'bridge-building' image, should be able to manage the party and Barisan Nasional, while coming out from his shell as a real Islamic leader by virtue of his family background and his qualifications. His experience as former PTD officer, an elite civil service position, would mean he would continue the tradition of an administrator leading UMNO. Sanusi Junid, a skilled political operator, whom no one can write off,<sup>107</sup> harbours the ambition of becoming the future Prime Minister, working with Abdullah Badawi who is older than himself. Being a former corporate figure, Sanusi Junid could emerge as another UMNO and government leader from the professional sector after Dr Mahathir's departure. A Chinese daily and a Malay tabloid reported that there would be a Cabinet reshuffle in November 1991, Dr Mahathir being expected to appoint a second Deputy Prime Minister.<sup>108</sup> But Dr Mahathir refuted the rumours. Therefore, there are many possibilities as to what could happen between now and the 1993 party election. The clear hierarchy of the UMNO leadership will only be known when Ghafar Baba chooses his Deputy in the government. Should Ghafar Baba leave the post early, unless Dr Mahathir wants to repeat the history of the election for party Deputy President in 1981, the one whom Dr

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<sup>107</sup> Stuart Drummond, 'Malaysia and Singapore: the looming succession,' *The World Today*, March 1991, p.53.

<sup>108</sup> *New Sunday Times*, October 27, 1991, p.2. Some UMNO leaders who were reluctant to identify themselves, supported claims that Anwar Ibrahim had asked Dr Mahathir to appoint him as the second Deputy Premier. They also mentioned that in the forthcoming Cabinet reshuffle, Sanusi Junid would be appointed Minister of Education, a move that would strengthen Sanusi Junid's position for the party election in 1993.

Mahathir picked as his deputy in government would be the man who would eventually control UMNO and would occupy 'Sri Perdana', the Prime Minister's residency.

It can be concluded that UMNO's political culture has changed: from idealism to pragmatism; from the collective aspiration for independence to the personal interests of materialism. The rural Malays have slowly changed their attitudes toward UMNO, and urban Malays seem to reject the unique position of UMNO. While UMNO members still look to the party as a source of patronage in their life, UMNO leaders see the party as a resource for accumulating wealth. Therefore, UMNO has become a vehicle for power, wealth, status and honour. In fact, these elements have become the source of 'Daulat' (sovereignty) in UMNO, which has replaced the 'Daulat' of Kingship. Both power elites, the political and the traditional, have been competing for 'Daulat'. Nevertheless, UMNO still relies for its source of power, on the rural Malays, who in terms of cognition, have a varied degree of political literacy. Party members are divided in terms of their feelings toward the party and its role in government, the leaders hoping that members always recognise the contribution of UMNO to Malay development, in return enhancing their support for UMNO. Party members are in fact, generally content with the UMNO structure and its system, but they are confused by the games played by their leaders.

Today, in UMNO, cliques, camps and groups have been created to ensure that potential leaders gain the upper hand in their power struggle. UMNO reflects the traditional Malay way of life but accommodates to the changing environment. Therefore, with the creation of cliques, leaders are behaving like a feudal aristocratic elite forming small fiefdoms made up of loyal retainers. These fiefdoms can unite for a common interest, but can also fragment for many reasons. Malay society, is structurally still very feudalistic. So elements of feudalism, aristocratic rule and authoritarianism are still intact within UMNO, even though the party and its members have been passing through a process of modernization. Based on the recent conflict

with the monarch, the continuing influence of the Malay rulers in the political and economic sphere, and also the continuing support of parts of political and business elite for the monarchy, Dr Mahathir himself has suggested that 'we are moving back to the days of the Malay rulers'.<sup>109</sup> Dr Mahathir was referring to the conduct of the rulers and their advisers, but it seems as if UMNO leaders themselves have transformed into modern Malay 'rulers' who have themselves exploited the practices of traditional Malay political culture.

The changing orientations of UMNO members have made UMNO develop a new pattern of political culture. It has moved from a 'parochial' political culture into a new form, which is a mixture of 'parochial' and 'subject' political culture,<sup>110</sup> where there are some who do not consciously involve themselves in the political system, and some assume a passive or obedient relationship to the system. Although they are affected by the system, they are ineffective in influencing it. Only about 1500 delegates to the UMNO General Assembly really participate in the system. Indeed, Malay political culture as manifested in UMNO is a mixture of tradition and modernity. Although the political structure has adapted itself to modernity, its social structure is without major discontinuities. UMNO has grown as a mass party which has members from all strata of social life. In the context of political participation, UMNO is an agent of socialization. The Malays and UMNO members do not feel alienated from the existing political structure, as witnessed by the high voting figures and the support for Barisan Nasional or APU, but few play an active role in the political decision-making process, and there is a lack of knowledge and interest in public politics generally. Thus it is a political culture of hierarchical traditional values which co-exists with the modern political and socio-economic world.

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<sup>109</sup> New Straits Times, November 9, 1991, p.8.

<sup>110</sup> For the definition and concepts of 'parochial' and 'subject' political culture, see the Introductory Chapter.

### *Conclusion.*

Throughout this study, I consider 'political culture' as a political aspect of a value system which includes ideas, customs and myths. These are identified and acknowledged by most of the community members. Political culture contributes to rational political behaviour and thinking. Political culture could also be assumed to be similar to the concept of 'ideology', which describes the orientation of mental, world views and structures of thinking. As a result, political culture can be observed from its doctrinal and generic aspects. There are two fundamental components which constitute a political culture, namely; attitudes towards the political institutions of the state, and secondly, the degree to which citizens feel they can influence and participate in the decision-making process.

#### *The reality of Malay Political Culture.*

Pragmatism<sup>1</sup> is the value system which controls UMNO's political thinking. Its programmes are always ad hoc<sup>2</sup> and change according to circumstances. However, it was *Semangat Kebangsaan Melayu* (Malay nationalism) which established the root of its political thinking from the day the party was founded. After Independence, however, rural development was a major policy delivered to the grassroots, and it has subsequently been an asset for those contesting in General Elections. When Barisan Nasional was formed, the party ruled the country by promising to the people that it would uphold Developmentalism as its ideology. Nevertheless, from 1979 to 1982, PAS and ABIM challenged UMNO's ideology of *Semangat Kebangsaan Melayu*. Dr Mahathir tried to reinstate *Semangat Kebangsaan Melayu* as a priority issue for UMNO, while at the same time introducing a new approach towards Islam. This, however, presented a dilemma for UMNO, in that some people in UMNO believed that *Semangat Kebangsaan Melayu* should be enhanced; some wanted Islam to be given priority as a strategy with which to confront

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<sup>1</sup> See the meaning of Pragmatism in Horace Standish Thayer, *Meaning and Action: A Critical History of Pragmatism* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968).

<sup>2</sup> An interview with Rais Yatim, (London: June 21, 1992).

PAS who had been using Islam as their party's main objective; and while others simply saw UMNO to be a source of wealth and status.

In response to this dilemma of unity of purpose, Dr Mahathir forwarded an idea, stimulated by utopian<sup>3</sup> values, called '*2020 Vision*'. It was intended that these values would develop the Malaysian notion of national unity and social cohesion, social justice, political stability, system of government, quality of life, social and spiritual values, national pride and confidence. The vision was designed with the intention of making Malaysia a 'developed' nation by the year 2020, and in the bumiputeras, Dr Mahathir inspired the hope of the emergence of 'a viable and robust bumiputera commercial and industrial community.'<sup>4</sup> However, Bumiputeras would have to work harder than the non-Bumiputeras, in order to ensure their success and restore their dignity.<sup>5</sup> To some UMNO leaders, Dr Mahathir is a thinker who has always tended towards futuristic ideas. His thinking has always been a great deal more adventurous than that of other UMNO members and leaders. As a result, UMNO leaders and the mainstream press have stressed the need for the rakyat to appreciate the '*2020 Vision*'. Incidentally, the National Economic Policy that was introduced in 1991 to replace DEB, is somewhat futurist and utopian as well, since the policy it advocates has no time limit. The belief is that efficiency in the field of economic management could retain and increase the bumiputera's stake without having to depend on exclusive Bumiputera and Malay political power.<sup>6</sup>

While '*2020 Vision*' is a secular utopia which hopes to bring in a new world through hard work, PAS on the contrary, appeals to the Malays through its vision of a spiritual utopia which expects a new world of Islamic states through the blessing and strength of the Almighty God, Allah. Malays now anticipate the implementation of

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<sup>3</sup> Frank E. Manual (ed.), *Utopia and Utopian Thought* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966).

<sup>4</sup> *The Star*, 'Malaysia: The Way Forward,' March 2, 1991.

<sup>5</sup> *The New Straits Times*, November 9, 1991, see the translation text of the speech by UMNO President Datuk Seri Dr Mahathir Mohamad at the 1991 UMNO General Assembly. pp.8-9 and 11.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*



*Huddud* law in Kelantan, which would be a test of PAS political credibility. Should this prove successful, another change in political culture is expected to occur.

Nevertheless, there is a line of thinking in UMNO which looks to an ideal future of *nativism*.<sup>7</sup> This is a strong aspiration to return to past glory. ABIM's element have wanted the Islamic scholar be given a major role in the government management system, as was the case in the last Malay Empire of Johor-Riau-Lingga. The tendency of some Islamic scholars to use the term 'Malay-Muslim' (in traditional Malay thinking, Islam and 'Melayu' are synonymous) illustrates this new tendency and revolutionary tendency to differentiate religion and ethnic identity. Other elements, however, have stressed 'Malay' rather than Islamic dominance in the country. For them, the restoration of UMNO by Dr Mahathir was seen as an attempt to secure Malay power as well as Islam.<sup>8</sup> They believed in the sacred word of a feudal Malay hero, Hang Tuah, who stated that '*Tak kan Melayu Hilang Di Dunia*' (The Malays will never vanish from this world). The special Malay rights in the constitution have long been at the centre of a Malay vision which has attracted the Malay masses, who have suffered in poverty for a long time.

Charismatic leaders generally employ utopian thinking. They formulate an abstract value system which forces the rakyat to seek guidance from the elites. For example Musa Hitam used his concept of '*politik kampung*', and Tengku Razaleigh's perception of '*kemungkaran ekonomi dan politik*'. Therefore, the more abstract the value system is, the greater the opportunity is for the elites to manipulate and direct the masses.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> The concept is cited from the work of Sartono Kartodirdjo, *Protest Movement in Rural Java* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1973).

<sup>8</sup> See 'Mengapa UMNO Patut Jadi Dominan dalam BN' [a text of the UMNO Presidential speech at the UMNO General Assembly, Friday, November 30, 1990] in *Utusan Malaysia*, December 1, 1990.

<sup>9</sup> Giovanni Sartori, "Politics, Ideology and Belief Systems," *American Political Science Review* 63 (June 1969), 410.

### *Levels of Militancy.*

Malay communities have experienced a conflict of values, because of the disintegration of their affiliation to origins, locality and dialects. With the Islamic resurgence, the Malays who had already been divided by the political framework of 'More Malay than you' politics, were also divided by the 'Holier than thou' concept of political allegiance. The Malays were a very patient and accommodating society until they felt that their survival was being challenged. It was the political elites who then exploited them politically for the former's own socio-economic interests. The masses were mobilised to support their leaders in confronting other elites. This happened in 1987; when MCA challenged UMNO, UMNO Youth organised a public rally to show their strength and unity in facing the challenge. UMNO itself planned to hold another gigantic public rally at Merdeka Stadium. But Dr Mahathir stabilised the situation by arresting (under the Internal Security Act) a number of ruling and opposition leaders in *Operasi Lalang*.

The militancy of the Malay masses, as recorded in history, has generally taken a reactive form. This happened in 1946, against the Chinese of 'Bintang Tiga',<sup>10</sup> and again in May 1969, when the DAP and Gerakan ridiculed the Malays. However, it was the Memali incident of 1984, which has been recorded as the only major physical clash among the Malays, when the followers of Ibrahim Libya of PAS went against the Police Forces who happened to be Malay personnel.

The 1987 UMNO General Assembly marked another turning point when ruling UMNO leaders were challenged openly by a group of UMNO leaders. This was part of a process in the co-called 'circulation of elites,' in which a faction of the political elite offered themselves as alternative leaders. Although the post of UMNO President had been challenged in the past, the party election in 1987 was an unprecedented event in the history of modern Malay politics. The conflict between

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<sup>10</sup> Cheaah Boon Kheng, *The Masked Comrades: A Study of the Communist United Front in Malaya, 1945-1948* (Singapore: Times Books International, 1979), and *Red Star Over Malaya: Resistance and Social Conflict During and After the Japanese Occupation of Malaya, 1941-1946* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1983).

Team A and Team B lead to the breakdown of UMNO. However, the formation of UMNO Baru was a breakthrough in reviving the old UMNO. Nevertheless, Semangat 46 was now an alternative party for the Malays, and both of these inherited the culture of the old UMNO. The crisis between these parties will go on unless they are reunited in the future. The Malays, therefore, have a mixture of tolerance and militancy in their attitudes, and their tolerance may break down when their status quo is challenged.

*Attitudes Toward Tradition and Change.*

The structure of Malay thinking is a mixture of closed and open thinking. Malays are happy with tradition, but are also constantly searching for new alternatives in the name of progress. Some Malays can adapt to a changing environment, and whereas the rural masses are always trying to maintain tradition, their elites are not. The terms of *politik wang* (money politics) and *politik kampung* (Village politics) reveal this paradox of change in tradition. ABIM and PAS had the opportunity to offer an alternative, in the midst of a global Islamic resurgence, to reject Malay identity and accept Islam as a strong dynamic source of change. They wanted the Malays and their institutions to return to Islam, based on the Quran and Hadith, to guide their way of life. However, some Malays believe that Islam is a sacred tradition consisting of unquestionable absolute truth, and thus reject the idea of 'radicalising' Islam. To a certain extent, UMNO has accused some groups and personalities of using Islam for their own political interests. Malays are nevertheless worried about being labelled 'less Islamic' (kurang Islam) or unIslamic (tidak Islam) by the so-called Islamic scholars (ulamak). Dr Mahathir has suggested that many Muslims today are backward and ignorant in many areas because of the teachings of these conservative interpreters of Islam.<sup>11</sup>

Generally, the Malay masses believe that the environment is static unless changed by the strength of the external world. Their mentality tends to submit to

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<sup>11</sup> New Straits Times, November 9, 1991.

anything that becomes a general pattern or is insisted on by the ruling elites. During Mahathir's era, Malays have been exposed to the concept of a changing environment: the 'Look East Policy,' industrialization, privatization, and the dissemination of Islamic values were strategies used by the government in an attempt to change the Malay's mentality towards tradition and change. Dr Mahathir has developed the idea of expanding Malaysian efforts, especially those of the Malays, to become more global in their economic and political perspectives.

Confronting the new challenge of a 'unipolar world', Dr Mahathir has reminded the Malays that, if they do not change their lifestyles quickly enough, they will rapidly be sidelined and dominated.<sup>12</sup>

*New Tradition:* As can be seen from present trends now, UMNO must not only cater for its loyal supporters in rural areas, but must face the reality of fulfilling the needs of urban politics, the educated members, the middle class and the professional members who form pressure groups that will influence future policies within UMNO. These groups have the potential to develop new traditions in the party. The monarchy has formerly been a symbol of national pride in the political system, but by 1991, UMNO leaders had begun to 'educate' the Malay rulers to behave according to what UMNO has defined as the proper role of a 'constitutional monarchy'.<sup>13</sup> The myth of the agreement between Sang Sapurba and Demang Lebar Daun has been reinterpreted, reminding the Malay rulers of their role and bond with the rakyat. To a certain extent, it has been argued that the absolute power to rule had never been envisaged in the Rulers' mandates; in the first power-sharing contracts between the Malays and their Rulers, the latter existed and exercised the power with the consent of their loyal subjects.<sup>14</sup> This is the second time in history that the Rulers have been

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<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> On July 4, 1992, the Malay Rulers except the Sultan of Kelantan, the Sultan of Johor and the Sultan of Kedah signed the Proclamation of Constitutional Principles containing the code of conduct for them as proposed by UMNO leaders. For the details of the 10 points proclamation, see *Mingguan Malaysia*, July 5, 1992, and *New Sunday Times*, July 5, 1992.

<sup>14</sup> *New Straits Times*, December 3, 1990, and Camil Wariya, *Politik dan Raja* (Petaling Jaya: Penerbit Fajar Bakti, 1992), pp.43-106

openly confronted by the rakyat. The first time was in 1946 after the Rulers signed the Malayan Union agreement with the British.

*Altered Tradition:* There has been a modification in party traditions. The old methods of campaigning which depended on skill in oratory, have give way to modern 'political warfare skills' which include money politics, *surat layang*, slander, character assassination in various forms of publications, rewards in the form of business and political appointments, and so on.

UMNO leaders have called upon UMNO members not to encourage political gossiping,<sup>15</sup> but rumours in the capital city have had a tendency to foster and breed, thus gaining a velocity and momentum of their own, and consequently gain a respectable sheen that gets passed off as the truth, or something close to it.<sup>16</sup> Kuala Lumpur has now become a 'rumour mill'. The public tend to believe these rumours, since they subscribe to the view that there is 'no smoke without fire'. Therefore, at times, rumours can affect even the fortunes of the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange.

The Malays, who form the main power-base in the country's politics, appear to have become more tolerant of political diversity within their community. They not only challenged the party leader in the 1987 party election; in the General Election of 1990, the Malays no longer accorded the ruling party the automatic right of protecting their interest within the political framework. In addition, Semangat 46 led a multiracial opposition which was fought on the platform of a two party system. Therefore, the Malay government-non-Malay opposition dichotomy that has dominated the country's political history appears to have become less relevant.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> Abdul Ghafar Baba, *Perjuangan Suci UMNO* [Text of the UMNO Deputy Presidential Speech at the General Assemblies of Pemuda and Wanita UMNO, November 7, 1991]. p.5.

<sup>16</sup> *Malaysian Business*, March 16-31, 1992.

<sup>17</sup> Hari Singh, "Political change in Malaysia: the role of Semangat 46," *Asian Survey*, vol.XXXI, NO.8., August 1991, p.712.

### *The Malay Way of Politics*

Some younger Malays no longer regard adat (custom) as relevant, especially in those areas where they feel it conflicts with an Islamic way of life. In UMNO, most of the older members have wanted to maintain the Malay way of politics i.e. emphasis on moral values and traditional courtesy. However, this 'Malay way of politics' (politik cara Melayu) has declined as a new generation has become increasingly involved in politics. Malays have now begun to lose their traditional deference towards UMNO leaders, and the traditional value of Malay unity has already become a myth rather than a reality, whilst Islam has become a political tool rather than guiding principle for their private way of life. To a certain extent, the religious scholars in UMNO are considered by PAS as *Ulama Kerajaan* (establishment religious scholars) and are thus not recognised by PAS, who have proclaimed themselves as 'ulama swasta' (independent religious scholars). Therefore, the modern Malay style of politics can now be described as a mixture of the Malay feudalistic style, the practise of Machiavallian politics [the ends justifying the means], Gramsci's political formula [the ability to create blocs of interest containing disparate classes], the Hassan Turabi/Kurshid Ahmad/ Hizbul Muslimun of Egypt/ and Jamaat el-Islami of Pakistan political approach, mixed with Iranian-Libyan radical models. Unity of purpose seems no longer to exist. The *Politik Kampung* (village politics), which was the ideal of Malay political culture, has become a dying myth in UMNO politics.

### *The Unchanging tradition.*

Nevertheless, the substance of Malay political culture is still firmly based on 'feudal' traditions. Despite the imposition of a democratic system and a modernization that has brought about social and economic changes, Malay society is still hierarchical, and in many ways its traditional values are still adhered to,<sup>18</sup> deference to authority, which would be questioned only under very exceptional

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<sup>18</sup>Khong Kim Hoon, *Malaysia's General election 1990*, p.24.

circumstances, is still the norm among the rakyat. UMNO has become part of Malay social institutions, and has branches in almost all villages in the Malay Peninsula. Moreover, UMNO has been in power since independence, and thus it has been perceived by the rakyat as the natural government and ruler. To challenge the authority and leadership of UMNO has been seen as going against tradition, and could thus be considered as 'menderhaka' (treasonous). The failure of UMNO's splinter groups to form other political parties since 1951 has been seen by the rakyat as a sanction of the traditional bond between the ruler and the ruled. Malay unity is still a political myth in UMNO, and those who have rebelled against UMNO have been perceived as dividing and weakening the party that is the protector of the Malays.

#### *Patterns of Leadership and the Media.*

In most cases, UMNO leaders have tried to influence public opinion through the mainstream media, government broadcasting and other information agencies. As the government has developed more control over the mass media, it has increased its demands for conformity.<sup>19</sup> Naturally, as the Malay ruling elite, UMNO leaders have hoped that the masses would support rather than criticise them. The pattern of leadership in UMNO has been a kind of exploitative authority in which the policy has consisted of warnings and threats to inculcate insecure feelings in order to obtain allegiance from the members. As a result, the status quo and leaders' interests have been maintained, with the decision-making process always originating at the highest level of the organizational structure.

#### *Style of Leadership in UMNO.*

'Authoritarian,' 'dictatorial,' and 'visionary' are terms which have been used to describe Dr Mahathir's style of leadership as he has managed the conflicts within the party and shaped Malay political culture.

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<sup>19</sup> Albert Widjaja, *Budaya Politik*, p.270.

The leadership of Tengku Razaleigh and Musa Hitam has been as charismatic, with their influence prevailing in their own home states of Kelantan and Johor. Tengku Razaleigh's leadership has contributed to the unity of the Malay political parties and the Malays in Kelantan. With the coalition of PAS and Semangat 46, there were no more cases in which villagers refused to eat together, or insisted on following their own *Imams*, or where villagers forbade their children to marry into families from other political allegiances.<sup>20</sup> Consequently, in the case of Kelantan, it was necessary for UMNO to have a leader of the highest quality, who was as good, as or better than, Tengku Razaleigh, if they were to return to power there.

#### *Strategy and Tactics.*

Mahathir has managed to control UMNO through his political strategy and the application of the principles of warfare. Prompted by the changing political climate within the party, Dr Mahathir has made surprise attacks, used tactical withdrawals, and outmanoeuvred his opponents. He applied the '*coopting*' strategy in the cases of Anwar Ibrahim, Nakhaei Haji Ahmad and other ABIM and PAS leaders. Impelled by his obsession with the destruction of Semangat 46, he used an '*accommodating*' tactic in reaccepting Musa Hitam into the UMNO fold. As a result, Dr Mahathir managed to apply a '*confrontational*' strategy with Tengku Razaleigh. He placed obstacles in the way of certain former UMNO leaders, who had acted against him before, from joining UMNO Baru. Only when the party had really established itself, did he open party membership to all Malays.<sup>21</sup> In the case of the constitutional crisis of 1983, when he came into conflict with the monarchy, he applied a tactical withdrawal strategy and undertook to '*consult*' the Conference of Rulers. In his zero-sum game, he eventually managed to obtain what he wanted, which was to curtail the power of the constitutional monarchy. However, Dr Mahathir has had to face a long war with this traditional institution, which, up to the end of 1991, he has failed completely to

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<sup>20</sup> Far Eastern Economic Review, October 4, 1990, p.12.

<sup>21</sup> The text of speech of UMNO President at the UMNO General Assembly 1989 see The Star, November 16, 1989.



resolve. He still sometimes practises 'rule-oriented' tactics, and at other times uses 'rule-evasion' strategies, but there are other situations which necessitate the application of 'personal-political' tactics in order to neutralize his enemy, win commitments from UMNO members and mobilize the support of its leaders.

*The Balance of Power.*

Dr Mahathir retained Tengku Razaleigh in his cabinet until 1987 in order to balance Musa Hitam's influence, at a time when his patronage and support was needed by Musa Hitam. He also needed Musa Hitam's support in UMNO's strong base in Johor. By coopting Anwar Ibrahim in 1982, Dr Mahathir managed to slow down Musa Hitam's political manoeuvres. By reappointing Abdullah Badawi to serve in his cabinet in 1990, Dr Mahathir managed to check Anwar Ibrahim's influence in the party. Using these tactics, Dr Mahathir's position has been secured. To a certain extent, he has succeeded in gaining the confidence of the public in his leadership of the party and the government, since the public has anticipated a struggle for the succession in UMNO if he were to leave the party in the immediate future.

*Attitude towards Mobility.*

Dr Mahathir has always encouraged the notion of mobility in politics and economics. He has managed to create a group of corporate Malay leaders, businessmen and entrepreneurs. Even though some of them have benefited from what might be called 'sponsored mobility', it is an example of the attitude of UMNO leaders towards mobility. They intend to develop a Bumiputera Commercial and Industrial Community. The Malays have been shifted from their tendency to be dependent on the government and their privileges under the constitution. The growth in the number of Malay businessmen is an indicator of the move towards a business culture in Malay society, but this is the result of hard work which is not yet complete.<sup>22</sup> Thus, the NEP has been used as a tool for economic mobility.

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<sup>22</sup> Dr Mahathir Mohamad, *UMNO Ke Arah Abad Ke 21* (Text of speech in the 1991 UMNO General Assembly), p.34, its English edition published in *New Straits Times*, November 9, 1991.

Another venture was a programme called the 'modernization of the village'(Pemodenan Kampung). Here, attempts have been made to gear the minds of the rural people towards changing the country's status from that of an agricultural state to one of a new industrialised nation in the 21st century.

The masses are nowadays exposed to the financial world. They have been introduced to ventures on the Stock Exchange and to corporate shares. This began in 1981, when the government offered the Malays the opportunity to buy shares worth up to \$50,000, in order to generate Malay interest in this type of investment. It was called the *Amanah Saham Nasional* (the National Trustee Share scheme). In 1991, another investment scheme called The *Amanah Saham Bumiputera* was introduced. The Government bestowed on the poor people special financial facilities to encourage their participation in the scheme. Consequently, the middle class have become more business-minded. There have also come into existence in some areas syndicates which run a private investment scheme called *Sekim Cepat Kaya* (Get Rich Faster Scheme). These are among the factors that have prompted the Malays to abandon their traditional status as government servants, and gear themselves more towards a commercial and industrial society. Therefore, UMNO has inculcated a business culture among Malays.

#### *The Patronage System.*

A patronage system has long existed in Malay society, though this too has been modernised. Power, wealth and status are the traditional basis of the patron-client relationship. UMNO members are the new subject class who play the role of modern political retainers.

Leaders with their social power ['reward', 'expert', and 'referent' power] manage to enhance their position and the loyalty of their members. To strengthen and enhance this power, they form camps or inner circles based on their interests and strategies. As in the feudal tradition, when the ruling elites protected and rewarded

faithful loyal chiefs or local leaders, UMNO now rewards and protects its supporters. By the 1980's, this trend had in UMNO became a potential route of advancement for Malay wealth seekers.<sup>23</sup>

In this materialistic era, leaders at branch and divisional levels look forward to a better life style and always rely on their political leaders to reward them in the form of salaried appointments and business opportunities. This is done in return for their guaranteed loyalty and support. This loyalty changes once the leader loses his power, and members then defer to a new or potential leader. 'Patronised' members in general have a better opportunity to realize their ambitions both in the party and the government power structure. Thus, in summary, the 'spirit of politics' in UMNO has become a matter of who gets what, when and where.

In the 1987 party election, UMNO changed the pattern of its patron-client relationships. Team A was under the patronage of Dr Mahathir and Team B was under that of Tengku Razaleigh. This pattern was continued until recently in the form of UMNO Baru and Semangat 46. Nevertheless, within these parties themselves, there are groups whose loyalty is given exclusively to one particular leader, or potential leader. It is possible that from this a 'circulation of elites,' in the form of a more competition for power and position in the party, will develop.

UMNO leaders have become political entrepreneurs educating political leaders in the lower echelons as to how to become opportunists supporting those who offer the highest reward. From this it is evident that traditional political morality no longer has a vital role in this new political culture.

#### *The Priority of Policies.*

It is clear that in the Mahathir era, economic development has become a priority. Ten policies were introduced in relation to the economy, seven policies on socio-political development, and a few policies concerning international relations.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> New Straits Times, February 21, 1987, see the column entitled 'Anwar: UMNO is no place for wealth seekers'.

<sup>24</sup> See Dasar-Dasar Utama Kerajaan Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: INTAN, 1988).

All these are known as *Dasar-Dasar Utama* Kerajaan or the government's Main Policies. Among them are the following: the National Economic Policy which replaced the New Economic Policy; the Heavy Industry policy; the Industrial Master Plan; the National Agriculture Policy; the Privatisation policy; 'Malaysia Incorporated'; New Guidelines in Village and Rural Developments; the upgrading of National Productivity; and the Policy of Reducing the Burden of Public Expenditure.

The non-economic policies which have been given priority include the National Education Policy; the 'National Culture' policy; the dissemination of Islamic Values in the administration; the Look East Policy; the campaign with the slogan "Clean, Efficient and Trustworthy"; "Leadership by Example"; and the policy entitled 'Towards a population of seventy million Malaysians.'

### *Mahathirism*

The New Economic Policy under Mahathir has received a mixed response, particularly where it concerns the involvement of the state in business. Some have considered Mahathir's policies as the intervention of government for the sake of development,<sup>25</sup> a transition from *laissez faire* towards socialism,<sup>26</sup> and a kind of development by 'trusteeship'.<sup>27</sup> The critical view considers the policy as a development of "state capitalism" or "bourgeois bureaucracy".<sup>28</sup> Chandra Muzafar has seen the policy as a form of "communal capitalism",<sup>29</sup> Hua Wu Yin believes its aim to be to produce a new Malay state bourgeoisie,<sup>30</sup> while Seaward calls it plainly

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<sup>25</sup> D.McEachern and P.L.Burns, "The Problems of the State in Asian Industrialisation and Development," *Asian Pacific Review*, No.3/4, Winter/Spring 1986.

<sup>26</sup> R.S.Milne and D.K.Mauzy, *Politics and Government in Malaysia* (Vancouver:University of Columbia Press, 1978).

<sup>27</sup> Ozay Mehmet, *Development in Malaysia: Poverty, Wealth and Trusteeship* (London: Croom Helm, 1986).

<sup>28</sup> Hing Ai Yun, "Capitalist Development, Class and Race," in S.Husin Ali (Ed.), *Ethnicity, Class and Development: Malaysia* (Kuala Lumpur: Persatuan Sains Sosial Malaysia, 1984), and K.S.Jomo, *A Question of Class: Capital, the State and Uneven Development* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1986).

<sup>29</sup> Chandra Muzaffar, "Has the Communal Situation Worsened Over the Last Decade?: Some Preliminary Thoughts," in S.Husin Ali (ed.), *Ethnicity, Class and Development: Malaysia* (Kuala Lumpur: Persatuan Sains Sosial Malaysia, 1984).

<sup>30</sup> Hua Wu Yin, *Class and Communalism in Malaysia: Politics in a Dependent Capitalist State* (London: Zed Books Ltd., 1983).

'positive discrimination'.<sup>31</sup> From the Malay point of view, while they acknowledge and support the changes deriving from the NEP, it has also produced side effects, such as the formation of a new Malay middle class, which has affected the distribution of intra-ethnic income and produced a financial burden by the rapid development in the public sector. They have witnessed rising expectations, the existence of a 'dependency syndrome', and thereby growing dissatisfaction of non-Malays, and the intra-Malay elite.

Dr Mahathir already has a notion of changing the Malays. His ideas were presented in his works entitled *The Malay Dilemma* and *The Challenge*. In the latter, he confessed his pride in the way he has produced new Malay Millionaires, sponsored new Malay entrepreneurs, and increased the number of Malay professionals. Malays now have become more business-minded and materialistic and orientated towards the private sector. Accordingly the PTD -the administrative elite,- now wonder whether they will still enjoy the dominating position they have now, in the year 2020.<sup>32</sup>

In shaping Malay political culture, Dr Mahathir has had to face many challenges which have closed another important chapter in UMNO history. However, he has managed to maintain the present UMNO in power and it has been able to continue many of the traditions and customs of the old UMNO. Dr Mahathir does not, however, want great acclaim for his contributions but will be quite content in the knowledge that his goals have been achieved and his dreams have been realised.

Like other Asian cultures, Malay culture has tried to hold firm to its traditional core in the modern era. However, Dr Mahathir, by closing off the normal channels of compromise, and applying blunt coercion and open confrontation in political conflict, has apparently attempted to bring about nothing less than a Malay cultural revolution by shock tactics.

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<sup>31</sup> N.Scaward, "Balancing the Redress in Kuala Lumpur," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, September 25, 1986, pp.76-77.

<sup>32</sup> See *New Sunday Times*, June 21, 1991, p.6, under a column entitled "Ahmad Sarji: Officers must obey the rules.". According to him, the posts of Secretary General and Director General would always be reserved for PTD officers even though in many countries' these positions were held by professionals.

### *Sources of Conflict.*

A conflict took place in UMNO after its members had gone through a transitional period of great social change, political and economic modernization, and unavoidable power struggles. Until the end of the 1980's, Malay political development was still searching for a new premise on which to base its political concepts. It could even be said that Malays did not at that time lay claim to a real political identity, either in continuation of *Semangat Kebangsaan Melayu* as the basis of their survival or in the acceptance of Islam *in toto*. This meant that Malay politicians were not governed by any particular style or political behaviour; as a result 'arrogance politics' (politik bongkak) and the politics of 'self-interest' (mementingkan diri) dominated their political culture.

### *The Future Conflict.*

*Intra UMNO top leaders:* We may consider Dr Mahathir as the most successful leader in bringing change to the Malays and the country as a whole. However, when the time comes for him to step down, a new problem will arise- the question of succession. Since his security rests on the uncertainty of the party's present situation, this may be a major dilemma, especially, if Ghafar Baba has to retire from active politics before him. As it is now, there are two groups within UMNO, Ghafar Baba's group and Anwar Ibrahim's. In the event of Ghafar Baba managing to take over the leadership, the party would fall into the hands of the group known as the 'Orang Lama' (senior members). However, if Anwar Ibrahim were to succeed, UMNO would be subject to a 'new order' and 'new traditions'. If it falls to neither of them, it is possible that Anwar Ibrahim would think of calling together his loyal supporters to form another party which may combine with PAS and/ or Semangat 46. At that point of time, UMNO might have to be prepared to play a new role in opposition.

*Intra Barisan Nasional:* In the crisis of UMNO in 1987, MCA and MIC tightened their support for Dr Mahathir and UMNO Baru, in order to secure and

improve their position. Practically, the non-Malay parties in Barisan Nasional are continuously judging UMNO's strength and its support from the Malays. Once they believe UMNO's popularity to be declining, there will no reason for them to stay in the Barisan Nasional. For example Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia only joined Barisan Nasional for the sake of their power and political base in Pulau Pinang when faced by challenges from MCA and DAP, and Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS) deserted Barisan Nasional when it felt sufficiently confident to do so. Consequently, intra-Barisan conflict would occur if UMNO's strength was questioned and it was unable to put forward a leadership capable of managing this coalition party ruling the country.<sup>33</sup>

*UMNO As an Organization.*

UMNO's management structure is very strong when compared with that of other political parties in Malaysia. UMNO has salaried staff who run its offices at Central, State and Divisional levels. However, it is necessary for more highly qualified personnel to be appointed to head important sections in UMNO Headquarters, such as the Research and Information Departments. Moreover, State Liaison Offices must be well equipped with their own Research and Information units to operate throughout the year, researching, gathering and analyzing information from the grassroots level in order to produce regular reports on the situation on the ground.

*Ideology [Malay Nationalism and Islam],*

Until recently, UMNO members were still confused by UMNO's ideology, even though Dr Mahathir reaffirmed that UMNO ideology is one of Semangat Kebangsaan Melayu and Anwar Ibrahim himself outlined the need to emphasize Malay nationalism. The fact remains that propaganda used by PAS and ABIM in their rejection of Malay Nationalism has damaged UMNO. With the existing competition within the UMNO elite in their struggle to accumulate wealth and political power, ideology seems to be insignificant to UMNO at present. UMNO as

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<sup>33</sup> See Dr Mahathir's speech at the 1990 UMNO General Assembly in *Utusan Malaysia*, December 1, 1990.

the leader of Barisan Nasional also sponsors another ideology for the coalition party which is known as Developmentalism. Consequently, some political observers have been of the opinion that pragmatism should be emphasized, along with traditional UMNO political beliefs.

### ***Possible Political Development..***

#### ***Mahathir's successor.***

Although Ghafar Baba, the UMNO Deputy President and Deputy Prime Minister is the logical successor, Mahathir has left the public with a sense of uncertainty: Ghafar Baba, might be either a stop-gap or a real successor- but his lack of educational background and age in comparison with Mahathir are seen by some UMNO leaders as a disadvantage. Nevertheless, as in the case of John Major, the British Prime Minister, it has been shown that there is no necessary correlation between academic qualifications and one's ability regarding political leadership.

Anwar Ibrahim, a utopian thinker, has been portrayed by the media as a possible UMNO President and Prime Minister. But Tengku Razaleigh, Musa Hitam and Ghazali Shafie are among those UMNO leaders who have already fallen prey to press speculation. Will Anwar Ibrahim suffer the same fate?. Another factor to take into consideration concerns the way in which Malay leadership requirements tend to involve 'maturity', experience and quality. Nevertheless, Anwar who is now 45, would have a better chance if Mahathir 'really groomed' him.

Abdullah Badawi, 53, is the most experienced Vice President who was tested in UMNO's recent political conflict. He is retiring in personality, religiously educated, and experienced in administration. The Fleet Group media have never supported Abdullah in the competition for Mahathir's successor, but Utusan Melayu has. Formerly, it was thought that he could only be Deputy Prime Minister to Musa Hitam if the latter were to take over the leadership. But now he is moulding his own image as an alternative leader after Ghafar Baba. If the UMNO members need a strong



nationalist and tested UMNO leader who has a religious background, then Abdullah Badawi will stand a good chance.

Sanusi Junid, 46, is a hard working minister who is a political strategist and tactician. He and Abdullah are both 'orang lama' and happen to be Anwar's rivals. Sanusi Junid managed to get the Vice Presidency in the 1990 election. If either Abdullah Badawi or Anwar Ibrahim were to become UMNO President, Sanusi would stand a good chance of becoming Deputy President before taking over the UMNO leadership.

The party election of 1993, will be very significant for these leaders. The question of whether they will still be in line to contest the presidency or whether a 'new order' will emerge to face the Malay challenge for the 21st century is still not known. As a result, all the decisions for UMNO's future leadership will be made by the 1993 UMNO delegates.

#### *UMNO and Semangat 46.*

Many former UMNO members in Semangat 46 will return to UMNO after Dr Mahathir is no longer in power. The main reason for them forming the new party was their dislike of Dr Mahathir. Indeed, any UMNO leader after Dr Mahathir will be in a better position to unite the Malays. Furthermore, it is easier for the present UMNO to become again like the original UMNO than it would be for Semangat 46, not only in constitutional terms, but also due to the fact that they are the ruling party. Though Semangat 46 has a basic structure throughout the Malay Peninsula, it is now considered a marginal party in the west coast. To the Malays (but not for the UMNO leaders), the defeat in Kelantan and Trengganu did not jeopardise Malay dominance in politics as much as it would have done if they had lost on the West coast.

Conflict between UMNO and the monarchy is ongoing. In 1992, UMNO drafted a code of conduct, which was agreed to by certain Malay Rulers on July 4. Dr Mahathir reaffirmed his stand which emphasized that the Rulers must follow the advice of the Heads of Government, i.e Prime Minister and Menteri Besar. The

mainstream media managed to portray a negative image of certain Rulers, in particular, the Sultan of Kelantan and the Sultan of Selangor. There was an attempt to criticize the Sultan of Trengganu by members of the business elite, but the Menteri Besar defended him. There were rumours of a strain in the relationship between Raja Perlis and his Menteri Besar, and about the private lives of the Sultans and their royal families generally. In 1991, the UMNO General Assembly under the pretext of safeguarding the traditional institutions questioned the integrity of the Sultans in general. The case of the 'Lamborghini Diablo' of the Sultan of Kelantan,<sup>34</sup> and his absence from the 157th Malay Rulers' Conference at which the monarchy's code of conduct was discussed,<sup>35</sup> is an example of this conflict between Dr Mahathir and the Sultan. The Sultan of Kelantan has made it clear that he would not sign the proclamation. When the Sultans of Johor and Kedah delayed signing the code of conduct on the pretext that they needed more time to deliberate certain clauses in the proclamation,<sup>36</sup> has shown that another possible conflict might occur in future in those particular states.

UMNO will play an opposition role when its leaders can no longer manage party discipline, command deference and exploit tradition. A serious attempt has to be made by UMNO, to mould together its unity of purpose, to meet the party's objectives, and to strengthen its machinery at all levels. It is trying to return to the Malay way of politics (*politik cara Melayu*).

Generally, Malay political culture is a mixture of tradition and modernity. The Masses do not feel alienated from the existing political structure, as is shown by high voting figures and the active level of support for UMNO and Semangat 46 and PAS. However, few play an active role in the political decision-making process, and there is a lack of sophisticated knowledge of public politics generally. Therefore, UMNO

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<sup>34</sup> See the report of Jon Swain, 'Malaysia in a spin over royal racer' in *The Sunday Times* (UK), April 5, 1992.

<sup>35</sup> *New Sunday Times*, June 21, 1991, p.4.

<sup>36</sup> *New Sunday Times*, July 5, 1990.

culture is a political culture dominated by hierarchical traditional values combined to some extent with modern democratic values.

*Suggested areas for further research.*

There is great deal of study which could be developed from this research. The topic of political culture is very wide and as a result needs to be studied in greater depth, particularly in relation to the points raised here.

Firstly, there is the need to make a comparative study of Malay political culture, either on an intra-state basis, or concentrating on the intra-Malay world, including a study of Indonesia and Philippines. In the former case, Kelantan has been studied by local and western scholars, but very few studies have been carried out on the West coast states. However, there have been case studies, by Shamsul A.B of Kuala Selangor, and prior to that by Marvin Roger explored the political culture of the Malays in Sungai Raya in Muar, Johor. More cases and comparative studies would contribute to a more comprehensive picture of Malay political culture.

Furthermore, research on the culture of other bumiputera communities in Sabah and Sarawak, previously studied by anthropologists and sociologists,<sup>37</sup> could be enhanced by an intensive comparative study with other bumiputera in the Malay Peninsula, since these bumiputera are indeed part of the Malay race.

From there on, a comparative study with other Malay people in the Philippines and Indonesia, or even in the Pacific rim, could help illuminate the patterns of political culture in the Malay world as a whole.

Another point is that there is a need to study the culture of Malays within the opposition parties, such as PAS, Semangat 46, DAP, and Parti Rakyat Malaya, in order to compare the political culture of Malay opposition parties with the Malays in the ruling party.

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<sup>37</sup> For example the latest research by Jayum Javan "The Ethnic Factor in Modern Politics: the Case of Sarawak" (Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Centre for South-East Asian Studies, 1991) which studies the modern politics in Iban community.

Ethnicity in Malaysia has been studied intensively, the Malays generally becoming a scapegoat in judging the efficacy of democratic processes in Malaysia. Government under UMNO has sometimes been branded as racist, and been described as implementing an apartheid system. The fact remains that Malaysia is a multi-racial and multi-cultural country controlled by a coalition government represented by communal and regional political parties. In enhancing efforts to build a Malaysian nation, it is necessary to understand the different cultural roots of its citizens who are represented by bumiputeras from the Malay world, the Chinese who inherited the culture from their Chinese World, and the Indians from another separate culture and tradition.

Consequently, an understanding of Malay political culture will vitally contribute to an understanding of the political discourse of Malaysian politics for as long as the Malay leadership is dominant in Malaysia. On the other hand, the development of a Malaysian identity and the concept of Malaysian character is ongoing, and subject to the direction of the government's policies and political decisions, which are themselves subject to the conceptual and political debates and power struggles between the Malay political actors.

*The Chronology of the formation of the UMNO Baru and the Semangat 46.*

**1987:**

- |              |   |
|--------------|---|
| 24 April     | The General Assembly and the election of the Supreme Council.   |
| 29 April     | Tengku Razaleigh and Rais Yatim resigned from Cabinet.<br><br>3 Ministers and 4 Deputy Ministers sacked from Cabinet.                               |
| 19 May       | The Cabinet reshuffle.  |
| 26 June      | 11 UMNO members apply to the court for an injunction to declare the 24 April election null and void. They also place an application for reelection. |
| 26 September | Negotiations between a task force of the Supreme Council and the eleven UMNO members to settle the court case.                                      |

**1988**

- |             |   |
|-------------|---|
| 4 February  | UMNO declared an illegal society.   |
| 5 February  | A special meeting takes place between of former UMNO Supreme Council members to form UMNO 88. |
| 8 February  | Tunku Abdul Rahman submits an application to register UMNO Malaysia.                          |
| 9 February  | Dr Mahathir submits an application to register UMNO 88.                                       |
| 10 February | The Registrar of Society rejects the registration of UMNO Malaysia and UMNO 88.               |
| 12 February | UMNO officially deregistered.   |
| 13 February | Application to form UMNO Baru submitted.  |
| 14 February | UMNO Baru is registered.  |
| 15 February | Deregistration of UMNO and registration of UMNO Baru gazetted.                                |

16 February	UMNO Baru joins the Barisan Nasional as the 13th component member.
21 February	Approval given to the constitution of UMNO Baru by the pro-tem Supreme Council.
3 March	The crisis between the Sultan of Kelantan and the Menteri Besar publicised by press.
6 March	SEMARAK launched at Lubuk Jong, Kelantan.
1 April	Tunku Abdul Rahman, Tun Hussein Onn and Dato' Manan Othman apply to the court for an injunction to stop the transfer of UMNO assets to UMNO Baru and to prevent the latter from recruiting members from the original party.
3 April	The pro-tem Supreme Council of UMNO Baru approves the line-up of the States UMNO, dropping 33 of 133 originally elected UMNO Heads of Divisions.
16 May	The Registrar of Societies approves UMNO Baru's constitution.
21 May	The Supreme Council of the UMNO Baru officially formed.
11 June	The 1946 UMNO Reviving Coordination Committee is formed at the gathering of team B at Subang Jaya.
6 July	The meeting of the Supreme Council to revitalise the party States liaison Committees, 133 Divisions and 8,668 Branches..
4 August	The Johor Bahru by-election.
3 September	An application to register Semangat 46 is submitted.
9 September	UMNO Baru's Supreme Council approves the standing Order and meeting procedure for the Pemuda and

	Wanita.
20 October	The Parit Raja State Assembly by-election.
27 October	The Annual General Meeting of the UMNO Baru Pemuda and Wanita movements.
28 October	Special meeting on the party's constitution.
28-30 October	The first General Assembly of UMNO Baru which saw the decision to allow serving Supreme Council members to retain their positions until 1990.
	Dr Mahathir offers Musa Hitam and Tengku Razaleigh posts in his Cabinet as Ministers without portfolio.
17 November	Dato' Asri and his 12 members of the HAMIM Supreme Council join UMNO Baru.
5 December	Tengku Razaleigh tables a private bill to amend the Societies Act 1966 to revive 'old UMNO'. The bill is rejected by Parliament.
18 December	The Johor Malay Assembly is held at Johor Bahru.
<b>1989:</b>	
January	Beginning of UMNO branch meetings.
28 January	By-election in Ampang Jaya Parliamentary constituency .
1 March	Musa Hitam joins UMNO Baru.
21 March	Nakhaei Haji Ahmad, PAS Vice President, joins UMNO Baru.
5 May	The Semangat 46 party is officially registered.
24 June	By-election of Telok Pasu of Trengganu State Assembly constituency
5 August	By-election in Tambatan, a Johor State Assembly constituency.

11 October     The first General Assembly of Semangat 46 at the Federal Hotel, Kuala Lumpur. Tengku Razaleigh is elected President.



President	YAB Datuk Seri Dr.Mahathir Mohamad
Deputy President	YAB Datuk Musa Hitam
Vice President	YAB Dato' Amar Haji Wan Mokhtar Wan Ahmad.
Vice President	YB Dato' Abdullah Haji Ahmad Badawi.
Vice President	YB Encik Ghafar Baba
Vice President (Youth)	YB Encik Anwar Ibrahim
Vice President (Women)	YB Datin Paduka Hajah Rafidah Aziz.
Secretary General	YB Datuk Seri Sanusi Junid.
Treasurer	YB Encik Daim Zainuddin.
Information Chief	YB Senator Haji Hussein Ahmad.
Members	YB Dato' Khalil Yaakob. YAB Dato' Seri Ramli Ngah Talib. YAB Dato' Mohd.Najib Tun Haji Abdul Razak. YAB Dato' Mohamad Yaacob. YB Rais Yatim. YB Dato' Abu Hassan Omar. YB Dato Seri Syed Nahar Shahabuddin. YAB Dato' Mohd Isa bin Abdul Samad. YAB Dato' Seri Abdul Rahim Tamby Chik. YB Dato' Seri Haji Kamaruddin Mohd.Isa. YAB Dato' Abdul Ajib Ahmad. YB Dato' Shahrir Abdul Samad. YB Dato' Seri Mohd.Adib Haji Mohd.Adam. YB Tuan Haji Abdul Rahim Abu Bakar. YM Puan Marina Yusoff YM Dr Nawawi Mat Awin. YB Datuk Sabaruddin Chik. YB Datuk Haji Suhaimi Dato' Haji Kamaruddin. YBM Tengku Ahmad Rithauddeen Tengku Ismail. YAB Dato' Haji Ahmad Razali Mohd.Ali. YAB Dato' Haji Ali Ahmad. YBhg. Dato' Hisan Ibrahim. YM Tuan Syed Hamid Tan Sri Syed Jaafar Albar. YB Dato' Haji Khalid Abdullah. YB Puan Hajah Rahmah Othman

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<sup>38</sup> Source: *Penyata Tahunan UMNO 1985*, p.vii.

Appendix C

*The copy of the letter from Dr Mahathir to Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra,  
June 16, 1969.<sup>39</sup>*

Batu 6, Titi Gajah,  
Alor Star,  
17hb. Jun, 1969.

Y.T.M. Tunku,

Patek berasa dukacita karena tujuan patek membuat kenyataan kepada akhbar telah di-salah faham oleh Y.T.M. Tunku. Sebenar-nya tujuan patek sama-lah juga dengan tujuan Tunku, ia-itu untuk menyelamatkan negara ini daripada bahaya yang mengamcham-nya.

Pendapat2 Tunku berasaskan cherita2 yang di-bawa kepada telinga Tunku oleh orang2 yang mengelilingi Tunku, yang chuma suka mencheritakan kepada Tunku perkara2 yang mereka fikir Tunku suka atau patut dengar sahaja. Benar-kan-lah patek cherita pula berkenaan dengan keadaan, fikiran dan pendapat2 raayat yang sa-benar-nya supaya Tunku dapat faham tujuan patek membuat kenyataan yang di-tegor itu.

Tunku biasa cherita kepada patek sendiri ia-itu Tunku mengelakkan rusohan dengan menahan hukum bunoh yang di-jatuhkan kepada sa-belas orang subversib China. Sa-benar-nya tindakan Tunku ini-lah yang mengakibatkan rusohan dan kematian yang berpuluh kali banyak yang terjadi semenjak 13 Mei.

Tunku selalu "bertolak ansor" ia-itu memberi kepada orang2 China apa yang mereka tuntutan. Punchak tolak ansor ini ia-lah pembatalan hukum bunoh tadi. Pembatalan ini menimbulkan kemarahan yang besar oleh orang2 Melayu. Orang china pula menganggap Tunku dan kerajaan Perikatan se-bagai pengechut dan lemah dan boleh ditolak ke-sana ke-mari.

Sebab itu orang2 China tidak takut lagi menolak Perikatan dan orang2 Melayu pula tidak ingin kepada Perikatan. Sebab itu orang2 China dan India membuat kurang ajar pada 12 Mei kepada orang Melayu. Kalau Tunku biasa di-ludah di-muka, di-maki dan di-tunjok kemaluan boleh-lah Tunku faham perasaan orang Melayu. Orang2 Melayu yang Tunku fikir tidak akan memberontak telahpun menjadi gila dan mengamok sahingga mengorbankan nyawa mereka dan membunuh orang yang mereka benchi karena Tunku terlangong bagi muka. Tanggong-jawab tentang mati-nya orang2 ini, Islam atau kafir terpaksa di-letak di-bahu pemimpin yang salah pendapat.

Patek memohon ma'af tetapi patek ingin sampaikan perasaan orang2 Melayu kepada Y.T.M.Tunku. Sa-benar-nya orang2 Melayu sekarang, baik PAS baik UMNO, betul2 benchi kepada Tunku terutama orang2 yang di-hina oleh orang2 China dan yang kehilangan rumah tangga, anak-pinak, saudara mara karena tolak-ansor Tunku.

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<sup>39</sup> This was a letter in reply to Tunku Abdul Rahman (Prime Minister cum UMNO President) who criticized Dr Mahathir's press statement regarding the position of MCA in the Alliance Party after the May 10, 1969 General Election. This letter was reproduced and distributed in the University of Malaya and to the public by Malay student organizations in the country. (See especially the Chapter II:84-85, Chapter III:95-96, and Chapter IV:152-153 and other chapters of this thesis).

Mereka berkata Tunku chuma ingin di-kenalkan se-bagai "Happy Prime Minister" walaupunrayat menderita. Mereka tahu bahawa dalam keadaan dharurat pun Tunku ashek bermain poker dengan kawan China Tunku. Budak2 Polis mencheritakan yang Tunku menggunakan kendaraan dan eskot Polis untuk menchari kaki poker.

Sa-balik-nya pula orang2 China tidak ada sadikit pun hormat kepada Tunku. Mereka berkata Tunku "Naive" dan tidak ada kaliber. Ada lagi yang mereka kata yang ta' dapat patek sebutkan. Kata2 itu datang dari semua gulongan orang2 China, dari intelek sa-hingga China becha.

Pada masa lewat2 ini lagi satu kesan burok telah timbul. Orang2 Melayu dalam Civil Service dari Perm.Sec. ka-bawah, pegawai tentara dan Polis Melayu tidak ada lagi kepercayaan dan respect kepada Tunku. Patek tahu kebanyakan mereka sokong PAS dalam undi Pos. Pegawai Melayu dari Polis, tentara dan askar biasa maseh patoh kepada kerajaan oleh kerana arahan sekarang sesuai dengan kehendak mereka sendiri. Kalau Tunku membuat apa2 yang tidak di-ingini oleh mereka saya percaya mereka tidak akan menurut perintah Tunku.

Patek tahu Tunku takut komunis mengambil kesempatan kalau timbul kekachauan dalam negeri. Patek lebih takut kalau kerajaan mula "lose control over the armed forces". Sekali ini terjadi keadaan tidak akan puleh sa-mula, Sampai bila pun kerajaan sivil mesti tunduk kepada tentara. Tunku biasa jadi "happy Prime Minister" tetapi orang yang akan turut ganti ta' akan merasai "hapiness" apa2.

Patek berharap Y.T.M.Tunku jangan-lah menipu diri dengan berkata "satu hari mereka akan bershukor dengan perbuatan saya". Ta' akan yang sa-orang itu selalu betul dan yang banyak selalu salah. Patek ingin menyampaikan kepada Tunku fikiran ra'ayat yang sa-benar-nya ia-itu masa telah lampau untuk Tunku bersara dari menjadi Perdana Menteri dan Ketua UMNO.

Patek faham betul2 kuasa yang ada pada Tunku dan patek maseh ingat nasib Aziz Ishak. Tetapi ta' akan jadi sa-orang yang bertanggung-jawab kalau patek tidak terangkan apa yang patek telah sebutkan. Kalau di-penjara sa-kali pun patek terpaksa kata apa yang patek telah katakan.

Patek di-beritahu ia-itu Tunku berkata patek Pakistani. Patek tidak percaya kata2 orang karena patek tahu Y.T.M. Tunku tidak akan kata begitu. Patek-lah yang selalu mempertahankan Tunku apabila orang2 PAS kata Tunku anak Siam dan ta' berhak memimpin orang Melayu. Jadi Tunku juga akan mempertahankan patek walau punmaseh ada dua sudu darah Pakistani dalam tubuh badan patek.

Patek sekali lagi mengulangi ia-itu kenyataan yang patek buat itu ia-lah untuk pencegahan kejadian yang akan menambah perasaan benchi orang2 Melayu terhdap kerajaan dan menggalakkan orang2 China menjatuhkan lagi maruah orang2 Melayu. Rusohan yang lebih besar akan berlaku jika di-biarkan. Tentara sendiri tidak akan dapat di-kawal. Dan lagi kalau T.H.Tan dan Dewan Orang China boleh membuat kenyataan kenapa ketua2 UMNO tidak boleh .

Patek menulis surat ini dengan hati yang ikhlas dan harapan bahawa Y.T.M. Tunku akan bacha surat ini dengan sa-penoh-nya sendiri. Patek berdoa ka-hadhrat Allah subhanahuwataala supaya di-buka hati Tunku untuk menrima kenyataan yang sabenar ini walaupun pahit dan pedas.

Patek Yang Ikhlas,

(Dr. Mahathir bin Muhammad).

(English Translation)

Your Excellency, Tunku,

I feel unhappy because my aim to make a statement to the press has been misunderstood by Your Excellency, Tunku. In fact my aim is the same as yours, i.e. to save the nation from dangers which are threatening her.

Your opinion based on rumours which brought to your attention by people around you who like to bring those matter to your attention, matter which they think you like or ought to know. Allow me to tel you the real situation, thinking and opinion of the people so that you will understand my purpose of making statement which was criticized.

You always tell me that you avoid riots by stopping the death sentence passed on the 11 subversive Chinese. In fact, your this very action has caused the riots and since May 23 the killings which is 10 times more than the number of subversive Chinese sentenced to death.

You always compromise by giving in to the demands of the Chinese. The culmination of this compromise is the revocation of this death sentence. This revocation has angered the the Malays. The Chinese on the other hand regard you and the alliance government as cowardThis revocation has angered the the Malays. The Chinese on the other hand regard you and the Alliance government as cowardly, weak and easily to be pressurised.

Because of your compromise, the Chinese are not afraid to oppose the Alliance; whereas the Malays do not want to support the Alliance. The Chinese and Indians accordingly made trouble for the Malys on May 12. If you are used to be spat at in the face, cursed by and shown the private parts, then you will understand the feeling of the Malays. Malays which you thought will not rebel became mad and ran amok sacrificing their lives and killing people, wether Muslim or otherwise, has to be laid on the shoulder of the leader who have wrong policy.

I request your forgiveness but I wish to bring you the feeling of the Malays. In fact nowadays the PMIP and UMNO Malays, especially those who were humiliated by the Chinese and who lost their families, children and relatives, because of your compromising policy, hate you,

They said you just want to be famous as the "Happy Prime Minister", although the people are suffering. They even know that in the emergency, you were preoccupied in playing poker with your Chinese friends. The policemen said that you made use of police transport and escort to find your poker partners.

On the other hand the Chinese, who respect you the least, said that you are naive and of no calibre. There are other comments I cannot tell you. These comments come from all strata of the Chinese from the intellectuals to the trishaw riders.

Recently another bad impression was created. The Malays in the Civil Service, from Permanent Secretary downwards, military and police officers no longer have faith and respect in you. I know, the majority of them support the PMIP. The Malay officers in the Police and Army are still loyal to the Government because your instructions are in agreement to what they want. If you were to do anything which would be against their wishes, I believe they would not follow your orders.

I know you are afraid of the Communist will take advantage of any disturbance breaking out in this country. I am more afraid of the Government losing control over the Armed Forces. If this thing happens again, the situation will not be able to return to normacy again. Then the civil government will have to bow to the

Army forever. You have been used to be the Happy Prime Minister but the person who is to take over from you will not happy.

I hope your excellency will not fool yourself by saying "one day they will be grateful with my action". It is not possible for one man to be always right and the majority to be always wrong. I want to bring to you the real thinking of the people. Time has long passed for you to retire as the Prime Minister and the UMNO leader.

I understand that power you have and I still remember the fate of Aziz Ishak. But I will not be an act of a responsible person, if I do not mention what I have said. Even if I am put in prison, I will say what I have said.

I was told that you have said I am Pakistani. I D

I understand that power you have and I still remember the fate of Aziz Ishak. But I will not be an act of a responsible person, if I do not mention what I have said. Even if I am put in prison, I will say what I have said.

I was told that you have said I am Pakistani. I D

I understand that power you have and I still remember the fate of Aziz Ishak. But I will not be an act of a responsible person, if I do not mention what I have said. Even if I am put in prison, I will say what I have said.

I was told that you have said I am Pakistani. I D

I understand that power you have and I still remember the fate of Aziz Ishak. But I will not be an act of a responsible person, if I do not mention what I have said. Even if I am put in prison, I will say what I have said.

I was told that you have said I am Pakistani. I do not believe it because Your Excellency will not say such a thing. I always defend you whenever PMIP people you are a Siamese hence no right to lead the Malays. So you will defend me although there is on or thwo drops of Pakistani blood in me.

Once I repeat the statement which I made is to prevent the incidents which will increase the hatred of the Malays towards the Government and to encourage the Chinese to lower the prestige of the Malays. If this is to be neglected, a bigger riot will certainly take place. The Army itself will bot be able to controlled it. If t.H.Tan and the Chinese Chamber can make statement, why not the UMNO leaders.

I wrote this letter with sincerity and hope that Your Excellency will read it completely. I pray Allah Almighty to open your heart to accept this statement although it is bitter and searing.

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- 1.2. Files UMNO Pelbagai 1947-62

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2.3. *Penyata Tahunan UMNO Bahagian Parit 1982-1990*. [This document, sometimes bound as one volume with the Financial Report and the minutes, but mostly distributed in a folder file containing the Annual and Financial Reports, Agenda and Minutes of the meeting, along with Resolutions.]

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Between May-July 1991 I met with both UMNO and Semangat 46 Leaders, interest group leaders and those involved in the UMNO conflict. I managed to meet them during the parliamentary session of June-July 1991, either in the lobby of the Parliament Building, at their offices or during their party gatherings. I was also able to obtain information for this research during meetings with UMNO, PAS and Semangat 46 leaders at functions, visits or stopovers in the United Kingdom. Most of them were reluctant to be interviewed formally. As a result, most of the interviews were conducted in an unstructured manner, some being considered as private discussions. Among those interviewed were:

*Datuk Abdullah Ahmad Badawi*, UMNO Vice President and Minister of Foreign Affairs.

*Datuk Seri Sanusi Junid*, UMNO Vice President, Minister of Agriculture and former UMNO Secretary General 1984-1988.

*Datuk Dr Mohd.Yusof Noor*, UMNO Supreme Council Member, Minister of Public Enterprise, and also Deputy Chairman of Trengganu UMNO State Liaison Committee. He was formerly a university lecturer and Deputy Vice Chancellor of Student Affairs.

*Datuk Dr Abdul Hamid Othman*, the Deputy Minister in the Prime Minister's Department and former lecturer in Islamic Studies at the National University of Malaysia.



*Datuk Tajul Rosli Tan Sri Ghazali*, Deputy Minister of Power, Telecommunications and Posts, Deputy President of the 4B Youth Movement, also former President of the Malaysian Youth Council.

*Senator Annuar Haji Musa*, Minister of Youth and Sports and Deputy Chairman of the Kelantan State UMNO Liaison Committee.

*Datuk Sharif Jajang*, Member of Parliament for Sepang, Head of Sepang UMNO Division.

*Nasaruddin Alang Saidin*, Member of Parliament for Parit, Deputy Head of Parit UMNO Division, and Executive Secretary of Barisan Nasional.

*Othman Abdul*, Parliamentary Secretary at the Prime Minister's Department and the Head of Pendang UMNO Division.

*Abdul Rahman Ibrahim*, State Assemblyman for Derga, State Executive Councillor in charge of Housing and Local Government, and Deputy Head of Kota Setar UMNO Division and also the Information Chief for Kedah State UMNO Liaison Committee.

*Abdul Malik Munip*, Member of Parliament for Muar, former History lecturer at the University of Malaya.

*Ruhanie Haji Ahmad*, Member of Parliament of Parit Sulong, former Political Secretary of Dato' Musa Hitam and former Journalist.

*Rosnah Abdul Majid*, Senior Editor of the Utusan Melayu Press.

*Ahmad Nazri Abdullah*, Editor in-Chief of Berita Harian.

*Haji Hamdi Abu Bakar*, State Assemblyman for Pengkalan Baru and former Director of KEMAS for Perak State.

*Wan Hanafiah Wan Mat Saman*, Member of Parliament for Kota Setar, and former Senior Private Secretary to the Deputy Minister of Home Affairs.

*Haji Abdul Aziz Shamsuddin*, Political Secretary to the Prime Minister, Head of Gopeng UMNO Division and former Head of the Research Division of the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports. He served as a teacher before graduating from the University of Malaya and becoming Special Assistant to Dr Mahathir when the latter was Minister of Education and Deputy Prime Minister. Anwar Ibrahim's group framed him as a Musa Hitam supporter and they urged Dr Mahathir to sack him from the position of Political Secretary.

*Senator Haji Zahid Hamidi*, Member of Parliament, Political Secretary to the Minister of Defence, Central UMNO EXCO who holds the post of Information Chief, Perak State Head of UMNO Youth and Head of Bagan Datuk Divisional UMNO Youth. He worked in corporate businesses including Permodalan Nasional Berhad after graduating from the University of Malaya.

*Adnan Nawang*, former teacher and now a lecturer at the History Department of University of Malaya, with his colleagues in ASA (the Academic Staff Association) formed a pressure group. At first they strengthened their support for Anwar Ibrahim in the 1987 UMNO Election, hoping to bring about changes in education. However, they changed their 'loyalty' when they became suspicious of Anwar Ibrahim's sincerity concerning educational affairs and Malay interests.

*Nordin Kardi*, former Administrative Officer at the University of Agriculture who served BTN before he rejoined the university as a lecturer in education. He was formerly the Secretary General of GPMS.

*Lt.Gen (Rtd) Datuk Jaafar Onn*, a member of Semangat 46 Supreme council and formerly the Deputy Chief of Army Staff. He stood for Semangat 46 in the Tambatan by-election and in Johor Bahru Parliamentary constituency in the 1990 general election, he lost both. He and Tan Sri Osman Saad played a key role in changing Johor into a stronghold of Semangat 46.

*Datuk Zakaria Abdul Rahman*, Semangat 46 Supreme Council member, formerly Deputy Minister of Labour and Manpower, he represented Besut Parliamentary for two terms. He is also Head of Semangat 46 Besut Division and member of the party Trengganu State Liaison Committee.

*Ibrahim Ali*, Member of Parliament for Pasir Mas, and former student leader, he became the first Head of Berjasa Youth Wing, the founder Head of Semangat 46 Youth Movement. Before 1988, he served UMNO as Head of Pasir Mas UMNO Youth, and member of UMNO Youth Executive Council. He was appointed Chairman of Majuikan (Fishery Development Board) before he joined Team B to form Semangat 46.

*Haji Ibrahim Ahmad*, a Semangat 46 Supreme Council member, and formerly Political Secretary to Tengku Razaleigh. He served as a staff member at the UMNO HQ before being appointed to the post of Political Secretary.

*Zawawi Zin*, The present Head of the Semangat 46 Youth Movement, he has been involved in politics since his student days in the U.S.A. Then he worked voluntarily with BTN before becoming deeply involved in supporting Tengku Razaleigh-Musa Hitam's front to challenge Dr Mahathir in the 1987 UMNO Election. He was the first Deputy Head of Semangat 46 Youth in 1989 and became the acting Head after Ibrahim Ali rejoined UMNO. Subsequently, after Semangat 46 leaders were no longer in control of Koperasi Usaha Bersatu and its subsidiaries, Zawawi was one of the victims sacked from UMNO business arms. He was defeated by Mohd.Yassin Kamari of UMNO in the General Election of 1990 in Sri Gading Parliamentary constituency.

*Roslan Abdul Latif*, former Grik Divisional UMNO Youth Committee member who ran an educational institute to prepare Malaysian for further study in the USA. He was formerly a Malaysian student leader in The USA and was involved with BTN's effort make young Malays aware of education and politics. He was then involved in supporting Tengku Razaleigh and Musa Hitam in the 1987 UMNO election.

*Wan Muhyiddin Wan Nawang*, the UMNO HQ Research Officer since the mid 1960's and among the senior salariat staff. He has observed changes in UMNO HQ under a number of Secretary Generals. His capability as the Head of the Research Division in UMNO seems have been marginalised by the UMNO leaders. He has published a number of political books.

*Dato' Rais Yatim*, a graduate in law, is the Deputy President of Semangat 46 and was Minister of Foreign Affairs before resigning in 1987 after Team B was defeated in the 1987 UMNO election. Rais Yatim was recruited into politics as a Parliamentary Secretary at the Ministry of Culture Youth and Sport before being promoted to Deputy Minister and becoming Menteri Besar of Negeri Sembilan. He was recalled to Federal level as Minister of Information in 1982. He is now a postgraduate student at King's College, London, pursuing research in law for his Ph.D. [Interview with him was in his London residence on June 22, 1992].

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